Fearful Symmetry

How to Achieve Coherence among All the Players

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The Cold War era locked the United States and the former USSR into a political and military standoff based on the grim possibility that nuclear warfare might lead to their mutually assured destruction. The two superpowers were polarized not only in terms of their underlying ideology and means of governance (democracy versus communism) but also in terms of their means of economic production (capitalist-based free-market economy versus state-led socialism).

Further, they also insisted on polarizing the rest of the world. Like the African proverb that says that when two elephants fight, the grass gets trampled, the policies of striving for containment, conducting proxy wars, and creating spheres of influence took their toll on countries extraneous to the conflict. Although the political and economic approaches of the two superpowers were strikingly dissimilar, the overarching "symmetry" of these two actors, the two most powerful nation-states at the time, created the "thesis."

The contradictions contained within socialist regimes eventually led to their collapse, but the peaceful lull that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was shattered by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). We now find ourselves in the second stage of the "antithesis" or the "asymmetry" posed by global terrorism acting through nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups. In fact, the US military, fully recognizing the so-called asymmetric threats posed by such groups, established the Asymmetric Warfare Group within the US Army in 2005.[1]

Asymmetric warfare is not a new tactic but an ancient one that uses unconventional means to counter the overwhelming conventional military and technological superiority of an adversary. In the current context, such means may include terrorist attacks, weapons of mass destruction, guerrilla warfare, cyber attacks, and information warfare. The asymmetry of these warfare tactics underscores the relative imbalance in size, tactical approaches, and objectives of the actors. Powerful na-

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tion-states (not just the United States and former Soviet Union) are now threatened by nebulous terrorist groups that have no organized center, armies, or formal structure of governance.

The term "fearful symmetry," the next stage or "synthesis" we are moving towards, derives from William Blake's poem "The Tyger," the first stanza of which follows:

> Tyger Tyger, burning bright,
>
> In the forests of the night;
>
> What immortal hand or eye,
>
> Could frame thy fearful symmetry?[2]

Not only are we terrorized by the acts of terrorists (an obvious outcome since that is their aim), but also many of the latter are fearful of (if not actually terrorized by) the perceived threat posed by Western ideals and institutions. In other words, fundamentalist, Islamic-based terrorist networks and operatives find deeply problematic the ideas of universal suffrage and representative government, participatory democracy, respect for the rights of women as well as of religious and ethnic minorities, and free-market economic practices and institutions.

A fundamental change is prompting transformation from the antithesis of the asymmetric threats posed by global terrorism to the synthesis of a fearful symmetry. A palpable shift has occurred from the mere tactical level of posing asymmetric threats by global terrorists to an overarching psychological dimension wherein both sides instill fear in each other. The asymmetric threat of global terrorism is no longer confined to conflict zones with specific military engagements under way; it now affects civilians in every walk of life.

In fact, ordinary life has been transformed to accommodate the impact of global terrorism's asymmetric threat—witness the new protocols with regard to airline travel; heightened security in almost every aspect of everyday life; and a new, fearful consciousness of the presence of implicit danger. Moreover, this stage has reached a "steady state" in which neither the targets nor the effects of global terrorism are dissipating—a theme explored later in this article, along with a proposed resolution of the fearful symmetry.

Global, Fundamentalist, Islamic-Based Terrorism: One Size Does Not Fit All

At the outset, we must make a very basic distinction between Islamic-based separatist (or secessionist) movements that employ terrorist means and the so-called global, fundamentalist, Islamic-based terrorist movement. The reason for doing so is that the nature of Islamic-based terrorism determines, in part, the international response to it, as discussed below.

Palestine, of course, represents the primary example of an Islamic-based separatist movement. It has engaged in a decades-long struggle for autonomy, self-determination, and establishment of its own statehood, the causes and implications of which this article will not address. In light of the fact that the US State Department designated Hamas a foreign terrorist organization, Hamas surprised US and other policy makers by winning the Palestinian Authority's (PA) general legislative elections in January 2006.[3] It defeated Fatah, the party of the PA's president, Mahmoud Abbas, thereby setting the stage for a prolonged power struggle.

Although Hamas uses terrorist tactics of conducting suicide bombings along with launching short-range rockets and mortars in order to achieve its political

goals, it also provides basic human services such as educational, sports, health, and religious facilities to its constituents. The fact that Hamas has responded to the basic needs of Palestinians and allegedly has a reputation for honesty, in contrast to the corruption of which Fatah officials often stand accused, may explain, in part, its political victory. In essence, Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism.[4]

Rather than belabor the point by mentioning other Islamic-based separatist movements, it may be useful to consider whether a historical relationship (however tenuous) exists between the examples cited above and postcolonial movements that established new nation-states. Revolutionary forces in former colonies generally did not have access to organized armies or arms, often resorting to unconventional means for attaining their revolutionary goals (most notably, Mahatma Gandhi, who eschewed violence in order to gain India's independence).

Although Palestine is not emerging from a colonial past per se, it has not yet managed to win its own statehood. The fact that the global terrorism espoused by al-Qaeda now energizes this separatist movement and others reflects a profound departure from the past practice of using international law's principles of self-determination to create internationally recognized statehood. In fact, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict no longer catalyzes global terrorism; rather, in the view of the jihadists themselves, the global jihadist terrorist movements have overshadowed and surpassed it in importance.[5]

The Failure of the State

A significant underlying theme that unites the examples of Islamic-based separatist movements discussed above is the failure of the state as an institution of governance that creates an ordered society. A second failure that can no longer be ignored is the disinclination of people to hold their state leaders accountable. Thus, we may view the failure of the state as twofold—in terms of both governing and being governed.

The failure of the state as an economic actor is particularly relevant in this context. In the decades following the independence of most developing nations, the state was the only institutional actor large enough and sufficiently creditworthy to assume an entrepreneurial function. In other words, the state was the only actor capable of borrowing funds and providing for basic human needs, including power generation, transportation, and telecommunications.

In response to the urgent needs of their populations in such sectors, many nations created state-owned enterprises (SOE), which borrowed capital to support the capital infrastructure and other nation-building needs of the state. The SOEs, however, generally engaged in inefficient borrowing practices that burdened numerous developing states with high levels of debt, leading to the debt crisis and the continuing debt overhang of many countries. Over time, the collapse of SOEs, the failure to create adequate private-sector growth and private capital markets, the continuing debt burden, and many other complex factors led to stagnant economic growth and, in some cases, political instability.

The previous discussion drew a fundamental distinction between two types of fundamentalist, Islamic-based terrorism: separatist-based movements and the so-called global terrorism of al-Qaeda and related terrorist cells and networks. The first type is based on a failure of the state,

as described above, but the second arises from a failure of ideology.

The new ascendancy of the "rule of law" on a global scale is certainly worth considering. In the fracas of dying and defunct ideas, a core ideal of Western thought has endured, namely, Adam Smith's elevation of the drive to acquire material wealth to a classical economic ideal. This, in combination with John Locke's demand that the state protect private property and individual liberties, sets the stage for liberal political theory. In other words, the pursuit of personal happiness through the material acquisition of personal wealth as well as the state's protection of individual liberties, has risen to a Western classical ideal. Indeed, the terrifying force of this ideal may be its universality.

While Western societies developed legal structures over the centuries to protect private property (e.g., contract enforcement, mortgages, secured loans, liens, and bankruptcy proceedings) and to ensure the protection of individual liberties—for example, by passing a Bill of Rights and ensuring the due process of law—non-Western societies, for the most part, did not develop similar institutions. What began revolutionizing our world at the end of the last millennium was not adoption of a Western classical ideal by the non-Western world, but adoption of the Western methodology of achieving this ideal through private property, democratic governance, and the rule of law. For the most part, adoption of this Western-based methodology has fueled the legal reform efforts in the developing world for the past 25 years.

If the failure of ideology on a worldwide scale in the past century has led to the superficial ascendancy of Western-based institutions, the failure of ideology in the Arab world in the post–World War II pursuit of modernity has been perhaps even more painful and has not led to the same result. According to Fareed Zakaria, "For the Arab world, modernity has been one failure after another. Each path followed—socialism, secularism, nationalism—has turned into a dead end. . . . If there is one great cause of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, it is the total failure of political institutions in the Arab world." Modernization is now viewed as Westernization, globalization, or—worse—Americanization, but, as Zakaria points out, "importing the inner stuffings of modern society—a free market, political parties, accountability and the rule of law—is difficult and dangerous."[6] Going back to an earlier theme, neglecting to demand that state leaders take a more informed and critical approach to issues of governance and economic growth—a demand that the governed people legitimately could have made—also constitutes part of the failure of the state.

The profound transformation of the frustration, sense of humiliation, and despair in the Arab world into an ideology of hatred involves a very complex alchemy that lies outside the scope of this analysis. On the one hand, it appears that Islamic-based separatists have responded to the crisis of the state in a secularized fashion, using violence as a means to gain political power. On the other hand, it appears that in response to the failure of modernity and its accompanying ideological foundation, al-Qaeda has developed a more profoundly religiously influenced "new ideology of hate."[7] This ideology empowers its adherents through hatred and the single-minded pursuit of disruption, terrorism, and the destabilization of Western-styled economies. Its actions, largely of symbolic value, feed off the despair, disempowerment, and disenfranchisement of frenzied young Muslims. Rather than holding

Arab leaders accountable for their actions, this distrust has metastasized into an uncompromising hatred of Western ideals, values, institutions, symbols, and peoples.

The new generation of terrorists has no interest in undertaking the hard work of nation building. In fact, their brand of terrorism is not based on the failure of the state, which has already imploded, as has the failed state of Afghanistan, or is in the process of gradual decline and collapse, as in Iraq unless the civil strife there is reversed. Rather, this type of terrorism arises not only from a failure of Western-based ideology supporting "liberal democracy" but also, and more disturbingly, from the ascendancy of a new ideology of hatred.

A New Ideological Conflict

The creators and adherents of al-Qaeda's new ideology of hatred are educated, wealthy, privileged, and successful by Western standards, as are their new recruits, who are Western-educated engineers, physicians, and other affluent professionals. This ideology does not advance the economic or political stability of a nation-state in order to create stable, viable, state-oriented structures of governance and economic production—this is not at all the goal of global terrorists. In fact, one may argue that such terrorists emerging from the European context demonstrate that living in stable political economies does not deter them from adopting the ideology of hatred. Nor does it deter them from engaging in acts of terrorism—quite the contrary, in fact.

On a deeper level, the ideology of hatred fundamentally misunderstands man's acquisitive nature. From an outsider's point of view, much of their furious hatred seems based on envy and deep mistrust of the West's economic successes, political dominance, and cultural hegemony—its luxury goods, in fact. However, the ultimate luxury good is the freedom of choice. The freedom to choose and take risks to support those choices (as institutionalized by the genius of capitalism) is the ultimate freedom.

Deliberately choosing (and imposing on others) the "unfreedom" of having no or few choices dictated by religious leaders or tribal war lords does not constitute real empowerment. Indeed, far from disempowering other nation-states, global terrorism acts to disempower its own adherents by cultivating despair and a lack of hope in the future—or simply the belief that tomorrow will be better than today. Although this ideology claims to be faith based, it mocks universal, faith-based values.

If, on the other hand, Islamic-based global terrorists have not fundamentally misinterpreted man's nature and are willing to kill for it and, more importantly, to die for this state of unfreedom, then we are all lost. They have, in effect, created a new kind of human being impervious to the values of human civilization, not the least of which is the regard for the sanctity of human life. In fact, the systematic indoctrination of a creed of violence and the uncompromising repression of human creativity affecting all spheres of life may give rise to a new, terrifying sensibility that implicitly encourages a wanton disregard for human life. There truly is no real response to someone who is willing to die when we clearly are not.

In order to resolve the fearful symmetry, we must create a "new soldier," who needs to demonstrate the highly subjective qualities of empathy, compassion, wisdom, and heightened intuitive and perceptive abilities that enable him or her to navigate in unknown cultural, linguistic, and emotional terrains. Such a

soldier needs to be both intuitive and wise—thus, we will have to cultivate different cultural values (within the military and, more broadly, in Western-based societies) in order to create this new kind of soldier.

In the final analysis, however, despite any efforts to produce and deploy a new soldier, the fearful symmetry will be resolved only when and if the global terrorists themselves learn to love—not us but themselves. Only by giving up their destructive and self-destructive nihilism and replacing it with a sense of self-respect, and the respect for others, will the fearful symmetry truly end. This is the complex challenge posed by the fearful symmetry, and it is my sincere hope that we may all work together to revive hope and restore faith in the future. The true leaders in the fearful symmetry are those who can inspire hope, faith, trust, and, finally, love. Only when we can live peaceably together will the promise of the future be restored to us. At that point, we may move past the fearful symmetry and welcome a new era of history that will begin when this one ends.

However, creating and cultivating a corps of new soldiers to address global jihadists are extraordinarily difficult undertakings—to which most military establishments are unwilling to commit themselves. The following discussion examines the reasons militating against such a course of action and the reasons why and how we should pursue it.

Liabilities of the Counterinsurgency

Prof. Michael J. Mazarr succinctly puts into perspective many of the objections to adopting a US-based defense policy aimed at developing counterinsurgency campaigns and approaches.[8] He argues that the post-9/11 shift in defense policy towards military interventions against asymmetric threats, irregular warfare, stabilization operations, and nation-building exercises is misguided and, ultimately, quite dangerous. In fact, it may actually destabilize US national security rather than strengthen it. He correctly points out that

> although it is always dangerous to generalize, much of the instability described by theories of asymmetric and nontraditional warfare stems first and foremost from causes other than military aggression. Many rebellions, insurgencies, and civil wars are the symptoms of political, economic, and psychosocial factors that undermine social stability and popular commitment to public order. Once order has collapsed, leaders and groups arise determined to seize power, and the contest can become a clash of power-seekers. Yet, the essential problem in many so-called failed states and other contexts that give rise to civil wars, insurgencies, and the radicalism at large in the Muslim world is a society or a large group of individuals beset with some combination of economic stagnation, cultural resentment, historical grievance, political or national repression, and other factors. These afflictions—injustices, in the eyes of the aggrieved—are not amenable to military solutions.[9]

In other words, these military engagements are not wars at all but small, internecine, and often intrastate and interethnic conflicts.

The list of downstream negative consequences from shifting to a counterinsurgency-focused military approach include, for example, underfunding the research, development, and procurement of systems for war; inappropriately or inadequately training military forces for conventional warfare; underfunding nonmilitary agencies and programs better equipped to deal with the underlying causes giving rise to irregular warfare; and risking the loss of the US strategic and compelling advantage in

conventional-warfare arenas (especially in dealing with Russia's and China's potentially expansionist ambitions).[10]

Moreover, by adopting a strategy of fighting "small wars," the United States, in particular, is positioning itself to lose. Democracies have a limited capacity to absorb the costs of small wars because of an overall commitment to democratic principles and because of the general repugnance to brutal military behavior often found in such conflicts.

Jeffrey Record points out that dictatorships which use violent tactics with their own people and which are not accountable for their actions often have a higher tolerance for small wars than democracies.[11] Thus, the often protracted irregular wars are generally not winnable by major democracies such as the United States. Arguably, this is the case historically even with England and France, as witnessed by the asymmetric nature of many of the struggles for independence that took place in their colonial eras.

Further, the single-minded focus on winning the kinetic-warfare stage tends to make military strategists, policy makers, and perhaps the public as well feel that the war has been won and that the world is now a better place. It overlooks the fact that "military victory is a beginning, not an end. . . . Pursuit of military victory for its own sake also discourages thinking about and planning for the second and by far the most difficult half of wars for regime change: establishing a viable replacement for the destroyed regime. War's object is, after all, a better peace."[12]

Indeed, since many small wars are intrastate rather than interstate conflicts, regime change often becomes a significant factor at the conclusion of the kinetic-warfare stage. However, bringing about political transformation frequently lies beyond the ability of a military force. "Military conflict has two dimensions[:] . . . winning wars and winning the peace."[13] Military forces, designed to do the first, often do it well, but they are not designed to do the latter and often fare poorly—precisely one of the key arguments against engaging in irregular warfare in the first instance.

Finally, and most importantly, the use of the military in counterinsurgency operations and related engagements substitutes military operations for diplomatic efforts and development assistance. Arguably, this reflects a strategic misinterpretation of Carl von Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the continuation of politics by other means."[14] War is not meant to substitute for politics:

> It is thus dangerous to view the military as the lead agency to deal with very diffuse, broad-based asymmetric challenges such as radical Islamism, nation building, stability operations, and even counterinsurgency. Talk of redirecting U.S. military emphasis to asymmetric threats amounts to a form of avoidance, allowing U.S. national security planners to ignore the truly dramatic change underway in the character of conflict. As smart, adaptable, and courageous as U.S. military officers and men and women clearly are and will be, asymmetric challenges demand asymmetric responses—political, economic, cultural, informational, and psychological tools, tactics, and techniques allowed to work organically over time, not retrained military forces whose true purpose is to fight and win wars, which are different enterprises. The strategic trap is obvious: Furnished with a vast, expensive, skillful military tool, policymakers will use it again and again, as they have been doing, without confronting the tougher challenge of shifting resources into nonmilitary tools of statecraft.[15]

By dramatically expanding budgets for foreign aid, public diplomacy, exchange programs, and related nonmilitary forms of power, the United States can do much more to address sources of instability, stagnation, and grievance that underlie state failures, radicals, insurgents, and terrorist groups at large in a globalizing

world. Military power is not the way to defeat such threats.[16]

Incidentally, Robert Gates, US secretary of defense, agrees with this view:

> We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between. . . .
>
> But these new threats also require our government to operate as a whole differently—to act with unity, agility, and creativity. And they will require considerably more resources devoted to America's non-military instruments of power. . . .
>
> [There] is no replacement for the real thing—civilian involvement and expertise.[17]

Although there seems to be a fairly broad basis of consensus for devoting more resources to nonmilitary approaches, agencies, and policies in the context of responding to asymmetric threats, we seem to lack the requisite will to implement this need. However, as Gen David Petraeus points out, "power vacuums breed insurgencies."[18] In his view, these insurgencies typically emerge from civil wars or from the collapse of states. Generally speaking, insurgencies and global terrorism stem, in large part, from the failure of the state. Indeed, the failure of the development process derives from two related aspects of governance. First, within the host country one finds a failure in governing and in being governed. Second, from the perspective of the wider international community—especially advanced nations actively involved in the overall development process—one finds a failure in statecraft. In other words, failed states have experienced a systemic inability to successfully bring about sustainable development (albeit for a complex menu of reasons that lie outside the scope of this limited analysis). Nonmilitary sources on both a unilateral (state-to-state) and multilateral level have not fully succeeded in ensuring concrete development despite their best efforts to do so.

This leaves the international community with the baleful choice of either ignoring these power vacuums that lead to potential insurgencies, further instability, and endemic corruption—or taking some course of action in response to such conditions. Although the preferred course of action with respect to containing forces leading to the potential collapse of the state should involve nonmilitary actors, clearly this has not occurred successfully in many instances. Yet, the unavoidable conclusion is that neither political transformation nor economic development can take place without security.[19]

As we all know, nature abhors a vacuum. Despite (or perhaps in response to) the failure to devote additional US nonmilitary resources to the effort of quelling and preventing asymmetric threats, the US military paradigm has shifted. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, 16 September 2009, firmly validates the defense policy of supporting stability operations in order to

> establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities. . . .
>
> Integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. The Department shall: . . . .

> (3) Continue to support the development, implementation, and operations of civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unity of effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and building indigenous capacity for such tasks.[20]

Of course, the United States has certainly intervened nonmilitarily in conflict-ridden areas over the past 60 years. One commentator notes that "Africa has been the recipient of several Marshall Plans worth of foreign aid since World War II's end, yet it remains arguably as impoverished today as it was in 1946."[21] This stems in part from the reluctance of bilateral and multilateral aid institutions such as the World Bank to factor security needs into the development equation.[22]

The New Soldier

It is not certain whether broader nonmilitary interventions in the security, stabilization, and reconstruction process are forthcoming, but military forces (whether unilateral or multilateral) clearly are the first actors in conflict and postconflict situations. Therefore, I would argue for creation of the new soldier, whether acting for a unilateral force or multilateral forces, as a necessary agent of stability and, paradoxically, of change. While the current US military stability, security, transition, and reconstruction paradigm is in effect, creation and training of the new soldier seem inevitable. However, this article has a much broader vision in mind, which encompasses not only US military forces but also any and all military forces faced with asymmetric threats; these include those of France, Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, India, Morocco, Indonesia, the Philippines, and many more.

Ultimately, the new soldier corps should reside in multilateral armed forces and peacekeeping units such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union, African Union, and G-8's Global Peace Operations Initiative, a multilateral program that will create a self-sustaining peacekeeping force of 75,000—largely African—soldiers by 2010. The concept of the new soldier may also be relevant to the Africa Counterinsurgency Operations Training Assistance program and many other military and paramilitary programs.

In my view, multilateral and regional peacekeeping forces are better suited to fighting the wars of the new soldier since such forces are predicated on multilateralism, based on multilingual and multicultural approaches. Indeed, a RAND study points out that multilateral peacekeeping forces have added credibility, lower operating costs, and more access to seasoned professionals who have experience in handling crises created by collapsed states.[23] Thus, rather than create conflicts with standing national armies, perhaps it is time to take a new approach by reinvesting in and developing new forms of militarized interventions for the new soldier.

If we adopt this approach, we may need to negotiate and secure the agreement of members and participants to the underlying commitments, missions, and rules of engagement for reformulated and new military interventions with much broader goals in mind. The far-reaching political implications need to be part of the paradigm shift not only for the US military and its long-term sustenance, but also for other militaries strained by the demands of insurgencies and global terrorism.

Initially the new soldier should focus on such interventions as providing humanitarian relief; security and stabiliza-

tion; and conflict resolution and prevention. Ultimately, the new soldier should create the backdrop for initiating a diplomatic dialogue to end hostilities and begin the process of peace and reconciliation. Thus, the underlying articles of association of multilateral military forces such as NATO, the UN, and related organizations and units may need to be changed or overhauled to reflect the need and support for the new soldier. This may call for broader authority, for example, to intervene internationally by regional military forces, where necessary. For example, the African Union may be tasked with setting up peacekeeping forces in the Philippines.

Further, as we create the new soldier, we also may need to drastically alter recruitment strategies. There is significant concern that changing the emphasis on kinetic aspects of warfare to "softer" skills involved in conflict prevention and reconciliation, as well as nation-building exercises, will clash with and demoralize existing military structures—after all, established militaries are built on a different set of skills and expectations. Therefore, perhaps we should formulate and promulgate a new military career track to attract officers and other personnel who wish to develop the new skill sets necessary for the new soldier. Since the new soldier has a different mission, based on a different perspective and training, perhaps the core curriculum of military schools needs significant change as well. Retired military officers may wish to lead the effort in order to share their "lessons learned" perspective with others and help shift the military paradigm to include a different kind of soldiering by creating a different kind of soldier. As Defense Secretary Gates put it, "New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set."[24] This may be the new challenge: to create the new soldier, not in conflict with the soldier of today but as a new and invaluable partner for the military of tomorrow. ❑

Notes

1. See US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, http://www.awg.army.mil/ (accessed 6 June 2010).

2. William Blake, *Songs of Innocence and of Experience: Shewing the Two Contrary States of the Human Soul, 1789–1794* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 148.

3. See US Department of State, fact sheet, 11 October 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (accessed 25 July 2007).

4. See Council on Foreign Relations, "Hamas" (updated 27 August 2009), http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968/ (accessed 6 June 2010).

5. Reuven Paz, "Between Ideology and Strategy," in "What Does al-Qaeda Want?" edition 31, vol. 3 (18 August 2005), Middle East Roundtable, *bitterlemons-international.org,* http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/previous.php?opt=1&id=98#397 (accessed 6 June 2010).

6. Fareed Zakaria, "The Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?" *Newsweek*, 15 October 2001, http://www.newsweek.com/2001/10/14/the-politics-of-rage-why-do-they-hate-us.html (accessed 6 June 2010).

7. Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Place of Tolerance in Islam: On Reading the Qur'an—and Misreading It," *Boston Review*, December 2001 / January 2002, http://bostonreview.net/BR26.6/elfadl.html (accessed 6 June 2010). The author, a distinguished Fellow in Islamic Law at UCLA, alleges that the theological premises of global terrorism derive from "the intolerant puritanism of the Wahhabi and Salafi creeds." Founded in the early twentieth century, Salafism argued, according to the author, that one should respond to the demands of modernity by returning to the "original sources of the Qur'an and Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet)." Although "Wahhabism narrowly defined orthodoxy, and was extremely intolerant of any creed that contradicted its own," the author argues that it "does not bear primary responsibility for the existence of terrorist groups in Islam today." He argues that

> Wahhabism is distinctively inward-looking—although focused on power, it primarily asserts power over other Muslims. . . . Militant puritan groups, however, are both introverted and extroverted—they attempt to assert power against both Muslims and non-Muslims.

> As populist movements, they are a reaction to the disempowerment most Muslims have suffered in the modern age at the hands of harshly despotic governments, and at the hands of interventionist foreign powers. These groups compensate for extreme feelings of disempowerment by extreme and vulgar claims to power. Fueled by supremacist and puritan theological creeds, their symbolic acts of power become uncompromisingly fanatic and violent.

Ibid.

8. Michael J. Mazarr, "The Folly of 'Asymmetric War,' " *Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 33–53, http://www.twq.com/08summer/docs/08summer_mazarr.pdf (accessed 6 June 2010). Professor Mazarr is a professor of national security strategy at the US National War College.

9. Ibid., 35–36.

10. Ibid., 39–41.

11. Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose," *Parameters* 35 (Winter 2005–6): 16, 20–22, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/05winter/record.pdf (accessed 6 June 2010).

12. Ibid., 25.

13. Ibid., 26.

14. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87, 89.

15. Mazarr, "Folly of 'Asymmetric War,' " 38.

16. Ibid., 50. Professor Mazarr further argues that "the United States should powerfully enhance its efforts to reduce instability, conflict, and radicalism in key areas of the world and to shore up institutionalization and governance in critical states. It should do so, however, by relying on an expanded and deepened set of nonmilitary tools and do so largely in an anticipatory and collaborative manner rather than an ex post facto and interventionist one." Ibid., 35.

17. Robert Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power" (Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (accessed 6 June 2010).

18. Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, 1-4, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf (accessed 6 June 2010). General Petraeus further points out that

> recently, ideologies based on extremist forms of religious or ethnic identities have replaced ideologies based on secular revolutionary ideals. These new forms of old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars. These conflicts resemble the wars of religion in Europe before and after the Reformation of the 16th century. People have replaced nonfunctioning national identities with traditional sources of unity and identity. When countering an insurgency during the Cold War, the United States normally focused on increasing a threatened but friendly government's ability to defend itself and on encouraging political and economic reforms to undercut support for the insurgency. Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state collapse or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping friendly forces reestablish political order and legitimacy where these conditions may no longer exist.

Ibid.

19. James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 69, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/ (accessed 7 June 2010).

20. Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, 16 September 2009, 2, 3, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf (accessed 7 June 2010). See also FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, a manual devoted to conducting a counterinsurgency campaign, coauthored by Gen David Petraeus, which states clearly that "[counterinsurgency] involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in [counterinsurgency operations] alone" (p. 1-1).

21. Sean McFate, "U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?" *Military Review* 88, no. 1 (January–February 2008): 15, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&hid=109&sid=4878c47a-0d64-4da0-bc4f-e55ade516190%40sessionmgr13 (accessed 7 June 2010).

22. Ibid.

23. Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building*, xxv, xxxvi, xxxvii–xxxviii.

24. Gates, "Beyond Guns and Steel."

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