Air University Review, November-December 1986

The Strategy of the Indirect
Approach Applied to NATO

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Dalecky

For nearly twenty years, war in Europe has been deterred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategy of flexible response. Flexible response means NATO forces must be able to conduct conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear

operations effectively enough to deter a Warsaw Pact incursion into NATO territory and, if deterrence fails, to end the conflict quickly on terms favorable to the member NATO nations. Implicit in these favorable terms is the recovery of any lost NATO territory.

Until recently, the essence of deterrence for NATO rested with the decided superiority of the strategic nuclear forces of the United States over those of the Soviet Union. This fact logically led NATO to declare that any conventional attack would bring swift first use of theater nuclear weapons with prompt escalation, if necessary, to attacks against the Soviet homeland. Deterrence was a fait accompli since the Soviets could not risk strategic exchange on such unfavorable terms. But as strategic superiority has slowly become strategic parity, NATO finds itself equally deterred from initiating nuclear warfare. This is true despite what the individual NATO member governments might wish to believe. The fact is that in the event of armed conflict with the Warsaw Pact, NATO governments will be "overwhelmed by what they had quietly known all along, that NATO's strategy for 'first use' was not compatible with the loss of America's nuclear superiority."¹

In light of this shift in what the Soviets would term the correlation of forces, conventional strategy should logically take on a new importance for NATO if war in Europe is still to be deterred. This has not occurred. My purpose is to delineate what NATO conventional warfighting strategy should be and what force planning implications this strategy might infer.

NATO conventional strategy is built on intentions rather than capability. The forward positioning of NATO corps along the intraGerman/Czechoslovakian border (the "layer cake") is politically designed to demonstrate the intentions of the member nations who do not border the Warsaw Pact. It commits these nations ipso facto to respond militarily to a Warsaw Pact incursion. As a secondary benefit, it provides a framework for a forward defense that will ostensibly destroy Warsaw Pact forces as they attempt to establish offensive momentum, thus preserving the integrity of NATO territory.² But is such an operational plan the correct one in light of the recent emerging strategy of the Warsaw Pact? Jacquelyn Davis of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis has rightly stated that "discussions in Western Europe about Alliance strategy fail to consider the implications for NATO planning of the changes that have taken place in the Euro-strategic environment."³ Deterrence for NATO, after all, must depend on how Warsaw Pact political and military leaders view the situation. Of equal importance is the implementation of a truly credible defense should deterrence fail.

The Soviet Union has declared that it will not resort to the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe. This declaration could simply be propaganda and disinformation. For several reasons, not the least of which is the significant nuclear capability of NATO, Soviet desire to keep a conflict at the conventional level is real. The Soviets are realists who understand that the risks of theater, which to them is strategic, nuclear exchange are not worth what potentially might be gained.⁴ The latest analysis of Soviet strategy in Europe indicates that they are developing operational concepts designed to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. What's more, they intend to take the nuclear option away from NATO. The risk they perceive in a nuclear exchange is certainly not mitigated just because that exchange is initiated by NATO!

New developments in operational capability, backed up by fielded equipment upgrades, indicate the Soviets are striving to ensure the Warsaw Pact will be able to control and win a conventional conflict in Europe. These developments are designed to increase the speed, maneuver, and firepower of Warsaw Pact forces. The operational maneuver group (OMG), employed at a theater level, is the embodiment of this developing concept.

The OMG in its various forms and sizes is designed to probe the front and then go through and around NATO’s forward defense, not only taking away NATO's hope for a purely conventional victory but also denying NATO the nuclear option. The concept depends on highly mobile and powerful forces that will be inserted into NATO rear areas as early in the conflict as possible. Objectives for OMGs will not only be assets critical to the prosecution of the conventional war but also those which will prevent NATO’s nuclear response—the capture or destruction of nuclear warheads and the means to deliver them. The goal for OMGs is to operate in lucrative rear areas where NATO political leaders could never think of authorizing the use of nuclear weapons even if the capability to do so remained.⁵

An equally important mission of OMGs will be to bypass NATO's forward defensive positions and forces rapidly. Such operations are designed to exploit NATO's weaknesses and avoid NATO's strengths. Once in rear areas where defense is decidedly more difficult to orchestrate (at least under current NATO plans), OMGs can encircle the "forward defenders" thereby effectively erasing them from the order of battle while preserving offensive momentum. Soviet military doctrine has conceptualized the conflict in Central Europe as the westward movement of multiple fronts (in NATO terminology, army groups), with unprecedented speed and concentration, with the objective of arriving at the English Channel before U.S. strategic reserves can be mobilized to the continent.⁶ While this appears to be an unrealistic goal, the growing strategy mismatch of NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact, coupled with weakening of the nuclear leg of flexible response should be matters of grave concern for the alliance, particularly its Central European members. C. N. Donnelly states it succinctly:

It would appear then that Soviet operational art is striving to bring together strategy and capability. Highly mobile forces supported by massed artillery and a heavy commitment of modern frontal and theater tactical air assets are capabilities the Soviets have been building toward for years. One has a myriad of "bean counts" to turn to for corroboration.⁸ The fallacy of current NATO strategy is that it is not based on a true warfighting capability in face of these new Soviet initiatives. What NATO must develop is not a strategy that will counter Soviet forces but one which will counter Soviet strategy.

Any viable strategy must address the enemy's strategic concept first. Then the correct application of force can be determined. If we accept the fact that NATO conventional capability is critical to overall deterrence in Europe (which is by no means universally accepted), then such capability must be so oriented that it will counter the Soviet operational scheme—not play into its hands. The Soviets will be deterred only if the outcome of their strategy is in doubt.

NATO's forward defense is designed to discover the location of the enemy's main attacks and then bring forces to bear to destroy Warsaw Pact targets; thus, slowing momentum and wresting the initiative from the enemy while preparing to counterattack. The 1982 version of the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 characterized this scheme of defense as static, terrain-oriented, and, necessarily, relying "primarily on firepower from fixed positions."⁹ Nearly 75 percent of NATO combat ground forces and significant tactical air assets are committed to this task. But if the Soviets can concentrate quickly and push highly mobile forces through weaknesses in the front created by massive firepower supported by airborne and airmobile operations (the OMG concept!) then the forward defense cannot function. Using Soviet calculus, the outcome of the war is not in doubt. A linear disposition of available forces, even such a high percentage as currently planned by NATO, cannot to any acceptable probability prevent Warsaw Pact forces from achieving the mass necessary for the insertion of OMGs.

Since Soviet strategy is based on maneuver and surprise, it is on these principles that NATO strategy must concentrate. This means that NATO forces must modify what Dr. Steven L. Canby calls their "operational style."¹⁰ If sufficient force cannot be concentrated linearly for firepower and attrition to be effective, then the objective must be changed. The strategic objective should be to take the initiative from the enemy by dislocating the organization of his attack, disrupting his scheme of maneuver, and neutralizing the power of his forces.¹¹ How can this be done?

The goal of Warsaw Pact forces is to operate in lucrative rear areas, unopposed by significant forces. What if OMGs faced the threat of powerful NATO forces deployed throughout rear areas? What if, through ruse and deception coupled with highly maneuverable operational reserves supported with coordinated fires and tactical air power, the attacking OMG commander could never be sure his force retained cohesion, his supplies were intact, and his routes of advance and retreat were secure? What if NATO's disposition of forces, still comprised of multinational formations to preserve the character of the alliance, were arrayed nowhere but, in the mind of the attacker, seemingly everywhere? What if Soviet forces were made to eat the "layer cake" in large pieces rather than to simply slice through it? The attainment of OMG objectives and Warsaw Pact strategic goals would then, certainly, be in doubt!

Dislocating the attack of OMGs will require both physical and psychological methods. Once the attack axes of OMGs are discovered (a significant task in itself), NATO operational reserve and tactical air assets will have to move quickly to counterattack. These counterattacks might have as an initial goal the separation of artillery and air defense from the OMG. This task can be accomplished through the use of improved surveillance efforts coupled with counterbattery and suppression of enemy air defense fires and the application of tactical air against both enemy capabilities. Mobility of NATO forces will be critical. To facilitate this movement, ground forces will need initially to be deployed in and around critical points most likely to be OMG objectives within rear areas. These forces cannot be, in the classic sense, assembled to await orders to counterattack. Rather, they must have mission-type orders and be prepared to attack almost instantaneously with the discovery of the presence of mobile Warsaw Pact forces. For instance, it may be tactically wise to preestablish artillery support so that fires can be brought to bear immediately at significant depths throughout the main battle area. Such a "checkered square" deployment of defensive forces was successfully used early in World War II in the British North African campaign against mobile elements of Rommel’s Afrika Korps.¹²

Tactical air assets, including attack helicopters, will play a decisive role in such engagements primarily due to the flexibility and responsiveness they provide. Air superiority will remain critical to success. NATO mobile reserve ground forces cannot hope to move quickly enough to dislocate enemy forces unless they are essentially free from air attack. It is somewhat likely that the Soviets will devote significant air power to cover OMGs. And it is quite possible that large air battles will rage about most OMB incursions. NATO defensive counterair and attack air assets will have to be at a very high state of alert, possibly even airborne, in order to respond rapidly to the axis of OMB movement. Tactical air power’s most critical mission will be to facilitate the maneuverability of NATO forces and deny the maneuverability of Warsaw Pact forces.

Psychologically dislocating the enemy will be just as important. Camouflage, concealment, and deception should take on new importance. If NATO forces are to be moved from vulnerable and ineffectual forward positions, the Soviets must never know the areas that have been thinned, for it is exactly where they would choose to strike. Instead, the main battle area should seem to have—through camouflage, concealment, and deception—extensive cohesiveness and more forces arrayed than the attacker could hope to deal with. Electronic warfare will have decisive potential. Actual command electronic signatures would be carefully concealed while bogus deception signals would be regularly emitted.

Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong has stated that, ". . .our strategies ought to seek this as their principal object—the mind of the opposing commander."¹³ This emphasis can best be manifested by attacking the enemy along the "line of least expectation." The attacking commander must be made to feel suddenly trapped by the quick maneuver and surprise of the opposing NATO forces.¹⁴ While this might be accomplished by direct assault, a more devastating psychological effect can be produced by cutting deep into the attackers flanks and lines of communication. There is, of course, nothing revolutionary about such an approach. However, it seems questionable that effective flank and rear attacks could be carried out when the high percentage of NATO forces are arrayed along the border in forward defensive positions; especially, if operational maneuver groups can rapidly bypass these forces. In May 1940, French defensive doctrine was based on a similar scheme. French forces were linearly deployed, with very few reserves, along almost the entire border with Germany; but particularly in Belgium where it was expected that the main thrust would come. Instead, highly mobile, mechanized forces struck through Luxembourg and were quickly into the heart of France. The defense was never able to maneuver and concentrate effectively enough to neutralize the German columns.

Disruption of the Warsaw Pact scheme of maneuver will require an understanding of the attacker’s vulnerabilities. In the case of OMGs, exploitation of vulnerabilities can be especially fruitful for NATO. Execution of a quick breakthrough by Soviet forces will require careful coordination and synchronization. Psychological and electronic warfare by NATO can, again, prove to be of tremendous value. Soviet automated procedures and reliance on operational algorithms will provide significant opportunities for disruption. The Soviets will use the cover of night to speed incremental advances through prepared defenses. NATO must be better prepared to fight at night. Obstacles, especially rivers, will have to be crossed quickly. Wherever possible, NATO forces should be prepared to exploit such hesitations in the OMG’s momentum. Artillery support will be absolutely critical to OMGs.¹⁵ In fact, the ability of NATO to nullify the firepower of Warsaw Pact artillery effectively could prove to be the proverbial "war-stopper."

In order to neutralize the Warsaw Pact attack finally, its follow-on support must ultimately be denied. This includes not only logistics but also follow-on combat forces. The current concept of follow-on forces attack (FOFA) should be part of NATO plans in conjunction with providing effective dislocation and disruption of operational maneuver groups. It makes little sense to carry the light to the enemy's rear areas without first (or at least simultaneously) neutralizing the forces present in your area. Nevertheless, it is of critical importance that deep attacks against support and follow-on forces seize the initiative from the attacker, the ultimate operational goal. Seizing the initiative is a prerequisite to the development of favorable political alternatives that can lead to termination of the conflict on terms favorable to NATO.

It is in Warsaw Pact rear areas that force ratios mean the least and the principles of maneuver and surprise can most completely be applied. NATO must strive to attack effectively first. This does not insinuate preemptive strategy. On the contrary, it would be unwise for NATO to be anything other than a defensive alliance. However, once Warsaw Pact forces have crossed into the NATO territory, there can be no rational reason for allowing a sanctuary to remain. By the same token, planning for such an eventuality should not irritate the sensitivities of alliance governments. As Samuel Huntington states, "there is ... no reason why a politically defensive alliance cannot have a militarily offensive strategy."¹⁶ NATO should be prepared to cross into Warsaw Pact territory in order to take necessary steps to neutralize the forces already in place on NATO soil and create political leverage to force the Soviet Union to negotiate termination of the conflict. Again, such attacks need not (and should not) be frontal assaults against strong Warsaw Pact reserves. Rather, in addition to deep attacks already envisioned in the FOFA concept, raids might be accomplished by infiltrators playing on the political paranoia of leadership, by saboteurs against fragile communications linkups, by attacks against nuclear, ammunition, and fuel storage sites but, most important, against the lines of least expectation where the element of surprise can best be exploited.

U.S. AirLand Battle doctrine has been dangerously evolving away from the concepts embraced in forward defense. It is important that the alliance maintain a consensus concerning its military strategy. The essence of AirLand Battle doctrine is the identification of and concentration on the enemy's strategic center of gravity. The concept is built on historical precedent, which reveals that maneuver and surprise are the elements of combat which "enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones." To adopt such a doctrine, a somewhat revolutionary concept of command and control will have to be instituted. Decentralized command and control will be necessary to facilitate the agility to conduct such mobile operations. Commanders at all levels must have the authority to commit forces to a course of action that they know to be consistent with the theater strategy.¹⁷ Without such a scheme of command and control, disruption, dislocation, and, ultimately, neutralization of a synchronized Warsaw Pact attack cannot be assured; for, all NATO forces must maintain a tempo of combat of an unprecedented nature to counter numerical disadvantages. Forward defense cannot accomplish this, but a NATO variation of AirLand Battle might.

There is empirical evidence which suggests that such doctrine applied to NATO strategy would provide a credible defense. The Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored a war game in May 1981. In that war game, a corps sector of Central Europe was defended by former Generalmajor Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin and General der Panzertruppe Hermann Balck. Both officers had faced massive Soviet attacks during World War II. During the war game, they successfully defended the sector with a powerful mobile reserve. Conclusions concerning the actions were as follows:

The implementation of such a strategy would encounter some predictable obstacles. Federal Republic of Germany leaders would have to be convinced of its utility. However, it is the German people who will ultimately convince their leaders that overreliance on the concept of forward defense in the absence of nuclear superiority is suicidal for them as well as the rest of NATO. European NATO governments must be made to realize that the abandonment of forward defense in favor of a defense built on maneuver and surprise in no way signifies a lessening of U.S. political resolve to participate in Europe’s defense. Instead, it signifies a commitment to face squarely, in a logical manner, the strategy of the Warsaw Pact given the forces available to NATO now and in any foreseeable future.

If such a strategy were adopted by NATO, implications for force planning would dictate change in areas of emphasis rather than change in overall scope. Military professionals who have responded to recent strategic reform propositions for NATO seem to feel that reliance on maneuver and surprise and application of the indirect approach to strategy, with the accompanying abandonment of attrition-oriented operational style, is synonymous with "do more with less." In fact, adoption of such a strategy might require initial increases in spending to establish certain neglected or deemphasized capabilities, which would include:

• increased dispersal of theater nuclear assets,
• strengthening of civil-military cooperation,
• radical upgrade in interoperability,
• development of highly mobile reserves,
• strengthening of passive defenses,
• expansion of psychological warfare capability,
• development of comprehensive covert operations forces, and
• expansion of camouflage, concealment, and deception capability.

What is equally important is the development of a sense of strategy and operational art in the professional NATO officer. This is particularly true for the United States military establishment. It will be critical for commanders at all levels to be attuned to the operational goals of the theater. Adopting one of our adversary's adages, the Soviets say, " …no matter how good the tactics are, if the operational plans are no good, you lose!"¹⁹

The time has come for NATO to face the realities of the 1980s and beyond. Peace and the deterrence of war do not come without effort and commitment. Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategy are changing to reflect nuclear parity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO strategy must do the same. The irrefutability of current force ratios, even by optimistic estimates, indicates that there is unacceptable risk in relying on the attrition strategy implicit in forward defense. It is with an emphasis on maneuver and surprise coupled with the establishment of a comprehensive operational concept that NATO commanders can convincingly employ the forces supplied to them. Without this assurance, NATO cannot ultimately deter conflict in Europe or prevail if deterrence fails.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Fred C. Ikle. "NATO’s 'First Nuclear Use': A Deepening Trap?" Strategic Review, Winter 1980, as reprinted in"NATO Capabilities and Strategies," Air War College Associate Programs, vol. II, chap. 15, 14th edition, 1980, p. 26.

2. William P. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 31-35.

3. Jacquelyn K. Davis, "Europe's Edgy Approach to Strategy," Air Force, December 1985, p. 88.

4. Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbi, Fall 1983, p. 699.

5. C. N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group," International Defense Review, vol.15, no.9, 1982, pp. 1177-86. This article contains a detailed overview of Soviet operational theory as well as a historical precedence from the mobile groups of World War II.

6. Lieutenant General William E. Odom, USA, address to the College of Naval Warfare, 10 January 1986.

7. Donnelly, p. 1184.

8. See Mako, op. cit. Also The Military Balance l984-85 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies) and Soviet Military Power 1985 (Washington: Government Printing Office).

9. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 20 August 1982), p. 11-9.

10. Dr. Steven L. Canby, "Tactical Air Power in Armored Warfare: The Divergence within NATO," Air University Review, May-June 1979, p. 5.

11. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 339.

12. Ibid., pp. 373-85.

13. Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong, "Strategymaking for the 1980's," Parameters, March 1979, p. 10.

14. Liddell Hart, p. 340.

15. Donnelly, pp. 1185-86.

16. Samuel P. Huntington. "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security, Winter 1983-84, p. 40. Huntington's work is a convincing enunciation of a positive strategy. It should be read by all NATO officers.

17. U.S. Army Field Manual 100.5, Operations, May 1986, chapter 2. It is clear that the U.S. Army is progressing toward a concept of operations which reemphasizes the historical ascendancy of professional military skill. It recognizes the clear need for the indirect approach to strategy in the face of a numerically superior enemy.

18. F. W. von Mellenthin and R. H. S. Stolfi, NATO under Attack: Why the Western Alliance Can Fight Outnumbered and Win in Central Europe without Nuclear Weapons (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1984), pp. 144-45. (Emphasis added.) This work is a historical analysis of the Eastern Front during World War II as it applies to NATO today by one of the principal participants, and it has great significance to NATO operational art as well as strategy.

19. Donnelly, p. 1186.

Contributor

Captain John D. Williams, USMC (B.A., Cornell University; M.S., Defense Intelligence College), is an Intelligence Analyst assigned to Hq U.S. European Command. Captain Williams has served as intelligence collections officer, 1st Marine Division; intelligence officer, 4th Marines; recruit training officer at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California; and chief intelligence analyst, 1^st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California. His articles have appeared in Proceedings and Marine Corps Gazette.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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