Published: 1 June 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2008

Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster by Markus Wolf. Public Affairs (http://www.publicaffairsbooks.com), 250 West 57th Street, Suite 1321, New York, New York 10107, 1999, 460 pages, $19.00 (softcover).

Do you yearn for a good Cold War espionage story, one full of the cloak-and-dagger drama of treacherous cross-border operations? This book will cure that itch, for sure—and with a unique twist. Wolf’s autobiography is the real-world story upon which so many spy novels are based.

Col Gen Markus Wolf served as chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service in the East German Ministry of State Security, known as the Stasi, where he directed over 1,000 agents who infiltrated all sectors of West German political life, business, and other sectors of society. They also penetrated the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and even West German chancellor Willy Brandt’s inner circle (the greatest spy scandal in postwar Germany.) His story covers exotic and dangerous operations such as spy exchanges, dead drops, sleeper agents, recruiting and running moles, false identities, turning captured spies into double and triple agents, psychological warfare, disinformation, kidnapping, Romeo spies, and the never-ending quest for hard currency to pay off his West German agents. Interestingly, John le Carré, who authored a trilogy of books concerning the British Secret Intelligence Service during the Cold War, featured spymaster George Smiley as his protagonist. Rumor has it that Wolf served as the model for Smiley’s opposite Soviet number, code-named Karla, although le Carré has denied this.

Referred to in the West as “the man without a face” for his ability to avoid being photographed, Wolf was born in southwest Germany in 1923; his father was a Communist and a Jew. The family fled Nazi persecution and settled in Moscow in 1934, where Wolf attended elite party schools and became a Soviet citizen, a convert to Stalinism, and fluent in Russian. He also joined the Communist International (Comintern), where he underwent training in intelligence work. After Stalin dissolved the Comintern in 1943, Wolf was assigned as a radio reporter in Moscow, where he met Walter Ulbricht, later the first leader of East Germany. Wolf covered the Nuremberg war trials while working as a reporter in Berlin, returned to Moscow for a brief diplomatic assignment, and then returned to Berlin in 1951 to assist in setting up East Germany’s embryonic intelligence network.

Less than two years later, Ulbricht promoted Wolf, just 29 years old, to oversee East Germany’s Foreign Intelligence Service. Wolf never indicates why Ulbricht selected him, although he was sure that his upbringing and connections with Moscow had much to do with it. His mission called for gathering political, scientific, and technical intelligence (as well as intentions) about West Germany/West Berlin and passing all of this information to Moscow. For the next 34 years, Wolf developed his department into what became recognized as the most effective and efficient of all Communist espionage services. He retired in 1985, four years before the Berlin Wall came down.

Wolf was tried for and convicted of treason in 1993, a ruling overturned by a higher court in 1995. In the book, he reveals that he did not feel treasonous but wrongly prosecuted, complaining of victor’s justice. By uncovering the existence of multiple Nazis in the West German government (proof of which he provided to West Germany at strategic moments), Wolf helped maintain a half century of peace, the longest Europe had ever known. He felt vindicated by this act, which gave statesmen some assurance that they would not be surprised by the other side.

Wolf directed the majority of his efforts toward West Germany, capitalizing on a unique cultural and geographical situation that excused his agents from learning new customs and traditions or nuances of new languages. In addition, his people were largely interchangeable with the ones on the other side of the border. Travel, distances, and mingling did not present significant obstacles. Thus, he could rely almost exclusively on human intelligence (HUMINT) with little need for signals and imagery intelligence (SIGINT and IMINT). In contrast, the bulk of the United States’ intelligence-gathering efforts is based upon SIGINT and IMINT, with HUMINT playing only a limited role. As many people have pointed out, our intelligence shortcomings in the lead-up to the Iraq war underline the limitations of relying almost exclusively on SIGINT and IMINT.

Anyone associated with intelligence gathering, including US military personnel, should certainly read and study Man without a Face, which will give them an understanding of how HUMINT can work and how important it can become; furthermore, Wolf’s autobiography will give them the chance to make use of some of its lessons learned. I am not certain how significant this story might be for a run-of-the-mill military officer—or even a senior officer—not involved in intelligence work. Although it may satisfy a personal curiosity, I have my doubts as to its professional usefulness.

(As an aside, like a character in any good spy novel, Wolf’s life ended with a twist: he died on 9 November 2006—the 17th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the symbolic end of the Cold War.)

Lt Col Roftiel Constantine, USAF
Air Force Fellow
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor