Air University Review, July-August 1985
PRESIDENT Reagan's strategic defense initiative (SDI) has brought active defense against ballistic missiles back into the strategic debate for the 1980s and probably beyond. The level of this interest has been great enough to include SDI in the President's 1985 State of the Union message.1 Advances in ballistic missile defense (BMD) technologies have played an important role in this revival of interest after nearly a decade of public disinterest. The prospects for antiballistic missiles (ABMs) have brightened considerably since opponents declared missile defenses dead in the early 1970s and so-called exotic technologies involving directed energy transfer (DET) in the form of space-based lasers (SBL) and charged-particle beams (CPB) offer the possibility of dramatic breakthroughs in the military's ability to defend against a nuclear attack.
While considerable scientific and engineering progress was being made during the balance of the 1970s, it took President Reagan's forceful endorsement of space-based ballistic missile defenses to put the area into the forefront of a national debate over strategic nuclear policy. That debate had lain fallow during most of the 1970s but began to revive in the furor surrounding President Carter's announcement of American adoption of a counterforce targeting strategy through Presidential Directive (PD) 59 in August 1980.2 It was given further fuel by President Reagan's aggressive advocacy of offensive force modernization in his major October 1981 speech on the subject. The President's 23 March 1983 speech, which included reference to exotic systems and was instantly dubbed the "star wars" speech, brought BMD forthrightly into the overall debate.3
The BMD issue has moved to the center of the ongoing national disagreement over appropriate nuclear deterrence strategies for the future. Public advocacies have centered around the poles of continued adherence to assured destruction and strategies emphasizing limited nuclear options that pay some attention to the possibility of nuclear warfighting. To proponents of assured destruction, BMD always has been and always will be anathema: for them, the central reality of the nuclear balance is that a nuclear war would inexorably devolve to an all-out, possibly civilization-ending catastrophe, and it is the knowledge of that outcome that enlivens deterrence. Successful BMD raises the prospect that the disaster might be mitigated, and this possibility potentially removes useful inhibitions to engage in nuclear hostilities.
Assured destruction largely held public sway during the 1970s but has been challenged increasingly in the 1980s, and a part of that opposition contains an advocacy of BMD. Strategists in the Reagan administration are prominent in this revisionism, which argues that some more limited form of nuclear exchange is more probable than the assured destruction scenario. Recognizing that deterrence is the crucial purpose of nuclear strategy but that deterrence could fail through accident or inadvertence, these analysts argue for deterrence strategies of limited nuclear war. A major thrust of this strategic position is nuclear war termination at the lowest possible levels of destruction, such that society might survive and be able to recover. Given this emphasis, the attempt to defend against a nuclear attack is both natural and the only prudent and responsible course to follow.
BMD and the SDI stand as a lightning rod for the future debate. Predicting the outcome of that debate and thus what the likely role of BMD will be in the future requires, first, knowledge of the process leading to the SDI in Reagan administration policy and, second, awareness of the principal arguments for and against BMD. With these elements clearly in mind, some conclusions can be drawn.
The idea of active defenses against ballistic missiles is as old as the missile age. The theoretical problems associated with BMD had been solved before the first ballistic missile was tested, but overcoming largely engineering difficulties arising from the theoretical base have dogged BMD development. BMD in the form of antiballistic missiles (ABMs) was first raised as a possibility in the 1960s and resulted in the ABM Treaty of 1972, which precluded the deployment of effective active defenses by the Soviet Union and the United States.4 Many assured destruction advocates believed that they had foreclosed BMD for once and for all, and, as one contemporary commentator observed, "The ABM Treaty probably averted a costly competition in defensive systems."5
The anti-BMD forces were premature in their conclusion. Although the ABM Treaty prohibited deployment of all but minor ABM systems, it did not ban research and development efforts short of actual systems testing, which continued outside the spotlight of major public scrutiny. These research efforts were largely justified by counterpart programs in the Soviet Union and focused on two levels identified by then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in his final Annual Report to the Congress: "We continue treaty-permitted R&D on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) as a hedge against Soviet breakthroughs or breakouts that could threaten our retaliatory capability, and as a possible point defense option to enhance the survivability of our ICBM force."6
Brown's reference to point defenses is an allusion to ABM programs such as the low altitude defense system (LoADS), which incorporates nonnuclear-tipped interceptor rockets to intercept incoming Soviet reentry vehicles (RVs). These point defenses were given additional impetus by difficulties in finding a suitable basing mode for the MX missile system––a dilemma that suggested a point ABM defense as possibly the most plausible means to ensure the rocket's invulnerability. The other focus, suggested by the reference to possible Soviet breakthrough, is in so-called exotic defenses based in high-energy laser and charged particle beams. The Carter administration formed a Directed Energy Transfer Office within the Department of Defense specifically to direct research into these technologies by the various services. The most visible efforts have been programs that involve lasers in space to intercept and destroy rising Soviet missiles.7 This possibility led President Reagan to issue his now famous entreaty in March 1983: "I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace: to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."8
The statements of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in his Reports to the Congress indicate that the Reagan administration did not adopt a pro-BMD stance instantly. The secretary's first force statement contains a note of caution and even skepticism:
For the future, we are not yet sure how well ballistic missile defenses will work; what they will cost; whether they would require changes in the ABM Treaty; and how additional Soviet ballistic missile defenses––which would almost certainly be deployed in response to any U.S. BMD system––would affect U.S. and allied offensive capabilities.9
His second Report is cryptic and somewhat more optimistic, but it contains no reference to exotic systems. His entire discussion of BMD in the 350-page document is:
Our extensive work with Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) components has demonstrated that an active defense could protect some high-value strategic assets from ballistic missile attack. The program is structured, therefore, to sustain our understanding of this technology so that we could field an advanced andhighly effective BMD system quickly should the need arise.10
Between the issuance of that report on 1 February 1983 and the President's 23 March 1983 speech, the administration adopted directed energy transfer BMD. In his speech the President embraced exotic defenses, declaring, "Current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades, of effort on many fronts."11 His announcement accompanied the commissioning of two studies on the subject in June 1983, which were completed in October. These studies recommended spending $18-27 billion between fiscal years 1985-89 for research and development, and for deployment by the year 2000 of a system with a total cost estimated in the range of $95 billion.12
President Reagan accepted these recommendations formally on 6 January 1984 in the form of National Security Decision Directive 119. The SDI was thus born. Secretary Weinberger reflected this new emphasis in his fiscal year 1985 Report, which states, "The study concluded that advanced defensive technologies could offer the potential to enhance deterrence and to help prevent nuclear war by reducing significantly the military utility of Soviet preemptive attacks and by undermining an aggressor's confidence in the probability of a successful attack against both the United States and its allies."13 Secretary Weinberger recommended $1.74 billion in research and development funding for fiscal year 1985.14
Whether the spirited leadership of the administration will result in a movement toward deploying active defense is not entirely clear, nor is the wisdom of doing so obvious. Directed energy transfer defenses, after all, do not exist, and the technologies may never mature. Reaching some judgment on the desirability of moving toward defenses will be assisted by examining the arguments on either side of the issue.
BMD proponents make a number of arguments to support their advocacy. These arguments can be grouped around five related points, ranging from the feasibility of constructing effective defenses to the mandate for self-protection resulting from knowledge about the so-called nuclear winter phenomenon.
The first argument, contradicting the major negative argument in the ABM debate, is that active defenses are now technically feasible. In the 1960s, opinion centered on John Kennedy's misleading analogy that the missile defense problem was akin to "hitting a bullet with another bullet." Rather, a leading proponent argues that the task is conceptually much simpler than that: "A missile launched at the U.S. moves so fast that if you tossed an ice cube at it and hit it, you would divert from its course sufficiently to render it impotent.... [A) nuclear missile's high speed makes it vulnerable."15
This conceptual simplicity has, of course, been dogged by practical problems. In essence, the problem is one of target acquisition and tracking (a radar problem), trajectory determination (a computing problem), and interception (a weapons problem). Proponents argue that advances in radar, especially space-based, in computing capabilities, notably speed in processing, and in interceptor sophistication have, or soon will, overcome all these difficulties. Progress in systems such as LoADS and, in the longer run, the prospects of directed energy transfer BMD devices for a so-called layered system that could be essentially impenetrable are cited as evidence.16
The second argument is that missile defenses reinforce, rather than detract, from deterrence, especially if offensive arms reductions accompany BMD deployment. If belief in the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war makes avoidance of such a war the first premises of both American and Soviet foreign policies, then the problem of deterrence is to avoid changes in the perceptions producing inhibitions. As Herman Kahn put it, "One significant indication of the effectiveness of deterrence is that the Soviet Union and the United States share the belief that a nuclear war would only begin out of desperation or inadvertence."17 A major goal of nuclear deterrence policy is thus to ensure that neither side determines that it could profit by using its nuclear weapons. An important element in thwarting such calculations is uncertainty about the potential profitability of such attacks. As Keith Payne and Colin Gray stated, "Even ... limited conventional defensive coverage for U.S. retaliatory forces would create enormous uncertainties for Soviet planners considering the effectiveness of a strategic first strike."18 Daniel Graham and Gregory Fossedal expressed the same argument rhetorically: "Would a defense be adequate if it provided no rock-bottom guarantees at all but did throw so much uncertainty into the calculations of someone contemplating an attack on the U.S. that they would have to decide not to...?"19
Those favoring active defenses have always faced the criticism that offensive arsenal sizes are so great that anything short of total effectiveness would make no difference and that any defense could easily be overwhelmed by offensive weapons, thereby rendering it impotent. This criticism leads Secretary Weinberger to conclude that a movement toward defense would be most beneficial if accompanied by reductions in offensive forces. "For the longer term, offensive force reductions and defensive technologies can be mutually reinforcing. Effective defenses that reduce the utility of ballistic missiles and other offensive forces have the potential for increasing the likelihood of negotiated reductions of those offensive forces."20 Such reductions could reduce the quantitative (and possibly the qualitative) problems faced by defenses. If deployed and orchestrated properly, the result could be a movement toward a strategy of "assured survival," under which "we can reasonably project that strategic defense would be more likely to prevent all-out war––with the added, crucial advantage that if it does not, we are not totally without defense."21 The third and related argument is that defensive systems stabilize, rather than destabilize, the deterrence system and nuclear balance. The basis for this assertion is that BMD is nonprovocative because a defensive weapon does not put any offensive system at risk (it cannot be used to attack and destroy an offensive weapon before the offensive system is used). Thus, a defensive system has two salutary effects. First, because the system cannot be used preemptively, it avoids putting the adversary in a perceived "use them or lose them" situation during a crisis that might provide the incentive to launch first. Second, if such systems protect retaliatory forces, they reinforce the feasibility of second-strike strategies stressing disincentives to attack first.
The fourth argument is that it is irresponsible, and even morally reprehensible, not to make some effort at self-defense against a potential nuclear attack, since deterrence can fail. "The central problem of nuclear deterrence is that no offensive deterrent, no matter how fearsome, is likely to work forever, and the consequence of its failure would be intolerable for civilization."22 BMD acts as a prudent hedge against that failure that could mitigate the disaster should it occur. As Barry Smernoff argues in regard to laser-based defenses, "the emergence of SBL [space-based laser] technology creates a new alternative for coping with the seemingly inscrutable problems and ethical dilemmas of nuclear war and nuclear weapons and the open-ended nature of the strategic arms competition."23
The fifth argument arises from recent evidence that a nuclear war could trigger a phenomenon known as the "nuclear winter."24 Briefly, the idea of nuclear winter is that at some level of exchange (as yet unspecified), the result would be massive firestorms that would inject large amounts of microscopic soot into the stratosphere. This soot would create a dense cloud that would encircle the globe and block out the sun's rays. The effect would be to lower the average temperature of the earth by up to twenty degrees Fahrenheit, thereby destroying crops, freezing large portions of the globe's surface water, and making the earth essentially uninhabitable for up to a year. The result would be ecocide on a global scale and the possible effective extinction of life as we know it.
Although the scientific community is coming to accept the fact of a nuclear winter, the point at which it is triggered remains elusive and probably will continue to be so (the only fully reliable way to locate the nuclear winter threshold is to exceed it). In a general climate of uncertainty about the winter threshold, anything that could mitigate the extent of a thermonuclear exchange by reducing the number of detonations has some appeal. Ballistic missile defenses might keep any exchange at a level below the winter threshold by disabling a percentage of the incoming forces. This outcome would be especially enhanced if combined with a reduction in offensive arms, as Payne and Gray point out: "Advocates of a radical scale of nuclear disarmament need to appreciate that truly deep reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals would be feasible only in the event of a heavy deployment of strategic defensive systems."25 The force of this argument partly depends on what level of exchange would induce the winter; the lower the level, the greater the need to take measures to ensure that one does not exceed that threshold. The relative recency of investigation of the winter, however, ensures that this fifth argument will be the source of future debate and disagreement.
Historically, critics of BMD have dominated the strategic debate. This domination was most clearly evident in the period surrounding SALT I and the adoption of the ABM Treaty. The basic arguments against active defenses were articulated at that time, and they are currently being reiterated. In essence, these arguments can be grouped into three positions.
The first argument flows from assured destruction thought and characterizes BMD as a destabilizing chimera. To the extent that people believe active defenses will improve their chances of surviving a nuclear war, defenses loosen useful inhibitions against starting nuclear war rooted in knowledge of its disastrous, suicidal consequences. Moreover, most critics are deeply suspicious that such systems would not work well enough to make a substantial difference. This suspicion is particularly strong regarding population protection, since even minor "leakage" in urban-protecting systems would result in large-scale devastation. Thus, BMD is opposed in principle because it weakens the "hostage effect"26 central to assured destruction (an inhibition to start nuclear war because it would be suicidal––an execution of the hostages). Nevertheless, the protection apparently provided by such systems could prove illusory in the real event, which would be the cruelest irony of all.
The second argument also speaks to the question of stabilization versus destabilization. It is the problem of transition from a defenseless world to one in which active defenses play at least some part. This dilemma is also known as the "how do we get from here to there" problem, 27 and it refers to the instability that might accompany the addition of active defenses by one or both sides to the nuclear arms competition.
Two basic possibilities exist in this regard. The less troublesome is the situation where both sides more or less simultaneously develop and deploy systems of roughly similar capabilities (at whatever level of effectiveness). In that circumstance, arms control processes might be used to effect an orderly mutual deployment of such systems, so that the changeover would be symmetrical and would maintain similar force structures throughout for both sides. Whether the result at the end of this process would be stable or unstable is, of course, a matter of more fundamental beliefs about whether BMD is stabilizing or not.
More troublesome is the potential situation where one side makes a substantial breakthrough that would allow it to field a system for which the adversary had either no counterpart or only one that was markedly inferior. A dramatic advance in some form of DET-based weaponry would seem to offer the best likelihood of such a situation.
The potential source of instability arises because the disadvantaged state realizes its situation will be substantially weakened once deployment is complete by the other. If the defenses are formidable, the nonpossessor may be left with largely useless offensive forces that could be picked off and destroyed before reaching target, transforming the "use them or lose them" problem to an equally intractable "use them or leave them useless" dilemma.
The nonpossessor might decide that his only recourse is to fire his missiles before the other side's defenses are operational, and this creates the source of instability. The weaker state might decide that it is expedient and rational to "fire when you can" rather than to accept an inferiority wherein the opponent can threaten attack without having to fear retaliation.
Not all observers believe the problem to be severe. Graham and Fossedal, in particular, dismiss it: "Would the Soviets attack as we complete our ground-based defense? Of course not; no fundamental change in the balance of power is threatened . . .. The stronger U.S. defenses become, the less sense a Soviet strike makes––but the process is marginal, not an all-for-one shot."28
Cost is the final argument against active defenses. The price tag on the original ABM system proposed in the latter 1960s was $5 billion or so; depending on the source one consults and the kind of system one envisages, the defenses one could deploy could be enormously higher than that figure.
There is substantial disagreement on this issue. Advocates of the so-called High Frontier argue that existing technologies could field defenses at comparatively modest cost. Graham and Fossedal make such assertions: "At a cost of $2 billion ... the U.S. could protect the MX missile in existing Minuteman silos in North Dakota."29 Moreover, they allege, "Within five years, at a cost of $12 billion, the United States could deploy a two-layered fleet of satellites that would filter out 98 percent of a Soviet missile launch."30
Other observers, and especially those looking at systems that incorporate laser and particle-beam components, are less sanguine about cost. Hard information about cost estimates is not available publicly, but guesses abound. As one observer catalogues, "Estimates of the amount needed to make the new system both operational and effective range from $10 billion to $500 billion."31 Yet another observer provides a range for the installation of a layered system incorporating lasers and particle beams as well as ABMs: "The goal ... is to have a multilayered ballistic missile defense in place within 20 years at a cost estimated at between $250-$500 billion."32
Such guesses are, of course, just that and could be affected by the comprehensiveness and complexity of the system (the number of satellites needed) and by such factors as technological complications and inflation. The question is whether the American public would support the expenditures that the high end of the spectrum portends (particularly in an era of large budget deficits). Certainly there will be opposition on these grounds alone, and two associated difficulties may buttress that opposition.
The first problem is that supporters will not be able to demonstrate with any precision the effectiveness of proposed systems in advance of decisions to deploy them. Testing will always be modest, and whether such results can confidently be extrapolated to all-out exchange scenarios will always be controversial. Opponents will claim that the American people are being asked to spend a half trillion dollars for what is, in essence, a pig in a poke.
The second bedeviling factor is the possibility that the expense will be open-ended, with the defense simply opening a new arena for arms race competition. This prospect is most often associated with a race in space, where BMD satellites invite counterdeployment of antisatellite (ASAT) weaponry, redundancy of systems, and the like. Weaponizing the last medium could be extremely expensive and long-term, meaning that even very high cost estimates could represent no more than the tip of the investment iceberg.
These arguments have or will affect the likelihood that the strategic defense initiative will move toward fruition in the second Reagan term and beyond. These arguments have spanned most of the nuclear age, and they are elegant and persuasive, if contradictory. The question is which set will hold sway in the balance of decisions about SDI.
The setting is reminiscent of the circumstance in the latter 1960s when the ABM controversy raged. In that situation, ABM was defeated largely on two grounds: it was expensive, and there was substantial disagreement about whether it would work. The question of expense was made more difficult because ABM proposals came on the heels of an extensive offensive force modernization program that had produced Minuteman III and Polaris/Poseidon systems, while simultaneously Vietnam was draining defense resources. Moreover, a first round of comprehensive arms control sentiments was part of the mix.
Parallels exist today. There is considerable disagreement within the scientific community over whether the components of the SDI are or ever will be feasible. The "star wars" initiative came slightly less than two years after President Reagan proposed his comprehensive offensive force modernization plan, and the laser defenses in space apparently will be extravagantly expensive. The current deficit crisis may parallel the negative impact of Vietnam, since each represents a politically and economically debilitating drain on resources. Moreover, a new round of arms control talks in which the Soviets insist on banning the SDI defenses looms in the background.
This constellation of factors doomed ABM in the 1960s, but will it also foreclose SDI? There are three central problems: demonstrating the technical feasibility of SDI; making it seem economically palatable; and fitting SDI into an arms control framework acceptable to both sides. These are no mean tasks, but neither are they impossible. One way toward accomplishing them is through a "defense-protected build-down" (DPB) of offensive forces as the defense is erected––an approach now entering the American debate.33
The basic notion behind DPB is to combine the President's advocacy for offensive reductions (e.g., the START proposals) with a phased introduction of strategic defenses. Using arms control negotiations to provide schedules and timetables, both superpowers would gradually draw down their offensive systems and replace the eliminated items with defensive components. The defenses would protect the security of remaining offensive retaliatory systems, thereby reinforcing deterrence in the assured destruction sense, while simultaneously making the consequences of a failure of deterrence less disastrous (including, possibly, keeping detonation levels below that which would trigger the nuclear winter).
The expert community does not unanimously support this proposal. Alton Frye questions the basic relationship between offenses and defenses, saying "the sharp reduction in offensive warheads ... might tend to reduce the incentive to seek some new 'impregnable' defense––or conversely it might tend to make such a defense seem more attainable."34 At the same time, the proposal introduces another source of uncertainty into strategy. "The difficulty in estimating the effectiveness of a defensive system is a serious shortcoming of a DPB strategy."35
The DPB strategy has yet to attract the microscopic attention it may need. The proposal is conceptually compatible with President Reagan's combined interests in offensive force reductions and the SDI. It also offers some potential for addressing the economic and technical difficulties that form the political objections to BMD generally.
The major technical objection to any BMD system is that it can be overwhelmed and, moreover, that the response to erecting defenses is to create more offensive forces to ensure saturation. A build-down moderates that objection both by ensuring a quantitative reduction in the problem and restricting offensive warhead proliferation. The defensive problem is made easier when combined with an offensive build-down. Economically, a build-down would create some marginal reductions in spending on offensive systems––cost savings that could be devoted to the defenses. Those reductions clearly would not compensate entirely, given SDI costs, but the symbolism of the effort and its results in terms of reducing the "balance of terror" could make the effort politically attractive.
The combination could be broadly appealing. Emphasizing defense adds fuel to the SDI, and those who favor arms reductions can hardly oppose DPB. The arms control community could find solace and purpose in an approach that promises to reinvigorate a moribund process.
Any restructuring of the nuclear balance is a two-actor exercise that must include the Soviet Union. There are at least three reasons to question whether, at least in the short run, the Soviets can embrace such a proposal.
The first problem is the political strength of the new Soviet leadership. The process begun by Brezhnev's death will not end until the Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko-Gromyko generation passes on and Gorbachev and his followers firmly establish control. Until that transition process is complete, it is unlikely that any leadership will be secure enough to negotiate any change in the balance as radical as a DPB proposes.
The second problem is the Soviets' well-advertised opposition to the SDI. As argued earlier, a movement toward defenses is most stabilizing if both sides can do so simultaneously (preferably under some kind of arms control regime). Strident Soviet objections to SDI makes one wonder whether the Soviets simply do not think that they can compete in a concerted BMD competition in space.
Third, the Soviets have made a serious commitment to offensive force expansion over the past fifteen to twenty years. An offensive build-down would necessitate more sacrifice for them than for the United States.
Has the defense arrived, or is it still "ahead of its time?" Thus far, the missile age has witnessed the apparently immutable advantage of the offense over the defense, but the history of weaponry suggests that the relationship between offense and defense fluctuates. As Payne and Gray observe, "for the strategic defense to achieve a very marked superiority over the offense over the next several decades would be an extraordinary trend in light of the last 30 years, but not of the last hundred or thousand years."36 Supporters of programs such as the SDI may simply be marching slightly in front of an idea whose time is coming but has not quite arrived.
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa
Notes
1. The full text is reproduced in the New York Times, 7 February 1985. p. 13.
2. Harold Brown, "Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the Convocation Ceremonies for the 97th Naval War College Class," (Washington: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, 1980).
3. Ronald Reagan, "Remarks on Strategic Defense," 23 March 1983, reprinted in Daniel 0. Graham and Gregory A. Fossedal, A Defense that Defends: Blocking Nuclear Attack (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: Devin-Adair Publishers, 1983), pp. 143-45.
4. This problem is discussed extensively in Donald M. Snow, The Nuclear Future: Toward a Strategy of Uncertainty (University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1983), chapter 3.
5. Michael Mandelbaum, "The Future of Nuclear Weapons," Naval War College Review, September/October 1982, p. 66.
6. Harold Brown. Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982 (Washington: Government Printing Office. 19 January 1981), p 116.
7. Snow, pp. 101 -07.
8. Reagan, p. 145.
9. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 8 February 1982), p. III-65.
10. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 31 January 1983), p. 227.
11. Reagan, p. 144.
12. Keith Payne and Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1984. p. 821.
13. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1985
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 February 1984), p. 58.
14. Ibid., p. 193.
15. Graham and Fossedal, p. 44.
16. For details on this approach, see Snow, chapter 3.
17. This point is made strongly by the late Herman Kahn in his posthumously released sequel, Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 37.
18. Payne and Gray, p. 824.
19. Graham and Fossedal. p. 45.
20. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1985, p. 58.
21. Graham and Fossedal, p. 113.
22. Payne and Gray, p. 820.
23. Barry J. Smernoff, "The Strategic Value of Space-Based Laser
Weapons," Air University Review, March-April 1982, p. 14.
24. Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and the Climatic Catastrophe," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983/1984, pp. 257-92.
25. Payne and Gray, p. 840.
26. The "hostage effect" was coined by Thomas C. Schelling in The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960).
27. This issue is discussed in Donald M. Snow, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Strategic Future," Parameters, June 1983, pp. 11 -22. Colin S. Gray has also pointed out the problem in a number of his works.
28. Graham and Fossedal, p. 120.
29. Ibid., p. 49.
30. Ibid., p. 55.
31. Steven E. Cady, "Beam Weapons in Space: A Reality We Must Confront," Air University Review, May-June 1982, p. 37.
32. William E. Burrows, "Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion of Security," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1984, p. 843.
33. Alvin M. Weinberg and Kack N. Barkenbus, "Stabilizing Star Wars," Foreign Policy, Spring 1984, p. 164.
34. Alton Frye, "Strategic Build-Down: A Context for Restraint," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983/1984, P. 300.
35. Weinberg and Barkenbus, p. 168.
36. Payne and Gray, p. 826.
Donald M. Snow (B.A., M.A., University of Colorado; Ph.D., Indiana University) is Senior Research Fellow, U.S. Naval War College, and Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies at the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. He is the author of The Nuclear Future: Toward a Strategy of Uncertainty (1983), Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World (1981), and National Security: Issues in U.S. Defense Policy (forthcoming). Dr. Snow has been Professor of National Security Affairs at Air Command and Staff College and is a frequent contributor to the Review.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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