Air University Review, September-October 1985
NEARLY every prominent political group in America has found cause to distrust the military. Whigs and Jeffersonians believed the military a threat to liberty. Jacksonians believed the military an opponent of democracy. Nineteenth-century industrialists considered the military an impediment to economic prosperity. Progressives and liberals considered it an obstacle to social justice. During most periods, "almost everyone" has thought the military a threat to peace. Distrust of the military has been so continuous, in fact, that historians have come to regard it as one of the principal characteristics of traditional American civil-military relations.1 The source of that distrust has been, in part, sociological. Historically, the American military has been a group separate from the mainstream of American society and, for influential circles in American politics, an alien group worthy of suspicion.
In contemporary America, however, an evolution in that traditional attitude seems to be occurring with the appearance in American politics of a movement dedicated to military reform. Composed of prominent members of the Congress, media, and national security community, the military reform movement has criticized American national defense in general and the U.S. Armed Forces in particular. Among the movement's chief concerns about the armed forces is the professionalism of the officer corps. Military reformers believe that the officer corps, far from being a separate group alien to the American mainstream, has plunged into its center by adopting the dominant occupational model in civilian society. In the view of military reformers, that civilian emphasis in the officer corps poses a different sort of danger to society, military incompetence. Stated boldly, military reformers believe that the American officer corps has too many civilianized military managers and too few authentic soldiers.
This unconventional view of the military raises a series of questions.
The military reform movement constructs its case against the officer corps by reasoning from two firm convictions aboutthe nature of competent military institutions. The first is that the purpose of military institutions is fundamentally unlike anything found in civilian society. What civilian society at large tolerates or expects from its military institutions, it does not condone or promote in other institutions.2
The second conviction derives from the first. A military institution's unique purpose as an organization for violence demands a unique set of values among military officers, which civilian habits of mind and professional perspectives can adulterate. Thus, one of the officer corps' first obligations is to understand the unique role that military institutions play and to adopt a single-minded professional perspective congruent with that role.3
Military reformers adhere to the "institutional" view of military service and the "traditional" definition of military professionalism. They are related notions. The institutional view maintains the following: (a) military service is a "calling," characterized by norms and values subordinating individual, personal interest to a "presumed higher good"; (b) military personnel make up a social group distinct from society at large and earn admiration insofar as they observe norms demanding sacrifice and dedication (that is, insofar as they observe norms deemed loftier than those allegedly found in most of society); and (c) military service takes place within a paternalistic setting that inspires trust and a sense of community among military personnel.4
Similarly, the traditional definition of military professionalism holds that the corps of officers responsible for conducting organized violence in society's behalf is a true professional body having a unique expertise, responsibility, and sense of identity. Further, military institutions perform a "higher service" for society than most other institutions; hence, military service is a calling, not just another job. In order to maintain the professional standing of the group, officers must concentrate on the business of officership––warfare––and resist the temptation to adopt other professional perspectives.5
In the view of military reformers, the institutional view of military service and the traditional definition of professionalism create a system of values and commitments conducive to skill in military operations. Military reformers imply that those values and commitments are the basis of competency in an officer corps. They are not alone in that belief.
Many senior American military officers (and, of course, military traditionalists) accept the traditional definition of military professionalism. However, many junior officers do not. Junior officers are more prone to view military service as an occupation rather than a calling.6 Thus, they tend to have perspectives and habits of mind inconsistent with traditional views of military professionalism. Sometimes the inconsistencies are disturbing.7 Military traditionalists accuse the armed services themselves of having created and perpetuated occupational attitudes by encouraging officers to flirt with irrelevant professional perspectives from civilian society.8
Members of the military reform movement are more specific. The services, they allege, have diluted the professional qualifications of the American officer corps by making skill in management the preeminent quality of good officership. By exaggerating the importance of expertise in management, the reformers suggest, the services have tempted the officer corps to provide services that society does not need (or can find elsewhere more cheaply), to delude themselves about the nature of war and the characteristics of military leadership, and to confuse or discard essential military skills and habits of mind for irrelevant ones from civilian society. In brief, reformers say, the officer corps has become incompetent as its members have become civilianized.9
According to military reformers, the exaggerated emphasis on management skill in the American officer corps leads to other unhealthy consequences in addition to incompetence. One key effect is to undermine the quality of combat units. Allegedly, people are no longer led in the military. They are "managed." When people are treated as "resources" and billet cyphers, military service becomes dehumanized (i.e., it loses the paternalistic quality characteristic of an institution), and military institutions lose their attributes of trust and social community. In addition, exaggerated emphasis on skill in management allegedly leads to demoralizing personnel turbulence and turnover. It diverts resources from training for war to administration, procurement, and other support services. The Congressional Military Reform Caucus believes that the overall effect of those influences is clear: "We now have less unit cohesion, less quality in our combat units, and less ability to attract and retain qualified people than ever before."10
Military reformers assert that the services' exaggerated emphasis on expertise in management leads to an ethic for military service that is incompatible with the military's institutional norms. The managerial mind-set is said to promote recruitment policies that encourage fee-for-service voluntarism. The primary principle of such voluntarism is personal interest, not personal sacrifice. Recruits animated by such interest are difficult, if not impossible, to mold into truly coherent military units capable of accepting sacrifices of combat. Military reformers believe that units composed of such personnel will disintegrate under the strain of battle. Ultimately, military reformers question whether those soldiers will fight.11
Furthermore, reform advocates believe, the excessive emphasis on management skill in the military has so colored the officer corps' vision of its work that officers consider a successful career to be little more than the outcome of good management.
The crucial word for this phenomenon is "careerism," which means, in essence, the desire to be rather than to do. It is the desire to have rank, rather than to use it; the pursuit of promotion without a clear sense of what to do with a higher rank once one has attained it.12
Like the incentives offered to attract military recruits, careerism allegedly feeds on self-interest, not on self-subordination to an institutional norm.
The operative principle of careerism is "ticket punching." Ticket punching entails securing credentials for advancement as rapidly as possible while avoiding mistakes and risks that could blemish those credentials. This principle emphasizes short-term high performance, then pursuit of the next credential needed for promotion, promotion itself, and then a new cycle of credential-seeking for the next rank. This career profile often is associated with aggressive young executives in the business community and is increasingly criticized for its harmful consequences in industry. Not surprisingly, military reformers detect in it harmful consequences for the military, too.
Careerism is said to destroy the officer evaluation system for promotion and to trivialize the legitimate functions of officership. Most important, careerism destroys the bond of trust between officers and enlisted persons inasmuch as officers searching for attractive credentials use their subordinates rather than lead them.13 As more and more officers with the careerist attitude and the managerial ethic succeed, reformers say, the more room there is at the top for like-minded officers.14 Consequently, careerism is said to be contagious and self-perpetuating.
Finally, reformers indicate, the heavy emphasis on expertise in management in the officer corps moves officers toward a rationale or logic hostile to effective weapon development.
A manager's logical analysis arises from the world of economic competition, not physical combat. When a businessman's methods are applied to planes, tanks, and guns, they can lead to fatal mistakes.15
Managerial logic judges weaponry by "economic" criteria: cost per ton-mile, bomb load per air-mile, cost exchange ratios between weapons and their targets, and other indices of efficiency. Managerial logic supposedly confuses efficiency in the laboratory with effectiveness on the battlefield. Weapon developments guided by managerial logic frequently increase the vulnerability of American forces; they are often inconsistent with important human factors in combat; or they are too difficult to maintain, too expensive to operate, or too fragile to use regularly at maximum performance.16 In the opinion of" military reformers, those problems increase the hazard of combat to American forces, reduce the effectiveness of individual combatants, and jeopardize military readiness.
The military reform movement's case against the officer corps makes American officers and their professionalism appear minatory, not because the officer corps is hostile to American values but because it is incompetent, self-serving, and unprepared for war. According to military reformers, the record of the American military since the Inchon landing is the most impressive proof of the harm that modern officership has caused. The performance of U.S. forces in Vietnam, Koh Tang Island, Desert One, and Lebanon are evidence of incompetence that reformers attribute directly to the officer corps.17 What military reformers recommend is a restoration of balance among the abilities needed in the military (i.e., an end to the exaggerated emphasis on management skills and values among officers in favor of more traditional ones). 18 In short, military reformers want an officer corps with fewer managers and more real soldiers.
Frequently, military reformers cite no evidence as they state their case against the officer corps. When they do, reformers tend to cite evidence of a particular kind, expert testimony. If the military reform movement's case were exclusively a philosophical one describing a particular view of ideal officership, then the evidence that military reformers provide would justify no complaint. Military reform's case, however, is more than an argument for an ideal. Military reform's case purports to describe what officers do, what officers' qualifications are, how officers view their work, and how successful officers are in the performance of their duties. Military reform's case against the officer corps is largely sociological, and the movement's evidence is primarily a compilation of anecdotes.
Military reformers may be prisoners of the medium in which they present their case, the popular press. Journalism relies heavily on interview and expert testimony. Reformers who are journalists maintain, believably, that journalism is "a way to learn" about the sociology of the officer corps for people who are not social scientists. The weakness of journalism as a methodology is that it is arbitrary. Many journalists acknowledge that subjectivism is a characteristic of their craft. For reformer-journalists who are also members of a political movement, subjectivism appears to be an insurmountable obstacle. The evidence of reformers' confinement is the list of experts whom military reformers cite. Most of the experts are other military reformers.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the military reform movement is ignorant of scientific military sociology. Indeed, the movement is so beholden to a particular sociological work that it is difficult to explain why military reformers fail to cite it as the inspiration of their movement. That work is Crisis in Command by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage. In the mid-1970s, Gabriel and Savage criticized officers in the U.S. Army because of the Army's performance in Vietnam. According to the authors, aggressive careerism in the Army's officer corps led to the disintegration of primary group social bonds in combat units. As a result of that disintegration, the authors said, American forces collapsed under the strain of combat. Gabriel and Savage prescribed an antidote for the problem: a heavy dose of military reform to restore institutional-traditional values in the officer corps.
Crisis in Command
is a famous study and a controversial one. In 1977, about the same year military reformers began to construct the foundation of their movement, the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society examined Gabriel and Savage's study and published its findings. The examiners rejected Gabriel and Savage's evidence and their explanation of disintegration in American combat units.19 Paradoxically, military reformers appear to have embraced the outlook and recommendations in Crisis in Command just as social scientists discredited its evidence and conclusions.Military reformers are also aware of the work that social scientists have done in comparing military and civilian institutions, although they seldom cite it. Military reformers have borrowed the idea of "civilianization" from military sociology. Civilianization in the military is manifest in several ways: the changing qualifications of officers and officer occupational distributions that promote support services rather than operations; 20 the similarity of attitudes on domestic and foreign political questions among military elites (senior officers) and business elites (managers); 21 and, most important, the similarity between military and civilian occupational structure and organizational forms.22 Unlike military reformers, however, the sociologists who document those manifestations are careful to tell the reader that they are partial in scope and varied in degree.
For example, studies documenting the migration of officers out of operations show that the occupational concentrations of officers in operations vary dramatically among the services and over time. In 1973, the percentage of officers working in operations was 70 percent in the Marine Corps, 57 percent in the Army, 45 percent in the Air Force, and 30 percent in the Navy. By 1982, the occupational concentrations of officers in operations had changed significantly. The Marine Corps still had the highest concentration of officers in operations (53 percent), and the Navy still had the lowest (21 percent). The Air Force and Army had exchanged places (42 percent and 30 percent, respectively). 23 The striking change in the services may have been due, in part, to the extensive technological modernization that the Army and Marine Corps underwent in the 1970s and the resultant demand that modernization created for technical specialists.
Of equal interest is the relative stability of occupational concentrations in the Air Force. In some circles, the Air Force is regarded as the most technologically advanced of the services and the sociological pacesetter for the armed forces. The occupational stability in the Air Force implies that military forces experience a slower rate of sociological change as they mature technologically. On balance, the data also suggest that the circumstances of the officer corps' occupational concentrations are different enough among the services and over time to warrant distinctions and qualifications which the case against the officer corps does not make.
The study of elite attitudes has demonstrated strong similarity between senior military officers and civilian managers. However, it also has revealed important differences. The attitudes of military and civilian elites are most dissimilar on matters pertaining to national security and defense. The difference is great enough for observers to warn of the potential for grave disagreement over national security issues between elite groups.24 Military and civilian elites may be much alike, but their differences ought to leaven, as they presently do not, the reformers' notion of civilianization.
The most important evidence of civilianization in the military is the "convergence" of military and civilian occupational forms and organizational structures. To the degree that military personnel work like civilians work or work in organizations resembling civilian organizations, one can say "civilianization" has occurred. Numerous studies have addressed the convergence phenomenon, and scholars disagree about nearly every aspect of it. They disagree about the implications of convergence, the manner in which it is occurring, even about whether an aggregate convergence phenomenon exists. As one researcher has written, "The convergence phenomenon today has the status of an interesting hypothesis in military sociology."25 The military reform movement has assumed that convergence is a fact and, thus, has exaggerated the strength of its case.
A few military reformers assert that the real proof of incompetence in the American officer corps is to be found in American military history. They cite American military failures since the Inchon landing as proof. That "proof" is inherently biased. First, it is selective. Reformers imply inaccurately that American military history since Inchon is one of unrelieved operational failure. They never attempt to establish a balance between success and failure. Second, they arbitrarily set the historical boundary at Inchon perhaps because it is too difficult to explain how American military operations in World War II could have had so many examples of failure and still yielded such a resounding success. Moreover, the central assumption of the reformers' proof is that military officers are ultimately responsible for that which occurs on the battlefield. In reality, authority and responsibility are far more diffused than reformers seem to understand. In the American military system today, civilian political authority decides questions of force structure, force employment, equipment selection, and even tactical objectives. An informed investigation of responsibility for failure in American military operations since Inchon would doubtless come to a more evenhanded distribution of blame than the one military reformers have published.26
Finally, the reformers' historical interpretation of military competence has patent conceptual flaws. Military reformers have yet to define military competence. They have merely identified examples of what they consider incompetence. Military activity is a complex and heterogeneous enterprise. It occurs in two dimensions: a vertical dimension, in which hierarchical actions take place to prepare for and conduct warfare; and a horizontal dimension, in which simultaneous, interdependent tasks occur at each level of the hierarchy. It is possible to judge military effectiveness on the basis of performance in the vertical dimension by evaluating the political, strategic, operational, and tactical proficiency of organizations and groups. It is possible to judge effectiveness in the horizontal dimension by evaluating training, logistics, intelligence, industrial production, and combat. Obviously, evaluations along those dimensions will be complex and will detect friction and competition between the various factors.27 Events that the reformers have tagged as "incompetence" could easily have explanations having nothing to do with ability of field officers. The emphasis of the reform historians on an undefined operational ideal does not advance our understanding of military effectiveness or provide us a useful conceptual framework with which to judge it.
In the final analysis, the military reform movement's school of military history shares the same disabilities as all monocausal interpretations of history. It is simplistic and unsupportable. In the mid-1970s, many reputable American and European historians rejected monocausal schools of history as bad scholarship. Paradoxically, military reform historians chose that same period to invent a new one.
A case against the managerial emphasis in the officer corps, whatever its degree, could be made if one demonstrated clearly that it led to unacceptable consequences in the armed services. The military reform movement asserts that the managerial emphasis impedes the social integration of recruits, encourages careerism, and produces ineffective weaponry.
It is a matter of conjecture that the material incentives offered recruits under a system of voluntary service inhibit the formation of social bonds among combatants. There is no reason to believe that material benefits hinder integration any more than the alternatives to voluntary service do. What military reformers fail to understand is that all inducements to military service appeal to self-interest. Whether it is compulsory service with the threat of imprisonment or selective service with the prospect of personal reward, both appeal to selfish concerns. Inasmuch as that is the case, the only legitimate complaints about recruitment incentives pertain to the size, quality, representation, and cost of the recruited force. Hypothetically at least, a system of voluntary service helps social integration by reducing the rate of turnover among first-term enlistees and by making it easier to get rid of recruits who prove unsatisfactory.28
While it is conjecture that current recruitment incentives impede social cohesion in military units, there is no doubt that careerism exists in the officer corps. Senior officers have expressed their concern about careerism.29 Military reformers document the concern of more junior officers. Military reform's explanation of careerism, however, is unsatisfactory. Reformers, again, are content to assert but not to prove their assertions factual. They do not show causal links between careerism and the degree of management emphasis in the officer corps, and they do not prove that careerism creates any harmful consequences. Sociological studies of officer qualifications and career patterns suggest, in fact, that management skills are not decisive factors in the selection and promotion of flag rank officers.30 Those studies bring into question nearly everything reformers have written about careerism.
Although reformers have suggested that the emphasis on management in the American military, whatever its degree, leads to ineffective weaponry, the basis of their argument on this point is unclear:
The failing of managerial defense is usually described as its inability to distinguish between efficiency, in the economic or technological sense, and effectiveness on the battlefield. That covers the point, but too crudely. The real problem is the use of an oversimplified, one-dimensional form of analysis, often based on simulations and hypotheses, in place of more complicated judgments, based on data from combat or realistic tests that take into account the eight or ten qualities that must be combined to make a weapon effective.31
This is essentially a criticism of systems analysis. What is unclear is the manner in which ineffectiveness derives from systems analysis. Military reform's view may be that the methodology of systems analysis leads to ineffective weapons or that military systems analysts are incompetent. The first view is inconsistent with the best work that military reformers have done, which uses classic systems analysis techniques and shows intense interest in economic and technological efficiency.32 The second view is inconsistent with information that reformers themselves provide.33
In reality, the differences between military reformers and military analysts probably has less to do with particular tools or competence than with their opinions regarding the best manner in which to wage war and the proper apportionment of resources to prepare for war. There is evidence to support that interpretation of their differences. Military reformers are virtually unanimous about the need of the U.S. Armed Forces to adopt a tactical doctrine based on maneuver warfare, and they eagerly anticipate the resources that this doctrine will release to other categories of expenditure.34 The military reform movement is, after all, a political movement. Clearly, politics will be prominent among the movement's motives. If those observations are valid, then the source of difference between military reformers and military analysts will be found in doctrinal and political preferences, not in the degree of management emphasis in the armed forces or the collective competence of officers.
Military reform's case against the officer corps does not resonate with strength, but neither is it clearly wrong. That judgment is based largely, but not exclusively, on military reform's evidence. A strong case would have a clear and useful framework from which to proceed, would exhaust available evidence, and would select a rigorous standard of proof for that evidence. An incorrect case would be trivial on its merits or demonstrably false. None of those characterizations apply to military reform's case against the officer corps. The sociological evidence (military reform's case is clearly sociological) supports both an interesting hypothesis about civilianization and concern (but not alarm) about the structure and dynamics of sociological change in the officer corps. The sociological and historical evidence does not support a general judgment of incompetence in the officer corps, nor does it support the charge that the armed services place too much emphasis on management skills and values. In these areas, military reformers are guilty of judging the officer corps by using unhelpful labels and ignoring military culture. To reformers, military management is management, a scientific methodology developed by civilians for civilian enterprise. In reality, military management is to management what military music is to music. The languages are similar, but the cultural objectives (and outcomes) are not.
That the case against the officer corps does not resonate with strength does not mean that military reform's recommendation to create an officer corps with a different balance of skills is a bad one. It simply may mean that a workable, although imperfect, balance already exists. Military reform's appeal for more traditional values and attitudes among officers would be significantly stronger if reformers could show that those values contribute importantly to a competent officer corps. There is little reason to think that they do. Military reformers forget that the founders of American military professionalism, the officers whose views of officership became tradition, were the ones who preferred wars of attrition to wars of maneuver. Reformers forget that military traditionalists were the ones who recognized the contribution that high technology could make to armed might and who decided to make the United States armed services the most technologically advanced in the world. By those two standards of military reformism, traditional values and attitudes correlate with incompetence.
Modern officership, while not the cause for consternation that reformers say, is not necessarily a cause for celebration either. The work of modern officers seems to be increasingly rationalized in an inadvertent and, perhaps, unavoidable sociological process associated with technological modernization, doctrinal preferences for deterrence, and the necessity to advise civilian authority. For much of the officer corps, this rationalization process has stimulated new motives for service and new personal loyalties.35 Those motives and loyalties make the traditional view of military professionalism and even the more modern view based on an unlimited liability clause increasingly irrelevant and unreal.36 In short, a thoroughly contemporary view of military professionalism appears to be aborning in the modern Armed Forces of the United States. With it may come new ideas about the obligations of service, the obligations of institutions, and the anticipation of reward. Ultimately, military reform's case against the officer corps reminds us that the proper interest of military officers is officership and that officers do not define military professionalism by themselves. In that respect, military reform's case against the officer corps is helpful.
Hq USAF
Notes
1. Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil-Military Relations," in American Defense Policy, 5th edition, edited by John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 740.
2. James Fallows, "Keynote Address," The Proceedings of the 24th Air Force Academy Assembly: The US Armed Forces––Conscript or Volunteer? edited by Frank G. Klotz (U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1982), pp. 15-16.
3. Ibid., p. 16.
4. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "From Institution to Occupation," ArmedForces and Society, November 1977, p. 42.
5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), chapters 1-3.
6. M. J. Stahl, T. R. Manley, and C.W. McNichols, "Operationalizing the Moskos Institution-Occupation Model," Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 422-27.
7. Frank R. Wood, "Air Force Junior Officers: Changing Prestige and Civilianization," Armed Forces and Society, Spring 1980, pp. 483-506.
8. John E. Ralph, "Military Officers and Politics," in American defense Policy, pp. 767-70.
9. Jeffrey Record, "The Fortunes of War," Harper's, April 1980, pp. 19-20; Edward Luttwak, quoted in James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 117.
10. Congressional Military Reform Caucus, "Options and Actions for the FY83 Defense Budget," unpublished briefing script, 1982.
11. Fallows, "Keynote Address," pp. 16-17; David R. Segal and Joseph J. Lengerman, "Professional and Institutional Considerations," in Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress and the Volunteer Military, edited by Samuel C. Sarkesian (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1980), p. 171.
12. Fallows, National Defense, p. 114.
13. Ibid., pp. 114-18.
14. Gary Hart, "What's Wrong with the Military," New York Times Magazine, 14 February 1982.
15. James Fallows, "Muscle-Bound Superpower: The State of America's Defense," The Atlantic, October 1979, p. 61.
16. See Fallows, National Defense, chapter 3; Hart, op. cit.; Franklin C. Spinney, "Defense Facts of Life," Staff Paper, OSD/PA&E, 5 December 1980; and P. J. Bernstein, "Critics Debate Reagan's Naval Strategy," Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph, 7 March 1982.
17. Jeffrey Record, "Is Our Military Incompetent? Newsweek, 22 December 1980; Hart, op. cit.; Jeffrey Record, "The Beirut Disaster Could Have Been Avoided," Washington Post, 16 November 1983; Jeffrey Record, "Why Our High-Priced Military Can't Win Battles," Washington Post, 29 January 1984.
18. Hart, op. cit.
19. See Stanford W. Gregory, Jr., "Toward a Situated Description of Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army," Armed Forces and Society, May 1977; and John H. Faris, "An Alternative to Savage and Gabriel," in the same issue.
20. Kurt Lang, "Trends in Military Occupational Structure and Their Political Implications," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Spring 1973.
21. Bruce M. Russett, "Political Perspectives of US Military and Business Elites," Armed Forces and Society, November 1974.
22. David R. Segal et al., "Convergence, Isomorphism, and Interdependence at the Civil-Military Interface," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Fall 1974.
23. Military Women in the Department of Defense, Office Of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L), April 1983, p. 8.
24. Russett, p. 98.
25. Segal et al., p. 159.
26. See, for example, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983
27. K. H. Watman, W. Murray, and A. R. Millett, "On the Effectiveness of Military Organizations" (unpublished paper), Mershon Center, Ohio State University.
28. L. J. Korb, "Banquet Address," The Proceedings of the 24th Air Force Academy Assembly: The US Armed Forces––Conscript or Volunteer? p. 56.
29. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1977). p. 110.
30. P. P. Van Riper and D. B. Umwalla, "Military Careers at the Executive Level," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol 9, 1965, pp. 421-36: Arnold Kanter, "Managerial Careers of Air Force Generals: A Test of the Janowitz Convergence Hypothesis," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Spring 1976, pp. 121-33.
31. Fallows, National Defense, pp. 19-20.
32. See Spinney, "Defense Facts of Life," op cit.
33. Fallows, National Defense, pp. 95-106.
34. See Steven L. Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," Survival, May/June 1983; and Gary Hart, "A Military Reform Budget for FY 1984," Press Release, 14 March 1983.
35. Segal and Lengerman, p. 154.
36. See William E. Simons, "Military Professionals as Policy Advisors," Air University Review, March-April 1969; and John H. Garrison, "Military Officers and Politics," in American Defense Policy, pp. 760-66.
Major Forrest E. Waller, Jr. (USAFA; M.P.A., Princeton University) is Chief, Western Branch, Regional Estimates Division, Hq USAF Intelligence. He has served as a DOD staff intelligence analyst in Thailand; senior intelligence editor-briefer for the Chief of Staff, Hq USAF Intelligence; and Assistant Professor of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy. He also has had internships in the Executive Office of the President and at the Department of State. Major Waller is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School and a previous contributor to the Review.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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