Air University Review, January-March 1987
Since President Reagan’s initial announcement on 23 March 1983 of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as an alternative path to the strategic future, much has been written speculating on the transition to, and the role of, strategic defense (SD) in the years to come. This article offers an operational rather than a purely theoretical viewpoint of a strategic future in which defense by new technologies may play a role.
SDI is a research program to investigate the feasibility of ballistic missile defense (BMD) with the technologies that are emerging today. As such, SDI is essential for our strategic future in two ways. First, it will prepare us for a future in which more defense may be necessary to maintain deterrence. Second, it is accelerating the exploitation of technologies that can enhance all of our military forces. SDI is necessary and very useful in this regard.
The real debate in all of this centers on the decisions that will have to be made when SDI research has accomplished its objective. SDI is tasked to produce a potential system architecture for BMD that is cost-effective at the margin. To eliminate confusion in this discussion, I will term this system as elegant, or enhanced, BMD (EBMD). Decisions about deployment of EBMD will be entered into the overall Department of Defense (DOD) budgetary competition. It is an understatement to say that DOD budgeting is complex, convoluted, very competitive, subject to many external and internal pressures, and unpredictable for any given program. Strategic systems have the additional factor of high public visibility and extensive legislative debate. The future strategic debate factors are being shaped today.
Strategic factors are being formed by a confluence of events. Because of the lack of predictability of the outcome of these events, there is a natural tendency to treat the resultant factors in isolation. Unfortunately, this does not create an overall direction but leads to a reassessment of and a reaction to each new event. At a minimum, the factors include arms control treaties and initiatives; the status of strategic force capability; blurring between strategic and tactical force requirements; accelerating technology (potential, costs, and requirements); building requirements for space systems; EBMD potential and the associated air defense requirements; the budget and deficit; and an adversary who patiently works all the angles. These factors, in combination with others such as historical experiences and our national psyche, will determine our strategic future.
For now and the foreseeable future, strategic offense will provide the cornerstone of forces supporting the US deterrent strategy. We are currently receiving the initial manifestations of the President's Strategic Modernization Program, which is restoring the viability of our strategic forces. We have learned in the past 15 years that the strategic force capability must be maintained, even under negotiated treaty constraints, because the Soviets will continue to work at reducing its effectiveness. Thus, we must continue to maintain our strategic forces or their successors. Strategic defense, active and passive, is deeply embedded in the current programs. Passive strategic defense is represented by mobile and deceptive ballistic missiles––intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)–– continued assured positive control launch of the bomber force, and stealth technology. Active strategic defense is currently in the form of improved US antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability and some limited antisatellite (ASAT) capability.
SDI brings the high payoff potential of EBMD into the defensive discussion, with the Aircraft Defense Initiative (ADI) adding the absolutely essential compliment of air defense to EBMD. The strategic discussion centers on whether these proposed systems, considering both their cost and added military value, are required in addition to the current strategic programs. Complicating the argument for EBMD and air defense, even if they are found to be potentially cost-effective, is the historical evidence that deterrence supported by offensive forces has apparently worked and that deterrence based on defensive systems alone is at best an untested proposition. The most likely outcome is one of strategic offense and defense in combination.
The value of this combination has to be evaluated in the face of many uncertainties. Strategic force capability is perishable by the very nature of strategic force competition. Up to this point, we have relied on our Triad (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers); however, with the virtual explosion in certain technologies in the future, this may not be adequate. The consequence of the Soviets using to full advantage the technology explosion, especially in the medium of space, could be a rapid shift in the balance of power.
The Soviets pursue all angles of strategic offense and defense, including civil defense, while maintaining a numerically superior conventional force. They do this with a patience and diligence that gives new meaning to the tortoise-and-hare analogy. One can argue that some of their programs are cumbersome or not very effective, but the problem for us is that we cannot ignore these programs or systems, and the Soviets realize this. They maintain a "warm" base for programs in almost all areas, and this has great payoff as well as cost effectiveness. With their numerically superior force and broad-based research efforts, the Soviets can utilize technologies they have developed, or taken from the free world, to alter significantly the correlation of forces (COF) on many fronts. The technology explosion will offer the Soviets new opportunities to exploit, and their capability to deploy in space further exacerbates our problem.
Compounding our problem is the Soviet penchant for camouflage, concealment and deception, political and military misinformation, and special forces. New technologies used in these areas will further confuse our ability to predict correctly the outcome of engagements and the COF for our national leadership. The lack of confidence in COF predictions can result in coercion of the United States or, in conflict, the inability to gain control of the initiative from the Soviets.
As the initiator of a conflict, the Soviet Union would have initial control over surprise, initiative, and time lines of conflict--all of which would work significantly to its advantage. Control of conflict time lines would allow the Soviets to achieve expectations in coercion of forces before escalating or threatening to escalate the conflict. For example, by prolonging conventional phases of conflict, the Soviets could use ASW to destroy US nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) before escalation to nuclear conflict occurs. This could logically contribute to damage limitation as effectively as BMD. The Soviets realize that by stretching time lines, however, they may suffer reversals and loss of initiative. Heavy emphasis in technologies to accelerate ASW success would indicate tighter time-line control and positioning to be able to coerce the United States into submission prior to nuclear conflict. This would also give future Soviet BMD assets higher leverage, especially if weapon numbers are reduced by current arms control proposals. US strategic defenses, both active and passive, can mitigate these Soviet advantages. We may gain some insight into the approach and planning of the Soviets by observing where they dedicate their efforts and apply new technologies. We must remember that they will continue to approach the problem with a Soviet mindset that is incongruent with our motives and with our expectations for the future world.
The US approach to strategic forces and deterrence can be characterized as reluctant recognition of a necessary evil and is generally economically oriented. Because of this, we struggle with strategic offensive force procurement and eventually will face the same situation with EBMD and air defense. We very conscientiously decided, for economic reasons, to maintain nuclear deterrence in lieu of conventional superiority or parity. For economic and technical reasons, we dropped previous BMD and air defense systems for strategic offensive forces deterrence. Strategic offense has been our choice in the past and may well be in the future for similar economic and technical reasons. It even could be argued that strategic arms control and force reductions have economic underpinnings as well as moral grounds. We want the cost of our choice to be minimized.
Anyone who has argued for Peacekeeper, the B-1, the small ICBM (SICBM), or the advanced technology bomber (ATB) painfully understands several apparent things about the US psyche. In the United States, we strive to make our strategic systems perfect before we buy, wanting our investments to be minimized and to yield exacting results. These results have to be portrayed in the simplest, cleanest COF calculations with no fog of war allowed. A 50 percent effective system is alien to our psyche. We also tend to buy about one-half of what we start out to get; for example, the military requirements were for 200 Peacekeepers and 244 B-1s. We justify the systems for their lack of use, thus "hold at risk" replaces "destroy targets" and "deterrent value" supplants "military capability." Our society has avoided discussion of nuclear conflict and does not like the visible manifestations of our armament. This all has very ominous indications for the EBMD and air defense debate.
These influences will drive the expectations for EBMD and air defense to the impossible. The expectations will likely be for a 100 percent effective system that ends nuclear conflict forever, eliminates the need for strategic offense, has no visible basing in the United States, and maintains the "virginity" of space--all at 50 percent of the estimated cost. Many discussions will be extremely emotional. Unfortunately for those who argue for EBMD and air defense, the systems by their very nature will run counter to the aforementioned expectations.
Buying even 50 percent levels of stated military requirements of offensive forces can be viewed as adding bullets to your magazine--it still leaves you armed. EBMD and air defense, on the other hand, cannot meet capability expectations and have visible deficiencies due to reduced deployment and funding levels. Although a less than "full up" system would be militarily beneficial, it would not lead to the long-term moral objectives of a leakproof system; and if some potential for leakage exists, the perceived consequences will lead people to question why we are doing it at all.
The debate on whether to procure nuclear offensive systems is influenced by the destructive power of US nuclear weapons. EBMD and air defense, on the other hand, lacks such influence and raises the question of the continuing effectiveness of high-technology solutions in a very technologically competitive environment. EBMD will be less than 100 percent effective. Proving how effective it has to be will be subjective and a source of endless debate. (Try selling an expensive car that runs 70 percent of the time.) Strategic defenses by itself, cannot fill the requirement for future deterrence due to the inherent requirement in deterrence to threaten punishment; therefore, maintenance of the offense must be argued simultaneously with the promotion of EBMD and air defense.
In order to portray the effectiveness of strategic defense, the failure of nuclear deterrence needs to be discussed as a possibility. Tactics to counter the defensive technology, a library of scenarios, and the unknowns of Soviet technology will all be paraded through every audience who will listen. If the EBMD and air defense protagonists are successful in arguing these points and in convincing the antagonists, they may unwittingly enhance the potential for another undesirable outcome. By removing the total terror of nuclear conflict that reinforces deterrence today, conventional conflict, particularly between the superpowers, may become more likely.
In view of all of this, it is no wonder that we continue to cling to the hope of molding Soviet behavior. If they would just change, it would eliminate the need for this painful discussion. Unfortunately, our experience with this has been anything but reassuring. Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), past BMD, arms control, détente, and economic initiatives all reflect our past attempts at modifying Soviet behavior. We have altered their course of action in some cases, but they continued the new course of action with their own particular proclivities and idiosyncrasies. The results, therefore, were not necessarily what we predicted or desired. EBMD and air defense will be no different because the Soviets will react as Soviets and draw their own picture of the future strategic world.
In giving form and substance to the future strategic world, it helps to capture some general cases. In simplified terms, four cases, or worlds, come to mind.
The first world is the projected case of today's circumstances: numerically superior Soviet conventional forces, approximate parity in the number of nuclear weapons, the Soviets standing almost alone in the world of defenses, and no major technical breakthroughs. Maintenance of this status quo requires at a minimum that arms control treaties currently in the works be enacted and that there be absolute adherence to existing treaties. However, evolution of strategic offensive forces within treaty constraints will still occur on both sides. Working against continuation of the current status is the lack of treaty control over Soviet defense initiatives on all fronts. Their work in many technologies and our own SDI and ADI make the first world an unlikely future, as does the moral dilemma of nuclear war. Add to this the potential of space and we can safely assume that we will not be left where we are.
In the second world, the Soviets have convinced us to ignore the potential of SDI and ADI. This is the first world with Soviet EBMD and their air defense radically enhanced, and with no corresponding US systems. We cannot afford to be in this world, but it is where the Soviets want us to be.
The third world would be just as unpalatable to the Soviets as the second world would be to us. This is the world used in some strategic defense analyses under the scrutiny of the people worrying about transition phases. It is the world with US EBMD and air defense and with no comparable Soviet capability. It could be argued that because of their experiences in the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets could survive more comfortably in this world than could the United States in the second world. However, having dealt with strategic inferiority before, the experience has convinced them that a recurrence is not permissible.
The most likely future is in the fourth world. It would be the world where both sides have a form of EBMD, air defense, and strategic offensive forces. If the defenses are viable and not countered by offensive changes, it will be a world that also includes forces for attack of the opponent's defenses and as the counter to those forces. The form of the systems and style of combat will be radically altered by the technologies involved and by the space medium. Near-speed-of-light weapons will be side by side with missiles, airplanes, and advanced vehicles. Stealth technology will be further developed. Overall force structure may be smaller and mobility of ballistic missiles on the ground or in the oceans will be devalued. A clear strategic picture will be extremely elusive and a believable COF will be next to impossible. The demand for dollars for strategic assets will be accelerated.
EBMD and air defense procurement will come at a time of extreme stress on the military and national budget. The demands on the non-DOD portion of the budget will continue to expand. The burden of a continuing deficit will be heavier, and the temporary solution of inflation will be resisted because of its long-term implications. Even if DOD funding levels remain constant, other factors will stress the "bang-for-the-buck" factor with space and technology at the front of the list.
Until recently we procured systems for land, sea, and air warfare. We bought hardware for the 32 or 9 medium-to-medium combat environments (air-to-air, air-to-land, air-to-sea, sea-to-sea, and so on). Space, the fourth medium, is now a permanent and expanding factor in Soviet and US planning. The addition of this fourth medium nearly doubles (16 versus 9) the number of medium-to-medium environments for which we must be prepared, and space assets are expensive. It may be unreasonable to expect a correlative expansion in appropriations. The result will be either an overall thinning of the military force structure to pay for space or negligence of that medium, neither of which is a palatable alternative.
Compounding this are the rising technical requirements for systems to counter Soviet technology and numbers. The cost of new technology adds to the cost of research and systems, again leading to a thinning of the force structure. In this vicious cycle, less force structure leads to even more requirements on system capability, increasing system costs.
The offset to rising technical and capability requirements and cost will have to be the ability to utilize these assets in combined arms operations with multiple system tasking in many theaters of operation. If this happens, the distinction between strategic and tactical systems will blur, demanding operational versatility of high-technology systems in strategic and tactical missions with extreme speed from one theater to another or immediate access to many theaters--for example, space basing. Strategic defensive systems for sensing and for battle management will have to have capabilities for assisting in missions other than homeland defense.
Because of the economic factors, very capable strategic offense may again be suggested in deference to the offense/defense combination. After all, we have chosen that path before. Maintaining offensive capability will be required, and incremental monies applied to ensure capability may be more attractive than large sums of money for new defensive programs. There are competitive strategy benefits in continuing to modify our offense and to keep the Soviets spending on both defenses and offenses. The problem with this solution is that it has higher risk than when we chose it in the past. Soviet technology evolution for EBMD has the potential to negate mobile missile benefits--ICBM and SLBM--and holds at risk the majority of offensive assets we are building on today. Any shift to other offensive systems will be met by more elegant Soviet defenses.
A second alternative that comes to mind is procurement of defense-suppression systems to ensure offensive force effectiveness in lieu of defensive systems. Certainly if the United States deployed an EBMD and air defense system that was cost-effective at the margin, we would expect the Soviets to pursue counterdefensive systems rather than giving up. We may be faced with the same choice. Strategic offense plus counterdefense may be more economically attractive than offense and defense, especially in light of ultimately using counterdefense anyway. Unfortunately, neither alternative assures US ability to gain control of the time lines of conflict and initiative in the fourth world.
Dealing with the fourth world will require a strategy. There are currently many efforts to create a defensive strategy. This is an awesome task because EBMD and air defense systems do not exist, so their contribution cannot be evaluated. Unfortunately, our current strategy has recently been mislabeled as offensive. What we actually have is a deterrent strategy that is sound, and we have chosen to support it with offensive systems. Our current strategy could be well served by offensive and defensive systems in combination. However, until there is a defensive system to evaluate, the search for a defensive strategy may only be so much running to the port rail to give the indication that the ship is changing direction.
What is more important in the near-term is a sound evaluation of operational tactics and strategies for strategic offense and defense that will work to maintain escalation control, deter nuclear conflict, prevent coercion, and preserve the ability to terminate conflict in the fourth world. We will have to continue to ensure that the Soviets believe the nuclear option is a nonoption so that if conflict at lower levels cannot be prevented, at least escalation is avoided. Current arms control efforts, however, may serve to complicate deterrence in the future.
At the risk of sounding heretical, I believe that the current approach in strategic arms control reduction efforts may make conflict between the superpowers more likely in the fourth world. It does not control comparative defense systems on both sides. ASW, air defense, and BMD should be reduced in proportion to the opposing side's offensive forces to maintain stability and preserve the nuclear war option as a nonoption. Apparently, the Soviets realize the relationship between arms reductions and the viability of their defenses. This, coupled with an apparent fixation by the United States on total numbers of weapons rather than relative measures and with the fact that there are fewer strategic targets in the United States, makes the potential Soviet benefits outweigh the losses in weapons through arms reductions. It also reduces the economic burden of maintaining many old systems. In the future, much better defenses and less offensive weapons for the Soviets reduce the escalatory risks of involving themselves in tactical conventional conflict with the United States. If US SDI can be killed in the bargain, so much the better.
Whatever the outcome of arms reduction efforts, our strategic offensive forces will have to maintain the military capability to uphold the structure of deterrence that keeps the United States and Soviet Union militarily disengaged. The current bargaining should take into account the value of offensive and defensive systems in the fourth world to create a solution that is not just good for today's world but also for the future.
Today it is often said that EBMD has the potential to devalue ballistic missiles, the forgotten phrase being "land- and sea-based" ballistic missiles. This statement is straightforward and appears to be sound but it misses some key logic. A stated purpose of EBMD in warfighting would be to stretch out the time lines of conflict. I must admit that stretching time lines of conflict by introducing near-speed-of-light weapons appears a bit incongruous, so I will restate this to say that it is intended to stretch out the ballistic missile phases of conflict by making barrage launches impractical. What then will be the value of offensive systems in this environment?
SLBM weapons are a sizable portion of the US, not the Soviet, force structure. In the fourth world, their value will be significantly altered. The missiles themselves will be held at risk by EBMD and the submarines by ASW. Even the most conservative submariner should feel there will be a drastic change in the ability to detect submarines by the year 2000. He would also recognize that submarines can be attacked in conventional as well as nuclear phases of conflict. The current Soviet and US arms control proposals could trap the United States in an SLBM-heavy force that may be good for now but bad for the future. IF US ballistic missiles are held until EBMD attrition takes place, there could be more opportunity for the Soviets to attack our boats, with a resultant loss of 24 missiles per boat destroyed. This can radically and quickly alter the balance of power.
ICBM weapons are a sizable portion of the Soviet force structure and the smallest portion of that of the United States. It is true that in the first hours of a fourth-world conflict they would have reduced value. As the conflict wears on and EBMD is attrited by defense suppression, however, they will increase in value if maintained survivable by active and passive defenses. ICBMs may well end up being the most valuable offensive asset in the later phases of a conflict. Certainly a robust ASAT capability, such as a ground-based laser, could be invaluable in maintaining SSBN and land-mobile ICBM survivability during the defense-attrition phases of future conflict.
Air-breathing forces in the future will have combinations of the features of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and stealth. All tend to reduce the value of EBMD and to significantly raise the cost of air defense. The new attributes of stealth and increased speed also change the time lines of conflict and potential for surprise. Strategic bombers may well be the key to both conventional and nuclear phases of conflict in the fourth world. A logical outcome of our current arms control position is to move the Soviets toward an aircraft-heavier force structure. But given their advantages in air defense and our geographic vulnerability to cruise missiles, this may give them enormous future advantage. Prompt bomber weapons may replace some missions currently filled by ballistic missiles. Missiles may be held for longer-term conflict, thus the value of active and passive defenses.
We have a chance to premeditate an integrated approach for our strategic future, but we cannot afford for it to be a near-term future. It must account for our legitimate defense requirements but also be tempered with our psyche, mentality, and historical choices. It must presume that Soviet behavior will remain consistent and that deterrence will have to be maintained. We must plan for a strategic future that will include the strategic offensive Triad (SLBMs, bombers, and ICBMs), the strategic defensive Triad (ASW, air defense, and EBMD), strategic defense countermeasures, and space systems for the Soviets and the United States. Affordability and arms control have the potential to modify any one of these facets. But they should be pursued in a balanced approach toward offense and defense to ensure the vitality of deterrent forces to reduce the likelihood of conventional as well as nuclear conflict. The assets have to be evaluated in the fourth world, not the next decade. New technologies must be broadly applied for maximum potential and affordability, with combined arms operations being more than an afterthought. We must continue to investigate technologies that may be useful in defense of or attack on satellites and be better prepared for the future in space. Comprehensive long-term funding strategies must be developed under realistic defense budgets.
There are currently several opportunities that we should exploit. The Air Force has recently completed Project Forecast II to determine key technologies and programs for the future. Such a program for the entire DOD would provide the incentive and direction to more economically exploit new technologies for all military applications. The DOD reorganization may help provide the focus for higher technology arms development programs for combined arms use. It can also help iron out the affordability issue. Recent arms control fervor and the pressure for an agreement can be exploited using a realistic future viewpoint. Reasonable arms reductions that leave a balanced Triad can provide a numerically constrained offensive maintenance program which hopefully will keep offense expenditures at a consistent level. We might use the Soviet desire to control SDI development as leverage to control all strategic defensive systems numbers, but we should not limit technology development--the US trump card. The topic of defensive arms control could be exploited to evoke rational discussions at the national level of all strategic defenses and their role in protecting the United States and our allies as well as enhancing deterrence. Armed with such opportunities, we can forge a pragmatic strategic future for the United States.
Offutt AFB, Nebraska
Maj Timothy E. Kolter (BAS, Miami University) is a future force structure analyst, Director of Plans, Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He has served as a missile combat crew and missile wing emergency war order instructor at Minot AFB, North Dakota, as a single integrated operations plan programmer, Offutt AFB, and a force structure analyst at Headquarters USAF Studies and Analysis.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.