Air University Review, September-October 1984
Colonel Clifford R. Krieger
THIS year the U.S. Air Force published two very important documents: Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,1and a reissue of The Condensed Analysis of Ninth Air Force Operations in the European Theater of Operations (hereafter referred to as the Condensed Analysis).2 Study of these two documents by professional Air Force officers should both confirm their understanding of air power doctrine and lead to a better comprehension of how to employ air power.
In four short chapters, the new Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1 addresses the employment of military forces, the specific employment of aerospace forces, the missions and specialized tasks of the Air Force, and the preparation of aerospace forces for war (organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining). Going beyond describing the classic missions and specialized tasks of air forces and their organization, training, equipment, and sustainment, this edition discusses the employment of aerospace forces as part of a unified military organization to win in war. This emphasis on aerospace power as part of a holistic approach to war represents a new level of conceptualization not previously achieved. It also presents an overall concept for the proper employment of air power, calling for the air commander to have a broad plan of employment and encompassing ideas delineated in World War II's FM 100-20.3 The commander's broad plan of employment provides a key to air power often missing in recent discussions. Our AFM 1-1 is, in many ways, the equivalent of the Army's FM 100- 1, The A rmy and the Navy's NWP-1, Strategic Concepts for the U.S. Navy (Rev A).5 However, the Air Force's AFM 1-1 delves deeper into warfighting than either the Army's FM 100-1 or the Navy's NWP-1.
The new edition of AFM 1-1, while covering the same ground as the previous edition (and more), takes a different approach. The manual begins with a chapter that emphasizes both the relationship of the military to the nation and the interrelationship among the military services. Aerospace forces are seen as having certain intrinsic capabilities. To exploit these capabilities fully, aerospace forces must be integrated and coordinated with land and naval forces. Thus, unity of command, the appointment of a single commander to achieve unity of effort in carrying out an assigned task, is critically important.
The second chapter examines the employment of aerospace forces. An important addition here is the concept of a broad plan of employment and, in particular, recognition of the importance of employing aerospace power as an indivisible entity, based on objectives, threats, and opportunities. The chapter emphasizes that the commander has a broad plan of employment and conducts simultaneous strategic and tactical actions utilizing all available forces. The importance of employing both offensive and defensive action, as well as employing aerospace operations for psychological impact, is amply discussed. The basics of warfighting are covered in this chapter: that is, not only the principles of war (which now include both logistics and cohesion) but such important fundamentals as the need to gain control of the aerospace environment and to attack the enemy's war-fighting potential, to develop a coherent pattern for employing forces, and to take advantage of the wide array of unique capabilities that aerospace forces possess.
The third chapter focuses on missions and specialized tasks of aerospace forces. The long discussion of DOD Directive 5100. 1, which addresses functions of the Air Force, is much reduced from the previous edition. (The material in the DOD directive is covered elsewhere.)6 Rather than providing only a list of missions and a description of each, as in the previous AFM 1-1, the new manual covers each mission in terms of how it contributes to the achievement of the air component commander's objectives. For example, the discussion of air interdiction (AI), recognizing the fact that AI is normally flown "as part of a systematic and persistent campaign," stresses the need for the air component commander to consult with the surface force commanders in developing an AI campaign.7
The manual no longer includes space operations as an Air Force mission. Discussion of these operations was dropped based on the realization, expressed in AFM 1-6, Military Space Doctrine, that space is a place wherein the Air Force simply performs its classic missions in new and improved ways.8 On the other hand, aerospace maritime operations was added as a mission in recognition of the fact that maritime operations are "made unique primarily by the character of its objectives, the threat, and the forces involved."9 In addition, the specialized tasks of the Air Force have been updated and expanded in description.
The fourth chapter deals with organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining aerospace forces. Increased emphasis is placed on the services as providers of forces, while the unified and specified commanders and their functional (land, naval, and air) component commanders are viewed as the employers of forces. This distinction is critical to the proper employment of military power and of aerospace power in particular. Confusing the two responsibilities results in disrupting the effective functional employment of forces in order to maintain service command lines.
Finally, the historical discussion of air and aerospace doctrine that was an integral part of the previous manual has been moved to Annex A, and the bibliography (Annex B) has been updated. The bibliography now covers U.S. involvement in Vietnam, including books by Bernard B. Fall and Leslie H. Gelb.10 It also includes important works on World War II, such as those of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder and coauthors Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate.11 Some important books are still missing, such as Colonel Harry G. Summers's On Strategy, which examines our involvement in Vietnam from a Clausewitzian perspective.12
Notwithstanding the improvements in AFM 1-1, the manual is not complete in and of itself. It is a slender volume of only forty-seven pages, and it must be read within the context of other Air Force manuals on basic and operational doctrine (one- and two- series manuals) and against the backdrop of the history of air power. Including the historical background of air power in AFM 1-1 was not possible for two reasons. First, it would have run the volume to approximately 250 pages. Second, the detailed historical basis for its concepts is not of much interest to a large number of airmen, who are looking for the distilled doctrine. This exclusion of the historical background for Air Force doctrine should not be considered as a weakness in the product. Ours is a technical business, and many in our service must devote themselves almost exclusively to their areas of specialization, which are as important as doctrine in conducting successful air warfare.
While historical experience and modern capabilities must be woven together to formulate doctrine, distilled doctrine helps those involved in the technical end keep a focus on how we will fight.
Because AFM 1-1 does not include all of the historical basis for aerospace doctrine, the recent reissuing of the Condensed Analysis by the Air Force Office of History is an event worth noting. The Condensed Analysis discusses the employment of U.S. air power in France and Germany during 1944 and 1945. By coincidence, it is being published near the fortieth anniversary of the D-day invasion, the opening battle for Ninth Air Force's greatest campaigns. The historical account does not exist in isolation, however, but is linked to the early lessons of World War II--in particular, to the lessons learned by the Allies in North Africa. The historical chapters do not represent the definitive history of air operations in the European Theater, but they do present the official opinions of the American airmen who fought and helped to win the war there.
Printed as part of the Air Force Office of History's Project Warrior Series, this reissue is not expected to be a runaway best seller. However, it should find a receptive audience among Air Force officers attempting to learn more about how air power alters land (and naval) operations in war and why our doctrine is what it is. The reprinting of the Condensed Analysis is a faithful reproduction of the original issue, even to the very detailed maps and organizational charts that fold out of the book. It is not a popular history: it does not describe heroic events or technical points of particular aircraft. Instead, the book is an examination of World War II warfighting through the eyes of the commanders and staffs at the air component commander level and just below. This is a view often neglected, but one that we must study and understand if we are to be successful in a future war.
An important feature of the Condensed Analysis is its discussion of the large-scale, effective cooperation between air and land forces. It was in the campaigns across France and Germany that U.S. and British air forces were able to support their land forces effectively on a massive scale. Their accomplishments, while limited by the aircraft and ordnance of the day, were a major factor in helping Allied land forces overcome German resistance.
The book contains fifty pages of conclusions and recommendations. Especially interesting to today's operations personnel are those related to the issue of control of air power. Emerging clearly in these pages is the rationale supporting today's Air Force concept of centralized control and decentralized execution, of the air war under the command of a single air component commander. Also of interest to operations personnel are a conclusion and recommendation concerning the training of replacement aircrews: noting that tactics in the theater were often ahead of what was being taught in Training Command, the book contributors recommend proper liaison between the groups involved, plus an in-theater "top-off" course. Similarly, comments about the Tactical Air Command-Army team make important, relevant points concerning collocation, round-the-clock operations, joint planning, and exchange of personnel that still apply today.
Other conclusions and recommendations are of interest to Air Force logisticians. Although the Allies could not have won World War II without the excellent work of the logisticians, there were some problems, particularly as a result of a less than adequate understanding between combat and support elements. As the Condensed Analysis puts it: "Service and combat commanders were, in general, not fully acquainted with one another's specific mission and functions.13
The Condensed Analysis even contains some recommendations in the public affairs area. For example:
It is recommended that the air force policy on the availability of information to the PRO [public relations officer] section be as liberal as possible without compromising the security of planning or disposition of forces. It is further recommended that the PRO or his delegated representative be required to attend such operational meetings as are necessary to enable him to maintain a continuous picture of the immediate situation and future operations plans to the same extent as a wing commander or group commander.14
In good wings and groups today, the above practice is followed day in and day out.
This reissued version of the Condensed Analysis, along with other publications being reissued or updated by Air Force organizations, should be read by anyone hoping to understand the doctrine of the U.S. Air Force today. Among the important publications are two works by Dr. Robert Frank Futrell: The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (a reissue) and Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (an updated revision).15 Dr. Michael Gorn and Dr. Charles J. Gross, two air power historians, have referred to the first of these studies as perhaps the best history written on air power in the Korean War, while naming the latter book as the best official history of the development of the U.S. Air Force.l6 Certainly, both books merit our attention, in particular because they consider the problems of developing and employing air power not only at the tactical level but at the strategic and operational levels of war as well.
Certain threads run through the history of air power. Thus, someone reading the wartime diary of RAF Wing Commander Maurice Baring (who served as principal staff officer to General Hugh Trenchard, combat leader of the Royal Air Force in France during World War I) would notice the same general categories of Air Force missions that we list today.17 Reconnaissance and surveillance, counterair, close air support, air interdiction, and strategic offensive and defensive missions were all conducted in World War I. In fact, it was the importance of the Royal Flying Corps a mission of strategic defense, in opposition to a German strategic air offense, that led Jan Christian Smuts, a member of the Imperial War Cabinet and head of a parliamentary commission on home defense, to recommend a separate and coequal air force for Great Britain. All of the missions and specialized tasks of today can be found in World War II also, including the use of space as a combat environment (i.e., the German employment of V-2 strategic missiles).
In history we can also find some of the arguments that continue today. For example, some who read the most recent U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations, believe that the manual says that air power should be made available to the corps commander for his synchronization as a part of his battle.18 This matter is a key issue for officers in all of the services, suggesting a tension between responsive support to individual land and naval force units and the need to employ air forces effectively to meet the overall needs of the theater CINC. In the past, efforts to meet the needs of every unit have resulted in such fragmentation of the air effort (i.e., breaking of air assets into penny packets) that air actions were not effective and our aircraft were, in fact, vulnerable to attack and destruction themselves. Only as professional airmen understand both their doctrine and their history will they be able to handle the tensions properly and make the best use of limited air assets.
Lessons learned in both our distant and our recent past are reflected in our new AFM 1-1. One of the first points that the manual makes is that it is of paramount importance to have the support of the American people when employing U.S. Armed Forces and committing them to a war. This is a lesson learned in our early history and relearned, at great expense, during our involvement in Vietnam. Agreement among, and support from, three distinct groups is required to sustain a successful military policy: the government, the people, and the military. In Vietnam, enemy leaders realized that the American people were deeply divided by the war, and they played upon this division in their war effort. Additionally, it has been said that terrorism was used to undermine congressional support for our policy in Lebanon.
Another of the key points in the first chapter of the new AFM 1-1 is the importance of employing the military forces of the United States with the various services working as coequal members of an interdependent team. No one member of that team can win the war by itself; rather, all must work together. One of the lessons learned in World War II was that our military forces must be employed as an interdependent team of land, naval, and air forces commanded by one commander. This is a lesson that has been often forgotten in military action since 1945. Because of its speed, range, and flexibility, aerospace power in particular (more than land and naval power) must be employed as part of a unified command if it is to achieve its full effectiveness. This principle was not always followed in Korea or in Vietnam. It is a point often missed in many popular and acclaimed histories of World War II. For instance, Russell F. Weigley's Eisenhower's Lieutenants, despite the title, fails to address the majority of Eisenhower's lieutenants.19 Weigley takes the complex combined command structure of the Allies and slices it both horizontally and vertically. With one cut, he separates the land and air wars; with the other, he separates the British and American efforts. However, these cuts are not clean: although Dr. Weigley attempts to push the air effort and British participation into the background, both of these contributions had major effects on the American ground effort in France and Germany.
The concept of a coequal, interdependent relationship among air, land, and naval forces was a lesson learned in the Mediterranean Theater during World War II. In a theater where land and naval forces had equally important but competing demands for air power, the proper control and employment of that air power had to be worked out. The solution was centralized control of air power under a coequal air component commander. Although it was later ignored, this solution was initially applied in Europe also, as the Condensed Analysis describes:
In the campaign in western Europe, where the precision teamwork of the Allied air, ground, and naval forces accomplished battle miracles, the basic military conception that air, land, and sea power are coequal and interdependent was confirmed beyond all reasonable doubt. Interdependence being both strategic and tactical, any arrangement of our armed forces which might prejudice the equality of the three arms would similarly prejudice our success in war.20
Based on this idea, the Condensed Analysis calls for coequal component commanders under a single supreme commander.
There existed a need at theater level for separate, coequal air and ground headquarters, which could closely coordinate their operations but remain independently responsible to the theater commander or the Supreme Commander, as the case might be.
If such operationally coordinated but independent air and ground theater headquarters had been maintained in the ETO [European Theater of Operations), the resultant gain in flexibility of decision and promptness of action by the theater level or air command would have materially aided the Ninth Air Force in the execution of its administrative and operational commitments.21
In both the Korean and Vietnamese wars, we had to relearn these lessons. In Korea, we fought with three separate air forces for a major part of the war. Because of good will, good luck, and air superiority, we did not have any major problems. In Vietnam, not only was control of air power divided between the Vietnamese Air Force and the U.S. forces (Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps), but the U.S. Air Force itself was divided between Vietnamese-based air and Thailand-based fighter air and Strategic Air Command air. Thus, there were six different air forces fighting in Vietnam. Even among U.S. forces, there were not just three components for the theater commander to coordinate but a number of disparate commands, each engaged in its own war. If the air war had started to go against us, this arrangement would have caused us major difficulties.
The problem is further complicated when the theater commander believes that he is in a Position to act as one of the component commanders. This happened in the early days of the Korean War when General Douglas MacArthur elected to run the land war from his own headquarters. Only later, when General Mathew Bunker Ridgway became the United Nations Commander, was a separate land component organized. Writing about the responsibilities of command, Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA (Ret), says: "The primary interest of each such [senior] commander is, and must be, his mission."22 He then states:
The above proposition is of surpassing truth for the senior multiservice/multinational commander, who as will be addressed later, must use to its fullest the moral authority which stems from his complete mission orientation. The proposition however becomes difficult to assess when a multiservice or multinational commander is at the same time the commander of a single-Service or national command (known as "double hatting"). In peacetime, single-Service or national concerns may take up most of the commander's attention, to the detriment of his multiservice/multinational mission.23
Today, there is dual hatting in several locations. In each case, it could be detrimental to our war-fighting capability. One area with dual hatting is Korea, where the senior U.S. commander is the Commander, Combined Forces Command (CFC), the land component commander, and the U.S. theater commander. This is the same arrangement that existed during the beginning days of the Korean War. In Korea today, the problem is complicated by the lack of coequal components: the current peacetime air component commander is a U.S. Air Force three-star general (dual-hatted as Chief of Staff, CFC), while his land component commander equivalent is a U.S. Army four-star general. Military services being what they are, rank speaks--especially when previous assignments have not built up a bond of friendship and understanding. The Condensed Analysis refers to this specific issue in one of its recommendations, "Comparative Rank--Air Forces and Ground Forces," stating:
The air force and its components were at a disadvantage in the European Theater of Operations, because the commanders of air components were of lower rank than the commanders of their associated ground components. Three of the four tactical air commands were commanded (originally) by brigadier generals, while their three associated armies were commanded by lieutenant generals. This disparity extended throughout the TAC-Army staffs as well. Frequently air commanders and their staffs were required to deal with ground officers two grades higher but occupying comparable command and staff positions. This is not intended to imply that air-ground relations were not generally very amiable or that problems were not equitably worked out. However, differences in grade imposed considerable disadvantages on air components dealing with the ground forces.24
The situation in NATO today is similar to that in Korea. The opposite situation exists in Alaska, where the theater commander is also the air component commander and outranks the land component commander by one or two grades. The issue of how many flag-rank officers the military should have is one often raised by those seeking to keep down costs or to return to the grade ratios of earlier years.25 What is not often recognized is the danger of too much emphasis on economy and not enough on the effectiveness of one's command structure.
Even a casual reading shows that certain threads run through air power history. For professional Air Force officers, the problem is the lack of thorough histories that will allow us to learn more about those threads. Increased knowledge would translate into increased fighting effectiveness should war come. Gorn and Gross, in their previously cited article, state:
"Despite its enormous importance and popularity, military aviation has largely been ignored by most American historians."26 The historical basis for study by higher-level commanders and their staffs is sadly deficient. Further, much of what is written as military or aviation history fails to examine the seam between air and land forces. Much writing is service-oriented, examining only the merits of one service. Most of us lack the academic credentials and the available free time to correct this situation, but we must be aware of it when we read history. We must constantly read with a critical eye--to avoid learning the wrong lesson. But we must continue to read.
Air Force doctrine aims to integrate the lessons of air power history with ideas about how to employ the advances in technology not yet tried in battle. We study history to develop a context for doctrine development, we explore the capabilities of new technology, we conduct exercises, and we evaluate the way our units perform. What we learn from these activities must feed into our doctrinal development.
Since there is no best doctrine (only a better one), Air Force doctrine will never be complete or finished. Even though a new AFM 1-1 is on the street, we still have work to do. Some questions of interest to all of us remain unaddressed or unresolved. In a recent article in Air Force Magazine, General Bennie L. Davis stated that we should begin to think in terms of indivisible air power (the same idea is contained in the new AFM 1-1 statement that airpower must be employed as an indivisible entity).27 This is an area where our understanding of our doctrine must be refined. Another broad issue for airmen to examine is theater air warfare. For example, we must consider the problem of apportioning air effort in order to meet the competing requirements of land and naval commanders. In some theaters, such as the Central Region of Allied Command Europe, maritime support requirements are quite minor. However, in the Northern and Southern Regions, demands for maritime support could be substantial, and the issue may well loom large for the theater CINC and the air component commander. As airmen, we need to be thinking through these and other issues not yet resolved.
Professional Air Force officers who hope to command operational units or expect to be on operational staffs should be particularly aware of such matters and should be thinking about the directions that our doctrinal development must take. Air Force officers should not expect Headquarters USAF and major command personnel to do their thinking for them. Neither we on the Air Staff nor we in the Air Force as a whole have a final doctrine--one that we can simply memorize and then apply without judgment a modification. Continuously, commanders and staffs work on issues that could have far-reaching impact upon how we fight and whether or not we win the next war.
One such issue is whether aerospace power will truly be employed as an entity (as "indivisible air power," in the words of General Davis). To some extent, this issue revolves around the authority of the theater air component commander. If, for instance, SAC bombers are introduced into a theater where responsibility for integration into the overall air campaign is given to someone besides the air component commander, that basic unifying concept of aerospace power as an indivisible entity will be lost. If parceling out air power becomes commonplace, it will allow an enemy to defeat our air forces in detail.
Another such issue concerns Marine tactical aviation. The U.S. Marine Corps has worked out and articulated its doctrine for the employment of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as a uniservice force in support of naval objectives. The MAGTF can make a major contribution operating on its own to protect the flank of a major land operation. The Air Force accepts and supports the employment of the MAGTF in such a manner. Where the Air Force differs with the Marine Corps is on the matter of how to handle Marine Tac Air in the unusual circumstance where Marines are fighting as one of several divisions, on line, in sustained operations ashore. This issue has been around since the end of World War II and is often discussed, but resolution is not in sight. Air Force officers must know and understand both the Marine Corps and the Air Force positions on employment of the MAGTF, so that they can act knowledgeably and responsibly when in a position to deal with this question.
Another doctrinal debate, which has surfaced only recently, is about the term operational level of war--a relatively new term in this country. Up until now, it has been used to describe Army operations and, in fact, has been adopted by the U.S. Army. However, there is much confusion as to what the term means. As used in FM 100-5, it appears to represent a level of war between the theater strategic and the tactical levels, Thus, division operations and below would be considered tactical; corps, field army, and army group would represent the operational level of war; and actions guided by the theater commander and land component commander would represent the theater strategic level. This view is not universally accepted. Some would argue that there is no strategic level within a theater.28 In another view, military analyst Edward N. Luttwak states that the operational level is optional and is used when a military force is numerically outnumbered. He sees the operational level as a creative action that involves taking risks in order to win. He suggests that within the European Theater in World War II the Allies operated only at the strategic and tactical levels. However, he would credit General MacArthur with fighting at all three levels of war in the Southwest Pacific, as well as in Korea.29 We in the Air Force need to ask ourselves if the operational level of war has any meaning for us. If it does, we need to begin thinking about it and incorporating it in our doctrine.
An additional area where doctrine needs more attention is the space environment. The present AFM 1-6, which is currently under revision, states that all air force missions can be performed or supported from space.30 It also notes that government policies preclude the conduct of some air force missions in space. Furthermore, other missions may not even be considered in the context of space, since, at this time, they can be performed effectively without going into space. An example is close air support (although even this type of mission may receive some support from space, such as that provided by space-based navigation or communications systems).
EFFECTIVE doctrine should be neither as solid as granite nor as shifting as the sands of the desert. Rather, it must be reflective of past lessons learned, yet open to refinement and growth. Professional Air Force officers throughout our service should be contributing to the process of refinement and growth through their study, discussion, and writing. The ideas of Air Force officers should be surfacing in discussions at work, around the bar, and in the pages of our professional journals. Furthermore, the Hq Air Force Doctrine and Concepts Division welcomes any suggestions.31 Not every new idea is adopted, but each one is welcomed and considered carefully.
Air Force doctrine belongs to all of us. We must study to understand it thoroughly, but we must do more than that. As professional Air Force officers, we must help to shape and enhance it to meet the challenges of tomorrow.
Headquarters USAF
Notes
1. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 1984).
2. The Condensed Analysis was originally published in March 1946 by the Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2, Washington, D.C. In 1984, it was reissued by the Chief of Air Force History, Bolling AFB, D.C.
3. FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power (Washington: War Department, 21 July 1943). This short Field Manual is reprinted in Air Superiority in World War II and Korea, edited by Dr. Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan and published by the Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C., in 1983 as part of its Project Warrior Studies.
4. FM 100-1, The Army, is currently under revision. It is expected that lessons learned about the relationship between the Army and the nation and the concept of three levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactics) will be incorporated in the new edition.
5. NWP 1. Strategic Concepts for the U.S. Navy (Rev A), May 1978. Because of the way the U.S. Navy organizes, trains, and equips, its doctrinal development is quite different from that of the U.S. Army or the U.S. Air Force. Considearable authority is given to both CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT in the development of doctrine and, in fact, much doctrinal development is assigned to one or the other or to commanders reporting to one or the other.
6. Currently, DOD Directive 5100.1 is addressed in AFR 55-18, Functions of the DOD and Its Major Components. This AFR will be superseded by AFM 14, Missions and Functions of the U.S. Air Force, which addresses the functions of the Air Force, both primary and collateral, and their relationship to Air Force missions. The new manual should be distributed by the end of 1984.
7. AFM 1-1, p. 3-3.
8. AFM 1-6, Military Space Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 15 October 1982), p. 8.
9. AFM 1-1, p. 3-6.
10. Bernard B. Fall, Street without Joy (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole, 1964); and Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979).
11. Arthur WilliamTedder, With Prejudice: The Way Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); and Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, editors, The Army Air Forces in World War II, 7 volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948-1958).
12. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA, On Strategy A Critical Analysis of the Vietanam War (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1982).
13. Condensed Analysis, p. 130.
14. Ibid., p. 141.
15. Dr. Robert F. Futtell's The United States AirForce in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983) was originally published in New York by Duell, Sloan and Pearce in 1961. His Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine:A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1984) was originally published by Air University Press in 1971.
16. Dr. Michael Gorn and Dr. Charles J. Gross, "Published Air Force History: Still on the Runway," Aerospace Historian, March 1984, pp. 30-37.
17. Wing Commander Maurice Baring, RAF, Flying Corps Headquarters 1914-1918 (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1968). First published in 1920 by G. Bell and Sons.
18. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, 20 August 1982.
19. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1981).
20. Condensed Analysis, p. 1.
21. Ibid., p. 96.
22. Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA(Ret), Organization and Operational Employment of Air/Land Forces (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1984), p. 2-2.
23. Ibid.
24. Condensed Analysis, p. 98.
25. Tnomas Lawson, Office Inflation: Its Cost to the Taxpayer and Military Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Project on Military Procurement, June 1982, pp. 10-11.
26. Gorn, p. 30.
27. General Bennie L. Davis, "Indivisible Airpower," Air Force Magazine, March 1984, p. 46.
28. See, for example, AirLand Battle 2000 (1982 Version with Functional Areas) (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Headquarters TRADOC, 10 August 1982), pp. 9-10.
29. Edward N. Luttwak, Interview with author et al., Spring 1984.
30. AFM 1-6, p. 8.
31. The mailing address of Hq Air Force Doctrine and Concepts Division is: Hq USAF/XOXID, Washington, D.C. 20330.
Contributor
Col Clifford R. Krieger (USAFA; M.A., University of Southern California) is Chief, Doctrine and Concepts Division, Hq USAF. His previous assignments have included Thirteenth Air Force, Hq AIRSOUTH, Naples Italy, and F-4 tour in Thailand, Germany, and Vietnam.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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