Air University Review, March-April 1986

The War in Afghanistan

Dr. George W. Collins

THE initial reaction of the Afghan people to the coup of April 1978 that overthrew the government of Mohammad Daoud was relatively passive. That summer, however, as the true Marxist colors of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) were revealed, resistance emerged. Beginning in Nuristan and Badakhshan, rural opposition spread rapidly and reached most provinces within ten months. The first urban uprising occurred in Herăt in March 1979, and many other cities and towns soon were affected. The resistance continued to grow in scope, although the number of mujahidin (freedom fighters) was relatively small. Operating in a country that is a paradise for guerrillas, the mujahidin laid ambushes, attacked outposts, and assassinated provincial officials. In the cities and towns, they encouraged demonstrations and strikes. By the end of 1979, virtually no part of the country, except the major cities, was securely controlled by the government. Nevertheless, the resistance was unable to oust the DRA because of the lack of arms, cohesion, and leadership.²

Becoming increasingly disillusioned by the DRA's inability to cope with the situation and dissatisfied with the policies and attitude of Hafizullah Amin, the head of state, the Soviet Union decided that direct military intervention was necessary. After quietly introducing military elements piecemeal in December 1979, a massive airlift began on Christmas Eve, and during the night of 27 December, Soviet forces murdered Amin and seized control of Kabul. Motorized rifle divisions swung down the two highways from the Soviet Union through western and central Afghanistan, capturing Afghan army and air bases and controlling the highway network. Babrak Karmal was installed swiftly as the new president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.³

The invasion was a classic Soviet military operation employing deception, speed, and substantial force. The airlift involved about 30 percent of the Soviet military and civilian transport aircraft.⁴ Although some analysts criticized the employment of what seemed to be an ill-suited, heavy-armored force, most likely it was not intended for counterinsurgency operations but for dealing with the possibility that the DRA's own military units might offer resistance—as some did.⁵

Within weeks the Soviets also occupied Herăt, Kandahar, and the few other major cities; and they fully dominated the government. But the Afghans, instead of being intimidated by the invasion, now were doubly incensed against the DRA as the obvious Soviet puppet and against the Soviets themselves as an unwelcome occupying foreign power seeking to subvert Afghanistan's society and religion totally. The Soviets soon had about 85,000 troops in Afghanistan but, because of the mounting resistance, found it necessary to garrison forces in many locations, thus overextending themselves and making it difficult to handle even small-scale opposition. As American analyst Joseph J. Collins has noted, the Soviets blundered in that they ignored Clausewitz's fundamental dictum: know the kind of war in which you are engaging. The result was that they entered Afghanistan without a suitable tactical doctrine.⁶

Once in command, the Soviets endeavored to rebuild the dispirited DRA Army with the objective of having it bear the brunt of the fighting. However, they have not succeeded. It is estimated that the Afghan army now numbers less than 40,000 men—less than one-half its size prior to the April 1978 coup, primarily because of continuing desertion. As a result, most military operations are joint Soviet/DRA affairs, and the Soviet combat role continues to expand.⁷

Several Soviet military weaknesses were evident in the early operations. Inexperience in guerrilla warfare was made even more apparent by junior officers not trained to make battlefield decisions. The problem was exacerbated by the use of outdated field communications that made it difficult for higher headquarters to command from the rear. Moreover, a number of the Central Asian soldiers appeared to have little appetite to fight their ethnic Muslim brethren.⁸

For more effective management, the Soviets divided Afghanistan into seven military districts and introduced organizational changes in their ground forces. Probably the most important organizational change was the development of the reinforced rifle battalion containing antiair and artillery support and a tank company. Those additions provided the battalion with greater striking and sustaining power.⁹ Another organizational development was the creation of the 40th Army, with its headquarters in Tashkent, Uzbek, S.S.R., to command the Afghanistan theater of operations.¹⁰

Although initially, Soviet operations were directed primarily against the mujahidin, once the Soviets realized the popular support for the resistance movement, they deliberately turned to a terrorist strategy of "migratory genocide" and "rubblization." The tempo of their operations intensified appreciably in 1984 and even further the next year after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Fighter-bombers and medium bombers hit targets deep inside guerrilla territory, seeking to destroy the village infrastructure supporting the mujahidin. "Free-fire" zones were created along the main roads and extended back to the hills behind them, and the villages within these zones were "virtually obliterated." In addition, field crops, food storage facilities, and the irrigation systems so vital to Afghan agriculture were bombed in the attempt to drive the people off the land.¹¹ Soviet aircraft also deliberately attacked civilian caravans coming into or leaving the country, thus causing many casualties among women and children. Small bombs shaped as toys or other attractive objects were used with the intent to maim children, and these caused many livestock casualties as well. Large enhanced-blast bombs that explode in midair sending out lethal shock waves have been used also.¹²

In this type of warfare, the helicopter has proved to be invaluable for a number of roles: ferrying troops into battle, providing close air support of ground forces in combat, and attacking villages or isolated bands of mujahidin. Air assault operations, usually of company or battalion strength, have been most successful when combined with motorized rifle unit operations. The Soviets find helicopters better suited than fixed-wing aircraft for close air support, probably because of the limited mujahidin antiair capabilities. There are approximately 325 Soviet helicopters based in Afghanistan, of which perhaps one-half are Mi-24 Hind gunships. The helicopters, operated usually in groups of from two to six, often are flown close to the ground for protection. These "nap-of-the-earth" tactics are demanding of both aircraft and crews and have contributed to improved pilot proficiency.¹³

In 1985, the Soviet strategy moved beyond mere control of the urban centers and the highway network. The heaviest fighting took place in and around Kabul and in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan. Near Kabul, Soviet/DRA forces destroyed most of the villages to create a vacuum for better security of the capital. In retaliation, the mujahidin launched frequent rocket attacks at the city; and small-scale firefights occurred almost nightly within Kabul.¹⁴

The three major Soviet offensives of the year were in eastern and southern Afghanistan and were intended to close off supply routes to Pakistan. They took place in the Kunar Valley during May and June, in the Panjshir Valley in July, and in Paktia Province during August and September. Each drive was a division-sized operation involving approximately 10,000 Soviet personnel and between 1000 and 2000 DRA troops. They commenced with prestrike attacks by helicopter gunships and fighter bombers. Elite commandos and paratroops (spetsnaz) were transported in by helicopter to eliminate mujahidin defensive positions and to cut off escape. Then came armored attacks involving as many as 100 tanks. Casualties were heavy on both sides in each operation, and the battles in Paktia Province were among the bloodiest of the war.¹⁵

In each offensive the Soviets prevailed after hard fighting, then withdrew, thus failing to achieve decisive success. The mines they placed to block the trails were removed quickly, and supplies once more flowed through.¹⁶

Despite more than six years of combat in Afghanistan, the Soviets still have weaknesses in their forces. The very fact that their military journals stress mountain warfare, physical fitness, and initiative is indicative of some problems.¹⁷ Replacements sent to Afghanistan usually lack sufficient training, are low in morale, and show little enthusiasm for combat. Drug addiction is a growing problem. As a result of these conditions within regular Soviet units, greater reliance has been placed on the elite Slavic commandos and paratroops, who are adept at small-unit operations, even though total Soviet troop strength has increased to about 118,000.¹⁸

What is the nature of the Afghan mujahidin that makes him so formidable against superior Soviet military force? Perfectly at ease with his harsh environment, for centuries the Afghan has been respected as an able guerrilla. Possessing great courage, daring, and remarkable stamina, he is driven by a strict code of honor demanding implacable vengeance if it is violated. Loyalties are to famiIy and tribe rather than to a government or a nation. Throughout the struggle with the Soviets, mujahidin morale has remained high. Dedicated to what they perceive as a holy war (jehad) for their Islamic faith and cultural traditions, the Afghans are ready to continue indefinitely. It is estimated that there are about 90,000 mujahidin, of whom about 20,000 are active at any one time.¹⁹

The initial mujahidin resistance was based on traditional Afghan warfare, with few signs of any methodical approach to the problems of fighting against a modern army. Tribal groups fought en masse in set battles with no specialized functions allocated to particular soldiers.²⁰

Slowly, more organized warfare developed. Several provinces have a military commander who divides them into sector commands. The sectors are further subdivided into fighting units of twenty-five to thirty-five men including specialists assigned to handle mortars, rocket-launchers, or heavy-machine guns. One of the most notable commanders is Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose forces continue to operate in the Panjshir Valley despite repeated Soviet offensives. In coordination with residents of the valley, Massoud developed a well-organized military-political structure featuring representative political, financial, and other committees. He also has coordinated military operations with other commanders of northern and central Afghanistan. "Organization and training," Massoud has said, "are more important than weapons."²¹

Tactically, while guerrilla operations of hundreds of men have been launched occasionally, small units of thirty to forty men more frequently are used. The mujahidin prefer to set ambushes by bridges or defiles, to destroy the bridges or block the roads, and then to fire from the concealed positions they have taken in the surrounding heights. If the enemy has a strong advance guard, it is allowed to pass before the main element is hit. After the engagement, the mujahidin then quickly withdraw.²²

Despite their martial qualities and intimate knowledge of the terrain, the mujahidin operate under severe handicaps, including shortages of arms, medicine, and food. And in spite of the Afghans' reputed prowess in guerrilla warfare, many accounts cite poor tactical planning and a lack of weapons training. One observer reported that "the rebels still walk into ambushes because of improper training and only rarely coordinate attacks in ways that would stretch Soviet defenses." He described one ill-conceived ambush as "more like Keystone Kops."²³ Another noted that the mujahidin "spend as much time praying as working out tactics or maintaining their weapons." His film crew was more apprehensive about being accidentally shot by the mujahidin than of being hit by the Soviets.²⁴

Providing military assistance for the resistance is a major consideration of the United States and other nations. A CIA pipeline was established rapidly after the Soviet invasion, and approximately $75 million annually has been provided for a variety of weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, and medical supplies. These provisions are slipped into Afghanistan somewhat surreptitiously by truck or animal caravan, with caution taken not to involve the Pakistan government officially in this traffic.²⁵

The more distant the location is from Pakistan, the more difficult it is to supply arms and supplies there. Some items reach the mujahidin from Iran, but many so routed go to Shi'ite groups whose support of the resistance is questionable.²⁶

Since 1980 there have been repeated mujahidin complaints about the quantity and quality of the arms received. Generally the fighters request more heavy machine guns, mines, rocket grenades, and—as most essential—more effective antiaircraft weapons.²⁷ Charges continue to be levied that many of the arms intended for the mujahidin never reach the fighting areas. There are accusations that the Pakistanis divert some for themselves, that the resistance political parties based in Pakistan retain others, and that the mujahidin are stockpiling some in Afghanistan for future use.²⁸

Nevertheless, according to a number of reports, the arms situation improved during 1985 and resulted in greater mujahidin capability against enemy ground and air attack. That was reflected in engagements throughout the country and particularly evident during the Paktia offensive, where the mujahidin were able to maintain a fighting force of from 3000 to 5000 men in action.²⁹ Among the weapons introduced in 1985 were Chinese 107-mm multirocket launchers and an improved SAM-7, and the mujahidin anticipated that Swiss Oerlikon 20-mm cannon and possibly British Blowpipe portable missiles for air defense would be available this year. Because of the heavy fighting in 1985, the U.S. Congress reportedly appropriated $250 million as an emergency fund for arms and ammunitions.³⁰ Nonetheless, the availability of arms remains spotty as some areas continue to have weapons and ammunition shortages.³¹

After more than six years of war, Soviet control of Afghanistan is far from complete, and the resistance continues to hold most of the country. But the Soviets' increased viciousness is taking a toll as they escalate the terrorization of the people.³² Since the war began, probably more than 200,000 Afghans have been killed and more than one-third of the population has been forced to flee to Pakistan, Iran, or the Afghan cities. Agricultural production is estimated to be less than 25 percent of prewar levels in some areas. There has been enormous slaughter of livestock, and many surviving animals are in poor health. Food shortages have resulted in "very acute signs of severe societal stress," and the famine in places has been compared to that in Ethiopia.³³

The Soviets, too, have suffered losses, although far fewer than the Afghans. As many as 60,000 have been killed or wounded in battle. Others were evacuated from Afghanistan because of disease. The estimated financial cost to the Soviets has exceeded $20 billion.³⁴

At the Geneva summit conference in November 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev was quoted as saying that the Soviets would like to get out of Afghanistan.³⁵ However, most signs indicate that they intend to remain. While there are suggestions that the Soviets may be backing away from the Brezhnev Doctrine once a Communist state, always a Communist state), ³⁶ they are working energetically to recast Afghanistan political, social, and economic life in a Communist mold. That objective is reflected in the control exercised over national policy, newspapers, professional organizations, and the bureaucracy. Communist party membership and proficiency in the Russian language have become prerequisites for advancement, and the KHAD, the Afghan government's secret police, is everywhere.³⁷

U.S. policy has consistently supported the U.N. resolutions for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, a nonaligned Afghanistan, the free return of the refugees, and the people’s right of self-determination in creating their own government.³⁸ Unfortunately, the Geneva rounds of indirect talks sponsored by the United Nations to achieve those objectives have been stymied by failure to reach agreement on a timetable for a Soviet withdrawal.

It generally is agreed that a critical challenge that the resistance faces is to establish unified political and military leadership, since, without it, the efforts of both fighters and supporters are fragmented and resources wasted. The political parties of the resistance, based in Pakistan, are divided ideologically along a spectrum of Islamic and secular beliefs. In addition, there are bitter personal and tribal rivalries.³⁹

Under pressure from the foreign nations that support the resistance, an alliance was formed in May 1985 of the seven major resistance political parties, the "Islamic Unity of Mujahidin."Although the alliance is loosely structured, it provides some coordination for military operations and may ultimately bring the unity that is imperative if the resistance is to achieve the diplomatic legitimacy and influence necessary for official international sanction and support. Late in 1985, the alliance began petitioning for representation in international bodies, including the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and it planned to establish offices around the world to assist in publicizing the Afghanistan situation.⁴⁰

In any event, the war has long escalated beyond the stage in which an ill-equipped and tactically unprepared mujahidin force can by itself force a Soviet withdrawal. Fortunately, that force is now better armed, organized, and professionally skilled than it was initially, and it can improve its position with more extensive military operations, including a more active campaign to disrupt urban life in Kabul and elsewhere. Nevertheless, nations sympathetic to the plight of the Afghans must grapple with the fact that extensive foreign assistance—diplomatic and military—is essential to an active resistance movement and for an independent Afghanistan.

Notes

1. Noor A. Husain, "Alternative Futures for Afghanistan," in Afghan Alternatives: Issues, Options, and Policies, edited by Ralph H. Magnus (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1985), pp. 189-90.

2. For details about the April 1978 coup and the beginning of the resistance movement, see Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984), pp. 49-57 and 67-78; and Henry S. Bradshear, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1983), pp. 74-104.

3. Bradsher, pp. 175-88; and Joseph J. Collins, "The Soviet Military Experience in Afghanistan," Military Review, May 1985, p. 16.

4. Yossef Bodansky, "The Bear on the Chessboard: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan." World Affairs, Winter 1982/83, p. 278; and Denny R. Nelson, "Soviet Air Power: Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan," Air University Review, January-February 1985, p. 32.

5. Some observers suggest that this configuration was a precaution against intervention by a foreign power. See for example, James B. Curren and Philip A. Karber, "Afghanistan's Ordeal Puts a Region at Risk." Armed Forces Journal International, March 1985, p. 79.

6. Bodansky, p. 278; and Collins, p. 20.

7. John B. Ritch III, Hidden War: The Struggle for Afghanistan, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1984), p. 17; Harriet Culley, editor, "Afghanistan," Gist, U.S. Department of State, September 1985, p. 1; and Ellie D. Krakowski, "Defining Success in Afghanistan," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1985, p. 46.

8. Joseph J. Collins, "Afghanistan: The Empire Strikes Out," Parameters, March 1982, p. 55; Nelson, p. 41; and Hammond, pp. 101-02.

9. Bodansky, p. 283.

10. Magnus, p. 203.

11. Louis Dupree, "Tainted News," New York Times, 22 June 1984, as reprinted in Afghanistan Forum, October 1984, p. 20. (Because many of the items in Afghanistan Forum do not carry complete citations, I shall cite Afghanistan Forum—hereafter referred to as AF—with the appropriate volume and page numbers, where applicable, rather than the original publication.) Also, Dupree, "Afghanistan in 1983: And Still No Solution," Asian Survey, February 1984, pp. 235-36; Ritch, p. 19; Nelson, pp. 36-40; "Afghan Rebels Suffer As Soviets Hit Harder," Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 6 September 1985, p. 10C; Mark Whitaker with Frank Gibney, Jr., "Afghanistan: A New Soviet Offensive," Newsweek, 9 September 1985, p. 40, and AF, September 1985, pp. 8-9.

12. Curren and Karber, pp. 88 and 96, and Edward Giradet, "Moscow’s War of Terror in Afghanistan," U.S. News and World Report, 15 October 1984, pp. 43-44.

13. Nelson, pp. 33-35; Bodansky, p. 287; Collins, "Afghanistan: The Empire Strikes Out," p. 35, Gilberto Villahermosa, "Soviet Enveloping Detachments," Armor, September-October 1984, pp. 13-17; G. Jacobs, "Afghanistan Forces: How Many Soviets Are There?" Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 June 1985, p. 1232; and Martin Walker, "The Distant War That Keeps the Red Army Happy," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 July 1985, p. 9.

14. "Soviet's Afghan Drive Called Largest This Year," New York Times, 17 April 1985, p, 7; Whitaker with Gibney, p. 40; and AF, November 1995, pp. 10 and 19.

15. Husain Haqqani, "Breaking the Seige," Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 June 1985, p. 51; "Soviets Are Ending Recent Drive in Afghanistan, Diplomats Say," Baltimore Sun, 11 September 1985, p. 2; "War Rages in Afghanistan Near Border with Pakistan," St. Joseph, Missouri Gazette, 4 September 1985, p. 7A; "Afghan Rebels Suffer As Soviets Hit Harder," Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 6 September 1985, p. 10C: and AF, November 1985, p. 7.

16. Richard Evans, "The Battle for Paktia." Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 September 1985, p. 7; and AF, September 1985, p. 6 and November 1985, p. 6.

17. Joseph J. Collins, "Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan: A Preliminary Assessment," Comparative Strategy, No. 4, 1983, p. 162. See, for example, the following issues of Soviet Military Review: February and May 1982, October to December 1984, and September 1985.

18. David C. Isby, "Panjsher VII, Soviets Smash Afghan Resistance in Vital Valley," Soldier of Fortune, February 1985. p. 36; Culley, p. 1; Olivier Roy's comments in AF, July 1985, p. 1. September 1985, pp. 9 and 17, and November 1985, p. 11.

19. Nake M. Kamrany and Leon B. Poullada, "The Potential of Afghanistan's Society and Institutions to Resist Soviet Penetration and Domination," Modelling Research Group, University of Southern California, January 1985, pp. 10-20; AF, March 1985, p. 16; and Military Balance 1985-1986 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), p.119.

20. Olivier Roy, "Soviets in Danger of Over-Extending Themselves," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 December 1983, p. 14.

21. Christina Dameyer, "Afghanistan's Guerrilla Commanders," Retired Officer, January 1985, pp. 38-39; Collins, "Soviet Military Experience," p. 24; and Paul L. Moorcraft, "Bloody Standoff in Afghanistan," Army, April 1985, p. 29.

22. Collins, "Soviet Military Performance," pp. 158-59.

23. David G Isby, "Afghanistan: After Five Years What's Next?" Soldier of Fortune, March 1984, pp. 50, 51; and AF, January 1985, p. 17.

24. Moorcraft, p. 28. For more information on the effectiveness of mujahidin ambushes, see Collins, "Soviet Military Experience," p. 23.

25. AF, September 1985, pp. 16-17; and "Caravans on Moonless Nights: How the CIA Supports and Supplies the Anti-Soviet Guerrillas," Time, 11 June 1985, pp. 38-40. For a refutation of the latter article, see Afghan Update, 5 September 1985, p. 4.

26. Kamrany and Poullada, p. 58; and AF, January 1985, p. 2, and November 1985, p. 21.

27. Moorcraft, p. 32; and AF, March 1985, p. 11.

28. William Claiborne, "Feud over CIA Aid to Afghan Rebels,"

Manchester Guardian Weekly, 17 February 1985, p. 13; Craig Karp, "Afghan Resistance and Soviet Occupation," Special Report No. 118, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, December 1984, p. 3; and "Resisters Hide Arms inside Afghanistan," Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 21 July 1985, p. 3A.

29. Afghan Update, 30 September 1985, p. 2; and Evans, pp. 48-49.

30. Moorcraft, p. 32; Whitaker with Gibney, p. 40; and AF, November 1985, p. 10.

31. AF, November 1985, pp. 19 and 21.

32. M. S. Noorzoy, "Long-Term Economic Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: An Interpretive Study," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 17, 1985, p. 151.

33.Ibid., p . 167; Denis Warner, "Soviet Union Carving out a New Outer Mongolia," Pacific Defence Reporter, December 1984/1985, p. 46; and AF, March 1985, September 1985, and November 1985, pp. 5, 9, and 7, respectively.

34. Michael Getler and Don Oberdorfer, "Zia Says Soviet Afghan War Casualties Exceed 80,000," Washington Post, 27 October 1985, pp. Al and A22.

35. "Behind Closed Doors," Newsweek, December 1985, p. 30.

36. Anthony Arnold, "The Stony Path to Afghan Socialism: Problems of Sovietization in an Alpine Muslim Society," Orbis, Spring 1985, p. 55; and Magnus, p. 201.

37. AF, September 1985, pp. 5, 8-9, and 19; and Noorzoy, p. 168.

38. Culley, p. 2.

39. For excellent analyses of the resistance political parties, see Tahir Amin, "Afghan Resistance: Past, Present. and Future," Asian Survey, April 1984, pp. 373-99, or Eden Naby, "The Afghan Resistance Movement," in Magnus, pp. 59-81.

40. Culley, p. 1; AF, July 1985, p. 3, and November 1985, pp. 1, 11, and 14-15; and Magnus, p. 204.

Contributor

George W. Collins (B.S., M.A., Northwestern University; Ph.D., University of Colorado) was Associate Professor of History at Wichita State University, Kansas, at the time of his recent retirement. Before retiring from the U.S. Air Force as a lieutenant colonel, he served as a B-17, B-29, and KC-97 navigator and taught at the Air Force Academy and Air War College. Dr. Collins was a Fulbright Senior Fellow in Afghanistan and has written articles that have been published in a variety of professional journals, including the Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor