Air University Review, March-April 1986
FROM London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies issues an annual inventory of orders of battle called "The Military Balance." A number of military journals publish editions featuring these lists. When one learns, for instance, that "hy mor coy" means "heavy mortar company" and figures out that a nation touting "FGA: 2 sqns with 30 A-4KU" has a rather small air force, the list begins to make sense. It can even be fascinating if one has a professional interest in these matters.
The problem with looking at national power in terms of weaponry and numbers of divisions, wings, fleets, etc., is that it fosters a "bigger, better, and more" syndrome in our approach to national security. Perhaps, in this increasingly interrelated and complex world, large military forces may be pricing themselves down the road taken by the dinosaurs. Simultaneously as the cost of fielding a large, modern military has increased, situations and circumstances where the use of the kind of overwhelming force they are capable of delivering have become rare. Power can be measured in many ways other than by impressive weapons inventories. Smaller nations rich in resources like oil often have large international corporate and industrial holdings that tender them the kind of economic and political clout that translates quite well into power. While the military forces of some small but wealthy countries barely fill half a column in any journal's "military balance" edition, they may still be able to frustrate the superpowers through state-sponsored terrorism or by supporting insurgents (or freedom fighters).
Even as armies, air forces, and navies acquire increasingly capable and expensive weaponry, there seem to be ever more restrictive limits on the application of military power. From 1961 to 1975, as the world's greatest military power, the United States was unable to attain its national goals in Southeast Asia. To be sure, American technology was vastly superior to that of the North Vietnamese, Vietcong, Khmer Rouge, and Pathet Lao. Taken together in any "strategic balance" edition published in 1975, these forces would not have begun to use the ink needed to cover our inventory. As the war progressed, every tangible measurement of military success indicated that we were clobbering the enemy and, while losing 57,000 American lives and spending nearly $200 billion on the war, we killed perhaps a million of our foes, wrecked their transportation and electrical generating systems, and destroyed thousands of trucks as they moved through Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In South Vietnam, the claim that our army was never defeated in a major battle is historically supportable, if arguable. Still, the color of the flag over Ho Chi Minh City testifies to the relevance of inventories in measuring military capability.
The Soviet Union has fared no better. Despite a long tally sheet, hefty in numbers of divisions, fleets, and wings of newlyminted "Ftrs and Bbrs," the Soviets continue to suffer from traditional Russian insecurities, as evidenced by the more than thirty divisions they keep quartered in the lands of their Warsaw Pact allies. And how effective are those forces? Eyeball-to-eyeball and toe-to-toe with the U.S. and NATO forces, they would probably give at least as good as they got. Since most analysts agree that this kind of war is most unlikely, the Soviet Union, too, has to contend with applying power in a world where overwhelming military force often is not relevant. In Afghanistan, for instance, after six years of fighting, the Afghan rebels are far from defeated. The Soviets, on the other hand, control most of Kabul, at least during the daytime.
The most pressing problem for the American military may not be how to continue our buildup in the face of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Rather, it may be how to effectively use what we have, given the realities of the modern world. The use of military power is an art. It has very little to do with inventory lists or programs planned for the "outyears." Winning or losing in warfare is the crucial issue. A fascination with lists of weaponry, their capabilities, and numbers of "divs and sqdns" obscures the larger and more important dimensions of warfare. The mastery of strategy and tactics is fundamental, and just as important is an understanding of the importance of culture, geography, history, and political realities of the day. As appealing as it may be, the solution is not so simple as "nuking them till they glow" or "bombing them back to the Stone Age."
E.H.T.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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