Air University Review, September-October 1985

Integrity: What Are The Data
Telling Us?

Major Lewis H. Gray, Jr.

When responsible, dedicated people are joined together by lofty goals, they expect and demand integrity. Integrity is the fundamental premise of military service in a free society. Without integrity the moral pillars of our military strength––public trust and self-respect––are lost.

Integrity demands of each individual the highest standards of personal and professional honesty, and an unfaltering devotion to duty. It is rarely the easy way. Integrity is constantly assailed by self-seekers, and shirkers. Resist them all. You, the Air Force, and the Country will be the better for your resistance.¹

General Charles A. Gabriel
Chief of Staff

GENERAL Gabriel's remarks came in response to a survey of commissioned and noncommissioned officers attending professional military education courses at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in 1983. General Gabriel wanted to emphasize the key role of integrity in personal and professional activities. Additionally, in a letter to Lieutenant General Charles G. Cleveland, then Commander of Air University, he commented on a previous poll: "I was struck with the finding that nearly 90 percent of the officers felt that they had been pressured by the organization or their superior to compromise their integrity." He concluded this letter with a request for General Cleveland "to follow this up with the 82/83 classes, look into the whys and examples, and keep me in the loop as you go along."²

In response to General Gabriel's request, Majors Donald W. Hudson, Gerald E. Hull, and Robert L. Stevenson, officers attending Air Command and Staff College, conducted a research study titled "Integrity––The Pressures to Compromise." The three officers developed a survey to determine " the whys and examples" of breaches in integrity and distributed 1177 questionnaires to officers and senior noncommissioned officers enrolled in resident professional military education (PME) courses. Of that number, 781 or 64 percent of the questionnaires were returned.

Although the survey does not reflect the total Air Force population in terms of demographics, it serves as a "benchmark in understanding why, to what extent, and in what circumstances officers and senior NCOs felt pressured to compromise their integrity."³ The study was also unique in the sense that it considered actual examples of breaches in integrity instead of sampling attitudes about the subject. For example, Major Joseph R. Daskevich and Paul A. Nafziger had asked in their 1980 Air Command and Staff College survey on professionalism, "Were you ever pressured by the organization or senior officers to compromise your integrity?" Hudson, Hull, and Stevenson went several steps further and asked their survey participants to describe circumstances in which they felt pressured to compromise their integrity and, additionally, to list the primary motivations. The survey confirmed previous PME surveys: "77 percent responded they felt pressured during their Air Force career to compromise their integrity in a job-related situation." On a positive note, almost 90 percent of the participants felt that they were adequately equipped to deal with questions of integrity.⁴ These are the key points drawn from "Integrity––The Pressures to Compromise," but other important aspects of the report can best be examined in the context of previous research and the comments of important critics in various articles, speeches, and journals. A number of surveys and commentaries on the ethical climate of the military appeared during the 1970-83 time frame. While some common themes from these surveys and commentaries are supported by "Integrity––The Pressures to Compromise," others are refuted in the Maxwell study.

Perceptions of Integrity

In 1970, General William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, tasked the Army War College to survey the professional climate in the U.S. Army. The resulting Study on Military Professionalism began a series of critical articles about the ethical health of the Army and, later, the Air Force as well. Designed "to assess the professional climate of the Army.... identify ... problem areas, and ... formulate corrective actions," the study portrayed the Army as "sufficiently out of step with ... time-honored aspirations and traditional ethics of the professional soldier to warrant immediate attention at the highest levels."⁵

The study identified a serious gap between the ideal professional climate and the climate perceived by Army officers. The ideal included "individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence, unselfish motivation, technical competence, and unconstrained flow of information." But young committed captains were "frustrated by the pressures of the system, disheartened by seniors who sacrificed integrity on the altar of personal success, and impatient with what they perceived as preoccupation with insignificant statistics."⁶ Not surprisingly, this report, written during the Vietnam era, reflected strong reactions to requirements for body counts after battlefield engagements. The respondents felt that they had compromised their integrity when they had had to fill specified quotas and then make recounts if the quotas fell short of the required number. In such instances, young officers perceived that the ethic of "duty, honor, country" had begun to slip away from the corps, as they had been required to demonstrate loyalty to their bosses rather than to the institution. Many young idealistic officers also slipped away and were "replaced by those who will tolerate if not condone ethical imperfection."⁷

Although one might speculate that the report reflected an Army torn by the trials of Vietnam, a second study conducted at the Army War College by Major Melville A. Drisko in 1977 indicates that many problems exposed in 1970 still existed in 1977. Drisko reported that although 96.5 percent of his respondents felt at least adequately equipped to make responsible ethical decisions, most felt that the system did not reward that kind of decision. In fact, almost one-third of some 2200 respondents felt that the organization actually rewarded unethical behavior. Worse yet, almost two-thirds felt that ethical behavior or "telling it like it is" was actually dysfunctional because that behavior went unrewarded. The ethical problems most frequently mentioned by Drisko's respondents appear surprisingly similar to problems cited in the first report: "competitive pressures placed on officers, lack of integrity perceived in senior officers, career survival through statistics, and little tolerance for mistakes."⁸ More serious than those problems was another concern, which Drisko expressed in his analysis: namely, that the Army system, rather than external contemporary sociological pressures, was the principal cause of unethical behavior in the officer corps. Because the ethical problems stemmed largely from internal pressures, Drisko stated, they would be solved only as the Army dealt with them honestly and directly.⁹

A number of surveys at Air University between 1974 and 1983 identified similar problems related to integrity and ethical norms in the Air Force. As a result, in an article titled "What the Captain Really Means ..., Major Peter Henderson concluded that among young officers there was a significant lack of faith in the integrity of Air Force management and leadership. Major Henderson based this conclusion on a survey of some 780 officers attending Squadron Officer School. Of 617 respondents, 61 percent indicated that they found it necessary at times to sacrifice their integrity in the interest of job requirements, while only 26 percent stated that they were not required to compromise their integrity. The officers indicated that they were pressured to compromise most frequently in reporting and documenting inaccuracies. They also felt that correction of the problem should begin at top management levels: 37 percent selected senior officers as the worst offenders.¹⁰

Major Howard M. Epstein surveyed students from Air War College (AWC), Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), and Squadron Officer School (SOS) in 1976 to determine Air Force officers' attitudes toward unethical behavior. One question asked whether the Air Force seemed to have a problem with unethical behavior. Overall, 58 percent felt that there was such a problem; but, as a group, company- and junior field-grade officers felt more strongly about the problem than did the AWC students. For example, 80 percent of the SOS students and 62 percent of the ACSC group felt that the Air Force had a problem with unethical behavior, but only 32 percent of the AWC students agreed.

In 1980, Majors Joseph R. Daskevich and Paul A. Nafziger designed a survey titled "The Pulse of Professionalism" to survey attitudes on professionalism among students in the PME schools at Air University. In addition to a wide range of questions on military professionalism, two questions pertained directly to integrity:

Were you ever pressured by the "organization or senior officers" to compromise your integrity? How frequently do you think other officers compromise their integrity?¹¹

The survey was administered again to an SOS class in 1980; to AWC, ACSC, and SOS classes in 1981; and to a class at the Senior NCO Academy in 1981. The Squadron Officer School continued to survey each of its classes after the initial survey in 1980 and used the results in a seminar on military professionalism during the last week of class. Although many classes were surveyed, the data from classes 83D and 83E are representative of previous classes and current company-grade officer attitudes. One can observe in Table I that company-grade officers in every survey felt less pressured to compromise their integrity than other participants did. But all groups perceived that others compromised their integrity to a greater extent than they themselves. Students at Air Command and Staff College and the Senior NCO Academy were the most pessimistic in their opinions of others. For example, 80 percent of two separate ACSC classes believed that others compromised their integrity sometimes or often. As a result of such data, General Gabriel requested further examination of the issue.

The surveys conducted at Air University were not the only indications of growing concern over a lack of integrity in the U.S. Armed Forces. In fact, these surveys tended to support the views expressed by many other people in a variety of articles, speeches, memorandums, and journals. For example, General John D. Ryan, former Air Force Chief of Staff, made the following comment in a policy letter to his commanders subsequent to the Lavelle incident:

Integrity––which includes full and accurate disclosure––is the keystone of military service. . . . We must not compromise our integrity––our truthfulness.... False reporting is a clear example of a failure of integrity…Integrity can be ordered but it can only be achieved by encouragement and example.¹²

Lieutenant Colonel Monroe T. Smith addressed the problem of falsifying information in an article titled "Reporting Inaccuracies––A Rose by Another Name" in 1983. He indicated that the Air Force has a problem with honesty and integrity, preferring to call dishonest statements by another name––"inaccurate reporting."¹³

Table I. Responses to Questions on Pressures to Compromise and Perceptions of Compromise.

Were you ever pressured by the "organization or senior officers" to compromise your integrity?

How frequently do you think others compromise their integrity?

*Combined statistics of SOS classes 83D and 83E.

Chaplain (Major General) Henry J. Meade expressed a belief at the Corona West Conference in 1976 that the time had come to reassert integrity as a "lifestyle" for leaders throughout the nation. He indicated that integrity, as a total way of life, was getting more and more difficult to find.¹⁴

In papers presented to the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society in 1979, Sam C. Sarkesian and Thomas E. Kelly addressed military ethics in an institutional context. Sarkesian argued that military personnel belong to a society that more or less shapes its own view of integrity.

If we accept the fact that personal integrity is developed from a variety of sources, not only from within the military, then there is an inherent tension between the concept of personal integrity, duty, honor, country, and officership. Thus, there can be times when the personal integrity of the military professional is confronted by the contrary demands of the profession, the institution, and the search for career success.¹⁵

Sarkesian went on to say that dilemmas between personal integrity and professional and institutional demands should not be rationalized under the deeply engrained concepts of obedience and professional loyalty. He cited such historical examples as Antigone, Socrates, and Sir Thomas More, who were willing to sacrifice their lives rather than submit to unjust institutional demands or laws.

Kelly directed his paper to the problems surfaced in the study by the Army War College and discussed in Major Drisko's 1977 report. Kelly suggested that the Army had not taken adequate steps to solve its problems and that institutional practices were continuing to pressure Army officers to compromise their integrity.¹⁶ In another 1983 article, Major W. H. Margerum, Jr., stated that a military officer simply cannot be a professional without integrity because integrity is the foundation of the professional officer's character: it determines all that he is or ever can be."¹⁷ Margerum's strong statement, combined with the large body of literature that establishes the existence of a problem and defines its nature, could lead one to conclude that the foundation of the officer corps is shaky at best and possibly crumbling at worst.

Common Themes on Integrity

Several basic themes dominate the recent literature on integrity. Most of the literature expresses a belief that a lack of integrity among professional military personnel was a serious problem in the 1970s and is still a problem. Another theme is the perception that military personnel most frequently violate principles of integrity by doing false reporting or knowingly documenting untrue actions or statistics. Still another view, which perhaps has the most significant and far-reaching implications, is that the military institution exacerbates the problem.

3. Is integrity really a problem in the Air Force?

31.5% a. No

32.5% b. Not sure

35.5% c. Yes

5. The amount of emphasis placed on integrity by the Air Force is

6. How well equipped do you feel to deal with integrity questions in the Air Force work environment?

7. Should the Air Force be teaching "integrity?"

16. While associated with the Air Force, have you ever been pressured to compromise your integrity in a job-related situation?

17. After being pressured, did you compromise your integrity?

Table II. Responses to Questions in
"Integrity--The Pressures to Compromise"

Majors Hudson, Hull, and Stevenson either directly or indirectly address their basic themes in their report. Table II shows the extent to which a lack of integrity is perceived as a problem in the Air Force: only 35.5 percent of all of the respondents were absolutely sure that integrity is really a problem. However, in crosstabulating this information, Majors Hudson, Hull, and Stevenson found that while the officer population as a whole was evenly divided on this question, with 33 percent for each response, the noncommissioned officers by a two-to-one margin (46.5 percent to 21.5 percent) felt that integrity is a problem in the Air Force. The senior officers from the Air War College responded quite differently from the noncommissioned officers: by a margin of 46 percent to 21.5 percent, they stated that integrity is not a problem in the Air Force.¹⁸

These data provide a clear signal that integrity is a serious problem facing the officer corps. Whether a lack of integrity in the Air Force is real or perceived, the discrepancy between the population of senior noncommissioned officers and senior commissioned officers suggests a serious situation that needs attention. All groups recognize that the Air Force should teach the principles of integrity (see responses for question 7, as well as those for related questions 5, 16, and 17), but roughly half of the participants felt that the Air Force places too little emphasis on integrity. Although 88.5 percent felt at least adequately equipped to deal with questions of integrity in the Air Force work environment, 76.3 percent still felt pressured to compromise their integrity, Of that group, at least 65 percent (or roughly half of the total respondents) did, in fact, compromise their integrity at least "rarely."

Table III. Types of Compromise Found in "Integrity--The Pressures to Compromise"

Group I--Dishonesty 55.7%

False reporting (42.4%)
Theft/misappropriation (3.7%)
Offering/accepting favors or bribes (2.2%)
Other (5.2%)
Tolerating (witnessing or knowing of integrity breaches) (2.2%)

Group II--Unfair Actions (Personnel) 17.4%

Inordinate influence to contribute/join (1.5%)
Sexual harassment (.4%)
Discrimination/favoritism (5.2%)
Inaccurate evaluation/recommendation (8.9%)
Other (.7%)
Tolerating (.7%)

Group III--Poor Judgment 4.6%

Sexual misconduct (1.1%)
Drug abuse (.2%)
Other (2.6%)
Tolerating (.7%)

Group IV--Disloyalty 3.9%

Security matters (2.4%)
Toward others (.9%)
Other (.2%)
Tolerating (.4%)

Group V--Personal Interests 15.0%

Unauthorized/unnecessary use of government vehicles (2.2%)
Unauthorized/unnecessary use of other government property (.2%)
Use of rank/position for personal gain (3.5%)
Use of rank/position to circumvent "the system" (ignoring regulations, plus others) (7.4%)
Other (.4%)
Tolerating (1.3%)

Group IV--Other 3.5%

(All incidents not included in above categories.)

In addressing the second major theme, Majors Hudson, Hull, and Stevenson categorized specific incidents in which integrity was an issue (see Table III). Of the 781 people who participated in the survey, 350 also provided written accounts of incidents that they had personal knowledge of. The authors categorized these responses in six major groupings: dishonesty, unfair actions, poor judgment, disloyalty, personal interests, and others. Most of the responses (55.7 percent) reflected "dishonesty" (Group 1), and the category "false reporting received 42.4 percent of that total. These data confirmed views expressed in some of the literature on integrity. The Army studies, comments by General Ryan, and articles by Major Henderson and Colonel Smith listed false reporting as perhaps the most commonly occurring breach of integrity in the military. The following comments are representative of other categories included under the "dishonesty" general heading:

DCM endorsed artificial readiness figures of his airframe fleet. Aircraft were reported OR [operationally ready], whether they were or not, every Friday night to eliminate weekend down-time.

***

I did not enforce the overweight program as vigorously as I should have in my squadron. I was CC (component commander). I went through the motions of the program, but did not fully prosecute the situation. There was no pressure on me to do this.

***

As a fledgling in AFSC [Air Force Systems Command], I was involved with my boss in continual violation of AFR 30-30 [Standards of Conduct]. Defense contractors wined and dined our office either in pursuit of contracts or to pacify the boss on program of extant contracts.

The second major group of integrity-related incidents––"unfair actions" (personnel)––drew only 17.4 percent of the total responses. Most of the incidents involved either inaccurate evaluation/recommendation or discrimination/favoritism. The following incidents are representative of this major group:

The squadron commander advised me that I must join the NCO club to have my APR [airman performance report] endorsed by the DCM [deputy chief of maintenance] and/or the Wing Commander. I refused because I did not feel my membership in the NCO club should have anything to do with my APR. I was an E-7 at the time. He again approached me just prior to taking my APR to the CBPO [consolidated base personnel office].

***

I was told to hide an obese TSgt during an IG [inspector general] visit because his presence in the unit would distract unnecessarily from favorable impressions. My boss gave the NCO a 4-day pass, i.e., not leave.

***

As a supervisor of both officers and airmen in a flying squadron, I felt I somewhat compromised my integrity when rendering evaluation reports. If I had rendered what I consider truthful reports, my troops would not have been competitive for promotion.

"Personal interests" was the next largest group having integrity-related incidents, with 15 percent of the responses. These three incidents are representative of this category:

A C-141 pilot transported his household goods and diverted an aircraft from its prearranged schedule. I was ordered not to report it for investigation or to upchannel it as required by regulation.

***

I had a boss who was moonlighting on government time, and he pressured me to cover for him. I did not turn him in, but when he was found out, I did not lie to cover for him as he wanted me to.

***

As a member of a high-level staff, it was necessary to develop fictitious reasons to support aircraft procurement figures provided to Congress even though new attrition projections indicated that the original aircraft buy was no longer necessary.

The percentage of responses in the category of "poor judgment," "disloyalty," and "other" was relatively small, but the behavior described by the respondents has serious implications for effective professional relationships. The following incidents were included under the "poor judgment" and "disloyalty" headings:

My squadron commander ordered a search of the enlisted barracks. The search identified two enlisted members possessing cocaine. My squadron commander never reported the incident.

***

As a base contracting officer, I advised a contractor that he and his staff could not eat at the dining hall. The contractor had the contract for running the dining hall but not all the individuals who ate at the dining hall worked on the dining hall contract. I was in compliance with an Air Force regulation and was supported by two full colonels and two different JAG [judge advocate general] officers. The contractor complained to a congressman. As a result, the two colonels said I made the decision. I was legally right but politically wrong.

Although approximately one-half of the respondents stated that they probably would compromise their integrity again in similar circumstances, they rejected, by a two-to-one margin, the idea that the ends justify the means. This discrepancy is somewhat puzzling since the respondents listed their primary motivating factors as protection of careers, concern for organizational images, protection of bosses, and performance of jobs in spite of the regulations. Does this apparent contradiction mean that self-preservation and organizational image must be primary concerns at any cost? It seems to suggest support for the third theme––that the military institution itself exacerbates the problem, as some of the Army studies and military sociologists suggest. Table IV lists several questions and responses that support this contention. Examination of questions 10 through 15 shows the tendency of the respondents to take a situational stance in dealing with breaches of integrity. They were much more likely to deal openly with the problem if a breach of integrity involved a fellow worker or subordinate (questions 12-15). And the reasons for that tendency were predominantly to "maintain the standards of integrity." On the other hand, 35 percent of the participants would not pursue a breach of integrity if they had to confront the boss with a difficult decision. And the primary reason was fear of retaliation. This finding suggests that the open-door policies maintained by bosses may not be as effective as they should be. It also seems to support the idea that institutional pressures may be responsible for the refusal of many officers to address hard questions of integrity.

Table IV. Responses to Questions in
"Integrity--The Pressures to Compromise"

10. If you detect a breach of integrity in your boss, would you be more likely to

61.5% a. Deal with it openly, or
35.0% b. Let it lie

11. Why?

12. If you detect a breach of integrity in a fellow worker, would you

86.5% a. Deal with it openly, or
10.0% b. Let it lie

13. Why?

14. If you detect a breach of integrity in a subordinate, would you

93.0%	a. Deal with it openly, or
5.5%	b. Let it lie

15. Why?

The implications of these themes on integrity for the commissioned and noncommissioned officer corps are enormous. In our democratic nation, the military must keep civilian leaders informed of its capabilities and preparations to carry out military operations in support of foreign policy. Absolute integrity is a must. While commissioned and noncommissioned officers must have faith in their corporate abilities, they must also have the courage to point out shortcomings. Not only is honesty necessary in the arena of national decision making, but also the corporateness or unit cohesion that is the heart of a combat unit cannot exist in an atmosphere of dishonesty and distrust. Although the data suggest that a lack of integrity is not an all-pervasive problem in the professional officer corps, instances of pressures and the reasons for succumbing to these pressures are much too numerous for the good health of the corps.

An Improved Climate For Integrity

The responses in "Integrity––The Pressures to Compromise" cry out for clear institutional reforms to encourage integrity among military professionals. If people feel threatened by their environment, burdened by unenforceable regulations, and led by superiors with questionable integrity, commissioned and noncommissioned officers will continue to struggle for survival in an unhealthy climate. What can be done to improve the climate and reduce pressures that cause many Air Force members to compromise their integrity?

The answer to that question has obviously eluded leaders of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps over the past decade, if indeed there has ever been any real concern or desire to change the climate. Past solutions have focused on speeches, comments in various journals, and cursory attempts to teach proper actions in all military schools and professional military education courses. Notable exceptions, of course, are the service academies, where students live and breathe strict honor codes for four years. But the data indicate that little has changed during the past decade.

The current Chief of Staff indicates a strong desire to make integrity the "fundamental premise of military service in a free society." Thus, the first step has been taken. Senior leadership supports the exercise of integrity throughout the Air Force. But the second step is uncertain. Will each link in the chain of command down to the airman basic now apply principles of integrity?

There are a number of ways to expedite the process. The authors of "Integrity––The Pressures to Compromise" suggest that integrity must be taught at all levels of the Air Force from accession program through senior PME schools. But instruction cannot be limited to the classroom. Setting the example on the job and rewarding ethical behavior must become integral parts of the workplace, and that responsibility falls directly on the shoulders of the commander, who must be selfless in relating to his unit. For example, if a commander knows that his unit is ill-prepared to carry out its responsibilities because of either poor equipment or unqualified people, he is obligated to report the status of the unit to his superiors. Of course, he should also discuss his plans for improving the situation, and senior leadership must then give him an opportunity to implement his plans. Holding commanders accountable for their units may require more than one-year "ticket-punching" tours; the additional time would allow commanders to establish rapport with their people.

This improved rapport would perhaps help to reduce the threat perceived by many officers that ethical choices and adherence to the standards of integrity might become obstacles to their survival in the Air Force. The authors contend also that too many people fear the consequences of failure and an inability to perform at 100-percent efficiency. The atmosphere of competition in today's Air Force encourages many people to compromise their integrity in order to remain "in the running." To counter this trend, the authors suggest that the Air Force "continue to encourage an open dialogue to explain why a certain action is necessary. Extend a helpful atmosphere to get the job done right rather than creating an 'or-else' environment."

The final recommendation is that the Air Force should review all regulations and revise or eliminate those that cannot be enforced or are not enforced universally. Many respondents felt that they had to bend the system or "cheat a little" to perform their jobs in total conformity with regulations, especially with respect to paperwork. On the other hand, essential regulations must be strictly enforced. The authors suggest Air Force-wide screening of consistently "pencil whipped" requirements and modifying essential requirements to ensure universal enforcement.

Significant change comes slowly to bureaucracies, yet drastic changes seem necessary to weed out some of the institutionalized practices that impose undue pressure on Air Force people. The atmosphere can change perhaps when commanders clearly demonstrate their integrity and responsibility for their people and their missions and when Air Force members recognize that integrity is rewarded behavior. The changes may be only incremental from year to year, but if continuing, observable changes become the rule rather than the exception, surveys in 1994 will reflect tangible improvements instead of mere talk about the problem.

Fairchild AFB, Washington

Notes

1. General Charles A. Gabriel, USAF, TIG Brief, 10 October 1983, p. 2.

2. Majors Donald W. Hudson, Gerald E. Hull, and Robert L. Stevenson, "Integrity––The Pressures to Compromise," Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1983, pp. 2-3. The "nearly 90 percent" finding that General Gabriel alluded to was derived from a 1981 Air Command and Staff College survey.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Majors Joseph R. Daskevich and Paul A. Nafziger, The Pulse of Professionalism (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 1980), p. 14; Hudson, Hull, and Stevenson, pp. 20-21, 29.

5. Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Army War College, 30 June 1970), pp. v, 1.

6. Major Francis B. Galligan, U.S. Army, Military Professionalism and Ethics (Norfolk, Virginia: Naval War College, June 1979), p. 12; Study on Military Professionalism, p.12.

7. SOS Officership Nonresident Course Book––Phase II (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, April 1982), p. 35.

8. Major Melvin A. Drisko, "An Analysis of Professional Military Ethics: Their Importance, Development, and Inculcation," Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Army War College, 19 June 1977, pp. 38-40.

9. Thomas E. Kelly III, "Ethics in the Military Profession: The Continuing Tension," paper presented to the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 4 June 1979, p. 7.

10. Major Peter Henderson, "What the Captain Really Means..." Air University Review, January-February 1976, pp. 96-101.

11. Daskevich and Nafziger, p. 14.

12. General John D. Ryan, Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 November 1972). General Lavelle was running the air war during the latter years of the Vietnam conflict and issuing orders on rules of engagement that were in conflict with stated national policy. His reports, however, never indicated what was really happening. A sergeant who worked in the general's chain of command refused to continue falsifying reports and exposed him.

13. Lieutenant Colonel Monroe T. Smith, "Reporting Inaccuracies––A Rose by Another Name," Air University Review, January-February 1983, pp. 83-88.

14. SOS Nonresident Course Book, p. 36.

15. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Moral and Ethical Foundations of Military Professionalism," paper presented to the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 3-5 June 1979, pp. 18-19.

16. Kelly, p. 4.

17. Major W. H. Margerum, Jr., "Integrity: The Military Professional and Society," Air University Review, September-October 1983, p. 79.

18. Hudson, Hull, and Stevenson, pp. 17, 20, 23, 24, 38, 39, 41.

Contributor

Major Lewis H. Gray, Jr., (B.A., University of Washington; M.S., University of Southern California), is Flight Commander, 92d Air Refueling Heavy Squadron, Fairchild AFB, Washington. He has been an area manager, a phase manager, and lecturer at Squadron Officer School; navigator and instructor navigator in KC-135Qs at Beale AFB, California; and education and training officer at Extension Course Institute, Gunter AFS, Alabama. Major Gray is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. He wasa a student at Air Command and Staff College when he wrote his article on integrity.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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