Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy by Stephen J. Cimbala. Praeger Publishers (http://www.greenwood.com/imprints/index.asp?ImprintID=I8), 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881-5007, 2000, 240 pages, $68.00.

This book is yet another endorsement of Clausewitz’s military theory- specifically, his descriptive analysis of friction in war. It attempts to draw contours between "classical" Clausewitzian military theory and contemporary chaos theory. Thus, it is the union of two schools of thought- one that has stood the test of time and acquired nearly biblical prestige in military and political circles, and one that is struggling to make a mark. Stephen Cimbala may appear to be putting new wine in old wineskins, but the old skins still work fine.

The author’s message is clear that friction has always been part of strategy, politics, and war. It is still a fundamental reality of those processes and will remain so in the future. As Clausewitz noted, it is the difference between "war on paper" and war. Depending on one’s perspective, friction both plagues and benefits deterrence, crisis management, and peace operations. Friction applies to revolutions in military affairs. Despite programmatic attempts to argue otherwise, technology cannot eliminate friction or even accommodate it. This is because friction breeds friction. Although some technologies may address some forms of friction, they will produce other friction in the process.

For example, a classic national endeavor involves eliminating political friction militarily, military friction economically, or economic friction politically. Then, of course, one finds many variations on that theme. Historically, however, the result is more friction, sooner or later. Cimbala points to various historical case studies to prove the point. In addition, he focuses on present-day conflicts to argue that friction is here to stay.

Readers looking for a solution to this dilemma will be disappointed, and rightly so. No solution exists. Cimbala argues that soldiers and politicians alike must always appreciate the existence of friction and its importance in all activities. Simply knowing that friction exists can help predict its effects- and, hopefully, plan accordingly.

All this may be no more profound or illuminating than Clausewitz’s original description, and Cimbala may be guilty of overstating the obvious and making the simple more complex- thus adding friction himself. Moreover, purist Clausewitz disciples, no doubt, will look for inaccurate interpretations and applications. Clausewitz and Chaos, however, is effective in making the reader think about friction, and that, after all, is Cimbala’s purpose.

Col Eric Ash, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama