Air University Review, January-February 1985
Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew
WILLIAM Lind's articles are usually both enjoyable and challenging. The typical Lind article is punctuated skillfully with sardonic wit used to highlight fundamental problems within the U.S. military that might otherwise be overlooked or ignored. Unfortunately, Bill Lind's latest contribution to the Air University Review was not a noteworthy literary effort. * Perhaps worse, the article mirrored the faulty analyses and simplistic solutions typically found in the writings of the so-called military reform group, for which Lind is a vitriolic unofficial spokesman. However, the article did serve as an object lesson to those who might be tempted to accept the ideas of the "military reformers" without rigorous scrutiny.
*William S. Lind, "Reading, Writing, and Policy Review: The Air Force's Unilateral Disarmament in the War of Ideas," Air University Review, November-December 1984, pp. 66-70.
Identifying Lind's thesis tested the reader's patience. After opening with an obscure quotation, followed by a truism about the importance of ideas, and an overly long example only tenuously connected to his theme, Lind finally settled on his message. Using his unique flair for understatement, Lind asserted: "Intellectually, the Air Force officer corps appears not merely sluggish but moribund." To Lind, the reason for this problem is clear: "The average officer appears to read little if at all about warfare [and] writes less . . .."
The evidence that Lind presented to bolster his assertions reflected the shoddy research and incomplete analysis that is all too typical of self-anointed experts who comment on military affairs. First, Lind claimed that Air Force officers do not read professional military literature. His basis for this claim was an offhand comment made by a former editor of the Air University Review, plus the minimal response generated by a sharp debate carried on by Lind and an Air Force colonel in previous editions of the Review. The former argument relied on "gut feel" rather than hard data. The latter argument disregarded alternative explanations, including my own personal reaction that the colonel stated his case well in his pieces and that the quality of Lind's remarks did not merit further attention.
Lind presented equally unconvincing evidence regarding the writing of Air Force officers. Concerning the Air University Review, he asserted that "imaginative articles written by Air Force officers on controversial subjects seldom appear in its pages." As a frequent contributor to these pages, I am tempted to launch a frontal attack on this assertion. However, this would miss the point. The point is that Lind presented no content analysis, no survey of authors, and no definition of "controversial subjects." In short, he presented no evidence, and his assertion remains only an assertion.
This is not to say that Lind's assertions are totally wrong. The sweeping generalization that the Air Force officer corps is intellectually sluggish and moribund is not substantiated by Lind's evidence (or lack thereof). I might agree, however, that not enough Air Force officers read and write seriously about the complex and controversial issues which the American military must face. I have no hard evidence except my observations of several thousand Air University students over the past seven years. Even though my evidence may be more persuasive than Lind's, I would hesitate to make any sweeping assertions.
Lind continued in his essay to speculate about a cause for the problems he asserted and to propose a solution. But once again, his analysis was incomplete and his proposed solution simplistic.
According to Lind, U.S. Air Force officers do not read or write about controversial topics because of censorship within the Air Force security and policy review process. Lind compares the leniency of U.S. Army censorship with the stringent policies followed by the United States Air Force. His solution to the problem, as one would suspect, requires an Air Force policy and review process at least as lenient as that of the U.S. Army. It is instructive to examine each of these points.
Lind indicates that while there may be multiple reasons why Air Force officers do not read and write about controversial subjects, the bulk of the blame can be fairly placed on the security and policy review process. Lind may be correct. But without evidence, one can say only that censorship prevents the open publication of certain controversial articles and books. It does not necessarily prevent Air Force officers from reading controversial materials, either from open sources or from sources available only within the government. Nor does it necessarily prevent Air Force officers from writing about controversial subjects and publishing such material for official use only. Lind would have been much more accurate if he had said that censorship may restrict the ability of officers to read and write about controversial subjects and that it may inhibit constructive dialogue between the military and civilian intellectual communities.
In spite of Lind's lack of evidence and analysis, I would agree that censorship is a serious problem. In my experience at Air University, I have seen a large number of important articles and studies that have been denied publication because of security and policy review. Many, it would seem, were denied clearance on questionable policy grounds and perhaps could be accurately characterized as victims of Pentagon paranoia. But the solution to the problem is not as simple as Lind suggests.
It is clear that the military has the right, indeed the duty, to restrict what its officers publish. Even Lind would agree that the Air Force cannot allow one of its officers to publish an article advocating willful disobedience to lawful orders. Thus the issue in question is not censorship. Rather, the issue is how to apply censorship in a manner that satisfies the often-conflicting needs for constructive debate, organizational cohesiveness, and necessary secrecy.
The Air Force has an especially difficult problem with security and policy review, particularly when compared with the Army. It is one thing to publish an article questioning the purchase of an armored fighting vehicle or criticizing the performance of the M-1 tank. It is quite another thing to question the purchase of the MX missile, to argue against the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe, or to criticize the performance of the Minuteman missile fleet. The political and military implications of the issues are much more limited in the first instance than in the second. Open discussion of nuclear issues would be much more likely to affect delicate international negotiations and Soviet perceptions of our deterrent posture. In essence, it is possible that there must be different censorship standards for the Air Force and the Army. All of this means that we face a very complex problem requiring more than a simplistic solution. We need to devise a security and policy review system that meets the complex and often conflicting needs of the Air Force.
What would be the elements of such a system? Four come quickly to mind, but even these elements have hidden complications. First, there should be a reference standard or benchmark to use in judging whether or not publication should be denied because of conflicts with current policy. At present, we have reasonably precise definitions to determine whether material is classified confidential, secret, or top secret. A similar meaningful standard would be most helpful in terms of policy review. Unfortunately, even with a reference standard, the policy review system could be abused, just as the classification system has often been abused by overzealous classifying authorities. Abuses of such a system might be minimized if we place the burden of proof on the censor. Today the burden of proof is on the writer (de facto, if not de jute), and the censor can deny clearance almost out of hand and with only the most cursory explanation. Each public release denial should be accompanied by a full explanation, including suggestions for corrective action. Additionally, there should be censorship accountability. Today, written works are evaluated for clearance by nameless members of the Pentagon bureaucracy. The requirement to place personal reputations on the line when denying clearance might change many security and policy review decisions.
Unfortunately, the requirement for full explanation and accountability might create an enormous bureaucratic bottleneck at the Pentagon and impose an intolerable workload on those saddled with the responsibility to review various written works for public release. This problem might be solved by decentralization of the security and policy review process. Although decentralized by regulation, the list of exceptions that currently require clearance by Pentagon agencies includes nearly every important or controversial subject. In effect, the process is highly centralized. Unfortunately, decentralization requires officers in the field who are willing and able to "bite the bullet" and make the difficult and contentious decisions under guidelines that are vaguely defined. Such decisions obviously carry heavy risks where the decision-maker's career is concerned. This explains why these kinds of decisions have, over the past decades, been gradually centralized into the faceless and nameless Pentagon bureaucracy where careers can be protected.
There are no easy answers, and each answer seems to create its own set of new problems. Moreover, I have only mentioned four elements of a reformed security and policy review system. There may be many others of equal or greater importance. It would be particularly interesting to read comments from those who have actually been part of the process within the Pentagon, from public affairs personnel who are charged with administering the system, and from legal officers with opinions on the legal basis of the system.
I invite comments on the problem from all who are interested in the subject. Further comments from Lind would be welcome, even though I continue to be dismayed by his original haphazard analysis and simplistic solutions.
Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew (B.A., Williamette University; M.B.A., University of Wyoming) is Deputy Director for Research, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Hq Air University. He has served in several SAC missile assignments and as Chief, Warfare Studies Division, Air Command and Staff College. Colonel Drew is a frequent contributor to the Review, and his article in this edition is first-prize winner in the fourth annual Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition. He is a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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