Volume 27, Issue 3, May - June  2013

Manned Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
Strategic, Tactical . . . Both?

Since the inception of Operation Enduring Freedom, manned airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) forces have evolved from their precounterinsurgency mission of conducting long-term strategic intelligence collection to become the world’s premier purveyors of tactical intelligence. Today’s manned airborne ISR forces provide battlefield intelligence directly to ground war fighters in near real time through a variety of communications methods. This intelligence often gives our ground forces the information they need to engage hostile forces and to protect themselves from imminent attacks. Although these ISR forces are immeasurably valuable to today’s fight, the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rebalance of our mission focus to the Asia-Pacific herald a concomitant shift for those forces. By means of a brief historical survey of the collection of strategic and tactical intelligence, this article examines and highlights the difficulties of making such a transition. Ultimately, by studying the past, we hope that we can inform our impending decisions regarding the employment of our manned airborne ISR force. Historically, the Air Force has tended to wash its hands of tactical capability following the termination of hostilities. This article argues against making that mistake and further advises that a return to a preponderant emphasis on strategic collection will take considerable time, resources, and personnel.

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  • Col Jamie Sculerati 11/5/2012 2:57:06 PM

    The whole issue of strategic and tactical needs to be left as old baggage -- just as our kinetic brethren figured out, those labels depend on the context of the action or decision. A single item of intelligence can be tactical, operational, and strategic simultaneously, depending on the context of the decision or action supported. These days, the remaining distinction is tied to funding and tasking priorities and authorities, all of which need substantial redesign.

  • Major Jeremiah Burgess 11/7/2012 8:05:37 PM

    This isn't a strategic vs tactical discussion, rather it is a discussion on shifting ISR targets. Today's fight requires real time ISR to warfighters, often without follow-on analysis (at least by AF analysts). The transition to SRO ISR requires different training for collectors, exploiters & analysts. Pre-msn IPOE will need to be more detailed and post-msn analysis will be critical to future collect & understanding the data collected. This is a huge shift in thinking & will require refinement of skills that have atrophied (i.e. airborne ELINT) or may not even exist with today's Airmen.

  • Russel A. Noguchi, Lt Col, USAF, Ret 11/21/2012 2:18:57 PM

    Good article based on SIGINT and IMINT, but it lacks the renewed importanace of HUMINT to air, space and cyber power. With new emphasis on Irregular Warfare, there is a greater need for a robust HUMINT capability to tipoff other INTs and to provide actionable, time critical targeting intelligence to combat ready remotely piloted aircraft and unmanned airborne vehicles.

  • Lt Col Alex Castro 1/17/2013 4:42:32 PM

    This IS the issue in terms of balancing capability across the spectrum of potential conflicts, but the uncertainty of the future means that the ISR force needs to remain flexible regardless of the type of enemy/environment presented. That said, the nature of our ISR process, like in TEABALL, resides more on the proficiency of the PED in conjunction with the A/C and sensors. Unlike many kinetic platforms, ISR best derives its success when a cohesive progression from specialty to specialty is made by both aircrew and the associated ground PED teams. The calculus must include both. Great article!