Air University Review, November-December 1984

Mission Critical:
The Junior Officer-Senior Noncomissioned Officer Relationship

MANY officers assigned to the rated supplement after the Vietnam drawdown came face to face with a completely unfamiliar figure--the senior noncommissioned officer. As fighter pilots, bomber navigators, and others fanned out into various support fields, they were unprepared to cope with new challenges in leadership and management posed by their relationship with senior enlisted people. These sergeants had been leaders and managers for twenty years and were fifteen or more years older than the officers. Pilots and navigators who had worked with crews that included enlisted members began to realize that clear lines of command observed on large aircraft were a bit more hazy in the field. Rated people who had not worked with large crews had virtually no relevant experience. Today, young lieutenants, fresh from the Air Force Academy, Officer Training School, and Reserve Officer Training Corps, face an even tougher challenge when they take over sections without the benefit of experience or the credibility that comes from having served as a flight crew member.

With few exceptions, the junior officer-senior noncommissioned officer relationship is fundamental to the effective performance of Air Force units. In many activities--maintenance, supply, security police, finance, or any other support function--if these two people do not function effectively together, leadership and management of the unit, as well as the mission, suffer. Yet in many cases, the relationship does not work well.

Because of the disparity in age and experience, young officers and older superintendents are less likely to work well together than individuals of about the same age and with similar backgrounds. Certainly, it is not surprising that an NCO with twenty years of service might view with jaundiced eye a new boss almost young enough to be a son or daughter. Thus, the system of assigning two mismatched individuals to work together may itself be a root cause of the problem.

The difficulties arising from the age-experience gap are further intensified when the newly commissioned lieutenant is inadequately prepared to assume a position of leadership. This lack of preparedness seems to stem from three sources: poorly timed training in leadership and management, little or no experience in the work area, and inadequate involvement of officer supervisors or commanders.

Two surveys conducted from October to December 1983, plus interviews conducted by management specialists at the Leadership and Management Development Center during the same period, point to these three areas as difficulties. One survey, administered at three separate U.S. Air Force bases, was addressed to lieutenants who had master sergeants or higher working directly for them as noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs). The other survey, administered at the Senior NCO Academy, sought information from noncommissioned officers who either worked for lieutenants in their current jobs or had worked for lieutenants at some point since they attained the rank of master sergeant.

How does the Air Force train lieutenants to assume these positions that are so critical to mission accomplishment? What roles do typical lieutenants and senior noncommissioned officers perceive as proper for each other in the officer-NCO management team? Answers to these and other questions were at least in part revealed by the surveys and the interviews. The specific results themselves are interesting, but the more important general message that emerges is that these mission-critical teams walk a fine line between success and failure. The question is, how do we broaden that line?

Officer Preparedness

Young officers without prior civilian work experience have five avenues, for professional preparation prior to taking charge of units or sections: commissioning sources (Reserve Officer Training Corps, U.S. Air Force Academy, and Officer Training School); technical schools; professional military education; prior enlisted service; and direct advice from immediate supervisors or commanders. The first three sources present formal programs that offer varying degrees of preparation. Their major drawback is the period between the officer's exposure to training and his or her initial assumption of a position of responsibility. Regarding the latter two sources of preparation, direct advice from immediate officer supervisors and commanders offers considerable potential for helping the new lieutenant, while prior enlisted experience has some positive value but also some drawbacks.

All three sources of commissions offer leadership and management training in different formats, but they share common problems of timing. First, the officer candidate is relatively immature when he or she receives the training. Second, too much time elapses between the receipt of the training and his or her first duty assignment. Curricula vary from program to program, but the basic content is similar in the sense that it includes case studies of management situations in the field, some exposure to experienced enlisted supervisors, and generalized leadership training.

A major disadvantage of the ROTC program is that it is administered in hundreds of colleges and universities in courses of varying length. Although the program provides a standardized curriculum and the instructor corps includes officers as well as enlisted personnel who may provide excellent insights, the course materials are subject to as many interpretations as there are schools and instructors.

The Air Force Academy and the Officer Training School do not have a problem of standardization, but they have other unique problems in the area of leadership and management training. The academy has initiated a reinforced leadership program that emphasizes practical application within the cadet wing, but the military environment is somewhat artificial in the sense that future officers have only limited contacts with enlisted personnel, particularly in a supervisory relationship. The somewhat harsh leadership techniques used in dealing with underclassman who are essentially the same age may have a negative effect if new lieutenants attempt to transpose them directly to the field where older subordinates may tend to be somewhat less subservient.

Officer Training School offers two advantages over its two counterparts: the training is compressed into a period immediately preceding commissioning, and "ninety-day wonders" are normally exposed during training to prior enlisted people who are being commissioned. However, the condensed curriculum and the attendant "fire hose" approach to instruction works against the program.

In the final analysis, commissioning programs are sound in their approach to leadership and management development, but they should be viewed only as orientation programs in this area.

Prior to assuming supervisory responsibilities in any operational unit, most young officers are required to attend some sort of specialized training at one of several training centers or other locations. These centers emphasize technical aspects of the various career fields--operating procedures, pertinent regulations, and exposure to relevant equipment. But they provide only limited exposure to leadership and management training.

From the standpoint of the lieutenant's performance vis-à-vis the senior NCO, the primary advantage of technical schools is the fact that officers normally attend them immediately prior to assuming duties as section chiefs. At present, providing effective leadership and management training is not a primary goal of technical schools. Nevertheless, the timing of this training makes these schools a logical place for further preparation of young officers to assume their leadership roles. On the other hand, since lieutenants have not yet operated in a unit environment and do not understand the practical aspects of their jobs, training efforts based on abstract leadership principles may be of doubtful value.

Squadron Officer School and the Lieutenants Professional Development Program of the Leadership and Management Development Center (LMDC) are essentially the only sources of leadership and management training available to junior company grade officers. Most other professional development courses are designed as supplementary programs and assume some degree of practical experience prior to attendance.

Squadron Officer School offers excellent instruction in a seminar format taught by people who specialize in leadership and management, and the curriculum includes lessons on relations with NCOs that are taught by noncommissioned officers from the Senior NCO Academy. This training is valuable as officers move through their careers, but it comes too late to help the new lieutenant who is becoming a section chief, since most officers do not attend Squadron Officer School until they have at least two years of commissioned service. Although Squadron Officer School offers an excellent correspondence program that is almost immediately available, many educators agree that correspondence programs are not as effective as resident programs.

The Lieutenants Professional Development Program, offered by LMDC since mid-1979, provides tailored instruction in the areas of officership, leadership, and management to lieutenants with less than two years of commissioned service. LMDC consultants employ a combination of lectures, seminars, and question-and-answer periods aimed at translating leadership and management theory to real-life situations. Although this course aims to fill the vacuum left by other programs, at least in focus and content, its effects on Air Force lieutenants are somewhat limited, as it is currently offered by an LMDC traveling team only when requested by an installation commander. Thus, the program may be offered at some installations only every few years and at other installations never at all. LMDC is not currently manned to offer the program on a regular basis either in the field or as a resident program at Air University, but LMDC consultants agree that proper application of the program could reduce the difficulties faced by young, inexperienced officers in the early phases of their first assignments.

Complete figures are not available for prior-enlisted members commissioned and serving in officer-in-charge (OIC) positions, but the limited survey results show that approximately half of all lieutenants mentioned in either survey who supervise senior enlisted people have spent some time as enlisted members. If this high percentage of prior-enlisted lieutenants represents an Air Force-wide trend, the officer force in the support fields may be assuming a new complexion. Officers who have enlisted experience in their officer specialty will have an advantage over their peers where technical expertise is concerned. Most prior-enlisted officers will also have an age advantage over nonprior-service officers, and their greater age should give them an advantage in their relations with enlisted superintendents. But even though they may enter the officer corps with a certain built-in credibility, enlisted experience at the working level does not necessarily make them better leaders and managers.

Management specialists at LMDC state that officers with enlisted experience are more likely to be effective in OIC positions if they had advanced to the supervisory level prior to commissioning. Otherwise, younger prior-enlisted officers may identify with enlisted members of the same age and may be unable to maintain appropriate separation from young enlisted personnel on the job or during off-duty hours. This situation, of course, complicates relations with senior noncommissioned officers. Others, regardless of the length of their prior service, may assume that they now know everything about the job and are insufferable.

In spite of these potential problems, many officers with prior enlisted time serve effectively in leadership positions initially too difficult for less-experienced officers. However, there will never be enough prior-enlisted officers to fill all of the demanding positions; and, even if there were sufficient numbers of these officers, manning the support fields in this manner would create difficulties in the force structure.

on-the-job guidance by supervisors

Seventy-three percent of all lieutenants responding to the survey indicated that they receive little or no advice from their immediate supervisors or commanders concerning relations with their enlisted superintendents. Lieutenants responded far more negatively in this area than about the adequacy of their leadership and management training prior to assuming their current positions. Thus, one may conclude that although supervisors' or commanders' assistance to young officers assuming critical positions in their units could be a major contributing factor in leadership development, the Air Force has achieved relatively few leadership benefits from this source.

Management consultants at LMDC support this premise. Most of them suggest that senior NCOs are responsible for a certain amount of the training of their young OICs, but that higher-ranking officers in the unit must provide the basis for this on-the-job training. These officers usually have more experience, perhaps in similar situations, and could offer a great deal of practical advice to their new lieutenants.

Commanders and officer supervisors who do not properly guide their lieutenants may create problems in several ways. Supervisors concerned only with results may not care how sections are run, so long as the mission is accomplished. Some may ignore their lieutenants and deal directly with their more experienced noncommissioned officers in charge, thereby undermining the chain of command and the authority of the lieutenant. Still others may direct their young officers to stay in the shadows and allow enlisted supervisors to run the sections.

Experienced officer supervisors who take the time and effort can do much to enhance leadership qualities in younger Air Force officers and to promote effective organizational relationships. They can prevent or solve numerous problems if they help these young officers get started on the right foot, monitor their progress, and nudge them in the right direction as the need arises.

Leadership and Management
Environment on the Job

What leadership and management styles are available to newly commissioned lieutenants as they enter their first job? What are the perceptions of senior noncommissioned officers concerning the proper role for these young officers?

While the critical relationship between a junior officer in charge and his or her senior enlisted superintendent may be less than optimal in part because of the officer's lack of preparation, many senior sergeants appear to reject the efforts of young OICs subconsciously--this, despite the fact that outwardly they seem to go to great lengths to train and help these officers. Almost 70 percent of those who completed the NCO survey gave a strong, positive response when asked whether they could run their sections just as well without their officers in charge. These NCOs were probably still very helpful and supportive of the officers. More than 90 percent of the lieutenants who were surveyed indicated that noncommissioned officers in charge were helpful in introducing them to their first jobs. Such apparently incongruous statistics should not be surprising: mature and experienced supervisors are expected to overcome resentment, or at least not to display it, and to give the benefit of their experience to their units. On the other hand, experienced supervisors often harbor some inner resentment against people at higher levels with less experience. This difficult backdrop of emotions is the typical environment facing young lieutenants as they attempt to establish their positions.

Most lieutenants, at least initially, adopt one of two management styles. Some, recognizing inadequacies in their managerial skills and technical knowledge, approach the job with attitudes of timidity. Others assume, or attempt to assume, more authority than their knowledge warrants. Obviously, the ideal style lies somewhere between these extremes; but finding this happy medium is an achievement beyond the capabilities of many young officers.

I encountered an example of each extreme upon entering my new career field under the rated supplement program. Both individuals were male second lieutenants; both arrived on station at approximately the same time; both had essentially the same levels and types of jobs; and both had chief master sergeants working for them as their superintendents. One individual had a weak personality and could command little or no respect; the other was a young, intelligent, hard-charging officer with considerable leadership potential and an infectious manner. Both were utter failures. The officer with the weak personality was doomed from the start; the other showed possibilities but brought on his own failure. Most lieutenants, of course, do not exhibit such personality extremes, but these two examples illustrate management styles at the two ends of the management spectrum.

The timid lieutenant subjugated himself to the chief and abdicated control of the section to him. He made no real effort to resolve the problems of the unit, and he kept shorter hours than anyone else. He even allowed the chief to move his desk to the center of the office--the obvious position of power--and pushed his own desk against the wall near the door as if he were a receptionist. The lieutenant quickly became the laughing stock of the office. The chief who initially supported the lieutenant in the face of disrespect from enlisted personnel, soon withdrew the support and began to mock the lieutenant along with the other enlisted men. Once the chief withdrew his support from the lieutenant, the lieutenant's fate was sealed; he could not overcome enlisted perceptions of him as a person lacking leadership abilities.

The other lieutenant considered himself so effective in working with people that he depended solely on his human relations skills and disregarded the requirement for technical competence. After assuming control, he let it be known almost immediately that he, not the chief, was the decision maker and that he was not concerned with a team effort. He assigned the performance of menial tasks to the chief, attended meetings alone, committed his unit to unreasonable or impossible actions, and made technical decisions based on insufficient information. The unit, from the chief on down, dropped any residual support for the lieutenant. Productivity in the section declined.

Many young officers in charge should and do cast themselves intentionally more in the role of the timid lieutenant, but they follow a more balanced approach. They recognize, at least initially, that they lack experience and that their leadership and management skills are untried. If such officers later assume the role of principal decision maker for their sections, this status should be based on proven ability and not on ex officio power.

Lieutenants responding to the survey were divided in describing their management styles. More than half (56 percent) indicated that they take broad views of mission requirements and leave technical operation of their units to noncommissioned officers. Twenty-six percent stated that they allow their superintendents to direct day-to-day operations but they expect to be kept informed. Only a small percentage (7.4 percent) stated that they make all of the decisions. Other responses were mixed.

Interestingly enough, enlisted responses to essentially the same question were almost exactly the opposite. Fifty-five percent of the sergeants stated that they direct day-to-day operations, and only 26 percent reported a partnership of equals. But contrasting perceptions are not necessarily indicative of a problem. Perceptions of leadership and management are the same as reality, at least to the individual concerned. Thus, if individuals are satisfied with their perceived roles, they will act out those roles, and, in many cases, their perceptions become reality. But this line of reasoning can be faulty if an individual's perception is based on insensitivity to his or her surroundings, as was the case with the hard-charging authoritarian lieutenant.

Regardless of a lieutenant's position or perceived position in the continuum from minimum involvement to autocratic control, the officer must be in charge and must have some measure of authority in the section. Management experts vary in their opinions concerning initial efforts by officers to establish themselves as the heads of their sections. But they agree without exception that enlisted superintendents must be the primary trainers for officers in charge, particularly if the officers are not prepared for their jobs.

Most experts agree that a solution to problems in the lieutenant-NCO relationship begins with thorough coaching of new officers by other officers in the unit. These veteran officers should explain to new lieutenants such things as potential pitfalls and areas of major concern. They should also present their impressions of the personalities of the people whom a new officer will supervise--especially the NCOIC. New officers in charge should then be candid with the NCO superintendent about their experience and expertise (or the lack of these), asking for cooperative help. At the same time, new officers should insist on an organizational role in which their responsibility increases as they acquire additional knowledge of operations. These officers should then work to master the details of operations as quickly as possible, taking care to preserve their officer status and to avoid becoming tied slavishly to the NCO's superior technical knowledge.

On the other hand, enlisted superintendents can overtrain officers to the point that the officers develop the styles and attitudes of enlisted individuals. Although many sergeants are outstanding managers, there should be subtle differences in the management styles of officers and noncommissioned officers. Officers should be concerned with fitting the production of their section into the mission plans of their parent units. Noncommissioned officers should have similar goals, but they should perhaps be more concerned with the production process itself. This is the essence of the relationship between officers and their enlisted superintendents.

This issue of mission orientation was addressed in the surveys; the results on this question are interesting. When asked whether they would take courses of action that would have the most benefit for their sections or for parent organizations if they were given a choice on specific issues, enlisted members indicated overwhelmingly that they would act in favor of their parent organizations (i.e., they were mission-oriented). The lieutenants, however, tended to have the opposite perception of sergeants' reactions: they stated that superintendents would usually act more parochially and be less concerned with the mission. What these data seem to indicate is that both the commissioned officer and the NCO would act in favor of the mission if he or she were running the section alone. But where both individuals are present, the officer may feel that the OIC is the one who must adjudicate between mission demands made by higher-level supervisors and demands related to section welfare that are represented by the NCOIC. Depending on how the NCOIC presents the section needs, the lieutenant may or may not feel that the NCOIC is supporting the lieutenant's efforts to meet mission requirements. Whether or not the officer's perceptions are accurate, the responsibility for a distasteful decision--placing mission above section--should fall on the officer.

One final hazard for developing officers is the pitfall of relying on social contacts or close friendships with superintendents as a route to success in the leadership and management business. Effective NCOs neither expect nor really want the team to operate in such a manner. Officers limit their options severely if they take this route; a sound relationship on the job should be built on appropriate mutual respect.

Some lieutenants find it difficult to navigate this maze of emotions, perceptions, and training; and many of these are driven off course to the detriment of their units. Management experts agree that production is almost always better when the members of an OIC-NCOIC team work together. Perceptions from the survey confirm this fact, but specific correlations are difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, most sources agree that a single manager is probably better than a two-member management team hindered by the ineptitude of one member.

Should the Air Force make major changes in its traditional policy of assigning young officers with senior noncommissioned officers? Some senior enlisted members (based on survey results and interviews) actually would prefer more situations in which noncommissioned officers are single managers much like warrant officers in the former Air Force management system. But this approach would hinder the development of officers for future management positions. As mentioned earlier, raising the percentage of prior-enlisted officers in the support fields would help to solve the problem of inexperienced lieutenants, but it would also undermine Air Force efforts to develop each officer generation so that its members have twenty to thirty years of potential service. Furthermore, the effectiveness of prior-enlisted officers is questionable in some circumstances.

Consultants at the Leadership and Management Development Center suggest varied approaches in establishing training programs for newly commissioned lieutenants. One approach involves assigning them to sections as OICs or as their assistants for periods of six months to learn the business. On completion of this initial assignment, they would be reassigned to other sections, where they could begin anew without the stigma that frequently is associated with lieutenants because of their lack of experience and job knowledge. Another approach would take the form of a civilian management training program in which they become immersed in the technical aspects of their jobs and perform all appropriate tasks prior to assuming any supervisory or management position. Both of the suggested programs would put officers for some period of time in somewhat untenable positions within units, particularly if they encounter difficulties during training periods.

If one assumes that no major changes can be made in the system of assigning junior officers with senior noncommissioned officers, what avenues of improvement are available within the system? The simplest approach--more direct supervisory mentoring--will not require a change in policy. Lieutenants included in the survey are eager for such assistance, and they currently have no other method of obtaining the timely advice needed for supervising particular sections and personalities. Senior officer supervisors could even go so far as to schedule formal training sessions or programs and draw on the experience of other senior officers in the unit. In addition to providing direct assistance to younger officers, officer supervisors and commanders with an appreciation for lieutenants' problems are likely to experience growth in their own management philosophy and style, thereby achieving a sound basis for more consistent, ongoing support of all of their subordinate sections.

A more far-reaching proposal is to establish the Lieutenants Professional Development Seminar as a one-week resident course offered at frequent intervals. New lieutenants could be required to attend the training immediately before assuming their first supervisory positions. This course, as currently presented, offers valuable training but lacks timely application. A resident program of this sort should be administered by LMDC, where the expertise lies, but its implementation would require additional facilities and manning.

The problem of poor officer-enlisted relations is not new, but it has been overshadowed in many quarters recently by discussions of leadership versus management that tend to focus almost exclusively on the officer corps. To the extent that these discussions apply to the roles of officers in an increasingly bureaucratic (and less combat-oriented) Air Force, they may have some value. However, today's Air Force still needs a focused effort on ensuring that officer-enlisted teams are equal to the challenges before them. The mission of the Air Force requires that an aircraft maintenance unit be able to produce sorties for the next Grenada and that a security police flight be able to protect critical nuclear assets. These sections and others must be able to accomplish their missions not six months from now but all of the time. There is very little room for mismatched teams of officers and noncommissioned officers ill-prepared for carrying out their jobs. More timely training may help to resolve some potential problems, but senior officers must recognize their professional obligations to act as mentors to their younger officers both before and after these new team leaders assume their jobs. The mission depends on properly functioning units, not units that spend valuable time simply analyzing and debating leadership theory.

Major Richard H. Estes (B.A., North Carolina Methodist College; M.A., University of South Carolina) is assigned to Tactical Division, DCS Plans and Operations, Hq USAF. His previous tours include assignments in maintenance and munitions at Pease AFB, New Hampshire, and Kunsan Air Base, Korea. He has flown the F-15 and served as a T-38 instructor pilot. Major Estes is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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