Air University Review, July-August 1985
Colonel Ray E. Stratton
Lieutenant Colonel August G. Jannarone
THE objective of strategic targeting is to make the enemy feel at risk in his home territory so that his national behavior will be modified or his hostile intentions deterred. For more than twenty years, the United States has successfully avoided nuclear war through deterrence that is based on the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on any adversary who attacks this country or its allies with nuclear weapons. The policy of nuclear deterrence has not deterred conflict at the lower end of the warfare spectrum, however, as the Korean and Vietnam wars clearly illustrate. Additionally, growing Soviet capabilities to project military power outside their borders require increased U.S. capabilities to defuse crises and deter or contain brush-fire wars in areas of the world critical to our national interests. While additional investment in rapidly deployable conventional forces is certainly called for, it is not feasible from a resource standpoint to respond militarily to every problem in a Third World marked by growing unrest.
Because virtually any low-intensity conflict could escalate into a major power confrontation, there is a real need to develop and employ a force that can deter brush-fire wars or, if deterrence fails, end such wars quickly with the lowest possible level of violence. Speed of reaction, flexibility, and an exceptional degree of mobility make the special operations forces (SOF) of the Army, Navy, and Air Force ideally suited to perform this deterrence/containment mission. Although SOF are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a wide range of missions in nearly all types of conflict, the capability of these units to conduct covert or clandestine missions makes them exceptionally effective in low-intensity operations beyond the purview of conventional military units. These operations, designed specifically to deter or contain conflict, may be conducted even before open hostilities break out. Since SOF assets are limited, the careful selection of targets for SOF units is a central consideration if we are to ensure their effectiveness.
In seeking to deter an enemy, a major goal is to affect him psychologically––that is, to affect what he thinks about his potential for success in a given situation. The capability to strike surgically is an important advantage that special operations forces offer in psychological warfare. Such forces can be used with little collateral damage, thereby avoiding the negative effects associated with killing innocent civilians and destroying nonmilitary facilities.
The effective use of SOF in a deterrent mode requires the selection of targets that will have the desired effects on the enemy's mind. This targeting process must involve detailed intelligence data and a holistic approach to target analysis.
Holistic targeting takes into account all elements of an enemy's power structure and force vulnerabilities. In this targeting approach, targets are selected to influence the enemy's perceptions more than his order of battle and may focus on any element of the enemy's power structure to affect his sense of behind-the-lines security, his mobilization and deployment decisions, and even the manner in which he plans and conducts his operations. Targeteers must be sophisticated enough to take into account political, economic, and cultural factors in addition to the traditional military factors used in target selection.
In the past, the failure to take a holistic approach to targeting in low- to mid-intensity conflict has led to difficulties. For example, the near total destruction of North Vietnam's electric power generation and distribution systems had only a limited effect on the ability of the North Vietnamese to conduct the war in South Vietnam. Since the Vietnamese economy was basically agricultural and the climate mild, the morale of the people was not greatly affected by the interruption or cessation of electric power. Conversely, destruction of similar target arrays in industrial cities in cold climates during the dead of winter might have a much more dramatic impact.
Once selected, psychological targets may be attacked in a number of ways and for a variety of purposes. For example, the war effort of a country that includes a number of restless minorities could be undermined by propaganda and psychological operations. Unrest in rear areas would doubtlessly cause the enemy to divert significant forces to his rear areas to restore order and protect valuable assets. The major requirements for developing such targets, however, hinge on detailed human intelligence (HUMINT) and culturally sensitive analysts––two areas that currently require considerable upgrading in the U.S. intelligence community.
There are several other ways in which SOF operations might be used for deterrence purposes. SOF might be used to eliminate a terrorist headquarters. Swift, surgical destruction of a terrorist center would undermine terrorist morale and serve as a warning/deterrent to other would-be terrorists. On other occasions, targets might be attacked to provide a supporting psychological backdrop for a deception operation aimed at the enemy leadership. Even the threat of destruction of a key industrial facility or important agricultural resources on which a nation heavily depends can be a strong psychological deterrent to an undesirable action by an adversary.
Should it appear that deterrence has failed and hostilities are imminent, targeting for SOF expands to include targets that will disrupt, delay, or even stop enemy activities, particularly those affecting the massing, timing, and communicating with his combat units.
British military strategist B. H. Liddell Hart held that the objective of battlefield operations should be to paralyze the enemy's forces by striking at the enemy's command structure or its "head." This approach should be followed in SOF targeting: operations should aim at targets that will disrupt enemy operations. Targeteers should select C3 targets as high in the enemy's chain of command as possible to maximize the confusion and delay created by destruction of the targets. Through careful selection, the destruction of a relatively few key targets with the expenditure of limited amounts of force can have far-reaching impact on an enemy's ability to employ his forces.
"Noncontact interdiction," where the attacking special operations forces do not come in direct contact with enemy forces, is another highly effective tool in the hands of an astute targeteer. Destruction of a key tunnel or bridge at an impassable chokepoint can have prolonged and significant impact on the movement of enemy forces. A prehostility, covert attack on such a target can also have a deterrent impact on the enemy leadership (although such an act could be a cause of war if the source of the attack were discovered).
The next twenty years will almost certainly see an increasing number of crises requiring a U.S. response short of full mobilization. The potential for employment of special operations forces will rise proportionately. The effective use of these forces in various types of conflict hinges on three factors: development of a coherent targeting doctrine for special operations forces, enhancement of our intelligence capability in the HUMINT area, and training targeteers who are capable of assessing potential targets within a holistic framework.
At present, targeting doctrine focuses primarily on major conventional hostilities and neglects the potential for deterring lower-level conflicts and containing such conflicts when deterrence fails. Perhaps the newly formed Joint Special Operations Agency within the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure can take the lead in developing a doctrine to guide the unified command targeteers in their efforts to target special operations forces in the various theaters.
Efforts to improve the collection of human intelligence are underway, but it will be several years before they come to full fruition. In the interim, military intelligence sources should continue the vigorous collection of intermediate-level information not dependent on deep-plant agents. This information can be of considerable value to special operations targeteers and mission planners. Such detailed, technical information as the sound propagation characteristics in a particular valley under certain meteorological conditions, the time that the street lights go on and off in a particular town, and the load-bearing ratio of the soil in a particular meadow can be critical to both wise target selection and effective mission planning for special operations. When specific efforts are directed toward acquiring it, this type of operational data is not overly difficult to obtain.
Correspondingly, we must work at developing intelligence analysts and targeteers who understand the role of political, psychological, and economic elements in modern, low-intensity conflicts. Such analysts and targeteers must have a knowledge of cultures and languages that goes far beyond that provided by our present training programs. Furthermore, well-prepared area specialists must be given longer tours in relevant assignments.
The development of a coherent targeting doctrine for special forces that takes into account their unique mission and capabilities is long overdue. Without enhancements, we shall continue to view potential adversaries through the limited perspective of overhead technical systems and analyze intelligence data through the biased filter of American values and priorities. The cost of continuing business as usual will be ineffectiveness in dealing with low-intensity conflict in the Third World, which is the type of conflict the United States will most likely face in the foreseeable future.
Hurlburt Field, Florida
and
Santa Monica, California
Colonel Ray E. Stratton (B.S., Texas A&M University; M.S., Troy State University) is Commandant of the USAF Special Operations School (MAC) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. He flew more than 500 combat missions in nine types of aircraft in Southeast Asia as a forward air controller, air liaison officer, and operations advisor to the Vietnamese Air Force. He also served in the Air Staff as Chief of Security Assistance Policy and Management for foreign military sales and training programs for thirty-one foreign air forces. Colonel Stratton isd a Distinguished Graduate of both Air Command Staff College and Air War College.
Lieutenant Colonel August G. Jannarone (B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University; M.A., San Diego State University) is Senior Air Force Research Fellow at Rand Corporation. His extensive experience in worldwide planning for unconventional warfare (UW), deception, and psychological operations and civic action includes service with the Special Operations Joint Task Force Europe as UW contingency and special planner and with the Second Air Division (MAC), at Hurlburt Field, Florida, as Chief of Plans and Programs. Colonel Jannarone is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a Distinguished Graduate of Armed Forces Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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