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Document created: 6 March 2006
Air & Space Power Journal - Chronicles Online Journal
Maj Clifford M. Gyves
Actions are Universally Based on Analysis
Nearly every action based upon information inputs derives from some form of analysis. Whatever the task, a decision to act upon available information depends on an actual consideration of that information. Such a consideration constitutes an analytical process, however simple or brief. For example, a glance at a gray, cloudy sky before departing for work might induce one to carry an umbrella. The thought process is, “It’s cloudy, which suggests it may rain today. If it rains, I will get wet unless I protect myself with an umbrella. I should take the umbrella in case it rains.”
Armed confrontations through the full spectrum of conflict entail orchestrated violence. The degree of planning and control can vary widely, depending on the parties’ sophistication, organization and strategic outlook, but in all cases the combatants act upon information that they gather for consideration. The decision to attack one’s adversary with a hatchet is rather simple, taking into account a small number of factors such as the opponent’s apparent physical strength and disposition; what particular offensive or defensive weapon he may be holding; what part of his body may be most vulnerable to attack; and whether he has any comrades nearby who may enter the fray. Meanwhile, an organized military campaign may employ a plethora of interrelated and complex planning and analysis processes, each digesting a multitude of informational planning factors. Nevertheless, each action, complex or simple, hinges upon an analysis of information, which presents a potential pressure point on which an opponent might exert leverage or influence.
The Decision Cycle—Eye on Analysis
Military and intelligence professionals alike deploy an array of tools designed to destroy, disrupt, delay or deceive an adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action cycle (commonly called the “OODA Loop”1 or decision cycle). Efforts to impair an enemy’s decision cycle generally target the cycle’s inputs, information and intelligence, which the adversary acquires during the observation phase of the cycle. Camouflaging or concealing friendly assets is one example. This approach follows the adage “garbage in, garbage out”—bad inputs lead to bad outputs.
Orientation is the process of deriving meaning and applying context to the information input acquired during the observation phase. The creator of the OODA Loop model, John Boyd, suggests “that the orientation phase of the loop is the most important step, because if the enemy perceives the wrong threats, or misunderstands what is happening in the environment around him, then he will orient his thinking (and forces) in wrong directions and ultimately make incorrect decisions.”2
The decision phase applies what was learned to construct potential operational courses of action—choices—and to select one that hopefully will yield the most favorable result. That choice is executed during the action phase. Often countermeasures focus on this back end of the cycle, the action end, by interrupting an adversary’s ability to execute a chosen course of action. Such operations include crippling his means to act, like destroying his troops or weapon systems, while others endeavor to sever the enemy leader’s ability to communicate his orders to the troops in the field.
American strategy planners expend notable effort on the observation and action phases. Yet, despite Boyd’s emphasis on the orientation phase, few postulate how to attack the internal orientation or decision stages directly. Countermeasures essentially box in the orientation and decision phases of the OODA Loop by attacking the inputs or outputs. The actual information synthesis that occurs during those phases remains only indirectly affected. These two internal phases taken together—the core of the cycle, if you will—constitute the adversary’s analysis function, since therein he processes information to facilitate action.
Analysis in Iraqi Counterinsurgency Operations
Each day, media and intelligence reports highlight small-scale attacks on coalition and Iraqi interests, and the body count makes for sensational and emotional news that play a significant role in driving coalition counterinsurgency action. One chief counterinsurgency goal, both strategic and tactical, aims to reduce (or ideally end) friendly Iraqi and coalition casualties.
Those casualties result from tactical operations conducted by myriad jihadi militant fighters (JMFs), whose ranks include former Baathists, disaffected Iraqi civilians, foreign (non-Iraqi) volunteer mujahedin (jihadis) and opportunistic thugs who fight loosely under the call to jihad. JMFs boast both Shi’a and Sunni persuasion. The elements’ interconnectedness varies, as do their levels of sophistication and organization. Their targeting priorities also differ, as some elements focus on attacking coalition military forces, earning them the moniker anti-coalition forces, while others concentrate on the nascent Iraqi government, national security forces, infrastructure and civilian population, making them essentially anti-Iraqi forces. Tactical counterinsurgency efforts directly engage these JMFs and their operations.
Traditional analysis methodologies on the tactical front generally underpin defensive and counteroffensive actions with standard, pattern-focused analytical processes. Even though it produces predictive intelligence for the operator, standard analysis depends heavily on historical data, especially when battling a seemingly amorphous, disjointed insurgency with little centralized direction.3 Moreover, even if the insurgents had a central, organized campaign plan, they wouldn’t likely share it with coalition forces. Therefore, coalition analysts must rely on statistical data from insurgent activities to divine patterns that might render clues to future JMF actions. The more statistics the analysts have to collate, the more accurate their predictions will become. This fosters an iterative process, where the more attacks the JMFs execute, the greater the volume of statistical data analysts can study to modify past assessments and generate future predictions.
For example, suppose JMFs decide to start focusing ambushes on small motorcades of Ford Expeditions, versus Chevy Suburbans, based on a belief Fords are more vulnerable to their assaults. The insurgents may start surveiling known coalition travel routes to ambush Fords passing through. It would take traditional analysis time to winnow out this element as a critical component of JMF attack methodology and target selection. A number of attacks on Fords would have to transpire before attacks on Fords became statistically significant over attacks on Cheverolets or other vehicle brands.
These statistics aren’t just numbers, however; the tables and figures represent property damage, injuries and deaths. Thus, the counterinsurgency analytical cycle requires as input the very thing it’s trying minimize.
Tactically, coalition analysts evaluate elements of JMF attacks on
The Enemy’s Thought Process
Traditional, incident-oriented analysis is ill-equipped to penetrate and disrupt the enemy’s internal OODA Loop segments, namely the orientation and decision phases (collectively described as the analysis function). The JMF decision cycle is likely to function differently from American or western thought processes. What the adversary selects from his observation phase and how he analyzes those inputs in his orientation and decision phases will differ significantly from their counterparts in an American OODA Loop, yielding vastly different outputs, or actions.
Insurgents differ from American or coalition troops; within their own ranks, they differ from each other. The enemy “forces” come to the fight from disparate backgrounds and combat experience, and as mentioned earlier, bring with them varying levels of sophistication and discipline. JMFs are not all professional military soldiers, so the tactical-level planning factors at the squad or cell level may include elements that are inconsequential to regular military or government professionals. For instance, coalition analysts may gather lots of information on the characteristics of mortar launch sites historically used to attack coalition bases of operation, including the terrain; types of concealment afforded the actual launch site; availability of hiding places to cache the mortar tubes before the attack; and egress or escape routes, to name a few. The JMFs, in reality, may select launch sites based on a number of characteristics, some of which are the same as the aforementioned ones, but some of which may be different. The deciding factor between an optimal site and one not to be used may be as simple as the availability of parking for the getaway vehicle (which could also dictate the time of the attack, based on the traffic and parking patterns throughout the day). Or, it might be the signal strength and coverage for a specific cellular telephone service which the JMFs use to receive launch orders. It might even be as simple as the site’s proximity to a restroom, or to a shop that sells cheap food and drink that the JMFs can patronize while waiting for the attack (launch) order. (After all, non-professional fighters don’t always pride themselves on hardship and discipline. They may take the easy path—the one that affords the basic amenities that can help them pass the time more comfortably.) Number-crunching coalition analysts may not recognize these unobvious “analytic factors,” but JMFs might find them relevant to their decision process nonetheless.
The coalition analyst must address enemy idiosyncrasies that he might not consider logical or significant. It forces the analyst to place himself in the enemy’s mindset and view things from the enemy’s perspective.4 The enemy may take into account factors that appear irrelevant, spurious or illogical, or utilize “facts” that coalition analysts know are untrue (or discount as such).
Consider this hypothetical example: JMFs may more aggressively target American-made SUVs that are painted green because they see the use of green as a grievous affront to Islam. Green has religious significance in Islam—particularly in radical Islamist circles affiliated with, or sympathetic to, the Palestinian movement, which uses it as its official color. Coalition analysts might overlook vehicle color as a potential targeting factor since color is often regarded as something that should be discounted as inconsequential in American society; the analysts might spin their wheels on “hard” characteristics like vehicle size and concomitant engine size, degree of armoring or motorcade composition, none of which may bear any importance to the JMF tacticians.
As another hypothetical illustration, suppose rumors have circulated, based on anecdotal but purely coincidental evidence, that coalition vehicles bearing license plate numbers beginning with the numeral “1” carry the highest ranking personnel. While the plates are random and have no real correlation to the actual vehicle occupants, such erroneous thinking may still play a significant role in JMF analysis and subsequent operational planning.
Furthermore, unique cultural and societal factors play a key role in the
adversary’s thought process. The relevant cultural “dimensions include
philosophy, language, religion, and the social systems that link individuals to
the social entity they belong to and whose values they accept.”5 This applies to
individuals, groups, and arguably whole societies. Some political scientists in
recent years have begun examining the role a nation’s culture has on its strategy
formulation,6 the characteristics of which are encapsulated in its so-called “strategic
culture.” A country’s strategic culture in turn guides its behavior toward
other states, that is, the kind of foreign policy choices a nation pursues.
Strategic culture represents the manifestation of a nation’s cultural elements
that relate directly to the nation’s preferences in handling interstate
conflict and the attendant use of force. It is not the sum total of a country’s
culture, but is a byproduct of its culture combined with its current political
processes, military capability, economic strength and technological resources.
Thus, as an illustration, one can argue that while Europe and the
Understanding a nation’s strategic culture lends insight into its strategic options which become manifest in behavioral outcomes. A nation’s strategic culture gives “decision-makers with a uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which we can derive predictions about their behavior.”10 Such predictions can help strategists and policy analysts deal with a given nation on the strategic, international chessboard. Policy analysts consider an adversary’s decision-making process at a very broad level, taking into account his historical behavior, cultural taboos and strategic preferences. The predictive process evaluates the range of behavioral outcomes from which an adversary may select; some models even consider the adversary’s perceptions in framing and interpreting his information inputs. Sometimes strategists or policy analysts may consider what the enemy’s information (or intelligence) requirements are to determine their own (friendly) strategic priorities. The adversary, however, uses intelligence requirements to prioritize his information inputs (for the observation phase) as well as to give structured meaning to the input process (for the orientation phase). Strategy or policy analysis usually examines the decision-making section of the OODA Loop, but neglects the orientation phase. It devises an ad hoc concept of the enemy’s strategic analytical machinery without explicitly building it.
Within the context of armed conflict, “the ways of war [are] determined by culture.”11 This applies at the tactical level as well as at the strategic level of observation. A “strategic culture can be said to exist and to persist if one finds consistency in [strategic preferences]...from formative historical periods up to the period under examination.”12 Strategic culture may very well constrain operational or tactical choices that a group may consider employing in combat, but tactics may adapt and change within those broad parameters (which the JMFs routinely demonstrate as they modify their tactics in response to evolving coalition countermeasures). Therefore, the strategic culture approach lays the foundation for broad analysis, but a more detailed inspection of the enemy’s tactical analytical processes requires a more focused technique.
The Counteranalysis Alternative
Counteranalysis, like the strategic culture approach, incorporates the enemy’s cultural biases and filters while employing many elements of traditional analysis. Where standard analytical methods attempt to discern patterns in adversary behavior, counteranalysis aims at reconstructing adversary thought processes and decision cycles that formulate behavioral choices. The objective is to try to reverse-engineer the analysis process upon which the JMFs ground their attack strategy. By replicating the adversary’s analytical process with respect to targeting, coalition analysts could short-circuit the JMF targeting and attack mechanism.
The military and intelligence communities have devoted little if any attention to the concept of counteranalysis. In fact, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, does not even include the term. One military interest internet site defines it in terms of disruptive countermeasures:
Counteranalysis – [preventing] accurate interpretations of indicators during adversary analysis of collected materials. This is done by confusing the adversary analyst through deception techniques such as covers.13
This definition follows the standard paradigm of manipulating the adversary’s analysis (orientation-decision) function indirectly by spoiling the input (observation) function. Attacking the input would more accurately qualify as deception, a sub-discipline of counterinformation.
A new, alternative definition for counteranalysis would bypass this construct by connoting it as a unique counterinformation sub-discipline directly affecting the enemy’s analytical function.14
In that vein, a proposed definition for counteranalysis might be:
Counteranalysis - utilizing analytical techniques or methodologies to develop an understanding of an adversary’s analytic process, thereby predicting the adversary’s potential decision outcomes and likely courses of action.
This technique does not seek to disrupt the enemy’s analytical process so much as to anticipate it and leverage it to ascertain what his decisions—and derivative courses of action—may be before he has a chance to implement them.
The counteranalysis methodology offers some distinct advantages over traditional analysis in a counterinsurgency context. Counteranalysis may present a uniquely attractive option for mitigating casualties in the Iraqi counterinsurgency campaign, where traditional analysis normally requires an accumulation of enemy attacks to develop an historical base of analyzable statistics.
Ultimately, counteranalysis’ success hinges on getting into the enemy’s head and to think—to analyze—things from his perspective, using his own decision process (or as close an approximation thereto as possible) to anticipate his future actions. Coalition analysts must narrow the analytical focus to the factors the adversary considers relevant, which may be hard to discern from a traditional analyst’s sea of random data points. A solid knowledge of the adversary’s cultural biases, or filters, represents a good baseline, but cultural study alone will not disclose his idiosyncrasies and relevant analytical factors. These factors are often unique to specific tactical cells operating on the battlefield. The enemy’s relevant factors dictate what information inputs he requires to feed his analytical, target selection process. Therefore, coalition analysts must commission field collections to determine what priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), collection requirements (CRs) or collection priorities the JMFs are pursuing in their target selection practices. A key input to reverse-engineering and replicating the enemy decision process is for intelligence collection managers to focus friendly intelligence collections on uncovering enemy PIRs, the inputs to the enemy analytical cycle.
Discerning the Enemy’s Inputs: Intelligence Priorities
Humans have a limited capacity for processing information. Policy makers, strategists and military commanders constantly call for more intelligence, but they ultimately find themselves bound by their cognitive limits in digesting and evaluating a maximum volume of that intelligence. Additionally, decision-makers recognize they can’t know everything, so they decide in advance what they really need to know to make sound decisions and prioritize those elements of intelligence. This applies to insurgents as well as regular military forces. Coalition analysts need to know what intelligence inputs the insurgents seek to inform their analysis and decision process. Knowledge of the required information inputs, combined with the internal cultural preferences, cast against the historical outputs (as determined via historical analysis), will enable coalition analysts to replicate the JMF analytical cycle. Discerning those inputs falls to the field collectors, whom the analysts must task with appropriate collection requirements.
Field collectors can ascertain JMF intelligence priorities first through recruited human informants. Ideally, an informant who can penetrate a JMF cell can report back on the enemy PIRs. Also, informants can seek second-hand information from others in the community. People who have been approached by JMFs can recount what questions the insurgents have posed (“How often do American motorcades pass by your store? What color are the vehicles?”), if not directly to coalition collectors then to other Iraqis—one of whom could be a well-placed informant.
Captured JMFs can reveal a great deal about insurgent collection efforts. Gun-toting fighters and booby-trap trigger-men would prove less valuable than a captured planner or reconnaissance collector, since those carrying out the attack probably have less knowledge of the pre-planning intelligence inputs. However, if coalition forces are fortunate enough to apprehend someone performing pre-operation intelligence gathering—perhaps conducting surveillance on a target or attack site, or eliciting information from people about coalition facilities or operations—they have a few advantages. First, the apprehension team captures tools and gathered data along with the hostile collector; such tools include cameras, notes, or diagrams—perhaps even a list of intelligence items to collect. Secondly, interrogators gain access to someone with direct knowledge of at least some of the enemy intelligence collection requirements. Finally, pre-operational collectors working for an insurgency or terrorist organization tend to be peripheral sympathizers rather than central members. In other words, they are average, minimally trained citizens co-opted by the larger organization to provide long-term, intelligence support to the active fighters who are otherwise engaged in combat operations. This tangential attachment to the cause, coupled with a reduced level of training or “combat hardening” makes these sympathizers less vested in the insurgency and less resistant to interrogation. Coalition interrogators may find them more susceptible to inducements and more likely to cooperate during questioning.
Seized JMF planning documents provide one other means to learn about JMF intelligence priorities. Just as a captured operative in the field may possess insightful documentation, a captured JMF safe house should reveal planning documents such as charts, reports, field manuals, graphs, maps and tables. Still other documents are virtually free for the taking in the public domain, if coalition collectors and analysts know where to look. Open source documents abound on the Internet, where many terrorists and JMFs post everything from instructional manuals to after-action reports. Some documents list specific collection requirements for successful insurgent operations. The Al-Qaeda Manual15 enumerates specific intelligence collection requirements in the twelfth chapter, or “lesson.”16 Collectors can find other intelligence shopping lists, tailored to specific theaters, on the Internet. The key is to know where to look on the web and to have collectors who can read Arabic. Again, human informants may help direct collectors to the appropriate sites, since local informants will have better access to “talk about town” on what good jihadi web pages to visit.
Pitfalls to Avoid
Analysts must not over-generalize the application of the adversarial analytical models they construct. The insurgency is far from a monolithic, centrally controlled entity. Rather, much of it is grass-roots in composition and cellular in function. Different cells and elements may operate by differing methods and target priorities, so analytical predictions based on Sunni methodology in Baghdad won’t necessarily help anticipate Shi’a hostile actions in Ramadi.
Moreover, once the analysts have enumerated the enemy PIRs and replicated the adversarial analysis model, their customers, the coalition operators, might not exploit it to full offensive advantage. The operators might be tempted to employ passive countermeasures17 immediately following the collection and discovery of enemy PIRs, but that may be counterproductive. If collectors conclude JMFs are targeting based on vehicle color (green), the operators may simply stop using green vehicles to avoid ambushes. Since the JMFs are determined to attack regardless, refraining from presenting them with the target characteristics or parameters they currently use in target selection will only force them to find new factors. This leaves the coalition analysts once again in the dark, initiating a new collection cycle to determine what the new insurgent PIRs happen to be. In the meantime, friendly elements sustain attacks while the analysts try to decipher the new targeting paradigm.
It would be better to use counteranalysis to predict likely attack times, locations and targets; then coalition forces could lay traps and conduct pre-emptive offensive operations employing ambushes, snipers, indirect counterfire, booby traps and capture missions. This applies force and pressure to the JMFs and makes their operations more costly. A number of JMF assault teams will continue to succumb to coalition military operations while the JMF analysts try to figure out how coalition forces are trumping them. That will take time. Meanwhile the JMFs will continue to frame attacks on patterns and criteria coalition forces have already discerned, and will continue to suffer attendant losses.
Undercutting the Enemy’s Operational Strategy
Coalition planners can lay the counterinsurgency model over the insurgency’s targeting and attack processes, effectively reverse-engineering the JMFs’ planning construct so that coalition forces can seize the initiative with offensive strikes. The coalition analysts, using the counteranalysis methodology, can get inside the enemies’ heads, anticipate their decision cycle processes and outcomes, and empower the coalition planners to get ahead of the insurgents’ operational strategy.
Thus, what is of extreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy….18
Therefore, determine the enemy’s plans and you will know which strategy will be
successful and which will not;
Agitate him and discern the pattern of his movement.19
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War
1. USAF Colonel John Boyd originally devised the OODA
Loop model as a means to describe the action-reaction process fighter pilots use
in tactical air-to-air combat. Its applicability to other disciplines or in a
broader context is the subject of debate in doctrinal circles, but it serves as
a good model for this topic at hand. Boyd’s model specifically names the phases
with verbs (observe, orient, decide and act), but
others sometimes refer to the phases using nouns (observation,
orientation, etc.), which more aptly suits this discussion. See
(3) http://www.fastcompany.com/online/59/pilot.html; or
(4) http://www.12manage.com/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html for reference.
2. “OODA Loop—John Boyd,” Value Based Management.net (http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html).
3. Traditional predictive analysis works well when dealing with state actors or hierarchical, centralized organizations. Such organizations often develop plans which can be compromised or stolen through intelligence collections or espionage. Thus, analysts and operators can anticipate the adversary’s actions, since those actions have been selected and organized in advance, i.e., the decision phase may have already been completed. (Interestingly, though, if the plan lists courses of action that may be taken if certain conditions emerge—but have not yet at the time the plan was written—then the analysts begin to cross into counteranalysis: they know the adversary’s decision-making process in advance, and can anticipate his decisions and actions that will come to fruition if the requisite conditions emerge in the future.
4. U.S. military doctrinal discourse makes much of seeing the battlespace from the adversary’s cultural and historical perspective, and to avoid using American or western cultural biases (sometimes called “mirror imaging”) when evaluating enemy strategy. See (1) LtCol Peter W.W. Wijninga and Richard Szafranski, “Beyond Utility Targeting: Toward Axiological Air Operations,” Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 2000 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2000), pg 54 (airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/szafranski.pdf ); (2) Dr. Paul Rexton Kan, “What Should We Bomb? Axiological Targeting and the Abiding Limits of Airpower Theory,” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2004 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), pg 30 (airchronicles/apj/apj04/spr04/kan.html); and Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset,” in Lloyd J. Matthews, Ed., Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998) (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug01/thomas.htm).
5. [Brig. Gen.] Edwin R. Micewski, “Strategic Cultures—Definitions, Problems, Challenges,” Ethik und Internationale Politik (Ethics and International Politics), eds. Edwin R. Micewski, Brigitte Sob and Wolfgang Schober (Austria: Literas Universitätsverlag, 2001), pg 64.
6. Political scientists develop international theories to help academics, strategists and policy makers grasp how actors (normally nation-states) interact with each other on the world stage. Theories variously attempt to explain why certain past interstate relations have occurred as well as to predict how certain nations may behave in the future. Policy makers and strategists naturally ascribe greater utility to the latter function. International relations theories vary widely in their explanatory and predictive power, and vary equally in the constituent factors they examine as inputs to the equation. Some, like structuralists, argue that a nation’s domestic character, of which strategic culture is a component, is irrelevant to how it interacts with other countries, since on the world stage all nations are subject the same universal constraints and therefore behave in similar fashions. Regardless of one’s opinion on international behavior, the strategic culture concept provides an excellent lens for discerning how a society’s broader culture can influence its collective decision cycle.
7. The presumption of a universal “western” culture remains a matter of dispute in political science circles. Both Europe and the U.S. share certain cultural elements, but they also exhibit distinct traits that raise the question of just how much of a common culture they can claim. The same can be said of different countries within Europe, or of different regions within the United States. Such a debate, however, lies outside the scope of this article.
8. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Vintage Books of Random House, Inc., 2004), pgs 31-32.
9. David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon, “A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?” Comparative Politics, vol. 11, no. 2 (January 1979), pg 128, cited in Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security, vol 19, no 4 (Spring 1995), pg 45.
10. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security, vol 19, no 4 (Spring 1995), pg 45.
11. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “A New Kind of War: Strategic Culture and the War on Terrorism,” Working Paper no.1 (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003), pg 5.
12. Johnston, pg 48.
13. Viking.com (http://vikingphoenix.com/military/mildefday.htm).
14. Often military or intelligence terms assume variant connotations, particularly ones beginning with the prefix “counter-.” One family of definitions centers on countering something through direct or disruptive engagement, while another definition cluster treats counter-something as using that something against itself in order to neutralize it. For example, counterintelligence boils down to using intelligence principles and techniques against hostile intelligence operations in an effort to render those hostile operations ineffective. (It is much like “spying on the enemy spies.”) Countersurveillance employs a surveillance team to detect and monitor—surveil, if you will—hostile surveillance (NACIC 97-10006, Counterintelligence Community Surveillance Terminology, May 1997). These are the military and intelligence version of fighting fire with fire.
15. A number of different versions have been captured around the world. The Manchester Constabulary captured one version from a safe house in the United Kingdom and translated it. This version is perhaps the most distributed version in English-speaking circles.
16. Jonathan R. White, Defending the Homeland: Domestic Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Security (Canada: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004), pgs 99-101.
17. By passive countermeasures we mean purely defensive means to avoid the enemy contact, as opposed to offensive measures whereby friendly forces directly engage and actively neutralize the enemy.
18. Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pg. 77.
19. Ibid., pg. 100.
Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu: The Art of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Vintage Books of Random House, Inc., 2004.
White, Jonathan R. Defending the Homeland: Domestic Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Security. Canada: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004.
Articles and Chapters Published in Collected Works and Anthologies
Micewski, Edwin R. “Strategic Cultures—Definitions, Problems, Challenges.” In Ethik und Internationale Politik (Ethics and International Politics), edited by Edwin R. Micewski, Brigitte Sob and Wolfgang Schober. Austria: Literas Universitätsverlag, 2001.
U.S. Government Publications
NACIC 97-10006, Counterintelligence Community Surveillance Terminology, May 1997
Dunlap, Charles J. Jr. “Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset.” In. Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated? edited by Lloyd J. Matthews. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998.
Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Thinking About Strategic Culture.” International Security, vol. 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995).
Kan, Paul Rexton. “What Should We Bomb? Axiological Targeting and the Abiding Limits of Airpower Theory.” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2004. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004. (airchronicles/apj/apj04/spr04/kan.html)
Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. “A New Kind of War: Strategic Culture and the War on Terrorism.” Working Paper no.1. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003.
Wijninga , Peter W.W. and Szafranski, Richard. “Beyond Utility Targeting: Toward Axiological Air Operations.” Aerospace Power Journal, Fall 2000. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2000. (airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/szafranski.pdf )
“OODA Loop—John Boyd.” Value Based Management.net. (http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_boyd_ooda_loop.html.)
Maj Clifford M. Gyves, USAF (BS, United States Air Force Academy; MA, The University of Arizona), is currently a student at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he is focusing his studies on the Homeland Defense program. In previous assignment between 2003 and 2005, he taught counterintelligence classes and directed counterintelligence and defensive operations training for the U.S. Air Force Special Investigations Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. There he developed and delivered curriculum for new accessions, as well as for agents slated for high-threat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. Major Gyves began his career as a Security Policeman in 1993 in missile security, but joined the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) in 1995. In AFOSI, his assignments have included stints as a criminal investigator and counterintelligence staff officer at Langley AFB, Virginia, and as director of counterintelligence for U.S. Southern Command Air Forces (USSOUTHAF), Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. While attached to USSOUTHAF, Maj Gyves coordinated and conducted counterintelligence operations in Latin America and the Caribbean in support of USAF operations. He has also commanded an AFOSI detachment at Osan AB, Korea.
he conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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