Air University Review, September-October 1986
When I first heard that quotation several years ago at Air War College, it didn't mean much at the time, as I had been busy flying airplanes for the previous seventeen years. Since the phrase was catchy enough, it always stuck in the back of my mind, but it wasn't until my tour on the Air Staff that those words began to have real meaning. Here I found that it clearly portrays the dilemma facing policymakers and decisionmakers in establishing priorities and requirements for new weapon systems. What follows is intended to amplify the wide-ranging impact of that quotation, explore briefly Soviet and U.S. approaches to fielding new technology, and provide some diverse views and food for thought.
What the unnamed Soviet general officer was saying in effect is that holding out for something better to come along on the horizon will be in conflict with what is already on the books and sufficient to do the job. At first blush, many research and development advocates might find this quotation somewhat offensive since it appears to fly in the face of promoting technological advances. But in one simple sentence, it brings to light the perplexity of choices and alternatives confronting the entire defense community in the application of new technology.
To the Soviets, this quotation has been part of their doctrine in fielding weapon systems. The Soviets see system evolution as a continuous stream in which new subsystems can be mated to proven components in an endless chain of updating and modifying. They are more likely to pursue a course of progressive modification than one of dramatic innovation. In their view, equipment that is complex in operation or fragile in design will be of littleuse under stressful conditions of combat. A 1985 Washington Post article stated that some U.S. logisticians have expressed those same concerns: "They fret that their delicate construct of computers, dust-free repair labs, and ocean-spanning supply lines will collapse in the smoke of battle."1 The most pervasive characteristic of Soviet technology is aversion to risk when it comes to designing new weapons-they value stability, security, and conservatism.
Since World War II, the United States has believed that it could develop sufficient technological superiority to compensate for Soviet numerical superiority. Even today, the Soviets continue to stress numerical strength while striving for technological comparability; neither requires acceptance of great risk or uncertainty. But it appears that the Soviet Union is narrowing the U.S. lead in weapons technology faster than predicted. In an interview with the Washington Times last year, General Lawrence A. Skantze stated: "It's not just the issue of quantity any more; it's also the issue of improved quality in the systems that they are putting out in the field."2 In response to Soviet advances in technology, General Skantze initiated Project Forecast II-a look into the next ten to twenty years to determine what technology the U.S. Air Force must develop to stay ahead of the Soviet threat. Project Forecast II is attempting to reestablish the technological lead in what the Air Force perceives to be principal high-payoff areas.
In contrast with the Soviet approach to systems acquisition, the American approach accepts quantitative inferiority while demanding superior technical performance, together with its inherent uncertainty and risk. General Skantze has commented on the subject of technological risks and our approach.
I'd like to add that as a result of having to develop technological leverage and maintaining it, we do push the state of the art, there's no question. But we push it in a deliberate way, though we're not trying to invent things on schedule. We push it in a way that there are risks, and there are technical problems that have to be solved. But if they become the basis on which no decisions are made, then I think we're just undercutting the very leverage that we depend on to beat a quantitatively superior threat. The public needs to understand that our counter to quantitatively superiority is technical leverage which we get from staying ahead of the Soviets. In order to do that, we've got to take some risks, but on a prudent basis, and we've got to expect some technical problems, but ones we can solve.3
Technology has been received by the West as its only alternative in compensating for the increased numbers of Soviet military equipment. This reliance on technology has evolved over the years into U.S. development of weapon systems that are termed "force multipliers"––to account for the Soviet quantitative superiority.
What is the Soviet view of U.S. technological leverage? In a series of statements made during a frank interview that was published in the Red Star on 9 May 1984, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in a major conflict (since using such weapons would be suicidal) and articulated his conclusion that conventional weapons are crucial to the future military equation.4 The Soviet military faces a major window of vulnerability into the next century as the West continues to modernize with a new generation of conventional "smart" weapons.5 As a result, resentment among the Soviet citizenry will grow against a military that cannot keep up with the West, while the military will become more convinced that the civilians are destroying their capacity to defend themselves.
One result of the U.S. approach is a focus on achieving extraordinary jumps in system capability. Although the United States may await realization of technical capability for such jumps, it may not really be capable of matching Soviet quantitative superiority solely through the application of advanced technology. Technical sophistication does not guarantee mission effectiveness. Sophisticated aircraft with impressive capabilities may offer significant potential, but the extent to which that potential can be realized will depend heavily on the way aircraft are employed in combat.
Because the U.S. military frequently develops replacement items as discrete products which are budgeted and justified with the rationale that their predecessors are on the verge of obsolescence, a vicious circle involving priorities and fiscal defense budget realities not uncommonly results. As military dependency on advanced technology increases, it drives the requirements for technical performance upward. These additional performance criteria, in turn, drive costs upward, tending to constrain the quantities that can be procured. Reduced quantities further increase dependence on high technical performance. This whole process often results in overdesign against the threat by incorporating impressive capabilities of questionable practical value.
How many times have you seen a statement of "need" that was based more on technological feasibility than on performance spread or capability actually called for by most real mission demands? How much of an aircraft's performance range is essential for mission needs, and how much may be merely a product of routine overdesigning? In a 1985 Rand paper on fighter force planning, Benjamin S. Lambeth was convinced that "excessively technical threat portrayals can yield serious imbalances between our perceived operational 'requirements' and our actual needs for most real world contingencies."6 A major share of our new weapon systems comes from technological breakthrough (opportunity) rather than from a mission "need."
It is important to keep two forms of technology application in mind. One, commonly referred to as the "technological imperative," incrementally improves weapon systems as the technological opportunity presents itself. The other, more complex form is advanced technology that defines possible new military strategies, equipment, application, or institutional structure and offers revolutionary changes to our traditional way of doing business.7 The current Strategic Defense Initiative is a classic example of the potential that advanced technology has on changing military concepts and doctrine drastically.
In his book titled Military Reform––The High Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces, Colonel Walter Kross concluded that the "Reformers" deemphasize or simply discount justified combat tasks to argue their case against high-technology weapons. The Reformers believe that we should field a day/fair-weather fighter force and limit air attacks to the immediate battlefield. The Reformers in their choice of "brilliantly simple" technology for weapons have no time for TACAIR functions aimed at preventing or altering land battles. But Kross argues, "In the process the Reformer leaves serious gaps, clearly evident gaps, for the Soviet Planner to exploit."8 To emphasize his point further, Colonel Kross adds:
How would NATO Planners feet if Soviet Planners were willing to forfeit what our own American Reformers would abandon in an effort to refute overly complex weapons and attendant combat tasks? I think our NATO Planners would be elated to hear that Soviet aircraft would avoid night/bad weather operations, that they would abandon air intercept radars and longer-range radar missiles, that they would not attack our airbases or suppress our air defenses, that they would not conduct countercommand and control operations, and that they would not try to 'interdict our logistics as we attempted to reinforce front-line Army units. Instead, Soviet TACAIR would only concentrate on close support of advancing Soviet armor and maintaining air superiority over Soviet airspace and the battlefield in day/visual conditions.9
Does anyone ever practice the "good enough" principle? President Carter applied it in 1977 when he canceled the B-1 bomber program. He believed that current B-52s, modified and equipped with nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), were "good enough" for our nuclear deterrent posture at the time. Was he right in doing so? Only time will tell the validity of his decision. Clearly because of his cancellation decision, we are now procuring fewer (100 rather than 244), much more capable B-1Bs for approximately the same costs. To a lesser extent, the modification community practices the "good enough" principle, for it is this group that is charged with modifying our older, less capable weapon systems to the point of being "good enough" to meet the threat until new systems can be fielded.
It is obvious that, at some point in time, one must modernize his weapon systems. But when? Should we wait for high technology that is on or just beyond the horizon, or should we proceed with proven technology? The question is difficult, and the answer lies somewhere between that of a current meld and future technology applications. In an interview with the Advanced Technology Fighter (ATF) program manager, Colonel Albert Piccirillo, Aviation Week and Space Technology, reported:
The danger now is in not being bold enough and coming out with an aircraft that the threat will be able to overcome in four to five years. We want to come out with something that will put us 10 years ahead of the Russians.10
The question facing decisionmakers then becomes a matter involving unknowns: Can this technological breakthrough we've been waiting on truly compound our adversaries' defensive problems, or can it be easily defeated by enemy adaptations?
Currently we are signing up to no more than 100 B-1B bombers in the hopes that stealth technology will permit the development of the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB). Benjamin F. Schemmer commented on the House and Senate agreement to have the Defense Department report ATB costs by February 1986: "Stealth critics suggest that that language is a foot in the door to challenge ATB's technical uncertainties and huge costs, and thus continue production of Rockwell's B-1B bomber."11 In discussing problems in AMRAAM air-to-air missile development, Schemmer stated:
Air Force Systems Command coerced the contractor, Hughes Aircraft, into accepting a $421-million development contract and a 50-month schedule to invent a complex missile incorporatng launch-and-leave radar technology into a small, seven-inch tube weighing under 350 lbs. After investing $250-million of its own money, Hughes (and the Air Force) found that the laws of physics and fundamental economics were not compatible with artificial clocks.12
As a nation, we expect so much promise out of our future technology and keep telling ourselves that we can eventually realize it, resulting in large amounts of concurrency between research and development and production in order to field a weapon system as quickly as possible. Many systems are fielded with the knowledge that they will require modification and upgrading at some later date, either because funding was insufficient or technology was unavailable to develop the full capability. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's decision to cancel the Army's air defense gun, DIVAD, was prompted by the gun's incapability to meet the military threat effectively. The General Accounting Office and other critics of the DIVAD had charged that the technology behind the project was faulty, but the gun was ordered into production anyway before a complete operational test and evaluation of the system.
What if the "better than" technology never materializes or the Soviets find a simple solution to defeat something like stealth aircraft technology? Then we often find ourselves left with a new weapon system that is a series of compromises in order to field a system "better than." On the other hand, one could probably argue that everything we do in the defense business is merely a continuous series of compromises based on current fiscal realities.
It becomes obvious that "Better Than Is the Enemy of Good Enough" leads directly into the "quantity versus quality" debate that has been raging for years between the military-industrial complex and "military reformers" from all sectors of American society. In his 1985 Rand paper on fighter force planning, Lambeth discussed this debate in considerable detail and concluded that, with all things considered, the issue is not really about quantity versus quality at all:
The real issue is how much 'quality'; across what performance spectrum, in what force mix, numerical strength, and sustainability, do we need to give us our desired mission-effectiveness for most plausible scenarios at a cost we can afford? 13
On the other hand, lack of confidence that U.S. technical sophistication can offset Soviet numerical superiority places excessive emphasis on the well-known tendency to stress "rubber on the ramp," while deferring future investments to some later date.
As much as our technology application in the defense business is open to debate by critics and reformers alike, we fully recognize that it is not a perfect system. Without some acceptance of risk in our weapons development program, we could find ourselves facing similar problems reported of the Soviets. Harley D. Balzer, a historian and close observer of Soviet science and technology applications, stated that their system is not as well off as it may appear to the West. According to Balzar recent Jewish émigrés from Russia have reported a scientific community characterized by growing corruption, declining quality, and personal rivalries; they further portray the Soviet system as extremely resistant to reform, providing little encouragement for innovation, and characterized by shortsighted goals that discourage adoption of new processes.14 While many of these reports are probably not totally unbiased views, they provide us with insight about an otherwise closed Soviet system. Because the Soviets place a high priority on secrecy, the exchange of ideas and presence of competition that enable science and technology to thrive are often absent. As a result, Soviets lose the technological opportunity that flourishes in our society under a free enterprise system.
Given all the complex issues related to them, resource allocation decisions involve hard choices. These choices all revolve around program funding and budgeting. The budget process is an organized decisionmaking process that involves complex considerations, multiple and diverse views, and timely consensus to achieve Air Force objectives. No one functional element, expert, or specialist can claim adequate competency to make all these decisions; resource allocation is everyone's business. Throughout this trying process, whether he realizes it consciously or not, the Soviet general's quotation will remain in the back of the decisionmaker's mind as he weighs the evidence and casts his vote.
Hq USAF
Notes
1. Washington Post, 18 August 1985.
2. Washington Times, 27 August 1985.
3. Deborah G. Meyer and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Interview with General Lawrence A. Skantze, USAF, Commander, Air Force Systems Command," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1985, p. 64.
4. Red Star, "The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day," Interview with Marshal Ogarkov, 9 May 1985, First Edition, pp. 2-3.
5. Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Decision-Making on Defense," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 1985, p. 87.
6. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Pitfalls in Fighter Force Planning," P-7064 (Santa Monica, California: Rand, February 1985), p. 7.
7. Jacques Gansler, "The US Technology Base: Problems and Prospects," in Technology, Strategy and National Security, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta and Ralph Sanders (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985), pp. 109-11.
8. Walter Kross, Military Reform––The High Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 188.
9. Ibid., p. 189.
10. "USAF to Request Demonstration/Validation Proposals on Advanced Tactical Fighter," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 August 1985, p. 24.
11. Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Dark Horizons for the U.S. Air Force?" Armed Forces Journal International, September 1985, p. 86.
12. Ibid., p. 88.
13. Lambeth, p. 5.
14. Harley D. Balzer, "Is Less More? Soviet Science in the Gorbachev Era," Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 1985, p. 39.
Colonel Richard H. Graham (B.A., Akron University; M.A., Pepperdine University) is 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Vice Commander, Beale AFB, California. He haas been Director of Program Integration, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; a T-37 instructor pilot and an SR-71 instructor pilot; a standardization evaluation division chief; and 1st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron commander. Colonel Graham's assignments have included Kadena AB, Japan; Udorn and Korat RTAFB, Thailand; and Hq USAF. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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