Air University Review, March-April 1985
Dr. Ilana Kass
Ethan S. Burger
DURING his recent visit to the United Kingdom, the Soviet heir apparent, Mikhail Gorbachev, played to a receptive audience when he suggested that progress in arms control and reductions in East-West tensions depend on U.S. willingness to abandon ongoing or future programs for the "militarization of outer space."1 In calling for a halt in U.S. programs to "place weapons in the heavens," however, the Soviet leadership and its principal propagandists are conspicuously silent about both their own ongoing strategic defense efforts and the impact of those efforts on arms control and strategic stability.2
Clearly, transforming the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) from a program into a bargaining chip has been a major Soviet priority ever since President Reagan's so-called Star Wars speech of 23 March 1983. The double standard inherent in this approach, however, raises questions as to the true motivation underlying the Soviet propaganda offensive against the SDI, particularly in view of the lessons learned––or lessons that should have been learned––from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations.
The purpose of this article is threefold: to analyze Soviet attitudes and perceptions regarding the SDI, to correlate these views with the Soviet Union's own strategic posture, and to assess how the Kremlin might attempt to counteract the U.S. initiative.
In anticipating the impact that the SDI is likely to have on future U.S.-Soviet relations and world peace, it is important to understand both the major tenets of Soviet strategic thought––the operative context of Soviet reaction to anything the United States does in the realm of military affairs––and the salient features of Soviet reactions thus far to the SDI.
the doctrinal basis of the
Soviet attitudes toward the SDI
Soviet world outlook and behavior stem from the tenet that "socialism" and "imperialism" are engaged in an unrelenting, uncompromising struggle from which the former is destined to emerge victorious.3 This tenet is reflected in a military doctrine that does not distinguish between deterrence and warfighting.4 Much as a good offense is considered the best defense, an effective war-fighting posture is seen not only as restraining the adversary's inherently aggressive intentions but as guaranteeing Soviet victory should war break out.
In Soviet military doctrine, the offensive is the basic type of military operation. It is maintained, however, that even with surprise preemptive use of nuclear weapons, the attacker is unlikely to escape retaliation. Hence, the Soviet-perceived need for the greatest possible damage limitation to the Soviet Union's political, economic, and military system is fully congruent with the Soviet view of war conduct and outcome. If victory is to be attained, a viable society and economy must survive the war. Stated differently, while defensive strategy is an anathema, a defensive component is an essential part of the overall strategy. The dividing line between offensive and defensive force postures, so familiar to Americans, is thus blurred.
Such a perspective has far-reaching implications for Soviet military programs. It sustains the view that offensive and defensive weapons evolve through a "permanent interaction," wherein improvements in one require and lead to improvements in the other. Inasmuch as there are no objective limits on "scientific technological progress," the cycle of weapons development is self-perpetuating, precluding, by definition, the emergence of an "absolute weapon" or the capping of the process itself.5
Much as the Soviets reject Western concepts of mutual vulnerability and mutual assured destruction (MAD), their view is incompatible with the Western action-reaction model which places equal responsibility for the arms race on the United States and the Soviet Union. Rather, in the Soviet view, the arms race derives solely from the "aggressive nature of contemporary imperialism," to which Soviet military programs must respond. The arms race ceases when and to the extent that U.S. programs are curtailed. Conversely, any and all U.S. military efforts by definition "whip-up the arms race" and "upset the parity that has been established between the two superpowers."6 It should be noted that the Soviet concept of "parity" has little to do with actual force sizes and capabilities. Rather, it is a descriptive term, applied consistently to the post-SALT I correlation of forces.
Soviet reaction to the SDI:
sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander
Moscow's reaction to President Reagan's 23 March 1983 announcement of the SDI was quick, angry, and fully in line with the basic tenets of Soviet doctrine. Throughout, the Soviets made extensive use of Western criticism of and objections to the SDI, thus playing to Western public opinion and underscoring the alignment of Moscow's positions with those of "sober thinking" U.S. and European peace activists.7
However, while at times employing derogatory language in reference to the SDI––for example, "the Washington Skywalkers" or "the President's April Fool Jokes"––Soviet commentary for the most part has carefully avoided endorsing Western criticisms that effective defense is technologically unattainable.8 Apparently, the Soviets have more respect for U.S. technological capabilities than many Americans do.
Two general characteristics demonstrate the degree of Moscow's rancor: the authoritative level of the response and the volume of the Soviet campaign against the SDI. From the outset of U.S. discussion of SDI, the Soviet response has involved the top rung of the Soviet political and military hierarchy. The first Soviet reaction to the SDI was General Secretary Yurii Andropov's 27 March 1983 Pravda statement. Other high-ranking officials (notably Minister of Defense Dmitrii Ustinov, then Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko) were quick to join in. Their statements were subsequently echoed and amplified by lower-ranking officials.
The sheer volume of the Soviet propaganda campaign against the SDI continued to increase in terms of shrillness and quantity of commentaries. During the first three months following President Reagan's announcement of the SDI (i.e., late March through June 1983), the initiative was attacked in virtually every pronouncement concerned with Soviet-U.S. relations, i.e., at least once a day in the major newspapers and radio and television broadcasts. The Soviet campaign is continuing as of this writing at only a slightly abated level. In terms of vituperation, the campaign against the SDI parallels those unleashed by the Soviet media in response to actual deployment of U.S. weapon systems, for example, the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMS) in Europe.
major themes of the Soviet reaction
Five themes characterize the Soviet campaign against the SDI.
The SDI is another example of U.S. aggressive intentions.
In comments ranging from broad assertions to specific accusations, the Soviets have conveyed the idea that the United States is preparing a first-strike capability with which to either "blackmail" the Soviet Union or wage and win a nuclear war. Thus, the SDI is said to be "not a new departure but, rather, an integral part of a vast, purely aggressive program of military preparations and further evidence that the present U.S. administration is not simply preparing for nuclear war but has set a course toward unleashing such a war."9The SDI is not a surprise, the Soviets claim, but a "logical continuation of ongoing U.S. programs aimed at a systematic and purposeful renewal of American military potential."10 Furthermore, the SDI will be accompanied by an accelerated offensive buildup, designed to provide the United States with a first-strike capability.11
The Pentagon plans to build up strategic offensive weapons and to develop ballistic missile defense and space systems are coordinated in terms of their schedule, and aim at completing the deployment of the so-called first-strike potential in the 1980s.12
The SDI is not a defensive concept.
The defensive aspect of the SDI, the Soviets assert, is simply a mask for something far more ominous. As Andropov put it and as has been repeated many times since, the SDI may appear defensive "on the face of it but only to those who are not conversant in these matters."13The White House is building in a hurry a "space shield" and deceitfully calls it "defense;" but under the cover of that shield it counts on impunity in delivering a first strike.14
Only at first glance does defense appear to be defense, not attacks.15
The SDI escalates the arms race, upsets parity, and increases the danger of war
. Soviet statements aver that the current U.S. administration has adopted a policy that holds grave risks for both superpowers.Reagan's new initiative undermines the approximate parity in weapons and forces existing between the USSR and the U.S. It is a new, more dangerous spiral in the arms race. Parity will be maintained, albeit at a higher, and, therefore, more dangerous level.16
The growing danger of war is the stern reality of our times. Washington's quest for superiority, reflected in the escalation of the arms race by the U.S. and NATO, is gathering momentum and entering a qualitatively new, significantly more dangerous phase. Some people in the West term this decision, the SDI, a "new defensive concept." In reality, however, this is a further improvement of the U.S. offensive capability, designed to disarm the USSR in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat. This is extremely dangerous and irresponsible.17
The SDI undermines the ABM Treaty
. The Soviets have stated that "President Reagan's 'initiative' is designed to undermine the ABM Treaty of 1972 and other bilateral and multilateral arms control accords."18 The precise point at which an actual violation will occur, however, is not yet clearly defined by the Soviets. For example, Izvestiia in April 1983 stated that the deployment of the systems comprising the SDI will be a direct violation of the [ABM and SALT] accords."19 Contrast this statement with a more sweeping military view expressed less than two weeks later that the President's 23 March 1983 speech "in and of itself violates the treaties."20The SDI makes Europe less safe.
Playing to West European public opinion, the Soviets have clearly hoped that NATO allies in Europe will add their voices of protest to persuade Washington to abandon the SDI. Paralleling their efforts to foment European protest against the Pershings and GLCMS, the Soviets have hammered away at the theme of increased danger for Europe and stressed that the SDI makes Western Europe into a "nuclear hostage."21 Amplifying this idea, the Soviets have also stated:The U.S. leaders also wish to use their Western European allies for transforming space over Europe into an arena for waging war. U.S. strategists intend to turn Western Europe into a U.S. frontline position, with all the ensuing consequences.22
Current Soviet views of the SDI reflect consistency in the Soviet Union's approach toward the strategic defense issue, as well as the double standard inherent in this approach. The Soviet Union's own longstanding commitment to strategic defense was never accompanied by its acceptance of a possible similar commitment by the United States.
Soviet military doctrine sees strategic defense as an integrated, multilayered system of "antiaircraft, antimissile, and antispace defenses," supplemented by an extensive civil defense program and designed to work in synergy with an effective first-strike posture.23 In the Soviet view, "if the potential opponents [both] possess weapons of mutual destruction, decisive advantage goes to that side which first manages to create a defense from it."24 This tenet goes far to explain the Soviet Union's consistent commitment to its own strategic defense as well as its no less consistent efforts to forestall U.S. progress in the area. The Soviet positions prior to and following the ABM Treaty negotiations illustrate these twin efforts.
In the period before the start of the ABM Treaty negotiations, the Soviets adhered to the view that ballistic missile defense is by definition a purely defensive system, the curtailment of which can be sought only by a potential aggressor. Consequently, the Soviet Union refused to negotiate ABM limitations. Ironically, the pre-1969 Soviet posture parallels the current U.S. position as embodied in the SDI, namely, that strategic defense is designed "to save human lives," is well worth the cost, and should not be curtailed other than in the context of an overall arms control framework.25
In mid-1968, however, the Soviets abruptly changed their position and began signaling their willingness to negotiate ABM limitations. An initial U.S.-Soviet agreement to start talks, scheduled for public announcement on 21 August 1968, was overturned by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. By October, the Soviets were renewing their efforts to get the talks off the ground, but a further delay was caused by the U.S. presidential elections. It was not until October 1969 that the 17 November 1969 start date was announced. In retrospect, there appears to be little doubt that Moscow's about-face resulted from growing concern about the technologically robust U.S. ABM program, most notably the Safeguard system, coupled with early disappointments with the capabilities of the Soviet Griffon and Galosh ABM systems. The Griffon, first publicly displayed in 1963 and scheduled for deployment around Leningrad, was dismantled in 1964, presumably because of technical problems. The Galosh, first paraded in 1967 and initially deployed around Moscow, followed with a similar fate. In late 1968, the Soviets abruptly halted construction with only about two-thirds of the system completed.
Correspondingly, the Soviet public position was restructured to underscore the destabilizing nature of the U.S. ABM deployments and the ensuing need to limit the U.S. programs. However, the Soviets have never publicly acknowledged that a Soviet system could also be destablizing (or that mutual ABM limitations would reduce the Soviet offensive buildup).26 This double standard continues to shape the Soviet Union's position.
From the Soviet point of view, the ABM Treaty was an important political and military success. The U.S. ABM program was effectively checked. Had negotiations (and U.S. domestic politics) failed to prevent the planned Safeguard deployment, the Soviet Union would have been placed at a disadvantage by the technological superiority of the proposed U.S. system. Trading off Galosh for Safeguard was thus a very good bargain for the Soviets.27
The ABM Treaty did not specifically limit qualitative improvements in the two sides' arsenals. The United States, however, followed the spirit of the treaty, reducing its missile defense R&D program. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, intensified its efforts in all areas of strategic defense, ABM research and development in particular. Concurrently, the buildup of Soviet offensive systems continued unabated. Furthermore, the Soviets declared both a right and a determination to continue their military programs, the ABM and SALT accords notwithstanding. For example, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov declared in August 1972 that "it goes without saying that until the danger of war is eliminated, the Soviet Union, as before, will continue to initiate all necessary measures to safeguard its own security and that of its allies."28 That a similar posture was communicated directly to the United States is clear from President Richard Nixon's June 1972 congressional testimony in which he underscored:
I think, however, I owe it to you and to the Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with programs in the defensive and offensive areas which are not limited by these agreements.29
Against this background, it is clear that little has changed in the Soviet posture. Moscow's virulence toward the SDI, while reflecting genuine concerns that the United States might use its superior technological base to break out of arms control constraints, continues to be designed to thwart U.S. progress in those areas where it is seen as technologically more advanced. As Dr. Richard DeLauer, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, indicated in his 1984 congressional testimony, the Soviets may have a significant lead over the United States in deployed ballistic missile defense (BMD) and antisatellite (ASAT) interceptor systems––a lead that results from and clearly demonstrates the level of their post-1972 effort––but the United States is technologically superior in many areas relevant to the SDI. These fields include computers and software, electro-optical sensors, radar sensors, guidance and navigation, lightweight and high-temperature-resistant materials, microelectronic materials and integrated circuits manufacturing, aerospace propulsion, signal processing, and telecommunications. Only in the areas of aerodynamics, power sources, and directed-energy technology did Dr. DeLauer believe the Soviets to be on par with the United States.30
To explore the avenues that the Soviet Union is likely to pursue in its effort to counteract the SDI, one must consider both the Soviet threats of forthcoming response and the realistic options open to Moscow.
Soviet threatened responses
Soviet statements on what the Soviet Union is going to do about the SDI fall into three broad categories. First, a number of statements have contained unspecified threats of retaliatory measures:
Every action brings about a counteraction. We will not remain unarmed. 31
The Soviet Union cannot stand still; we will be forced to adopt retaliatory measures.32
A second type of statement that the Soviets have made contains threats of accelerated buildup of Soviet offensive systems to "overcome" the U.S. BMD:
The USSR has always been able to duly reply to any challenge. No matter what weapons and in what quantity the U.S. might produce, the Soviet Union will always be able to match them.33
The efforts of one side to form an "absolute shield" force the other side to enhance devices for overcoming it, all the more so since the anti-missile defense will naturally have its weak, vulnerable spots––in the control, command and targeting systems, in the work of the computers, and so forth.34
The antimissile system devised by them can be vulnerable. Indeed, it may even be possible to break through.35
Finally, the Soviets have claimed that they have the technological wherewithal to match and possibly surpass the SDI:
The makers of the American "wonder weapon" are wrong when they assume that the "Russians cannot match the United States" in standards of technological development. It must be clear to everyone that nowadays there cannot be any major differences between the superpowers. The advanced nations have reached approximately the same scientific-technological standards and have weapons that are roughly equivalent, though naturally, there can exist insignificant differences in some respects.36
The USSR opened space to mankind. The launching of the first Sputniks, Gagarin's flight, gave once and for all an unequivocal answer to all kinds of speculation as to our technological capabilities and level of development.37
The obsession with a policy of strength in the White House deprives it of any sort of sense of reality, and, therefore, [it] cannot see that the world has radically changed, [nor] understand the impracticality of its efforts to achieve military superiority. The USSR has more than once shown that it possesses the economic and scientific potential to permit it in the shortest possible period to respond in an adequate manner to any type of threat to its security.38
Soviet options
The preceding analysis and the overall context of Soviet military doctrine and past behavior provide a framework for assessing the Soviet Union's realistic options. The Soviet Union appears to have four options open––two political and two military.
One of its political options is to abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty, i.e., either exercise its right to withdraw from the treaty in accordance with the provisions of Article XV or other wise declare the treaty null and void. This choice has a very low probability for several reasons.
First, there are no indications thus far that the Soviets are seriously considering it. Indeed, the only possible hint in this direction was the late Dmitrii Ustinov's 22 May 1984 statement that arms control is "equally needed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty will not serve U.S. security interests."39
Finally (and perhaps most importantly), since the existence of the ABM Treaty has not, thus far, prevented the Soviet Union from developing its own active strategic defense, the Soviets feel no pressing military need to declare the treaty null and void.40 Indeed, the Soviets are most likely to parallel U.S. SDI work without abrogating the treaty unless and until the United States does.
The second political option that the Soviets have is to try to repeat the ABM gambit, i.e., use arms control and political pressure as a means to forestall U.S. military progress, trading off, if necessary, an inferior Soviet system (as in the Galosh-Safeguard bargain) while reserving the right for continued R&D efforts. Clearly, the Soviets are currently pursuing this option and will probably continue to do so in the future, most likely in conjunction with one of their military options. From the Soviet vantage point, these efforts can yield significant political returns. For example, by advancing arms control proposals, the Kremlin promotes the Soviet Union's image as a "peace-loving" country, scoring important propaganda points in the United States, Europe, and the Third World. Concurrently, the United States can be portrayed as the "only obstacle to peace and stability"––an accusation that is likely to generate both domestic and international pressure for U.S. leaders to show greater "flexibility" in response to Soviet overtures. Already existing strains in the NATO alliance can be further exacerbated by direct Soviet approaches to West European leaders and public opinion (as illustrated by Gorbachev's London performance in January).
The Soviets also have two military options. The first is to continue the parallel commitment to strategic offense and defense, i.e., continue development and deployment of offensive and defensive systems within the broadly interpreted confines of the ABM Treaty and the SALT accords.
This military option can be pursued, as in the past, concurrently with political efforts to achieve arms control agreements. It would be consistent with the Soviet view of warfighting, which mandates superiority in both offense and defense. As regards strategic defense, in particular, the Soviets are likely to parallel the SDI while:
The Soviets may have some incentives for working on their own strategic defense efforts while allowing the United States to take the lead in space-based systems R&D. The development and testing of space technologies will be exceedingly expensive; not all avenues currently being investigated are likely to yield results. Thus, the Soviets may prefer to wait and see what technologies the United States has determined to be the most promising, subsequently modeling their own system on the proven elements of the U.S. effort.42
The second military option that the Soviets have is deliberate breakout, i.e., "stretching" the ABM Treaty to the breaking point by carrying out as many covert predeployment moves as they can get away with, but delaying overt violations as long as possible. Pursuit of this option may or may not entail the political act of abrogation. However, the Soviets are more likely to violate the treaty and deny the violations than declare the treaty null and void. Past cases of breakouts support the conjecture that the violator is more likely to force the opponent to abrogate than to exercise this option himself.
For the United States, this scenario is the most worrisome possibility, since U.S. planners may not be able to distinguish the breakout option from the first military option until too late. Should the Soviets opt for a breakout, they are most likely to:
Thus far, the Soviet effort in Geneva to halt U.S. SDI work as a precondition of further negotiations indicates that the Soviet Union has chosen to exercise its second political option, i.e., repeat the ABM gambit. No doubt, at least one of the military options will accompany Moscow's political endeavors; the U.S. dilemma is determining which one.
The Soviet Union is consistent in its view that strategic defense is an integral component of Soviet warfighting and war survival capabilities. In the Soviet perspective, mutual destruction is not an acceptable policy for rational leaders. As its authoritative spokesmen have asserted repeatedly for decades, the Soviet Union cannot and will not base its security and survival on the goodwill or rationality of the enemy.
Soviet Military doctrine lacks the concept of strategic sufficiency. As a result, the military programs driven by this doctrine are, by definition, open-ended. The only limitation acknowledged by this doctrine is the temporary obstacle of technical feasibility. Thus, the buildup of Soviet strategic defense is not linked directly to any specific level or trend in U.S. military programs. Soviet strategic defense––as well as offense––generates its own momentum as something that must be because of the "immutable laws of war " and the requirements of victory in war.43
Soviet military doctrine holds that the Soviet objective in any war, including a central strategic confrontation with the United States, must be victory, i.e., destruction of the opponent's power base while preserving the Soviet Union as a viable system with resources and power to affect restoration and maintain domination after the war. To achieve victory, the Soviets look to a combination of military systems working in synergy; strategic offense, strategic defense, and civil defense. None of the systems in this triad is expected to be 100 percent effective; and none is assessed in isolation, but only as it relates to the other two. "Victory," in the Soviet view, "is attained through the joint efforts of all the Armed Forces' services and branches.44 In essence, this doctrine means that the Soviets will continue to build and rely on strategic nuclear forces (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range aviation), to destroy as large a portion of enemy strategic weapons as possible before they are launched against the Soviet Union; strategic defense (BMD, "antispace defense," and antiaircraft defense), to destroy in flight as many as possible of the enemy's surviving weapons; and civil defense (sheltering, dispersal, and postattack reconstruction planning), to minimize the destructive impact of those enemy weapons that do get through to targets in the Soviet Union.
Given these systemic aspects of Soviet military doctrine, there is little reason to expect a significant change in the Soviet Union's commitment to both strategic offense and defense, nor should one anticipate diminution in Soviet efforts to forestall any U.S. initiatives that might enhance U.S. security or challenge Soviet strengths in the current correlation of forces.
Arlington, Virginia
Authors' note
: Portions of the original research for this article were conducted under the auspices of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. We wish to thank William A. O'Neil and Brian McCue of SRA Corporation for their insightful comments.
Notes
1. Washington Post, 19 and 20 December 1984.
2. See for two recent notable examples, Aleksei Arbatov, Voennostrategicheskii paritet i politika SShA (Moscow: lzdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1984), pp. 229-41, and Yevgeny P. Velikhov, "Space Weapons: Effect on Strategic Stability." Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1984, pp. 12S-15S.
3. See voina (war) in N. V. Ogarkov, editor, Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar' (Moscow: Voennoe lzdatel'svto, 1983), pp. 151-52 and Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1982), pp. 50, 55, and 56.
4. There is no Russian equivalent for the word deterrence. The term used by the Soviets (sderzhivanie) has no connotation of mutuality and is best translated as imposing restraint on the adversary (but not on oneself).
5.Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti, p. 36; also see pp. 41-43.
6.Ogarkov, Izvestiia, 23 September 1983, and D. F. Ustinov, Pravda, 12 July 1982.
7.Izvestiia, 15 April 1983, and Pravda, 10 May 1983.
8. Pravda, 30 March 1983, Literaturnaia gazeta, No. 14, 6 April 1983, and Krasnaia zvezda 26 September 1984.
9.Literaturnaia gzeta, No. 14, 6 April 1983.
10. Krasnai zvezda, 5 August 1983.
11. TASS. 9 April 1983, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union (hereafter referred to as FBIS), 12 April 1983, p. AA-7.
12. Pravda, 28 March 1983.
13. Iu. V. Andropov, Pravda, 27 March 1983.
14. Krasnaia zvezda, 27 August 1984.
15. Radio Moscow, 31 March 1983 in FBIS. 1 April 1983, p. AA-8.
16. Krasnaia zvezda, 15 April 1983.
17. Major General of Aviation C. Khelipov, Krasnaia zvezda, 14 April 1983.
18. TASS, 24 March 1983 in FBIS, 24 March 1983, p. AA-2.
19. Izvestiia, 15 April 1983. Italics added.
20. General of the Army A. Epishev, Krasnaia zvezda, 27 April 1983. Italics added.
21. TASS, 28 February 1984 in FBIS, 28 February 1984, p AA-1.
22. Krasnaia zvezda, 5 August 1983.
23. See strategicheskaia oborona (strategic defense), protivovozdushnaia oborona (antiair defense), protivoraketnaia oborona (anti-missile defense), and protivokosmicheskaia oborona (antispace defense in Ogarkov, Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar', pp. 710, 597, 598, and 599.
24. Colonel V. M. Bondarenko, Sovremennaia nauka i razvitie voennogo dela (Moscow: Voennoe lzdatel'stvo, 1976), p. 132.
25. See, for example, Prime Minister Kosygin's 1967 statement in Glassboro, New Jersey, cited by Michael J. Deane, Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy, Monograph in International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1981), p. 33.
26. For more detailed analyses of Soviet positions prior to and during the ABM negotiations, see Deane, op. cit., and Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority, Monograph in International Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982).
27. The Nixon administration originally proposed to defend four ICBM sites. In 1972, the United States signed the ABM Treaty that permitted each side the right to deploy two ABM complexes: one to defend the national capital and the other to defend an ICBM launch site. In 1974, the treaty was amended to allow for only one ABM site per country. In 1976, Washington deactivated its one operational ABM site in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The Galosh-1B around Moscow is thus the world's only operational ABM system.
28. Pravda, 24 August 1972. From the Soviet perspective, the "danger of war" can be eliminated only through the elimination of imperialism––the source of all wars. Stated differently , as long as the United States exists, so does the "danger of war" and the ensuing need for a Soviet military buildup.
29. Cited in Deane, p. 74.
30. Statement by the Honorable Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, to the 98th Congress, 2d Session, FY 1985 DoD Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense. 1984), p. 11-32.
31. Colonel General N. Chervov, interview with Budapest Domestic Television, 21 April 1983, in FBIS, 22 April 1981, p. AA-3. Chervov, a General Staff officer, emerged as one of the key Soviet military spokesmen on the Strategic Defense Initiative.
32. Radio Moscow, 13 April 1983 in FBIS, 13 April 1983, pp. AA-2-3.
33. New Times, No. 24, June 1983.
34. Chervov, interview with Bratislava Pravda. 29 April 1983 in FBIS, 3 May 1983, p. AA-1.
35. Chervov, interview with Budapest Domestic Television, 21 April 1983 in FBIS, 22 April 1983, p. AA-3.
36. Chervov, interview with Bratislava Pravda, 29 April 1983 in FBIS, 3 May 1983, p. AA-1.
37. Krasnaia zvezda, 23 May 1983.
38. Krasnaia zvezda, 26 September 1984.
39. Krasnaia zvezda, 22 May 1984.
40. In recent years, Soviet spending on strategic defense has equaled their spending on strategic offense. According to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations James D. Watkins, "the Soviets have outspent us more than twenty to one in the area of strategic defense, not to mention the tremendous amount they allocate to civil defense." Admiral Watkins' remarks at the Intrepid Museum Luncheon, New York, 13 April 1984.
41. DOD analysts report that the Soviet Union is currently upgrading the Moscow ABM system. When completed in the late 1980s, "the new system will be a two-layer defense composed of silo-based, long-range modified Galosh interceptors designed to engage targets outside the atmosphere; silo-based, high acceleration interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. "Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 33.
42. Evidence to support this conjecture can be found in former Soviet Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov's implicit criticism of the Soviet leadership for not authorizing sufficient funds to pursue the development of weapons based on "new physical principles" as is being done in the United States. Ogarkov, Krasnaia zvezda. 9 May 1984.
43. Ustinov, Sluzhirn rodine, delu kommunizma (Moscow: Voennoe Izdaatel'stvo, 1982), pp. 51-53, and Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti, pp. 58-59.
44. Ogarkov, Vsegda v gotovnosti, pp. 49-50.
Ilana Kass (A.B., Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ph.D., Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Columbia University) is a Senior Analyst with Systems Research and Applications Corporation, Arlington, Virginia; an Adjunct Professor of Soviet Military Studies at Georgetown University; and a frequent guest lecturer at the National War College. Dr. Kass has been a senior analyst with the Advanced International Studies Institute, Bethesda, Maryland, and senior lecturer at the Israeli Defense Forces Staff College, Jerusalem, Israel. She has contributed previously to numerous journals, including the Review and recent issues of Comparative Strategy and Strategic Review.
Ethan Burger (A.B., Harvard University) is a Research Associate with Systems Research and Applications Corporation.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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