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Getting Inside the Enemy’s Head:
The Case for Counteranalysis in
Iraqi Counterinsurgency Operations
Maj Clifford M. Gyves
Actions are Universally Based on Analysis
Nearly every action based upon information inputs derives from some form of
analysis. Whatever the task, a decision to act upon available information
depends on an actual consideration of that information. Such a
consideration constitutes an analytical process, however simple or brief. For
example, a glance at a gray, cloudy sky before departing for work might induce
one to carry an umbrella. The thought process is, “It’s cloudy, which suggests
it may rain today. If it rains, I will get wet unless I protect myself with an
umbrella. I should take the umbrella in case it rains.”
Armed confrontations through the full spectrum of conflict entail
orchestrated violence. The degree of planning and control can vary widely,
depending on the parties’ sophistication, organization and strategic outlook,
but in all cases the combatants act upon information that they gather for
consideration. The decision to attack one’s adversary with a hatchet is rather
simple, taking into account a small number of factors such as the opponent’s
apparent physical strength and disposition; what particular offensive or
defensive weapon he may be holding; what part of his body may be most
vulnerable to attack; and whether he has any comrades nearby who may enter the
fray. Meanwhile, an organized military campaign may employ a plethora of
interrelated and complex planning and analysis processes, each digesting a
multitude of informational planning factors. Nevertheless, each action, complex
or simple, hinges upon an analysis of information, which presents a potential
pressure point on which an opponent might exert leverage or influence.
The Decision Cycle—Eye on Analysis
Military and intelligence professionals alike deploy an array of tools
designed to destroy, disrupt, delay or deceive an adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action
cycle (commonly called the “OODA Loop”1 or decision cycle). Efforts to
impair an enemy’s decision cycle generally target the cycle’s inputs,
information and intelligence, which the adversary acquires during the
observation phase of the cycle. Camouflaging or concealing friendly assets is
one example. This approach follows the adage “garbage in, garbage out”—bad
inputs lead to bad outputs.
Orientation is the process of deriving meaning and applying context to the
information input acquired during the observation phase. The creator of the
OODA Loop model, John Boyd, suggests “that the orientation phase of the loop is
the most important step, because if the enemy perceives the wrong threats, or
misunderstands what is happening in the environment around him, then he will
orient his thinking (and forces) in wrong directions and ultimately make
incorrect decisions.”2
The decision phase applies what was learned to construct potential
operational courses of action—choices—and to select one that hopefully will
yield the most favorable result. That choice is executed during the action
phase. Often countermeasures focus on this back end of the cycle, the action
end, by interrupting an adversary’s ability to execute a chosen course of
action. Such operations include crippling his means to act, like destroying his
troops or weapon systems, while others endeavor to sever the enemy leader’s
ability to communicate his orders to the troops in the field.
American strategy planners expend notable effort on the observation and
action phases. Yet, despite Boyd’s emphasis on the orientation phase, few
postulate how to attack the internal orientation or decision stages directly.
Countermeasures essentially box in the orientation and decision phases of the
OODA Loop by attacking the inputs or outputs. The actual information synthesis
that occurs during those phases remains only indirectly affected. These two
internal phases taken together—the core of the cycle, if you will—constitute
the adversary’s analysis function, since therein he processes information to
facilitate action.
Analysis in Iraqi Counterinsurgency Operations
Each day, media and intelligence reports highlight small-scale attacks on
coalition and Iraqi interests, and the body count makes for sensational and
emotional news that play a significant role in driving coalition
counterinsurgency action. One chief counterinsurgency goal, both strategic and
tactical, aims to reduce (or ideally end) friendly Iraqi and coalition
casualties.
Those casualties result from tactical operations conducted by myriad jihadi
militant fighters (JMFs), whose ranks include former Baathists, disaffected
Iraqi civilians, foreign (non-Iraqi) volunteer mujahedin (jihadis) and
opportunistic thugs who fight loosely under the call to jihad. JMFs boast both
Shi’a and Sunni persuasion. The elements’ interconnectedness varies, as do
their levels of sophistication and organization. Their targeting priorities
also differ, as some elements focus on attacking coalition military forces,
earning them the moniker anti-coalition forces, while others concentrate
on the nascent Iraqi government, national security forces, infrastructure and
civilian population, making them essentially anti-Iraqi forces. Tactical
counterinsurgency efforts directly engage these JMFs and their operations.
Traditional analysis methodologies on the tactical front generally underpin
defensive and counteroffensive actions with standard, pattern-focused
analytical processes. Even though it produces predictive intelligence for the
operator, standard analysis depends heavily on historical data, especially when
battling a seemingly amorphous, disjointed insurgency with little centralized
direction.3 Moreover, even if the insurgents had a central, organized campaign
plan, they wouldn’t likely share it with coalition forces. Therefore, coalition
analysts must rely on statistical data from insurgent activities to divine
patterns that might render clues to future JMF actions. The more statistics the
analysts have to collate, the more accurate their predictions will become. This
fosters an iterative process, where the more attacks the JMFs execute, the
greater the volume of statistical data analysts can study to modify past
assessments and generate future predictions.
For example, suppose JMFs decide to start focusing ambushes on small
motorcades of Ford Expeditions, versus Chevy Suburbans, based on a belief Fords
are more vulnerable to their assaults. The insurgents may start surveiling
known coalition travel routes to ambush Fords passing through. It would take
traditional analysis time to winnow out this element as a critical component of
JMF attack methodology and target selection. A number of attacks on Fords would
have to transpire before attacks on Fords became statistically significant over
attacks on Cheverolets or other vehicle brands.
These statistics aren’t just numbers, however; the tables and figures
represent property damage, injuries and deaths. Thus, the counterinsurgency
analytical cycle requires as input the very thing it’s trying minimize.
Tactically, coalition analysts evaluate elements of JMF attacks on U.S., coalition
and Iraqi national targets. Such elements include attack characteristics:
location; time of day; method of attack (stand-off indirect fire, small arms, IED,
VBIED, suicide VBIED, etc.); weapon types; attacking personnel and group
composition (if applicable); and specific tactics employed (blocking force,
ambush, abduction, etc.). Other elements examine target characteristics, such
as the target type (facility, static crowd, large convoy, small motorcade,
pedestrian); the target’s affiliation (coalition forces, Iraqi government,
contractor, local national civilian, international aid worker); and how the
JMFs may have chosen the target (specifically selected or target of
opportunity). Still other data inputs cover the attack site characteristics (or
launch site in the case of indirect rocket or mortar attacks) and other
statistical factors such as geographic concentration or clustering of attacks,
frequency or separation of attacks over time, repetitive attacks, and so forth.
Ultimately, predictive analysis should determine patterns and identify
potential targets, timing and attack locations.
The Enemy’s Thought Process
Traditional, incident-oriented analysis is ill-equipped to penetrate and
disrupt the enemy’s internal OODA Loop segments, namely the orientation and
decision phases (collectively described as the analysis function). The JMF
decision cycle is likely to function differently from American or western
thought processes. What the adversary selects from his observation phase and
how he analyzes those inputs in his orientation and decision phases will differ
significantly from their counterparts in an American OODA Loop, yielding vastly
different outputs, or actions.
Insurgents differ from American or coalition troops; within their own ranks,
they differ from each other. The enemy “forces” come to the fight from
disparate backgrounds and combat experience, and as mentioned earlier, bring
with them varying levels of sophistication and discipline. JMFs are not all
professional military soldiers, so the tactical-level planning factors at the
squad or cell level may include elements that are inconsequential to regular military
or government professionals. For instance, coalition analysts may gather lots
of information on the characteristics of mortar launch sites historically used
to attack coalition bases of operation, including the terrain; types of
concealment afforded the actual launch site; availability of hiding places to
cache the mortar tubes before the attack; and egress or escape routes, to name
a few. The JMFs, in reality, may select launch sites based on a number of
characteristics, some of which are the same as the aforementioned ones, but
some of which may be different. The deciding factor between an optimal site and
one not to be used may be as simple as the availability of parking for the
getaway vehicle (which could also dictate the time of the attack, based on the
traffic and parking patterns throughout the day). Or, it might be the signal
strength and coverage for a specific cellular telephone service which the JMFs
use to receive launch orders. It might even be as simple as the site’s
proximity to a restroom, or to a shop that sells cheap food and drink that the
JMFs can patronize while waiting for the attack (launch) order. (After all,
non-professional fighters don’t always pride themselves on hardship and
discipline. They may take the easy path—the one that affords the basic
amenities that can help them pass the time more comfortably.) Number-crunching
coalition analysts may not recognize these unobvious “analytic factors,” but
JMFs might find them relevant to their decision process nonetheless.
The coalition analyst must address enemy idiosyncrasies that he might not
consider logical or significant. It forces the analyst to place himself in the
enemy’s mindset and view things from the enemy’s perspective.4 The enemy may
take into account factors that appear irrelevant, spurious or illogical, or
utilize “facts” that coalition analysts know are untrue (or discount as such).
Consider this hypothetical example: JMFs may more aggressively target
American-made SUVs that are painted green because they see the use of green as
a grievous affront to Islam. Green has religious significance in
Islam—particularly in radical Islamist circles affiliated with, or sympathetic
to, the Palestinian movement, which uses it as its official color. Coalition
analysts might overlook vehicle color as a potential targeting factor since
color is often regarded as something that should be discounted as
inconsequential in American society; the analysts might spin their wheels on “hard”
characteristics like vehicle size and concomitant engine size, degree of
armoring or motorcade composition, none of which may bear any importance to the
JMF tacticians.
As another hypothetical illustration, suppose rumors have circulated, based
on anecdotal but purely coincidental evidence, that coalition vehicles bearing
license plate numbers beginning with the numeral “1” carry the highest ranking
personnel. While the plates are random and have no real correlation to the
actual vehicle occupants, such erroneous thinking may still play a significant
role in JMF analysis and subsequent operational planning.
Furthermore, unique cultural and societal factors play a key role in the
adversary’s thought process. The relevant cultural “dimensions include
philosophy, language, religion, and the social systems that link individuals to
the social entity they belong to and whose values they accept.”5 This applies to
individuals, groups, and arguably whole societies. Some political scientists in
recent years have begun examining the role a nation’s culture has on its strategy
formulation,6 the characteristics of which are encapsulated in its so-called “strategic
culture.” A country’s strategic culture in turn guides its behavior toward
other states, that is, the kind of foreign policy choices a nation pursues.
Strategic culture represents the manifestation of a nation’s cultural elements
that relate directly to the nation’s preferences in handling interstate
conflict and the attendant use of force. It is not the sum total of a country’s
culture, but is a byproduct of its culture combined with its current political
processes, military capability, economic strength and technological resources.
Thus, as an illustration, one can argue that while Europe and the United States might share a common “western”
culture,7 the disparity in their respective military capabilities contributes to
divergent strategic cultures: faced with the same problem, Europe prefers
diplomacy while America
inclines toward military solutions.8 Strategic culture, then, sets parameters
for strategic choices. In so doing, it constrains the number of options
available to strategists and policy makers, effectively “limiting attention to
less than the full range of alternative behaviors...and solutions which are
logically possible.”9 For example, the United
States will not likely launch a nuclear strike against North Korea in response to a conventional
invasion of South Korea;
American strategists will only consider conventional military options absent
any North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction.
Understanding a nation’s strategic culture lends insight into its strategic
options which become manifest in behavioral outcomes. A nation’s strategic
culture gives “decision-makers with a uniquely ordered set of strategic choices
from which we can derive predictions about their behavior.”10 Such predictions
can help strategists and policy analysts deal with a given nation on the
strategic, international chessboard. Policy analysts consider an adversary’s
decision-making process at a very broad level, taking into account his
historical behavior, cultural taboos and strategic preferences. The predictive
process evaluates the range of behavioral outcomes from which an adversary may
select; some models even consider the adversary’s perceptions in framing
and interpreting his information inputs. Sometimes strategists or policy
analysts may consider what the enemy’s information (or intelligence)
requirements are to determine their own (friendly) strategic priorities. The
adversary, however, uses intelligence requirements to prioritize his
information inputs (for the observation phase) as well as to give structured
meaning to the input process (for the orientation phase). Strategy or policy
analysis usually examines the decision-making section of the OODA Loop, but
neglects the orientation phase. It devises an ad hoc concept of the
enemy’s strategic analytical machinery without explicitly building it.
Within the context of armed conflict, “the ways of war [are] determined by
culture.”11 This applies at the tactical level as well as at the strategic level
of observation. A “strategic culture can be said to exist and to persist if one
finds consistency in [strategic preferences]...from formative historical
periods up to the period under examination.”12 Strategic culture may very well constrain
operational or tactical choices that a group may consider employing in combat,
but tactics may adapt and change within those broad parameters (which the JMFs
routinely demonstrate as they modify their tactics in response to evolving
coalition countermeasures). Therefore, the strategic culture approach lays the
foundation for broad analysis, but a more detailed inspection of the enemy’s
tactical analytical processes requires a more focused technique.
The Counteranalysis Alternative
Counteranalysis, like the strategic culture approach, incorporates the enemy’s
cultural biases and filters while employing many elements of traditional
analysis. Where standard analytical methods attempt to discern patterns in
adversary behavior, counteranalysis aims at reconstructing adversary thought
processes and decision cycles that formulate behavioral choices. The objective
is to try to reverse-engineer the analysis process upon which the JMFs ground
their attack strategy. By replicating the adversary’s analytical process with
respect to targeting, coalition analysts could short-circuit the JMF targeting
and attack mechanism.
The military and intelligence communities have devoted little if any
attention to the concept of counteranalysis. In fact, Joint Publication
1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
does not even include the term. One military interest internet site defines it
in terms of disruptive countermeasures:
Counteranalysis – [preventing] accurate
interpretations of indicators during adversary analysis of collected materials.
This is done by confusing the adversary analyst through deception techniques
such as covers.13
This definition follows the standard paradigm of manipulating the adversary’s
analysis (orientation-decision) function indirectly by spoiling the input
(observation) function. Attacking the input would more accurately qualify as deception,
a sub-discipline of counterinformation.
A new, alternative definition for counteranalysis would bypass this
construct by connoting it as a unique counterinformation sub-discipline
directly affecting the enemy’s analytical function.14
In that vein, a proposed definition for counteranalysis might be:
Counteranalysis - utilizing analytical
techniques or methodologies to develop an understanding of an adversary’s
analytic process, thereby predicting the adversary’s potential decision
outcomes and likely courses of action.
This technique does not seek to disrupt the enemy’s analytical
process so much as to anticipate it and leverage it to ascertain what his
decisions—and derivative courses of action—may be before he has a chance to
implement them.
The counteranalysis methodology offers some distinct advantages over
traditional analysis in a counterinsurgency context. Counteranalysis may present
a uniquely attractive option for mitigating casualties in the Iraqi
counterinsurgency campaign, where traditional analysis normally requires an
accumulation of enemy attacks to develop an historical base of analyzable
statistics.
Ultimately, counteranalysis’ success hinges on getting into the enemy’s head
and to think—to analyze—things from his perspective, using his own decision
process (or as close an approximation thereto as possible) to anticipate his
future actions. Coalition analysts must narrow the analytical focus to the
factors the adversary considers relevant, which may be hard to discern from a
traditional analyst’s sea of random data points. A solid knowledge of the
adversary’s cultural biases, or filters, represents a good baseline, but
cultural study alone will not disclose his idiosyncrasies and relevant
analytical factors. These factors are often unique to specific tactical cells
operating on the battlefield. The enemy’s relevant factors dictate what
information inputs he requires to feed his analytical, target selection
process. Therefore, coalition analysts must commission field collections to
determine what priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), collection
requirements (CRs) or collection priorities the JMFs are pursuing in their
target selection practices. A key input to reverse-engineering and replicating
the enemy decision process is for intelligence collection managers to focus
friendly intelligence collections on uncovering enemy PIRs, the inputs to the
enemy analytical cycle.
Discerning the Enemy’s Inputs: Intelligence Priorities
Humans have a limited capacity for processing information. Policy makers,
strategists and military commanders constantly call for more intelligence, but
they ultimately find themselves bound by their cognitive limits in digesting
and evaluating a maximum volume of that intelligence. Additionally,
decision-makers recognize they can’t know everything, so they decide in advance
what they really need to know to make sound decisions and prioritize those elements
of intelligence. This applies to insurgents as well as regular military forces.
Coalition analysts need to know what intelligence inputs the insurgents seek to
inform their analysis and decision process. Knowledge of the required
information inputs, combined with the internal cultural preferences, cast
against the historical outputs (as determined via historical analysis), will
enable coalition analysts to replicate the JMF analytical cycle. Discerning
those inputs falls to the field collectors, whom the analysts must task with
appropriate collection requirements.
Field collectors can ascertain JMF intelligence priorities first through
recruited human informants. Ideally, an informant who can penetrate a JMF cell
can report back on the enemy PIRs. Also, informants can seek second-hand
information from others in the community. People who have been approached by
JMFs can recount what questions the insurgents have posed (“How often do
American motorcades pass by your store? What color are the vehicles?”), if not
directly to coalition collectors then to other Iraqis—one of whom could be a
well-placed informant.
Captured JMFs can reveal a great deal about insurgent collection efforts.
Gun-toting fighters and booby-trap trigger-men would prove less valuable than a
captured planner or reconnaissance collector, since those carrying out the
attack probably have less knowledge of the pre-planning intelligence inputs.
However, if coalition forces are fortunate enough to apprehend someone
performing pre-operation intelligence gathering—perhaps conducting surveillance
on a target or attack site, or eliciting information from people about
coalition facilities or operations—they have a few advantages. First, the
apprehension team captures tools and gathered data along with the hostile
collector; such tools include cameras, notes, or diagrams—perhaps even a list
of intelligence items to collect. Secondly, interrogators gain access to
someone with direct knowledge of at least some of the enemy intelligence
collection requirements. Finally, pre-operational collectors working for an
insurgency or terrorist organization tend to be peripheral sympathizers rather
than central members. In other words, they are average, minimally trained
citizens co-opted by the larger organization to provide long-term, intelligence
support to the active fighters who are otherwise engaged in combat operations.
This tangential attachment to the cause, coupled with a reduced level of
training or “combat hardening” makes these sympathizers less vested in the
insurgency and less resistant to interrogation. Coalition interrogators may
find them more susceptible to inducements and more likely to cooperate during
questioning.
Seized JMF planning documents provide one other means to learn about JMF
intelligence priorities. Just as a captured operative in the field may possess
insightful documentation, a captured JMF safe house should reveal planning
documents such as charts, reports, field manuals, graphs, maps and tables.
Still other documents are virtually free for the taking in the public domain,
if coalition collectors and analysts know where to look. Open source documents
abound on the Internet, where many terrorists and JMFs post everything from
instructional manuals to after-action reports. Some documents list specific
collection requirements for successful insurgent operations. The Al-Qaeda
Manual15 enumerates specific intelligence collection requirements in the
twelfth chapter, or “lesson.”16 Collectors can find other intelligence shopping
lists, tailored to specific theaters, on the Internet. The key is to know where
to look on the web and to have collectors who can read Arabic. Again, human
informants may help direct collectors to the appropriate sites, since local
informants will have better access to “talk about town” on what good jihadi web
pages to visit.
Pitfalls to Avoid
Analysts must not over-generalize the application of the adversarial
analytical models they construct. The insurgency is far from a monolithic,
centrally controlled entity. Rather, much of it is grass-roots in composition
and cellular in function. Different cells and elements may operate by differing
methods and target priorities, so analytical predictions based on Sunni
methodology in Baghdad won’t necessarily help anticipate Shi’a hostile actions
in Ramadi.
Moreover, once the analysts have enumerated the enemy PIRs and replicated
the adversarial analysis model, their customers, the coalition operators, might
not exploit it to full offensive advantage. The operators might be tempted to
employ passive countermeasures17 immediately following the collection and
discovery of enemy PIRs, but that may be counterproductive. If collectors
conclude JMFs are targeting based on vehicle color (green), the operators may
simply stop using green vehicles to avoid ambushes. Since the JMFs are
determined to attack regardless, refraining from presenting them with the
target characteristics or parameters they currently use in target selection
will only force them to find new factors. This leaves the coalition analysts
once again in the dark, initiating a new collection cycle to determine what the
new insurgent PIRs happen to be. In the meantime, friendly elements sustain
attacks while the analysts try to decipher the new targeting paradigm.
It would be better to use counteranalysis to predict likely attack times,
locations and targets; then coalition forces could lay traps and conduct
pre-emptive offensive operations employing ambushes, snipers, indirect
counterfire, booby traps and capture missions. This applies force and pressure
to the JMFs and makes their operations more costly. A number of JMF assault
teams will continue to succumb to coalition military operations while the JMF
analysts try to figure out how coalition forces are trumping them. That will
take time. Meanwhile the JMFs will continue to frame attacks on patterns and
criteria coalition forces have already discerned, and will continue to suffer
attendant losses.
Undercutting the Enemy’s Operational Strategy
Coalition planners can lay the counterinsurgency model over the insurgency’s
targeting and attack processes, effectively reverse-engineering the JMFs’
planning construct so that coalition forces can seize the initiative with
offensive strikes. The coalition analysts, using the counteranalysis
methodology, can get inside the enemies’ heads, anticipate their decision cycle
processes and outcomes, and empower the coalition planners to get ahead of the
insurgents’ operational strategy.
Thus, what is of extreme importance in war is
to attack the enemy’s strategy….18
Therefore, determine the enemy’s plans and
you will know which strategy will be
successful and which will not;
Agitate him and discern the pattern of his
movement.19
-
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
Notes
1. USAF Colonel John Boyd originally devised the OODA
Loop model as a means to describe the action-reaction process fighter pilots use
in tactical air-to-air combat. Its applicability to other disciplines or in a
broader context is the subject of debate in doctrinal circles, but it serves as
a good model for this topic at hand. Boyd’s model specifically names the phases
with verbs (observe, orient, decide and act), but
others sometimes refer to the phases using nouns (observation,
orientation, etc.), which more aptly suits this discussion. See
(1) http://www.mindsim.com/MindSim/Corporate/OODA.html;
(2) http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html;
(3) http://www.fastcompany.com/online/59/pilot.html; or
(4) http://www.12manage.com/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html for reference.
6. Political scientists
develop international theories to help academics, strategists and policy makers
grasp how actors (normally nation-states) interact with each other on the world
stage. Theories variously attempt to explain why certain past interstate
relations have occurred as well as to predict how certain nations may behave in
the future. Policy makers and strategists naturally ascribe greater utility to
the latter function. International relations theories vary widely in their
explanatory and predictive power, and vary equally in the constituent factors
they examine as inputs to the equation. Some, like structuralists, argue
that a nation’s domestic character, of which
strategic culture is a component, is irrelevant to how it interacts with other
countries, since on the world stage all nations are subject the same universal
constraints and therefore behave in similar fashions. Regardless of one’s
opinion on international behavior, the strategic culture concept provides an
excellent lens for discerning how a society’s broader culture can influence its
collective decision cycle.
16. Jonathan R. White, Defending the Homeland: Domestic
Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Security (Canada: Wadsworth/Thomson,
2004), pgs 99-101.
Bibliography
Published Books
Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu: The Art of War. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1963.
Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World
Order. New York: Vintage Books of Random House, Inc., 2004.
White, Jonathan R. Defending the Homeland: Domestic Intelligence, Law
Enforcement and Security. Canada: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004.
Articles and Chapters Published in Collected Works and Anthologies
Micewski, Edwin R. “Strategic Cultures—Definitions, Problems, Challenges.”
In Ethik und Internationale Politik (Ethics and International Politics),
edited by Edwin R. Micewski, Brigitte Sob and Wolfgang Schober. Austria:
Literas Universitätsverlag, 2001.
U.S. Government Publications
NACIC 97-10006, Counterintelligence Community Surveillance Terminology,
May 1997
Professional Journals
Dunlap, Charles J. Jr. “Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and
the Western Mindset.” In. Challenging the United States Symmetrically and
Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated? edited by Lloyd
J. Matthews. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, 1998.
(http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug01/thomas.htm.)
Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Thinking About Strategic Culture.” International
Security, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995).
Kan, Paul Rexton. “What Should We Bomb? Axiological Targeting and the
Abiding Limits of Airpower Theory.” Air & Space Power Journal,
Spring 2004. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004.
(airchronicles/apj/apj04/spr04/kan.html)
Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. “A New Kind of War: Strategic Culture and the War
on Terrorism.” Working Paper no.1. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute
for International Studies, 2003.
Wijninga , Peter W.W. and Szafranski, Richard. “Beyond Utility Targeting:
Toward Axiological Air Operations.” Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 2000.
Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2000.
(airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/szafranski.pdf
)
Internet Sources
“OODA Loop—John Boyd.” Value Based Management.net.
(http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html.)
Viking.com. (http://vikingphoenix.com/military/mildefday.htm.)
http://www.12manage.com/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html.
http://www.fastcompany.com/online/59/pilot.html.
http://www.mindsim.com/MindSim/Corporate/OODA.html.
 |
Maj Clifford
M. Gyves, USAF (BS, United States Air Force Academy; MA, The University
of Arizona), is currently a student at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, California, where he is focusing his studies on the Homeland
Defense program. In previous assignment between 2003 and 2005, he taught
counterintelligence classes and directed counterintelligence and defensive
operations training for the U.S. Air Force Special Investigations Academy at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. There he
developed and delivered curriculum for new accessions, as well as for agents
slated for high-threat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. Major Gyves
began his career as a Security Policeman in 1993 in missile security, but
joined the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) in 1995. In
AFOSI, his assignments have included stints as a criminal investigator and
counterintelligence staff officer at Langley AFB, Virginia, and as director
of counterintelligence for U.S. Southern Command Air Forces (USSOUTHAF),
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. While attached to USSOUTHAF, Maj Gyves
coordinated and conducted counterintelligence operations in Latin America
and the Caribbean in support of USAF operations. He has also commanded an
AFOSI detachment at Osan AB, Korea. |
Disclaimer
he conclusions and opinions expressed in this document
are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the
U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air
University.
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