Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper Stage Rocket 1958–2002 by Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA History Office, Office of External Relations (http://bookstore.gpo.gov/sb/sb-222.html), Washington, D.C. 20546, 2004, 253 pages, $28.00, (softcover).
The United States’ ability to develop liquid hydrogen as a fuel for space-launch vehicles was a critical factor in winning the space race against the Soviet Union. This resulted in many of the incredible discoveries of the solar system and led directly to Apollo S-II and the S-IVB stages, as well as the development of the space shuttle for quasi-routine access to space. The Centaur’s upper stage was developed by the Air Force to increase the payload-delivery capability of the Atlas launch vehicle—to place larger satellites at higher orbits. The Atlas-Centaur program was transferred to NASA in 1961 as part of the Apollo program—to propel the Surveyor spacecraft lander to the surface of the Moon.
This book is a continuation of the NASA History Office’s effort to document the agency’s programs and projects, and is written by Virginia Dawson and Mark Bowles of Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, near NASA’s Glenn Research Center (GRC), formerly Lewis Research Center in Cleveland. Ms. Dawson is formerly of GRC’s history office.
The authors address three themes within the book: the Centaur program’s survival through many attempts to cancel it; NASA’s changing tolerance for risk; and the successful collaboration between the vehicle’s contractors and NASA’s engineers. The book chronicles the development of the Centaur’s upper stage from the time it was transferred to NASA; through successful use on the Atlas and Titan launch vehicles; as an in-space stage that would ride in the space shuttle’s cargo bay; and it’s resurrection for use as a commercial launch vehicle.
As the authors admit, when commenting on manuscript review criticism from General Dynamics—the Centaur contractor—reviewers, this history is written from the NASA Lewis Research Center viewpoint and is biased towards the contribution of Lewis personnel. Similarly, it minimizes the participation and views of other NASA centers, albeit this reviewer, as an employee of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), who may be overly sensitive to critical comments about MSFC’s role in Centaur. It is interesting that NASA’s history office would publish a book highlighting the intercenter rivalries and disagreements over the Centaur at a time when the current NASA administrator, Mr. Sean O’Keefe, is pursuing a One-NASA theme to break the parochialism within centers. Perhaps, without knowing or intending it, this book serves to support Mr. O’Keefe’s One-NASA policy by demonstrating the detrimental effects of intercenter competition for limited resources, which, during Centaur, led to instances of mistrust and motive questioning.
Unlike the histories of the RL10 (upper stage engine) by Dick Mulready in Advanced Engine Development at Pratt & Whitney, or the Apollo Lunar Module by Tom Kelly in Moon Lander, this book provides minimal discussion of Centaur’s technical problems and solutions. Instead, it focuses on the programmatic, political, and interpersonal history of the program.
The authors counter an accepted, albeit false, paradigm about NASA’s Apollo program in the 1960s—that Congress provided an open checkbook with unlimited resources and no questions asked. As the Centaur program encountered technical difficulties and budget overruns, congressional interest questioned the value of the program and threatened cancellation. The authors allege some of the congressional interest resulted from MSFC’s criticism of the program and competition for resources, without adequately representing their position. It is also interesting to note that the authors interviewed program participants from all the organizations they discuss, with the exception of MSFC, which they repeatedly cited as mismanaging the Centaur program and then trying to get the program cancelled.
The book seems to criticize NASA’s changing tolerance for risk and the implications it had for the Centaur program without recognizing that NASA was simply reflecting the changing tolerance for space-flight risk from the US Congress and the American people. The intense scrutiny and concern over putting the Centaur in the space shuttle’s cargo bay was not due to any anti-Centaur bias from MSFC or JSC, it reflected the intense safety reviews of everything that was being prepared to fly on the space shuttle in the 1985 time frame. To this day, liquid-hydrogen propellant tanks are banned from the shuttle cargo bay because of their high risk of leakage.
This book highlights the development of technical insight by the government during a contractor-development program. Although it lacks specific detailed examples of how the work and expertise, of NASA civil service engineers from all NASA research and space flight centers and other national laboratories, were instrumental in the resolution of issues. As the authors correctly point out, NASA has always had more in-house technical capability and more detailed technical involvement by its civil service engineers and managers than an Air Force acquisition program. For the limited number of high-visibility systems that NASA procures versus the much-larger numbers for a military program, the increased technical insight is probably appropriate.
The Centaur program was one of national importance. NASA’s philosophy during this era and the technical experiences and lessons learned by General Dynamics and their subcontractors, on this program, were later shared with other Apollo-Saturn vehicle contractors. This open exchange of information was critical to meeting President Kennedy’s goal of landing on the moon by the end of 1969.
This book is probably of little interest to the general reader; however, Air Force personnel associated with the Centaur upper stage, which is still flying as part of the Lockheed-Martin Atlas V launch vehicle, should read this book to gain a greater appreciation of the Centaur’s early life. Another group that will find this book educational is Air Force aerospace engineering/acquisition specialists. The program management and advanced-technology system development stories provide lessons upon which to reflect.
Maj Kendall K. Brown, PhD, USAFR
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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