Air University Review, July-August 1985
Comments By
Lieutenant Colonel Lorenzo M. Crowell, Jr.
THE gestation period of this commentary has been excessive. What finally drives me to the typewriter is Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew's "Beware of Simplistic Solutions,"* written in response to William S. Lind's "Reading, Writing, and Policy Review."** It appears to me that the issues these men are debating, the quality of intellectual life in the Air Force, and the impact of the policy review process on that intellectual life, are of fundamental importance to U.S. national security.
Since 1980, one of the first assigned readings in the Air War College (AWC) resident course has been Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham's 1977 article "The Decline of US Strategic Thought," in which he maintains that we military professionals do not have the impact that we should have in the strategic debate because we are overwhelmingly concerned with a budget process dominated by programs, cost-effectiveness, systems analysis, etc., instead of being concerned with developing military strategy. This article is assigned to AWC students (the official "cream" of lieutenant colonels and new colonels) in an attempt to stimulate student interest in the professional study of military stategy.
*
Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew, "Beware of Simplistic Solutions," Air University Review, January-February 1985, pp. 102-04.**William S. Lind, "Reading, Writing, and Policy Review," Air University Review, Noember-December 1984, pp. 66-67.
This idea that we are not having the appropriate impact on military strategy was not new with General Graham. In 1968, General Curtis LeMay wrote that "the military profession has been invaded by pundits who set themselves up as popular oracles on military strategy. These 'defense intellectuals' go unchallenged simply because the experienced professional active duty officers are officially prohibited from entering the public debate."2 While General LeMay's term officially prohibited may be an overstatement of the policy review process, Lind's characterization of its effect as "crippling" is quite right in that our overly restrictive policy and security review process hampers our preparation for war.
In peacetime all we do, whether it's flying F-15s, maintaining C-141s, or sitting in Minuteman capsules, is ultimately no more than preparation for war. Part of that preparation is mental--dare I say intellectual?--which, above the routine learning of specific skills, is focused in PME. However, what is done formally in the classroom or by correspondence should not be the complete picture. In the background must be a vigorous, professional, intellectual life. This intellectual life should be stimulated by open debate of doctrine, tactics, military strategy, and even budgets in professional journals such as the Air University Review.
We are up against a problem that is not new. Frederick the Great said:
A mule who has carried a pack for ten campaigns under Prince Eugene will be no better tactician for it, and it must be confessed, to the disgrace of humanity, that many men grow old in an otherwise respectable profession without making any greater progress than this mule.
To follow the routine of the service, to become occupied with the care of its fodder and lodging, to march when the army marches, camp when it camps, fight when it fights--for the great majority of officers this is what is meant by having served, campaigned, grown gray in the harness. For this reason one sees so many soldiers occupied with trifling matters and rusted by gross ignorance. Instead of soaring audaciously among the clouds, such men know only how to crawl methodically in the mire. They are never perplexed and will never know the causes of their triumphs or defeats.3
While the "routine of the service" has certainly changed and while Frederick may have used "shoddy research and incomplete analysis" just as Lind did, the basic problem is the same--a military service whose professional life is not as vigorous intellectually as it could or should be. Vigorous professional debate is essential in the long run to the operational effectiveness of any military force, whether it's the army of Frederick or the United States Air Force.
In "Beware of Simplistic Solutions," Drew asserts that "the military has the right, indeed the duty, to restrict what its officers publish." I disagree, beyond the restriction of the publication of classified material. Once we review the writings of our officers for compliance with Air Force policy, we make every officer an official spokesperson and have to live with the policy implications of the utterings of each of us instead of only those in responsible positions. The easiest solution to that problem is, of course, not to approve anything in the least bit controversial. This solution ensures that the Air Force will speak with one voice in the budgetary debate and maximizes our effectiveness in the short-term battle of the budget. Unfortunately, it undermines the long-term effectiveness of the Air Force by ensuring that fundamental issues will not be subject to the full, thorough examination that can come only from an open, unimpeded debate. The difference between these two debates, budget and professional, is an important point that is often overlooked.
The Air Force should accept the minor, tactical losses in the budget battle (if any) that might result from having established policy challenged by serving officers in open professional debates. If among the Air Force officer corps we have knee-jerk screwballs who would "publish an article advocating willful disobedience to lawful orders," we need to let them identify themselves so that those in control of the profession can deal with such nonprofessional attitudes. (Part of belonging to any profession is accepting its unique professional standards and discipline.) Drew's suggestion that "the Air Force has an especially difficult problem with security and policy review, particularly when compared with the Army," does not help very much. If, as he argues, the "political and military implications of the issues" involved in purchase of the MX and deployment of cruise missiles in Europe "would be much more likely to affect delicate international negotiations and Soviet perceptions of our deterrent posture" than the implications of the issues involved in the purchase of a tank or an armored fighting vehicle, we should turn our professional attention to the MX and cruise missile deployment with more vigor. It is our professional responsibility to the American people to deal with the toughest and most sensitive issues, not to stifle debate about them.
If we want to include the knowledge and experience of Air Force military professionals with the work of "defense intellectuals" in the development of American military strategy and defense policy, we must encourage, not inhibit, professional debate. Until we acknowledge that the intellectual, preparation for war is at least as important in peacetime as is practice flying, practice bombing, and practice exercises, our military preparedness will suffer. A vital part of this intellectual preparation for war, essential to keep us from being "occupied with trifling matters and rusted by gross ignorance," is a vigorous professional debate conducted openly in professional journals. We do not need "an enormous bureaucratic bottleneck at the Pentagon." We need professional responsibility exercised by individual authors and editors. If anyone starts writing "knee-jerk screwball" stuff, he or she can simply be denounced as not an official spokesperson and expect to suffer the consequences for unsound, unprofessional thought--having his or her ideas denounced or refuted in print and thereby looking like a fool intellectually.
Legitimate dissenting professional opinion needs to be heard, not least of all by us. We do not need more debate about the need f or professional debate: we need debate that might very well enhance U.S. national security. Unless the U.S. Air Force stops sacrificing the long-term benefits of a vigorous professional debate for the short-term gains of speaking with a single voice in the budget debate, we must expect Bill Lind and the other "defense intellectuals" to dominate the discussion of American military strategy and defense policy, which is a vital part of our preparation for war.
Maxwell AFB, Alabma
Notes
1. Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret), "The Decline of US Strategic Thought," Air Force, August 1977, pp. 24-29.
2. General Curtis E. LeMay with Major General Dale O. Smith, America Is in Danger (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968).
3. Jay Luvaas, editor and translator, Frederick the Great on the Art of War (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 47.
Colonel Crowell is Chief, History of Warfare Studies, Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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