Air University Review, January-March 1987

Linebacker II:

The Decisive Use of Air Power?

Kenneth P. Werrell

There are many who see the bombing of North Vietnam in December 1972 as decisive. They see this operation as the example of how air power should have been used in Vietnam and how it might, or should, be used in the future. They speculate that if air power had been used this way earlier, the war would have been won or we would have gained better terms.

I disagree. First, the bombing of North Vietnam was fatally flawed by the lack of proper targets. Second, while political restrictions inhibited the airmen, inadequate tactics and equipment contributed significantly to the high losses and lack of results. Third, the bombing did not have decisive political/diplomatic results.

From the start, the United States used air power against the North as a political tool. The objectives of this air campaign, code-named Rolling Thunder (1965-68), were to stiffen the morale of the South Vietnamese, to interdict Communist supplies, to inflict punishment and cost on the North Vietnamese, and to demonstrate American will.1

But many, then and now, adamantly proclaim that the operation was restricted, some say decisively, by the civilian decision makers.2 Sortie levels were controlled, areas of North Vietnam were put off limits to air attack, bombing halts were frequent, and targets were carefully selected from Washington. For example, MiG fields were off-limits until 1967, as were missile sites until an American aircraft fell victim to them. In addition, the campaign was graduated, robbing the airmen of the elements of shock and surprise and permitting the North Vietnamese to build and adjust their defenses. From the beginning, there were those in high places who doubted the bombing could achieve its objectives.3

Military men emphasize the civilian-imposed constraints, but there are other reasons why strategic bombing was not, and could not be, decisive in Vietnam. The most substantial of these concern targets: what do you bomb? This was not World War II, North Vietnam was not Germany or Japan, and this was neither a total nor a conventional war. Germany and Japan surrendered after suffering terrible personnel and physical losses due to the fierce land, sea, and air war. Bombing was not the sole cause of the Axis defeat, but it was very effective against industrialized enemies supplying their own war materiel and fighting a conventional war. North Vietnam fit none of these categories. The North got its sustenance from the outside, the fighting (except in 1972 and arguably in the 1968 Tet offensive) was irregular, and the war was not total, certainly not for the United States. The only targets within North Vietnam upon which the bombing might have had a decisive effect were the people themselves or the people indirectly (that is, the dikes). But despite the writings of the theorists, aptly called the "Prophets of Gloom," attacking morale has not proved to be a war winner. It is also difficult to see how a democracy could deliberately target people in a limited war. A 1972 congressional report summarized the problem: "This study calls into serious question the efficacy of strategic and interdiction bombing against a highly motivated guerrilla enemy in an underdeveloped country."4

As a result of the scarcity and nature of targets and the cost of the bombing operations, the dollar value of the attacks greatly exceeded the dollar value of the value of the targets destroyed. One CIA estimate put the ratio at 8:1.5 Moreover, Chinese and Soviet shipments to North Vietnam exceeded the damage by a 6:1 margin. Meanwhile, US intelligence studies indicated that the bombing would not bring the war to a successful conclusion.6

Further, the airmen were ill-prepared to fight a sustained, conventional air campaign.7 American aircraft were unsuited for these operations in a number of ways. Ironically, "strategic" bombers were used against "tactical" targets in the South, while "tactical" fighters were used against "strategic" targets in the North. The lack of all-weather aircraft presented a considerable burden, especially in the winter monsoon season (December through mid-May). The United States fought a conventional air war with aircraft designed for nuclear warfare. The best example of this mismatch was the F-105. A fighter with an internal bomb bay, a contradiction in terms, it was the Air Force's workhorse, flying many of the missions over the North and suffering the majority of its casualties.8

The United States, for all of its technological prowess, was ill-equipped in other areas as well. At the beginning of the air war, the United States was still using unguided ("dumb") munitions, just as airmen had used 50 years earlier in World War I. Thus, aircrews had to overfly their targets, which proved dangerous and often fatal.9 Second, the United States had neither sufficient nor adequate electronic countermeasures (ECM). While Strategic Air Command (SAC) was reasonably equipped, fighters were not. Until late in the war, however, SAC operated unopposed over South Vietnam) while fighters carried out the war against increasingly lethal defenses over North Vietnam. A third example is that the United States did not have adequate identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems. This meant that long-range, air-to-air missiles, which should have given American airmen a considerable advantage over their foes, were constrained by fears of hitting friendly aircraft.

Perhaps the most important factor contributing to American unpreparedness was the underestimation of the power of the defense and the abilities of the North Vietnamese. The airmen focused on the weapons and type of warfare on which airmen always focus––where the glory is––fighters and air-to-air combat. It is true that the North Vietnamese built up their air force. But this air force proved as elusive as the Vietcong, using guerrilla tactics of hit and run and fighting only when circumstances were favorable. With the major exception of Operation Bolo in January 1967, when US fighter pilots lured MiGs into an air battle and then dispatched seven without a loss,10 American airmen did not engage in massive air battles and thus were unable to rack up scores as they had in World War II and Korea.11 Air-to-air combat was neither frequent nor important in the Vietnam air war.

More significant than North Vietnamese aircraft were their surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The American airmen first observed a North Vietnamese SAM site in April 1965, and SAMs claimed their first victim in July 1965. After the initial shock, the airmen were able to effectively counter these weapons.12 The major impact of the SAMS, however, was to force American aircraft lower and into the sights of the North Vietnamese antiaircraft gunners.

Flak was the principal North Vietnamese weapon against US aircraft. American airmen not only underestimated the North Vietnamese defenses, they especially underestimated the impact of flak. Both were serious mistakes. Between 1965 and 1973, enemy antiaircraft artillery engaged one-fourth of all flights over North Vietnam and accounted for 66 percent of US aircraft losses over the North.13

The Tet offensive changed the war for the United States. Following President Lyndon B. Johnson's speech of March 1968, American bombing of the North stopped above 20 degrees north latitude, and then, just before the November election, stopped in all of the North. Americans elected Richard M. Nixon, who began to withdraw US troops and turn the burden of the war over to the South Vietnamese.

In March 1972, the North Vietnamese attempted to knock the South Vietnamese out of the war with a massive, conventional invasion.14 Just as the North changed the rules of the game, so did the United States. Nixon was not Johnson, and 1972 was not 1965 or 1968. Nixon's policy of détente gave him flexibility that his predecessor, who feared intervention by the Russians or more likely by the Chinese, lacked. The president made clear that he intended to punish the enemy and to use his weapons with great determination. In his words, "The bastards have never been bombed like they're going to be bombed…...15 The president not only used air power as it had not been used before, he authorized the mining of North Vietnamese ports, long requested by the military.

US air power played a major role in stopping and inflicting terrible losses on the North Vietnamese forces. As never before, American airmen had targets they could see, hit, and destroy. The impact of air power in this conventional war was awesome; the impact of air power in the North, code-named Linebacker, was also different than it had previously been.

The airmen were better able to use air power because they had fewer political restrictions, although some targets and areas continued to be denied to them.16 More important, they had better weapons.

While introducing no new aircraft since the 1968 bombing of North Vietnam, the airmen, did use other equipment that improved bombing effectiveness. The airmen began Loran bombing in 1970, which made it possible to operate in the worst weather conditions and still get bombs within hundreds of meters of the aiming point.17 Although this was not precision bombing, it was certainly an improvement.

The most spectacular change was the introduction of guided munitions ("smart bombs") that could be placed within 10 meters or less of the target. A number of bridges that had withstood numerous, costly American strikes quickly fell to these new weapons. For example, in May 1972 four flights of F-4s dropped one span of the Thanh Hoa bridge and caused other critical damage with guided bombs. There were no losses on this strike compared with the previous 871 sorties during which 11 aircraft, but not the bridge, went down. The airmen considered the guided bombs to be ten to a hundred times more effective than unguided weapons.18

The Americans also introduced new equipment to give them a further edge over the North Vietnamese MiGs. A device that permitted US aircraft to identify North Vietnamese IFF (Combat Tree) was very helpful. In addition, a powerful radar and control system (Tea Ball) gave American airmen warning of the MiGs.19

The Americans employed new ECM and anti-SAM tactics to combat other Communist defenses. Against North Vietnamese electronics, they employed more chaff, a World War II device that still worked.20 The Americans also changed their anti-SAM tactics (Wild Weasel) from Iron Hand (four F-105s using antiradiation missiles) to Hunter Killer teams of two F-105s with the missiles flying with two F-4s with antipersonnel cluster bombs.21

As the bombing took its toll in the North and the invasion of the South stalled and then was pushed back, negotiations prompted Kissinger's "peace at hand" comment on 26 October. Although peacemakers got close to an agreement, they did not get a treaty.22

On 14 December 1972, President Nixon gave the North Vietnamese 72 hours to get back to serious negotiations "or else." The "or else" was a three-day bombing offensive against North Vietnam Nixon ordered that day and then changed on 19 December to an indefinite period.23 The object of Linebacker II, the code name for the December bombing, was to get negotiations going again. The airmen had already prepared plans for such a task; in August they had studied all-weather targets suitable for attack by the B-52s. The Boeing bombers were used because they had an all-weather capability required by the winter monsoon, carried a heavy bombload, and symbolized US determination, as they were our primary nuclear bomber. The planners selected targets that would get a strong message across to the North Vietnamese and, at the same time, minimize civilian casualties. To ensure the latter, they not only picked targets to avoid population centers but established procedures (bomb runs and instructions) that would also avoid people.24

US airmen returned to the home of the SAMS, flak, and MiGs on the night of 18 December.25 For three consecutive days, the script was about the same. F-III attacks on airfields and various other targets began at 1900 and lasted about nine and one-half hours.26 About 20 to 65 minutes later, the first of three waves of B-52s unloaded its bombs. The second wave followed about four hours later and was, in turn, followed by the third wave about five hours later. Each wave consisted of between 21 to 51 B-52s supported by 31 to 41 other aircraft, and each wave flew exactly the same pattern––the same heading from the west and, after a sharp turn after bombing, the same exit heading to the west. There were also daylight attacks by Air Force, Marine, and Navy aircraft.

The bombing rocked Hanoi, but US losses rocked the airmen as well. During this opening phase, 12 aircraft went down, not a large number and certainly bearable; however, the B-52 losses, three on the first night and six on the third, were shocking. For up to this point, the Air Force had lost only one B-52 to enemy fire, although 17 had been lost to other causes. While the overall B-52 loss rate of 3 percent of effective sorties on the three missions appears acceptable, bear in mind that the loss rate on the third mission was 6.8 percent and that the Air Force had deployed only 170 to 210 B-52s in Southeast Asia and had only 402 in service in 1972.27 This is reminiscent of the summer and fall of 1943 over Germany.

The B-52 losses highlighted a number of problems. First, the B-52 fleet was of mixed quality, consisting of 107 of the older but modified D models and 99 of the later G models. Only half of the latter had upgraded ECM equipment, which proved to be one of the critical factors as to which aircraft got hit by the SAMs, the killer of the B-52s.28 In addition, compared to the Ds, the Gs carried a smaller bombload, had problems with their bomb release mechanisms, and stationed their tail gunners forward with the rest of the crew and therefore depended entirely on electronics.29

A second problem was that the B-52s were controlled or, better put, overcontrolled from SAC headquarters in Omaha. SAC literally formed the basic battle plan and tactics thousands of miles from the actual combat. Initially SAC used a policy of no maneuvers on the bomb run, although such maneuvers often permitted aircraft to elude the SAMs.30 SAC also mandated a "press on" procedure which dictated that bombers continue their missions despite the loss of engines, computers, and, most critically, ECM equipment.31 Not surprisingly, with one headquarters controlling the bombers and another the support aircraft, there was a lack of coordination between the bombers and their escorts, including two instances in which B-52s fired on US aircraft.32 0ther coordination problems included US radios jammed by EB-66 ECM and friendly radar severely degraded by B-52 ECM.33

Third, clearly American ECM, the key to fending off the SAMS, was not doing the job. The B-52's ECM protection markedly declined in the 100-degree turn immediately after bomb release as the bank reduced the effectiveness of the bomber's spot jammers.34 Winds that differed from forecasts in direction and speed dispersed the chaff corridors and thus reduced ECM protection. For example, on 20 December only four of 27 B-52 cells were in chaff cover at the bomb release line, and all of the B-52s downed were 5 to 10 miles from chaff cover.35

There were other problems. The concentration on the MiG threat while placing the SAM threat last proved in error. But most of all, the bomber tactics were unvarying. I trust that the above description makes clear the fact that the bombers attacked the same way three nights in a row.

Little wonder then that the Air Force formed a tactics panel and changed tactics.36 Although most US aircraft continued to fly their missions about the same way, this was not true for the B-52s. On the four missions between 21 and 24 December, only 30 B-52Ds were employed in a single wave. In addition, the planners varied the timing, headings, and altitudes. The airmen increased the amount of chaff, attempting to lay a chaff blanket instead of a chaff corridor. Thus, instead of 15 percent of the bombers receiving chaff protection at the bomb release point, now 85 percent did.37 Night hunter-killer teams were first used on 23 December to better counter the SAM threat. The Air Force also quickly installed jammers and modified antiradiation missiles for use against a new band of radar ("I" band) that had surprised them.38

The airmen hit Hanoi with these new tactics on 21 December and lost two B-52s and one A-6A. The next three nights bombs fell on targets in Haiphong and north of Hanoi. The new tactics and new targets paid off as the airmen lost only three aircraft on these three missions. There was no bombing on 25 December, perhaps a gallant, certainly a diplomatic gesture that permitted North Vietnamese defenders to rearm.

The attack on 26 December was one of a kind. The United States sent 120 B-52s, the most on any of the Linebacker missions, against targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. Although supported by 99 aircraft, two B-52s went down. Following SAC's "press on" policy, both bombers attempted to attack in broken cells––that is, two-ship instead of the normal three-ship formations––thus lacked adequate ECM power.

The remaining three missions (27-29 December) employed 60 B-52s each night, but otherwise fit the same pattern. Five aircraft (two B-52s) went down on 27 December. There were no losses on the last days.

In all, the B-52s dropped about 15,000 tons of bombs, while tactical aircraft added another 5,000 tons.39 Because there were only 12 hours of visual conditions during the operation, the airmen aimed the bulk of their ordnance by nonvisual techniques such as radar and Loran.40

Linebacker II cost 27 aircraft (15 B-52s)and 43 crew members listed as killed or missing in action, 41 captured, and 33 recovered.41 Compared to the 3 percent expected losses,42 the overall loss rate of below 2 percent and a B-52 loss rate slightly above 2 percent was not all that bad. Thus, the airmen compared the loss rates in Vietnam and those of Linebacker favorably with those in World War II and Korea. Such a comparison, however, obscures the significant fact that Vietnam-era aircraft were much more expensive than their predecessors while inventories and aircraft production were much smaller.43

Nevertheless, American airmen throttled two parts of the North Vietnamese air defenses. The small Communist air force launched 32 aircraft, attempted interceptions with 20, but scored no hits on the B-52s and downed only two F-4s for the loss of six MiGs.44 American tactics (ECM, night, and high-altitude operations), bad weather, and fighter escort nullified the MiGs. All but the latter also largely nullified North Vietnamese flak, which damaged only one B-52 and downed three tactical aircraft.45 But if the American airmen adequately handled the flak and fighter threats, the same cannot be said of the SAMS.

SAMs downed all 15 B-52s lost, as well as three other aircraft.46 The American airmen, however, did not target the SAM sites until the sixth mission on 23 December and did not attack them again until 27 December, when B-52s and F-111s attacked the most effective single SAM site.47 The B-52 and F-111 attacks on SAM sites continued on the last two days of the operation, along with attacks on SAM storage facilities. Despite these efforts, intelligence estimated that only two sites were 50 percent damaged, eight were undamaged, and results against three were unknown. The Americans credited one site with downing five to nine B-52s. As a result, American bomber crews were briefed on 27 December to fly well clear of that location.48 It should be noted that only 3 percent of the bombs fell on SAM targets as compared with 5.3 percent that fell on airfields.49 The saving grace was that by 29 December the North Vietnamese had run out of SAMS, leaving the North essentially defenseless.50

The efficiency of the bombing can be measured not only by low US casualties but also by low civilian casualties. Despite sensational press headlines and North Vietnamese propaganda statements, bombing accuracy was good.51 We have not only the evidence of aerial photographs and observers but also the North Vietnamese statement that 1,623 civilians were killed. If the World War II experience had held true, the expected civilian losses from 20,000 tons of bombs would have been between 10,000 and 40,000 killed.52

There are some who believe that at this point we could have named our terms.53 Others insist that had we used air power in this manner earlier, the war would have ended earlier.54 Another author sees Linebacker II as a classic example of the use of military force to achieve a political end quickly.55 Others think it was an exercise in futility: morally bankrupt, militarily ineffective, and diplomatically unnecessary.56 Many assert that the bombing brought the North Vietnamese back to the negotiations.57

What did the bombing achieve? On the diplomatic front, the North Vietnamese returned to the peace talks apparently with a different attitude. This was the purpose of the bombing, and there were changes to the final treaty. We got what we wanted––our POWs out, the South Vietnamese onboard, and some face saving. The North Vietnamese got us out; the South Vietnamese got some assurances from the United States.58 However, the bottom line remains that there were no substantial changes from the agreements made in October.59

On the military front, Linebacker II was clearly an outstanding feat of arms. After years of restrictions and frustrations, American airmen were able, in typical blunt American fashion, to take on and defeat a formidable air defense system directly. For the United States, and especially the airmen, this was a proud, satisfactory way to "end" the war, or at least to end American involvement. But the tactical aspects, the "victory," should not obscure the fact that strategic bombing did not achieve decisive ends in Vietnam.

Could bombing have been decisive? Those who believe so emphasize the lack of political will by the civilian decision makers, at least up until December 1972. These critics underestimate the power of public opinion in a democracy, both domestically and internationally, and clearly Johnson felt very much constrained in both areas. He also feared, with good reason, the reactions of the Russians and Chinese. Certainly political factors restricted American use of air power.

Nevertheless, strategic bombing of North Vietnam was unable to achieve decisive results for two other reasons. First and foremost, there were no vital strategic targets in the North, with the possible exception of people. Second, American airmen were neither adequately equipped nor tactically ready to carry out decisive nonnuclear operations. Linebacker II was not, and could not be, decisive in the Vietnam War.

Radford University, Virginia

Author’s Note: This is an expanded version of a paper delivered at the Northern Great Plains Conference at Eau Claire, Wisconsin, September 1986.

Notes

Information in brackets is the call numbers for the Air University Library (AUL) and the USAF Historical Research Center (USAFHRC), both at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

  1. The Pentagon Papers, the Senator Gravel edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), vol. 3, 269.
  2. U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), xiii, xviii, 271; Lou Drendel,… And Kill MiGs: Air to Air Combat in the Vietnam War (Carollton, Tex.: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1984),8.
  3. Pentagon Papers, vol. 3, 294-95; David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 367-68; conversation with Richard Kohn, chief of Air Force History, June 1986; Lou Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985), 15, 18.
  4. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Bombing as a Policy Tool in Vietnam: Effectiveness, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, 19 [CIS 9382-21 10/72]
  5. Pentagon Papers, vol. 4, 136, 225-26.
  6. Ibid., 6, 62, 115, 168, 180, 222, 225; Project CHECO, "Line-backer: Overview of the First 120 Days," 1973, 6 [AUL M38245-221]; "Summary of Responses to NSSM-1," Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, pt. 13;16773.
  7. For especially sharp criticism of the airmen, see Hanson Baldwin, "Introduction," in Jack Broughton, Thud Ridge (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969), 12-13; and Dana Drenkowski, "Operation Linebacker II," Soldier of Fortune, September 1977.
  8. The F-105 was poorly designed with essentially no backup for its vital hydraulic controls. Of 617 Air Force aircraft lost over North Vietnam, 280 were F-105s. Michael McCrea, "U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses and Damage in Southeast Asia (1962-1973)," 1976, 6-47 [AUL M31914-22 #305]. In addition to a total of 334 F-105 combat losses in Southeast Asia, there were 63 operational losses. John Granville, "Summary of USAF Aircraft Losses in SEA," 1974, 22, 36, 57 [USAFHRC K417.042-16].
  9. Broughton, 22, 96,; William Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1978), 126.
  10. This was half of North Vietnam’s MiG-21 inventory. James Eastman et al., eds., Aces and Aerial Victories: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1965-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 35-42.
  11. In 1968, the American advantage in air-to-air kills to losses had fallen to a mere 1.4:1. As a result, the Navy instituted its now well-known "Top Gun" program in March 1969 and afterwards did much better, raising its kill ratio from 2.4:1 (1965-68) to 12.5:1 (1969-73). The Air Force did not do as well in this arena, its kill-to-loss ratio declining from 2.25:1 up through 1968 to 2:1 after 1968, although in fairness, its area of operations and opposition proved more difficult than the Navy’s. "Southeast Asia Air-to-Air Combat," Armed Forces Journal International, May 1974, 38. Air-to-air combat proved different from forecasts; for example, missiles didn’t work all that well. The Air Force success rate was10.5 percent hits per attempt. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "Uncoordinated Draft: [Linebacker Study]," 1973, 6 [USAFHRC K712.041-19]. In World War II, USAAF fighters had a 3.55:1 edge in air-to-air combat against Germany and 4.25:1 against Japan. The Navy and Marine Corps ratio against Japan was 12.97:1. USAAF, Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of Statistical Control, 1945), 255-61, 263-68; "Statement by Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, on Occasion of 37th Anniversary of Naval Aviation," 9 May 1949, 8 [Naval Historical Center]. In the Korean War, Air Force fighter pilots ran up a 6.82:1 score of victories to losses in air-to-air combat. Larry Davis, Mig Alley: Air to Air Combat Over Korea (Carrollton, Tex.: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1978), 70; "USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft Korean War," USAF Historical Study No. 81, 1975.
  12. Losses-per-missile fired dropped from 5.7 percent in 1965 to under 1 percent in 1968. In 1972 the rate rose to 1.15 percent. Momyer, 136; McCrea, 2-21, 2-22.
  13. A further 15 percent fell to SAMs, 7 percent to MiGs, 2 percent to friendly causes, and 10 percent to unknown causes. McCrea, 6-29, 6-46, 6-55; Granville, 11.
  14. The North Vietnamese introduced new weapons such as the SA-2 and SA-7 (SAMs), 130-mm long-range artillery, and AT-3 (guided antitank missiles) into the fighting in the South. A.J.C. Lavalle, ed., Airpower and the 1972 Spring Invasion (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985),4.
  15. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 506; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grossett and Dunlap, 1976), 606-07.
  16. Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 410; Hersh, 526.
  17. Tactical Air Command, "SEA Tactics Review Brochure," II, 68 [AUL M41737-283].
  18. Guided weapons, however, were expensive, limited by the weather, and few in number. CHECO, "Linebacker," 21-27; Nordeen, 59, 63; Jeffrey P. Rhodes, "Improving the Odds in Ground Attack," Air Force Magazine, November 1986, 48.
  19. These measures helped reverse the less-than-sensational Air Force exchange rate from 18 Air Force aircraft lost to 24 MiGs downed between February and July 1972 to 5:19 from August to 15 October. Karl Eschmann, "The Role of Tactical Air Support; Linebacker II," Air Command and Staff College thesis, 1985, 28, 30 [AUL M431 122 E741r].
  20. The US Navy had used chaff in the 1965-68 campaign, but the Air Force had not because it lacked a suitable dispenser. During Linebacker, Air Force aircraft dropped the Christmas treelike tinsel uTAC, "SEAsing both airborne canisters (June 1972) and bombs (August 1972). Momyer, 129; MACV, "Uncoordinated Draft"; Nordeen, 24.
  21. TAC, "SEA Tactics," II, 78.
  22. During the bombing from March through October 1972 called Linebacker and later Linebacker I, the Air Force flew 9,315 sorties and dropped 155,500 tons of bombs on the North. The United States lost 63 aircraft (22 to MiGs, 20 to SAMs, and 21 to flak), and in exchange downed 40 MiGs, CHECO, "Linebacker," 70-72; R. Mark Clodfelter, "By Other Means: An Analysis of the Linebacker Bombing Campaigns as Instruments of National Policy," Master’s thesis, University of Nebraska, 1983, 77.
  23. Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 412; Clodfelter, 105, 111
  24. W. Hays Parks, "Linebacker and the Law of War," Air University Review, January-February 1983, 16; Nixon, 734.
  25. Broughton, 36.
  26. Details on the Linebacker II missions are drawn from [Headquarters Air Force], "Briefing Books," 2 vols. [USAFHRCK 143.042-12].
  27. Norman Polmar, ed., Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft and Missiles (Annapolis, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979) 126; Granville, 18; Lavalle, 30; James McCarthy and George Allison, Linebacker II: A View from the Rock (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Airpower Research Institute, 1979), 12; Eschmann, 70-72.
  28. Eschmann, 49, 70-72; McCarthy and Allison, 86. On these first three missions, 1.6 percent of the Ds and 4.9 percent of the Gs went down per sortie. In the entire 11-day campaign, the Ds suffered 1.8 percent and the Gs 2.7 percent losses. About 10 percent of the missiles fired against the Gs impacted, while only 3 percent of those fired against the Ds did likewise. [Headquarters Air Force], "Briefing Books," I and II; Operations Analysis, "linebacker II Air Operations," 31 January 1973 [USAFHRCK168.06-232].
  29. The gunners on B-52Ds were stationed in the tail, where they used either electronic or visual sighting. McCarthy and Allison, 70; Eschmann, 49.
  30. This policy quickly changed beginning with the second wave on the second day. McCarthy and Allison, 46-47.
  31. Robert Clement, "A Fourth of July in December: A B-52 Navigator’s Perspective of Linebacker II," Air Command and Staff College thesis, 1984, 18, 49; McCarthy and Allison, 30, 32.
  32. USAF, "Linebacker USAF Bombing Survey," 1973, 35 [USAFHRC K717.64-8]; TAC, "SEA Tactics,"II, 77; Eschmann, 60.
  33. Eschmann, 60, 63; Clodfelter, 121.
  34. TAC, "SEA Tactics," II, 76.
  35. SAC briefing, "Chaff Effectiveness in Support of Linebacker II Operations," March 1973 [USAFHRC K168.06-223].
  36. "The Battle for the Skies Over North Vietnam: 1964-1972," 94 [USAFHRC K239.043-14].
  37. "Chaff Effectiveness.
  38. Ibid. For a general discussion of the changes, also see Clement, 49; Eschmann, 75076; McCarthy and Allison, 97, 121; 388th Tactical Fighter Wing History, October-December 1972, 27, 32-33 [USAFHRC K-Wg-388-H October-December 1972].
  39. B-52s flew 708, F-111s 148, A-7s 226, and F-4s 283 effective sorties. [Headquarters Air Force], "Briefing Books," II.
  40. During the limited visual conditions, the TAC fighters scored some remarkable successes, most notably hitting tow especially difficult targets, the Hanoi thermal plant and Radio Hanoi. The latter, protected by a 25-foot-high and 10-foot-thick blast wall, had survived the bombing of 36 B-52s. F-4s got four laser-guided bombs inside the walls and destroyed the target. Clodfellter, 120; Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, "Linebacker II: 18-29 Dec. 72," supporting Document III_K1 [USAFHRCTS-HOA-74-197].
  41. History of Air Force Intelligence Service, 1 July 1972-30 June 1973: Linebacker II Summary III, K2 [USAFHRCK142.011]; Center for Naval Analyses, "U.S. navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Fixed Wing Aircraft Losses and Damage in Southeast Asia (1962-1973), pt. 1: List of Aircraft Lost," 1977, 191-93, 223, 488-92 [AUL M31914-22 #305 (a)v.I]. Eschmann, 103-04, lists 30 aircraft destroyed, including three lost in accidents. Eastman, 17, states that 27 Air Force aircraft were lost. The North Vietnamese claimed that 81 US aircraft (34 B-52s) went down. Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreements (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 161-62; Richard Holloran, "Bombing Halt Brings Relief to B-52 Crews in Guam," New York Times (2 January 1973), 3. Drenkowski, pt. 2, 55, says that 22 to 27 B-52s were destroyed.
  42. Clodfelter, 108; Clement, 47.
  43. [Headquarters Air Force], "Briefing Books," I and II.
  44. Eschmann, 108; Carl Berger, ed., The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: 1961-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 98; Drendel, 47, 73; "Chaff Effectiveness"; McCarthy and Allison, 65, 116; Eschmann, 46.
  45. Eastman, 125.
  46. The North Vietnamese did not have the most modern equipment. In the 1973 Middle East war the Egyptians and Syrians inflicted heavy losses on Israeli aircraft with the Soviet SA-6, a missile not seen in the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese may have improved and manned their defenses without the help or knowledge of the Soviets. Porter, 161; Jon M. Van Dyke, North Vietnam’s Strategy for Survival (Palo Alto, Calif.; Pacific Books, 1972), 61, 217.
  47. On the third day of the campaign, a SAC commander ordered a search for North Vietnamese SAM storage facilities. Within 18 hours, the intelligence people began to find them, whereupon SAC requested JCS permission to bomb them. Permission for all but one was forthcoming, although it too another 24 to 36 hours. As a result, these targets weren’t hit until 26 December, McCarthy and Allison, 97-98.
  48. Ibid., 155; Eschmann, 94; George Allison, "The Bombers Go to Bullseye,"Aerospace Historian, December 1982, 233.
  49. While several helicopters and transports were destroyed on the ground, intelligence claimed that only two to three MiG-21s were damaged. The bulk of the bombs fell on railroad yards (44 percent) and storage facilities (30 percent). ACSI, "Linebacker II";"Linebacker USAF Bombing survey," 3, 14, 16-17, 40-43.
  50. Clodfelter, 127. The airmen had also run out of worth while targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. McCarthy and Allison, 163.
  51. For a detailed study of the press reporting of the Linebacker Ii offensive, see Martin Herz, The Prestige Press and the Christmas Bombing, 1972 (Washington, D.C.:Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1980). Other samples include: Kalb and Kalb, 416; Clodfelter, 117-18; "Nixon Blitz Leads to the Table," Time, 8 January 1973, 9-13; "Outrage and Relief," Time, 8 January 1973, 14.
  52. In World War II, two Japanese civilians were killed for every two tons of bombs, and one Briton was killed for every ton of bombs. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report (European War), (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 1; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 16-20; Hans Rumpf, The Bombing of Germany (London: Frederick Muller, 1963), 154-65; R.J. Overy, The Air War; 1939-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), 120. The North Vietnamese also evacuated many civilians from Hanoi and Haiphong. Clodfelter, 123.
  53. Thomas Moorer, "The Christmas Bombing of Hanoi—or How the POWs Got Home," Naval Aviation Museum Foundation, March 1981; Sharp, 258; Alan Dawson, 55 Days: The Fall of South Vietnam (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 123.
  54. "What Christmas Bombing Did to North Vietnam," US News and World Report, 5 February 1973, 18; Alan Gropman, "Air power in Vietnam: Lost Opportunities," paper delivered 17 January 1986, Raleigh, N.C., 39; George Keegan in The Lessons of Vietnam, ed. W. Scott Thompson and Danaldson Frezzell (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 143; Barry Goldwater, "Airpower in Southeast Asia," Congressional Record, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pt. 5:5346; Vietnam Settlement: Why 1973, Not 1969? (Washington, D.C., 1973), 190; Douglas Pike, "The Other Side," n. 77, and Alan Gropman, "Commentary: The Air War," 84 (both in Peter Braestrup, ed., Vietnam As History: Ten Years After the Paris Peace Accords [Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1984]).
  55. Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), 259.
  56. Porter, 137, 158-59.
  57. "Moorer on Airpower," Aviation Week, 17 September 1973, 7; Gropman, "Airpower," 39; Lewy, 414-15; Momyer, 243; Clodfelter, 131-32; Timothy Lomperis, The War Everyone Lost—And Won: America’s Intervention in Viet Nam’s Twin Struggles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 94; Porter, 136-37, 156-65; Vietnam Settlement, 120-21; Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 161-63.
  58. Kalb and Kalb, 418, 421-22; Arnold Isaacs, "Discussion,"in Braestrup, 87.
  59. It would be ahistorical to maintain, however, that the same terms could have been reached in October.

Contributor

Kenneth P. Werrell (USAFA: PhD, Duke University) is professor of history at Radford University, Virginia. His previous assignments include visiting associate professor (1977-78) at the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; visiting fellow (1981-83) at the Airpower Research Institute at Maxwell AFB, Alabama; and weather reconnaissance pilot in Japan. Dr. Werrell is the author of The Evolution of the Cruise Missile and the Eighth Air Force Bibliography. He is a previous contributor to the Air University Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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