Figure 1: The Doctrine Tree
Air University Review, November-December 1985
Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Friedenstein
THE evolution of the term aerospace doctrine inappropriately links our air and space doctrines. Space systems have characteristics that are different from air systems, which cause differences in the principles of war as they apply to possible conflict in space. Thus space doctrine is unique.
While there is considerable confusion with regard to the exact meaning of the concept of doctrine, a recent article by Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Drew offers a general view of doctrine that can serve as a basis for analyzing the relationship between air and space doctrine.1 Colonel Drew claims that there are three categories of doctrine: fundamental, environmental, and organizational.
Fundamental doctrine is grounded in an examination of history, and it applies in all operating mediums in any nation. Instantly recognized as elements of fundamental doctrine are purposes of the military, the nature of war, and the relationship of the military to other national instruments of power. Since fundamental doctrine is characterized by its timeless significance and universal application, it is rarely, if ever, rewritten in response to technological change.
Environmental doctrine is a compilation of beliefs about the employment of military forces within a particular operating medium; thus, land, sea, and air doctrine fit in this category. Colonel Drew points out that environmental doctrine is narrower in scope than fundamental doctrine because it encompasses only one operating medium. And since it describes military operations in a particular locale, it is strongly influenced by the physical characteristics of the medium. Environmental doctrine is still international in its application and should thus apply equally well to any nation's military force.
Organizational doctrine defines the basic beliefs of a particular military organization about how best to conduct warfare in its operating medium. Soviet and U.S. doctrine would diverge at this point. Organizational doctrine is very dependent on technology and is often tempered by local political constraints. If a statement of doctrine did not apply a decade ago or if it is obviously tied to the capability of a particular weapon system, it is organizational doctrine.
As shown graphically in Figure 1, an important concept of these three divisions of doctrine is that they build on the previous level of abstraction. The reasons for Colonel Drew's choice of the tree are obvious: leaves survive only for a short time on a severed branch or on a tree with decayed roots. Regardless of its place on the tree, military doctrine is defined by Colonel Drew as "what is officially believed and taught about the best way to conduct military affairs."2
Figure 1: The Doctrine Tree
The U.S. Air Force has found it difficult to define its doctrine since its days as the Army Air Corps, principally because rapidly changing technology creates doubt that the traditional "historical" method can produce doctrine relevant to "modern" battle. One early school of Air Force thought went so far as to claim that it was pointless even to write air doctrine because it would become obsolete so quickly that it would be useless.3 The fact that the Air Force revised its basic manual on doctrine one year after its first edition in 1953 and then again in 1954, 1955, 1959, 1964, 1971, 1975, 1979, and 1984 reflects the constant fight to keep doctrine current.
The first edition of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-2 in March 1953 was a very small booklet (4 inches by 6 inches) that contained only seventeen pages. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg may have anticipated the many revisions when he wrote his foreword:
Basic air doctrine evolves from experience gained in war and from analysis of the continuing impact of new weapons systems on warfare. The dynamic and constant changes in new weapons makes periodic substantive review of this doctrine necessary.4
It is difficult to find specific statements in the manual that would not apply to any modern air force. It was clearly environmental doctrine.
The 1954 edition of AFM 1-2 appears identical to the 1953 edition. Interestingly, General Nathan F. Twining's foreword to the manual is identical to General Vandenberg's foreword, except for the deletion of one sentence: "The dynamic and constant changes in new weapons makes periodic substantive review of this doctrine necessary."5 Apparently General Twining felt that fundamental air doctrine should not change.
In 1959, the word aerospace replaced the word air throughout the manual, reflecting General Thomas D. White's earlier introduction of the term.6 Space operations were doctrinally tied to air operations by this significant statement:
The aerospace is an operationally indivisible medium consisting of the total expanse beyond the earth's surface. The forces of the Air Force comprise a family of operating systems-organizations, ballistic missiles, and space vehicle systems. These are the fundamental aerospace forces of the nation.7
In 1964, an important change occurred that affected the very nature of Air Force doctrine. The foreword to all previous editions placed no external constraints on the development of doctrine (other than the lessons of history and the impact of technology). But General Curtis E. LeMay's foreword in 1964 formally recognized a constraint by national objectives and policies:
Basic doctrine evolves through the continuing analysis and testing of military operations in the light of national objectives and the changing military environment. Accordingly, the thermonuclear age has created conditions necessitating a rapid advance in the development of new concepts of air warfare. It is probable that new interprelations will continue to be needed if Air Force doctrine is to be responsible to changing national Policy requirements, the potential military threat, and developments in military technology.8
Since 1964, the foreword has consistently included national objectives and policies as constraints on Air Force doctrine. General LeMay's mention of the thermonuclear age was formal recognition that, although the best way to defeat an enemy may be the unrestricted use of all available military capacity, fear of nuclear escalation had become an undeniable restriction.
Most significant is the change of flavor that permeates the manual published in 1964. Without knowing the title or authors, a reader would instantly recognize that the content is essentially an Air Force discussion of how to deal militarily with aggressive communism. The manual had become organizational doctrine.
In 1975, a separate paragraph devoted to space reaffirmed the peaceful desires of the United States:
The underlying goal of the U.S. national space policy is that the medium of space must be preserved for peaceful use for the benefit of all mankind. National policy and international treaties restrict the use of space for employment of weapons of mass destruction. There is, however, a need to insure that no other nation gains a strategic military advantage through the exploitation of the space environment.9
The 1979 version of AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, was our highest expression of organizational doctrine. It recognized three types of space operations: space support, force enhancement, and space defense. Space support consisted of launching and operating satellites that provide force enhancement to earth-based units through surveillance, command-control-communications, navigation, and weather data. Space defense warned of hostile acts in space and cracked the door on our use of force in space by stating that it should "enhance deterrence by developing the capability to deny or nullify hostile acts in or through aerospace."10
Two significant changes mark the 1984 edition of AFM 1-1. First, it takes a refreshing step "back down the doctrine tree," toward the more abstract level of environmental doctrine. Though the concepts are certainly still a product of USAF heritage and today's technology, much of the presentation is divorced from our specific organizational context. Second, space operations have been deleted from the list of Air Force missions, reflecting their full integration into the remaining nine. The groundwork for this change is laid by a note at the end of the preface, which warns the reader not to construe any residual use of the word air as a more limited treatment of the aerospace medium.
In October 1982, the Air Force published the first edition of Air Force Manual 1-6, Military Space Doctrine. In addition to its specific doctrinal statements, it permits an assessment of how our space doctrine fits onto Colonel Drew's tree.
Does AFM 1-6 represent constrained or unconstrained doctrine? The very presence of chapter 1 attests that Air Force space doctrine is subservient to national policy. The title, "National Space Policy, Executive Guidance, and Legal Constraints" (emphasis added), indicates in no uncertain terms that the doctrine is constrained. Paragraph 1-3 identifies a governing political-military environment:
Military space-related activities are authorized by and regulated according to our nation's laws. They are affected by treaty commitments and by this nation's traditional adherence to international law. National policy sets the tone for military space operations. . . 11
Although no one has ever advocated that the Air Force dash into space uncontrolled by civilian policy, there are major arguments for an unconstrained statement of military space doctrine. Lieutenant Colonel Dino A. Lorenzini discussed four such arguments in the July-August 1982 issue of Air University Review: First, other directives provide statements of national policy; second, if fundamental tenets are not described in a doctrine manual, they are probably not stated elsewhere; third, an unconstrained doctrine offers more continuity; and fourth, without statements of possible actions, civilian leaders are not aware of lost opportunities.12 When a futurist doctrine is externally constrained in defining principles, it ceases to function as doctrine and becomes merely another statement of national policy.
As stated in the review of AFM 1-1, Air Force basic doctrine became constrained about 1964, principally by the fear of nuclear escalation. But air doctrine had decades to mature before this restriction. Space doctrine is still in its infancy. It is one thing to know the best way to conduct military operations and still work under constraints in implementation strategy. (There are always real-world restrictions: civilian policy is but one of them.) But it is a risky matter to allow outside influences to hinder the formulation of basic military truths.
Does AFM 1-6 represent environmental or organizational doctrine? The manual was written to apply only to the United States Air Force and does not apply to other national military forces operating in the medium, so it is clearly organizational doctrine. Thus, if AFM 1-6 were placed on Colonel Drew's doctrine tree, it would appear in the top foliage, beyond AFM 1-1, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Organizational Space Doctrine
Even though the Air Force now publishes only organizational aerospace doctrine, environmental air doctrine still clearly supports it. Since aerospace is a manufactured word derived from the words air and space, the question is whether there is environmental space doctrine to support the organizational space doctrine of AFM 1-6. Examining the origin of the term aerospace may help answer the question.
In 1958, General Thomas D. White, then Chief of Staff, introduced the term aerospace as a means of conveying his belief that air and space are an inseparable entity. From a technical viewpoint, the several divisions between the upper atmosphere (troposphere, stratosphere, mesosphere, thermosphere, and exosphere) are arbitrary, and wherever the boundary between air and space may fall, it is but one more arbitrary altitude along a continuum of decreasing atmospheric density. General White's view also has strong "support" from the legal community, for its members have been unable to agree on a boundary. Since there is no definite boundary between air and space, such as that between land, sea, and air, General White concluded that there could be no logical division between the two.13
General White's conclusion is certainly logical when one considers the developments in weapon systems during the late 1950s. The first successful Atlas flight on 14 December 1957 demonstrated that ICBMs would soon become a major part of the Air Force strategic force.14 It was widely accepted that manned aircraft and unmanned missiles were complementary systems. Bombers could be recalled after launch, but missiles had better alert potential, greater speed, and reduced vulnerability.15 More important, the ICBM was a weapon system that transited the air-space boundary two times during its mission. And the ICBM mission--striking the enemy's heartland--had been a unique and formally recognized Air Force mission since publication of the first manual on basic doctrine in 1953. But doctrine for strategic missiles is now an element of nuclear doctrine, rather than space doctrine. Space doctrine covers only orbital systems: thus, the link between air and space that once existed has been broken.
But perhaps there was more behind the concept of "aerospace." The events of the late 1950s reflect a period of intense debate within the military and between the military and NASA over roles and missions in space. Although General White presented his logic on "aerospace" apart from any stated rivalry among the services, the events of the period suggest that he was also driven by a strong desire to gain control of possible space missions for the Air Force.
If there are reasons to question the thinking that led to coinage of the word aerospace, should we not question the adequacy of a space doctrine based on the concept?
In his discussion of fundamental doctrine, Colonel Drew quotes a statement by Dr. I. B. Holley that the principles of war are doctrinal beliefs that have become axiomatic.16 If the principles of war are the enduring. generalized, and highest expression of military doctrine, they should provide a framework for this examination. One should note that each time these fundamental principles of war are applied to a particular environmental medium, they differ in spite of their common historical origins. The difference lies in the inability of forces in the different media to apply these fundamental principles in precisely the same way.
Characteristics of the aerospace medium covered in AFM 1-1, such as speed, range, maneuverability, flexibility, and responsiveness, have left an indelible "air mark" on the principles of war. But are these characteristics and the resulting aerospace version of military principles that they give rise to a valid basis for space doctrine? If we use our lineage of Air Force basic doctrine manuals to define the aerospace principles of war, do we find that these principles are wholly compatible with characteristics of the space medium? If our aerospace principles do not uniformly apply to space, then environmental (Air Force basic) doctrine is an insufficient and invalid foundation for space doctrine.
The principle of the objective is a central element in the successful conduct of any battle and has been included in all discussions of the principles of war in the Air Force doctrinal manuals. A single objective must be clearly defined so that it can be easily understood. The objective becomes the goal of military strategy and serves as a benchmark through all levels of command to ensure that all subordinate plans contribute directly to the objective.
Any detailed battlefield objective is ultimately traceable to a published doctrinal statement concerning the objectives of military forces. But AFM 1-6 reveals that we have yet to determine our real military space objective. The preface of the manual states:
The basic philosophy of space doctrine is to preserve free access to, and transit through, space for peaceful purposes by military and civilian sector. 17
This is certainly consistent with all public statements on space since the passage of the Space Act of 1958. But close examination of AFM 1-6 reveals a wider debate over subordinate strategies to ensure peaceful use of space. Parts of paragraph 3-4 state that space weapon systems not only can directly damage earthbased counterforce and countervalue targets but can suppress earth-based enemy defenses to improve penetration by other weapons.18 These potential war-fighting missions offer an objective far different from the "space peacekeeper" goal described in the preface. Clearly, the issue over military space objectives has not been resolved.
The principle of the offensive for the warfighting mission in space is closely tied to the principle of the objective because the offense has always been considered essential for victory. The air power concept of the offensive brought a new dimension to war, for it allowed "heartland operations" aimed directly against an enemy's strength without first having to defeat his defensive forces.19 However, by 1955, advances in air defense technology made heartland operations very costly, and the principle of the offensive was changed to the principle of the initiative. Rather than designating the enemy heartland, AFM 1-2 stated that "air forces also have the power to carry out operations immediately against an enemy at any desired point in time or space."20 This principle calls for imposing our will on the enemy and forcing him to abandon his plans for the offensive and concentrate on defense.21
There is no reason to assume that the principle of the offensive would not apply to space, but the present structure of the orbital force offers little, if any, capability. Few systems can maneuver, and none can "shoot back." The potential for offensive operations in space has been limited only because of technology and policy decisions against being "offensive" in space. This principle should become increasingly important in the future.
The principle of economy of effort has at times been treated as a separate item in Air Force doctrinal statements, but, at other times it has been treated as part of the principle of concentration.22 Taken separately, economy of effort warns the commander against overkill. Since few commanders have unlimited resources or an overwhelming superiority, a lack of economy in one action can have a severe impact elsewhere.23
Economy of effort is particularly important for space operations for different reasons. Each pound placed in orbit is still very expensive. Any evasive maneuvers require fuel, carried at the expense of payload. So any future force projection will undoubtedly be tailored to specific targets with little overkill available. The sheer cost of space operations demands "economy of effort," but too much economy can prove detrimental. In efforts to save money, the United States has built multimission spacecraft, which, because of their high individual cost, must be capable of operating for long periods. But the Soviet Union has opted for single-mission systems with shorter life. This circumstance gives the Soviets a reserve launch capacity and much freedom of action in a space conflict. Economy of effort in space deserves close scrutiny and some redefinition.
The principle of control has sometimes been labeled the principle of cooperation or the principle of unity of effort. Although World War II proved the necessity of placing air forces under a single commander, this concept was not labeled a principle of warfare until the publication of AFM 1-2 in 1955. That manual used the term principle of entity in discussing the mandate for centralized control to exploit the versatility of air power. A commander must "concentrate effort at decisive times and places" and avoid "segmenting the forces concerned and diffusing their effort in unrelated, infeasible, or excessively costly undertakings." 24 Entity was changed to unity of effort in 1975.25
By whatever name, centralized command should certainly apply to operations in space. Lieutenant General Richard C. Henry, USAF (Ret), repeatedly stated that one of the most striking aspects of all our space systems is that they service more than one user.26 Decentralized control of space would be ineffective today for the same reasons that decentralized control of air power in World War II permitted conflicting requirements on limited assets. AFM 1-6 recognizes this principle in paragraph 4-2, which predicts that a unified command will eventually evolve to control operations in space.27
The ability to concentrate forces was certainly enhanced by the much greater speed and range of aircraft. The 1955 AFM I -I noted that the continuity of the air medium permits concentration both in time and space over the range of the entire globe.28 Concentration allows a numerically inferior force to gain a local tactical advantage.29 The 1979 AFM 1-1 points out that concentration is achieved through deception, speed, and maneuverability.30
Concentration deserves close examination before it is applied to space because with air forces it has always been achieved by physically moving a number of weapon systems together to achieve local superiority. However, because maneuvering in space requires great amounts of energy, any attack against orbiting spacecraft will probably be a one-on-one engagement against a very predictable target. But if the spacecraft cannot be concentrated, can the support they provide be concentrated? To some degree, yes. Yet because of lengthy development time, we design a specific capability and deploy spacecraft during peacetime. Wartime surge capacity comes at great cost, primarily through orbital spares or replacement. Therefore, the traditional principle of concentration of force apparently has little application to space operations.
From 1955 to the present, the principle of flexibility or maneuver has been considered a characteristic of air forces because of the unrestricted access to targets offered by the air medium. Maneuver enables a commander to employ selective strength against an enemy's weakness and to withdraw when confronted by superior strength. Maneuver maintains the initiative in battle and allows offensive operations and surprise.31 Maneuver is only one element of flexibility, but it is the element most often used by the military.
If there is anything that space systems do not have, it is maneuverability. Great care is taken before launch to predict the orbit over the complete life of a satellite because it is essentially fixed forever once achieved. In the move from air to space, the larger medium has in fact reduced access and maneuver.
But what other kinds of flexibility are available? Reconfiguring a weapon system to support a particular need has been a very successful approach with ground, sea, and air forces; but, unlike space, these systems have always allowed routine physical access. Even the space shuttle does not provide the recurring access necessary to reconfigure a spacecraft payload.
Any provision for spacecraft reconfiguring must be made prior to launch and is usually provided to work around anticipated component failures. Flexibility and maneuver are not found in the space medium.
Although the principle of simplicity did not appear in AFM 1-1 until 1979, that manual warns that, despite the complexity of a grand strategy, orders to implement this strategy must be clear, concise, and simple. The concept is extended to hardware by implying that simplicity produces reliability and rapid repair.32
While the development of air power has certainly taxed any definition of simplicity, space systems represent one of today's highest expressions of complex technology. Merely to survive in the harshness of space, separate subsystems must control temperature, maintain attitude, provide power, and maintain communication with ground controllers--all to support an even more complex mission package. As military space systems are designed to operate more autonomously from ground control in a hostile threat environment, the systems will become even more complex. While space assets can certainly be controlled through simple plans and strategies, spacecraft themselves are highly complex.
Defense was discussed as a principle of war in 1975 and 1979. It stated that the defense can inflict significant losses against certain categories of weapon system.33 Since today's satellites and their ground stations are almost defenseless, they cannot exploit the principle of defense. They "defend" only in the hope of surviving an attack, rather than inflicting damage on the attacker.
Since a satellite is not physically accessible during hostilities, any defense mechanism must be designed before launch to cope with unknown threats over the life of the system. If an aggressor has enough time to observe and characterize a satellite, he will have a significant advantage because he can tailor his attack to take advantage of the weaknesses of each satellite. Certainly, there will come a day when spacecraft will have defensive firepower, but that time is probably decades away.
The principle of security requires two broad activities: denying useful information to an enemy and obtaining and exploiting information about the enemy. AFM 1-2 in 1953 stated:
Air forces gain security by the exploitation of their extensive capabilities to maneuver in operation and their ability to strike directly at the sources of enemy offensive air action. They also attain security through selective positioning of bases and the active defense of areas.34
Space systems have produced a revolution in obtaining information about the enemy. Uninterrupted line of sight from space to earth has removed a great deal of security from earth based warfare and has made it more difficult to achieve surprise, though surveillance from space is powerless to discern true intent.
Although orbit selection does allow some freedom in "positioning," there is no sanctuary as implied by AFM 1-2. However, the sheer distance and inaccessibility of earth orbits provide some security to satellites. Most disabled ships sink and airplanes crash, but broken satellites continue on their way, creating uncertainty for a target planner. Nevertheless, orbit mechanics have removed the traditional concept of a sanctuary where a force can retreat out of range of the enemy. Low-altitude satellites complete many orbits each day, with most passing over enemy territory, giving the enemy recurring and unavoidable line of sight to the satellite. The principle of security requires reinterpretation for space.
Surprise, which is gained through deception, audacity, originality, concentration, and speed, forces the enemy to fight at a time and place not of his choosing.35 Surprise must not be confused with total unawareness; it requires only that the enemy become aware too late to react effectively.36
Where space is concerned, surprise is achieved through deception and by attacks that bypass the restrictions of orbit mechanics. That is, any attack that projects destruction through movement in orbital trajectories is observable and predictable. Only directed-energy weapons and electronic countermeasures which operate in straight lines at the speed of light, can achieve surprise.
The principle of timing and tempo first appeared as a principle of war in 1979. It stated that by operating at a faster pace than the enemy can detect our actions and react, we can gain dominance of the battle.37 Although this principle should apply to a space conflict, there are some unique constraints on the decision time-line. First, it will not be possible in the near future for a commander to have a constantly accurate picture of the location or status of enemy space systems. The ability to classify a satellite mission and its operational status correctly depends on repeated observations. Even a firmly identified, operational satellite is observable only when it is in line of sight of tracking stations. With the small number of stations, a satellite's true orbit and status are known only over short dispersed periods; between these periods, the satellite possibly may maneuver or reconfigure. Second, even if a commander makes a decision based on currently accurate intelligence, he is not always able to execute his wishes because of the same tracking station restrictions. For some time into the future, any battle in space will feature contestants wearing blindfolds that can be removed only for short (and different) intervals.
In 1984, logistics was added and defined as the principle of sustaining both men and machine in combat by obtaining, moving, and maintaining war-fighting potential.38 The problem of placing, operating, and (with the advent of the space shuttle) repairing assets in orbit has been central to space operations since 1957. Even for civilian space missions, logistics has permeated every decision and operation since the first satellite launch. Advances in launch technology may somewhat case logistic planning difficulties, but they will forever be a central part of space operations.
Cohesion is also new in 1984 and is defined as establishing and maintaining, through shared experiences and purpose and a sense of common identity, the war-fighting spirit and capability of a force to win.39 Cohesion pertains to the warrior, not the machine. Though more difficult with dispersed forces, the need for cohesion follows man wherever he may fight--including space.
Our current space doctrine is highly constrained by contemporary national policy and the misapplication of air principles to space. As a result, our present space doctrine contains few, if any, statements of unalterable truths regarding the conduct of military operation in space. It is organizational doctrine, unique to space operations of the U.S. Air Force.
Close examination of the principles of aerospace war reveals that the principles do not all fit where military space operations are concerned. The principles of the objective, economy of effort, control, logistics, and cohesion are very general in nature and do apply to space; the principles of concentration, flexibility/maneuver, and simplicity do not apply. The principles of the offense and defense do seem applicable to space but only after space technology reaches a more mature state. The principles of security, surprise, and timing and tempo apply only in a way unknown before the era of space operations.
The environmental principles of aerospace war do not uniformly apply to space because the air and space environments are different. The lack of a clear-cut physical boundary between air and space has caused us to ignore the distinct characteristics of orbital operations. Since there is no doctrinal foundation for the term aerospace, we should reapply Major William C. Sherman's advice of 1921:
In deriving the doctrine that must underlie all principles of employment of the air force, we must not be guided by conditions surrounding the use of ground troops, but must seek out our doctrine ... in the element in which the air force operates.40
Figure 3: The Seperate Branches of Air and Space Doctrine
AFM 1-6 belongs on a wholly separate branch of Colonel Drew's doctrine tree, removed from AFM 1-1, as shown in Figure 3. And since the manual has made a statement of organizational space doctrine without first laying the necessary environmental foundation, we have actually produced leaves on a nonexistent branch.
In 1926, long before the Air Corps had produced a written statement of doctrine, William Mitchell described a pure environmental air doctrine before the House Committee on Military Affairs:
There has never been anything that has come which has changed war the way the advent of air power has. The method of prosecuting a war in the old days always was to get at the vital centers of the court try in order to paralyze the resistance. . . . Now, in order to keep the enemy out of that, armies were spread in front of those places and protected them by their flesh and blood. Now we can get today to these vital centers by air power.. . So that, in the future, we will strike, in case of armed conflict, when all other means of settling disputes have failed to go (sic) straight to the vital centers, the industrial centers, through the use of an air force and hit them. That is the modern theory of making war.41
This concept of the role of air power was the basis for all subsequent development of environmental air doctrine. A similar basis is desperately needed for the role that space should play in the conduct of war.
BUT how can we lay aside personal opinion and rely on logic to build this supporting structure for our space doctrine? I propose that the answer again lies in the principles of war. Just as today's aerospace principles provided the framework to test the adequacy of our "aerospace environmental doctrine, the next step is to take a full set of fundamental principles, examine them in light of the characteristics of the space medium, and produce the principles of space war. The challenge lies before us.
Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Notes
1. Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew, "Of Trees and Leaves --A New View of Doctrine," Air University Review, January-February 1992, pp. 40-48,
2. Ibid., p. 41.
3. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air university, 1971), pp. 3, 10.
4. U.S. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Manual 1-2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, March 1953),p.i.
5. U.S. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Manual 1-2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, April 1954),p.ii.
6. Major Gene E. Townsend, "The Dynamic Role of Air Force Doctrine," Air Force Doctrine, October 1979, pp. 53-55,
7. U.S. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Manual 1-1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 December 1959), p. 6. Emphasis added.
8. U.S. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Manual 1-1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 14 August 1964), p. i. Emphasis added.
9. U.S. Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Manual 3-1(Washington: Government Printing Office, 15 January 1975), pp. 1-2.
10. Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 14 February 1979), pp. 2-10.
11. Ibid., p, 2. emphasis added.
12. Lieutenant Colonel Dino A. Lorenzini, "Space Power Doctrine," Air University Review, July-August 1982, pp, 16-21.
13. General Thomas D. White, "Air and Space Are Indivisible," Air Force, March 1958, pp. 40-41.
14. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Space and Missile Systems organizations: A Chronology, 1954-1979 (El Segundo, California: Office of History, Headquarters Space Division, 1979), p.15 1.
15. White, pp. 40-41.
16. Drew, p. 44.
17. Air Force Manual 1-6, Military Space Doctrine (Washington: Government Printing Office, 15 October 1982), p. iv.
18. Ibid., p. 9.
19. Air Force Manual 1-2, March 1953, p. 11.
20. Air Force Manual 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 April 1955), p. 5.
21. Air Force Manual 1-1, 14 February 1979, pp. 5-4, 5-5.
22. Air Force Manual 1-1, 15 January 1975, p. 2-2.
23. Air Force Manual 1-2, 1 April 1955, p. 5.
24. Ibid., pp. 4-5,
25. Ibid., Air Force Manual 1-1, 15 January 1975, p. 2-2.
26. Lieutenant General Richard C. Henry, "Space Is a Place,"Air Force, June 1982, p. 38.
27. Air Force Manual 1-6, 15 October 1982, p. 10.
28. Air Force Manual 1-2, 1 April 1955, p. 5
29. Air Force Manual 1-1, 15 January 1975, p. 2-2.
30. Air Force Manual 1-1, 14 February 1979, p. 5-5.
31. Ibid., p, 5-7.
32. Ibid.
33. Air Force Manual 1-1, 15 January 1975, p. 2-2.
34. Air Force Manual 1-2, March 1953, p. 9.
35. Ibid., Air Force Manual 1-1, 15 January 1975, p. 2-2.
36. Air Force Manual 1-1, 15 January 1975, p. 2-2.
37. Air Force Manual 1-1, 14 February 1979, p. 5-8.
38. Air Force Manual 1-1, working draft dated 16 March 1984, p. 2-9.
39. Ibid.
40. Futrell, p. 4.
41. Ibid., p. 50.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Friedenstein (B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute; M.S., University of Southern California) is Director of Engineering, AFELM DOD Project Office, Office of the Secretary of the Air force, Washington, D.C. He has served as assistant professor and director of research for the Department of Astronautics at the Air force Academy. Colonel Friedenstein is a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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