Air University Review, May-June 1985
Colonel Mozes W. Weers, Royal Netherlands Air Force (Ret)
ON 1 July 1983, the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNethAF) celebrated its seventieth anniversary. From one (borrowed) aeroplane in 1913, the Dutch air force has developed into a modern and versatile air arm, with the General Dynamics F-16 as its principal weapon system. In NATO, the RNethAF forms part of the Second Allied Tactical Air Force, and Dutch air force personnel hold important positions in the integrated organization. The presence of the USAF 32d Tactical Fighter Squadron in the Netherlands is a visible token of the good relationship between two air forces that are both dedicated to the maintenance of peace and freedom.
The crest of the Royal Netherlands Air Force bears the words Parvus Numero––Magnus Merito ("small in number but great in merit"). The beginning of this force was indeed very small. On 1 July 1913, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands established by Royal Decree an aeronautical section as part of the Royal Netherlands Army. In its early days, this aeronautical section consisted of one automobile, one borrowed aeroplane, and three pilots, soon to be reinforced by three Farman F-20 aircraft, the well-known French pre-World War I model.
Three years before, in 1910, the first Dutch pilots had received their wings in France; and that same year, on 1 October 1910, one of them, H. Wijnmalen, scored the world's high-altitude record by climbing to a height of 2800 meters. Also in 1910, on 26 March, the Netherlands War Minister had installed a "Military Aeronautics Committee" to report on the issue of "aeronautics…both from a military and a technical viewpoint." The final report of that committee is dated 9 April 1912 and consists of more than 100 pages. Much attention is devoted to the use of balloons. The committee recommends the creation of an aeronautical section, however, in order to compensate for the weakness of the Dutch cavalry.
The newborn aeronautical section was based at Soesterberg, the same air base from which the USAF 32d Tactical Fighter Squadron is now operating but at that time no more than a piece of dry heathery land. When the First World War broke out in 1914, its strength had risen to eight aircraft. The Netherlands government had decided on a policy of strict neutrality; in consequence, the Dutch aircraft had to fly reconnaissance missions along the Netherlands borders, which––more often than not––resulted in a simple three-word debriefing: "Nothing to report." The short ranges of the Farmans necessitated the use of additional airstrips in the southern and eastern part of the Netherlands, some of which are still in use with today's air force. Also, in 1916, the Dutch government bought a piece of land near Amsterdam in order to be able to concentrate its air fleet behind the main Dutch defense line, the so-called Dutch water line, if the Netherlands should become involved in the war. This airstrip later became Holland's national airport, Schiphol.
As a result of the war, no spare parts could be imported from France, and Dutch engineers had to improvise; but the same war provided (rather surprisingly) many additional aircraft, as more and more foreign pilots were forced to make emergency landings on Dutch territory. By the end of World War I, not less than 107 aircraft were interned and––unless they were too much damaged––bought by the Dutch from the original owners. The young Dutch air arm thus became a peculiar mixture of aircraft, but its pilots were certainly among the most versatile in the world.
When World War I ended, the situation in the Netherlands did not differ greatly from that in other countries. Everybody believed that this had been the war to end all wars, and defense funds became scarce. Nonetheless, the 1919-40 period will be remembered because of some remarkable feats, such as the performances of the first Netherlands stunt team, the "five fingers of one hand," as they were called, and the first flight to the then-Netherlands Indies in 1924 in a Fokker F-VII civilian airplane, manned by KLM's chief-pilot Thomassen á Thuessink van der Hoop and Lieutenant Van Weerden Poelman. This first trip took no less than fifty-four days, but it marked the beginning of KLM's international airline schedules. In 1932, two open-cockpit Fokker D-VII aircraft were stationed in Iceland for meteorological observations during the Second International Pole Year. These observations were made at an altitude of 18,000 feet!
During World War I, Anthony Fokker had lived and worked in Germany, but he came back to his native country and founded Fokker Aircraft Industries, the main supplier of military aircraft for the Dutch air arm between 1920 and 1940. In 1919, the Dutch government placed an order for fifty-six Fokker C-1 reconnaissance aircraft and twenty single-seat Fokker D-VII fighter aircraft. The main weapon system for reconnaissance and fighter purposes became the Fokker C-5 single-engine, two-seat biplane, some of which were still in operational service when the war broke out in May 1940.
Its successor, the Fokker C-10, was the last biplane to be introduced in the Netherlands air arm. It was in full operational service during the early days of the war and, although it was inferior to the modern Messerschmitt aircraft, Dutch pilots outwitted their German opponents by what became known as the "house-tree-animal" technique of flying very low over the flat Dutch countryside. In 1937, under pressure of the international situation and the aggressive policies of Hitler-Germany, the Netherlands government started a modernization program for the Dutch air force. Fokker had developed a new monoplane, the D-21, thirty-six of which were ordered. The D-21 was simple in construction and maintenance and easy to fly but not as fast as its contemporaries: the Messerschmitt 109, the Hurricane, and the Spitfire. Another new Fokker product was the twin-engine T-5 bomber, sixteen of which were ordered for the new bombing wing. The increasing international political pressures forced the government to place contracts with other companies beside Fokker Industries, e.g., Douglas, which delivered, in 1939, eighteen Douglas 8-A aircraft. The pride of the Dutch, however, became the Fokker G-1 fighter, a slender, twin-engine, twin-tail aircraft, which carried no less than eight forward machine guns and one gun in the taildome. It was secretly developed in 1934 and was demonstrated for the first time at the 1936 Paris air show. The government ordered thirty-six of these fast aircraft.
On 1 September 1939, Hitler attacked Poland––an event that marked the beginning of World War II. It soon became clear that, unlike 1914, the Nazi government would not refrain from violating Dutch neutrality, when, on 10 January 1940, a German aircraft made an emergency landing in Belgium and plans were found for a German attack on Belgium and the Netherlands. The Netherlands air arm, now consisting of two operational air regiments, accordingly prepared itself for war.
Number one regiment consisted of a staff and two groups: a strategic group of ten G-10 strategic reconnaissance aircraft at Bergen and nine T-5 bombers at Schiphol, plus a fighter group made up of four sections (squadrons) of eleven and nine D-21 aircraft and ten and thirteen G-1 aircraft respectively. The second regiment consisted of four reconnaissance groups, which had nine, twelve, thirteen, and eight aircraft (both Fokker C-5 and Koolhoven FK-51 aircraft), and a fighter group with one section of nine D-21 aircraft and another section with eleven Douglas D-8A aircraft. Fighters and reconnaissance aircraft were dispersed over several airfields in the Netherlands. The grand total was 124 operational-ready aircraft. But what about their value in a struggle against the Luftwaffe? The Douglas D-8A was a light bomber-reconnaissance plane; to use it in a fighter role was a good aircraft but not fast enough; the Fokker C-10's range and speed were insufficient for a strategic reconnaissance plane; and the Fokker T-5 bomber was not quite ready for operational use, only one aircraft having been equipped with a good bomb rack. All in all, only seventy-two modern aircraft were available to withstand an overwhelming majority.
The German plans included two attacks by the airborne corps under General Karl Student's command. One group was to land near The Hague in order to capture the Royal family and the government; the second group received orders to attack the river crossings south of Rotterdam to facilitate the advance of the German 18th Army. Not less than 430 Ju-52 transport aircraft were made available to General Student; air support was to be given by General R. Putzier's units, totaling approximately 160 serviceable bombers (Heinkel 111, Ju-88, and Ju-87) and 240 fighters (Me-109 and Me- 110).
The German attack did not come wholly unexpected. As of 8 May, each morning from three to eight o'clock, all aircraft were on quick-reaction alert status. During the night of 9-10 May, many German aircraft flew over Holland in a westerly direction. The Dutch air defense command did not possess radar but received its reports from an air observer corps. The Dutch thought that the Germans had violated their neutrality for the purpose of mounting an air attack against Great Britain––as had happened before. However, over the North Sea the German planes made a 180° turn and approached the Dutch coast at very low altitudes in order to attack the airfields of Bergen (G-1 fighters and C-10 recce aircraft), Schiphol (D-21 and T-5 aircraft), Valkenburg, and Ypenburg (C-5, FK-51, D-21, and D-8A aircraft). Other airfields were attacked simultaneously by fighter aircraft. The unexpected bombardments caused moderate to severe damage but demoralized the airfield defense forces. At Bergen, the recce aircraft had been dispersed and thus remained undamaged, but the thirteen G-1 fighters had been closely packed together so that only one aircraft had been able to take off. At Schiphol and Ypenburg, practically all aircraft were able to take off in time. Fifty minutes after this attack, many German transport planes appeared near The Hague and south of Rotterdam. Paratroopers were dropped by the hundreds, with orders to conquer the four main airfields in their regions within thirty minutes so that other transport planes could bring in reinforcements.
For five hectic days, the Dutch fought against the German invaders. During this period, Dutch pilots and antiaircraft gunners succeeded in bringing down 345 enemy aircraft, including 222 Junkers 52 transport planes––more than 75 percent of the then-existing Luftwaffe transport fleet. Dutch losses were heavy, however: nearly all aircraft were lost, and seventy-five men were killed in action. On 18 May 1940, the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Netherlands Army, who had capitulated when the Germans bombed Rotterdam on 14 May, and who represented the Netherlands government in occupied Netherlands, awarded to the Netherlands air arm the "Militaire Willemsorde," the highest award for courage, conduct, and loyalty.
The cadets of two Dutch flying schools and some instructors and other personnel succeeded in escaping to France, from where they were brought to England. The group consisted of some 250 men, soon to be reinforced by others who had succeeded in escaping occupied Holland. Some of these men were attached to the Dutch Naval Air Arm (320th Squadron and 321st Squadron), the backbone of which consisted of naval personnel who had taken refuge in England with their aircraft, Fokker T-8W seaplanes. In 1941, Dutch prince consort Bernhard persuaded the British government of the desirability to form a Dutch squadron within the Royal Air Force organization––the 322d Dutch Spitfire Squadron. Many more Dutchmen were trained and enrolled in all sorts of allied squadrons; they flew Mosquitos, Lancasters, Halifaxes, Typhoons, etc. The 322d Squadron later became part of the 2d Allied Tactical Air Force and as such returned to the Netherlands in the wake of allied ground forces on 3 January 1945.
So far, nothing has been said about the Dutch possessions in the Far East, the Netherlands-Indies (now the Republic of Indonesia). The Dutch armed forces in this territory––with the exception of the Royal Dutch Navy––did not come under the competency of the Netherlands War Ministry but belonged to the Ministry for Colonies. The buildup of the Netherlands-Indies air arm, like that of forces in the Netherlands, had suffered from the Dutch policy of strict neutrality and the lack of funds in the years before 1940. But contrary to the homeland, the Netherlands-Indies government had one more year in which it could make preparations for the struggle against imperial Japan. Thus when––on 30 November 1941––the air arm was fully mobilized, it consisted of 224 first-line combat aircraft––80 Glenn Martin bombers, 72 Brewster Buffalo, 16 Curtiss Hawk and 20 Curtiss Interceptor aircraft, and 36 Curtiss Falcon recce aircraft––plus an additional 19 Lockheed Lodestar transport planes. On order––but not delivered in time–were 162 B-25 Mitchell and 162 Brewster Bermuda aircraft. The Dutch Navy possessed in the Indies another 60 seaplanes (Dornier and Catalina flying boats).
The first Japanese landing came on 17 December 1941 near Miri in the Sarawak province of Borneo. The struggle lasted until 7 March 1942, when the Dutch commander-in-chief was forced to capitulate. Before this date, however, nearly 500 pilot-students with their instructors had been evacuated to Australia. This group was reinforced with remnants of the army and naval air arms and with a number of experienced pilots who had been sent to Australia to collect B-25 aircraft but who found that these aircraft had not yet arrived. Thus, a considerable number of personnel were available to continue the fighting against the Axis powers.
In April 1942, the Dutch government in exile (London) decided that the flying school should continue its activities in the United States. Thanks to the cooperation of U.S. authorities, the Dutch could settle down in Jackson, Mississippi, under the command of Major-General L. H. van Oyen. The base commander at that time was Colonel Mayer, USAAF. All aircraft were made available by the U.S. government under the conditions of the lend-lease program, with the exception of all twin-engined aircraft, which were bought by the Dutch government. The flying school became a tremendous success with army and navy personnel brought together in one organization. The school included not only flying training but also training for navigators, bombardiers, air gunners, and other specialists. For these additional training programs, detachments were formed in Sioux Falls, San Antonio, Midland, Corpus Christi, Panama City, Pensacola, and Myrtle Beach. The total strength of the Dutch organization amounted to some 700 people.
The first group of pilots was honored by U.S. officials, who allowed the group to make a "goodwill" tour of the United States with a formation of twelve B-25 bombers. Also, these pilots were to ferry their own aircraft across the Pacific Ocean without the help of U.S. ferry pilots. The trip of approximately 17,000 miles went according to plans, and this first ferry flight was followed by a second one. Much to their regret, the fighter pilots, with their P-40 aircraft, had to cross the ocean by ship because of the short range of their aircraft. On 8 February 1944, the Dutch flag was lowered at Jackson for the last time: the training program was finished.
In the meantime, the Dutch had formed No. 18 Bomber Squadron in Australia, but because of difficulties it was not until January 1943 that this squadron became operational. Initially, squadron losses were high due to insufficient familiarity with the new aircraft, unreliable armament, and injudicious tactical utilization by the Royal Australian Air Force headquarters, which was in operational command of No. 18 Squadron. No wonder that everybody was happy when new crews arrived from the United States to relieve the first group after an overextended operational tour. The fighters were brought together in No. 120 P-40 Squadron, which operated most of the time from Merauke, and––as of April 1945––from Biak on New Guinea.
The third Netherlands-Indies squadron that became operational during the war was No. 19 C-47 'Transport Squadron. Crews for this squadron were in part recruited from USAAF 374th Troopcarrier Group under Colonel Ray T. Elsmore: they were Dutch airline pilots who had escaped from the Indies at the beginning of the war.
V-J Day, 15 August 1945, marked the end of World War II but not the end of military operations for the Netherlands-Indies army and air force. From the point of view of an air force man, it was an interesting period, characterized by a fast buildup under difficult circumstances and close cooperation with the air force in the Netherlands. The immense territory was divided into three regional commands, and air force headquarters was set up in Batavia (now Bjakarta). New aircraft, which had been ordered before the end of the war, arrived; and two additional fighter squadrons were formed, equipped with the North American P-51. Personnel and equipment arrived from the Netherlands, and ex-POWs also reinforced the army and the air force. By early 1947, there were fifteen air bases in use, occupied by two bomber squadrons, one photorecce flight, two transport squadrons, three fighter squadrons, and seven light aircraft recce/communication flights, plus a flying school and a maintenance base.
On 21 July 1947, this refurbished air force was put to a test when organized fighting started between Dutch and Indonesian forces. Similar to what the Israelis did to the Egyptian air force during the Six-Day War, the Dutch, in a sweeping attack, destroyed all Indonesian (ex-Japanese) aircraft but one, which was destroyed later. Thus, all air force resources became available for the support of ground forces. This pattern was repeated during the second policing action, which commenced on 19 December 1948 and lasted until 9 January 1949. Totals during this second action were 2403 sorties and about 4100 flying hours for the loss of four fighters and five light aircraft and their crews.
The military victory was overshadowed by political events, however. A "Round Table Conference" resulted in the acquisition of complete independence by the young Republic of Indonesia. Among the terms of the agreement was one that meant the end for the Netherlands-Indies air force: all installations, aircraft, and other equipment were to be transferred to Indonesia. On 26 July 1950, the last of a series of transfers took place, and thirty-six years of military air force history came to an end.
In the Netherlands, the postwar air force had to start with fewer assets than their colleagues in the Indies. The Dutch government in exile in London possessed a directorate for the air force, which was transferred to The Hague soon after the liberation of the Netherlands in May 1945. In 1947, this directorate was reorganized into an Army Air Force Command for the Netherlands, and plans were made to move toward establishment of one independent Netherlands air force with an air staff in The Hague and two separate operational commands––one in Holland and another in the Indies. The air staff started its work, but events in the Indies made it necessary to change these plans drastically.
Operational units during these postwar years consisted of the 322d Dutch Spitfire Squadron, deactivated by Great Britain's Royal Air Force but now reactivated as a national squadron; No. 6 Auster Squadron (light aircraft); and a transport squadron, the TRANSVA, later numbered as the 334th Squadron. In 1948, international developments led first to the Brussels Treaty and, one year later, to the founding of NATO. The Netherlands accepted a Medium Term Defence Plan, whereby Belgian and Dutch air spaces were combined to one air defense area to be defended by No. 69 Group. The Royal Air Force was to take care of German airspace with two groups. This plan marked the beginning of international cooperation in the air defense field in what later would become the 2d Allied Tactical Air Force. It also was determined that tactical fighter bomber squadrons to support offensive and defensive ground operations needed to be established. But what about the costs of realizing these ambitious plans?
Since 1945, the 322d Spitfire Squadron, the light aircraft squadron, more than 1000 volunteers, and four companies of airfield defense troops had been sent to the Netherlands-Indies to reinforce the forces there. Accordingly, the Dutch had to start practically from scratch in a country that had suffered tremendously during the last year of the war and where every penny was to be used for reconstruction purposes. Fortunately, the government decided to buy Great Britain's Gloster Meteor, which was already in use with the RAF. More important was that the Dutch Fokker factories were licensed to build the Gloster Meteor, with Belgium's Fabrique Nationale as producer of licensed Rolls- Royce Derwent engines. As a result, the first Meteor squadron was founded in 1948, to be followed, in 1949 and 1950, by four additional squadrons.
In the meantime, the U.S. government had agreed to the Mutual Defense Aid Program (MDAP). It was under the terms of this program that the tactical squadrons were to be equipped. In 1951, the first F-84E Republic Thunder jets arrived; and by 1953, with the support of U.S. MDAP teams, four tactical squadrons had obtained operational status. The buildup was accompanied by organizational changes. Army Air Command Netherlands was split up, forming an Air Defense Command, a Tactical Air Command, a Logistics Command, a Training Command, and an Air Field Defense Command. Two more air defense squadrons were added to the Dutch strength, as well as one more tactical fighter-bomber squadron and a photorecce squadron. In 1956, three night fighter squadrons, equipped with F-86K Sabre jets, completed the buildup.
This fast extension of the Dutch air forces in so short a period put a severe strain on personnel resources and would have been impossible but for the return to the Netherlands of the majority of the Netherlands-Indies Air Force personnel in 1950. Thus, in a different way than originally planned, both air forces were merged, eventually becoming an independent air force in 1953 by Royal Command.
The history of the Royal Netherlands Air Force during the last thirty-or-so years since 1953 is very much a history of NATO, of changes in strategy (from massive retaliation to flexible response), of modernization of aircraft and other equipment, but also of increasing costs and of diminishing Dutch readiness to make sacrifices for the defense of the West. As a result, the Dutch air force today is smaller than it was thirty years ago. Some of the highlights during this period were:
New strategic and tactical concepts, as well as the need to reduce personnel costs to a minimum, have resulted in a Streamlining of the RNethAF organization. Under the general direction of the Air Staff in The Hague, the former five operational commands have now been reduced to two: a Tactical Air Forces Command, comprising both the air defense and the tactical fighter components and working in close cooperation with NATO's 2 ATAF Headquarters, and a combined Logistics and Training Command, comprising nearly all other air force units. Only a few specialized units come directly under the Chief of the Air Staff, who is at the same time Commander-in-Chief of all RNethAF forces.
When, in 1913, the advisory committee wrote its report, these wise men concluded that the Netherlands defense organization had to be enlarged with an aeronautical section because "the possession of appliances of the same nature as are available to a potential enemy is not only necessary from a purely practical point of view but also, and to a very large extent, from a moral point of view." These words still hold true after seventy years of Dutch air force history. The Royal Netherlands Air Force is proud of its heroic past, but it is even more proud of the fact that with its sophisticated equipment, its high training standards, and the loyalty of its personnel, it is a valuable asset in NATO's defense of the free world: Parvus Numero, Magnus Merito!
Apeldoorn, The Netherlands
The author wishes to thank the Royal Netherlands Air Force Historical Section for its assistance in making material available for this article.
Colonel Mozes W. A. Weers, Royal Netherlands Air Force (Ret) is a lecturer of strategic studies at the Royal Netherlands Air Force Staff College. He also serves as a member of the Netherlands Military Servicees Arbitration Court. His military career included assignments with the RNeth/AF Training Command and the Air Staff, as well as with International Logistics Working Group F-104 at Hahn AB, Germany. Colonel Weers was Commandant of the Royal Netherlands Air Force Staff College at the time of his retirement in 1977. His earlier articles have been published in both Dutch and U.S. journals, including the Review.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.