Air University Review, November-December 1986
By every measurement, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a world power of awesome dimensions. From the Ukraine to Kamchatka, it is the world's largest country, a distinction Russia has held for four centuries. Today the U.S.S.R. can stand alone as a nation self-sufficient in resources, and it can stand with any nation in the sophistication of its diplomacy, in the level of its culture, and, more pertinent to our interests, in its military power.
Any number of defense journals, DOD publications, and official briefings remind us of the dimensions of "The Threat." In numbers of divisions, ships, planes, and other hardware, the U.S.S.R. stacks up as a leading military power. How we deal with that threat lies at the very center of what professional officers are about.
In the U.S. Air Force, we put too much emphasis on the hardware aspect of "The Threat." Certainly, the MiGs, Tupolevs, and Sukhois fielded by the Soviet air force are fine examples of aeronautical accomplishment. In fact, they are nearly as good as our best. What's more, the Soviets produce this very good stuff in extraordinary numbers. For quite some time now, nearly thirty Backfires a year have been rolling off Soviet production lines. The challenge is to prepare to fight an enemy that outnumbers and outguns us. Our best, indeed our only, chance for success is to outthink this worthy adversary. Deterrence is a political philosophy. Our job is to fight and to win. While deterrence "works," we must constantly prepare to practice our profession.
At the heart of the military profession is the art of war. The Soviets seem to understand that better than we do. By the time a Soviet officer advances to the higher ranks, he has spent far more time in professional military schools studying this art than his American counterpart. This poses an intellectual threat that is as real as the threat posed by wings of fighters and bombers, and if we are going to meet that threat, we have to do a better job of preparing our minds for war. The study of the art of war must be at the heart of our military education, providing the foundation for all that we study and think about. Understanding the budgeting, OER, promotion, and assignment systems is secondary to mastering the art of war.
To thoroughly understand war, one has to first understand history. The foundation of our profession is not to be found in engineering or technology. It is our past that has determined what we are all about as an institution, and an understanding of our past and present will help us chart where we may be going in the future.
The intellectual threat is one that must be met and overcome. There are no alternatives. The Soviets have numerical superiority and technological parity. Our best chance for winning does not lie in regaining the "technological high ground." After all, we held more than a technological edge in Korea and Vietnam ... and lost. If and when we go up against the Soviets, we had better have mastered the art of war; otherwise history will be on their side, and that is precisely what we will be—history.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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