Air University Review, November-December 1984

The Emerging BMD Debate:
Déjà Vu or Not?

THE American people are on the verge of another debate on ballistic missile defense (BMD). There are several possible explanations for renewed interest in BMD, but the underlying reason seems to stem from the perceived change in context since the question of Safeguard deployment was argued in the late sixties. Because it is possible, if not probable, that the same major issues that dominated the first debate will also provide the framework for the emerging one, defense analysts must decide at the outset whether the change in context is perceptual or real. Would a new debate on ballistic missile defense be déjà vu, or are there indeed sufficient contextual changes to make renewed arguing meaningful and fruitful?

On Thursday, 6 March 1969, the Senate Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations began to hear testimony on the implications of deploying the Safeguard system. Selected for deployment by the Nixon administration, the system represented more than thirteen years of research and development and proposals for deployment.

A BMD program had been first presented to Congress in 1955, and by 1958 the Nike-Zeus system was in full-scale development. Nike-Zeus was a high-altitude interceptor equipped with a nuclear warhead and controlled by ground-based mechanically steered radars. During 1959 and 1960, considerable sentiment favoring deployment grew in Congress, but the Eisenhower administration rejected deployment in favor of more research and development. Finally, in 1963, the Nike-Zeus system was abandoned because it could not cope with the Soviet threat envisioned for the late sixties.

After the demise of Nike-Zeus, a new and improved system, dubbed Nike-X, was entered into research and development. Unlike Nike-Zeus, which employed only a high-altitude interceptor, Nike-X represented an attempt to develop a BMD system that could provide defense-in-depth for population. Nike-X would use two interceptors. The long-range Spartan's mission would be nationwide area defense. The short-range, high-speed Sprint, on the other hand, would be deployed for terminal defense of major cities. Both interceptors would be controlled by new phased-array radars reflecting a significant technological advance beyond the mechanically steered radars of Nike-Zeus.

President Johnson's announcement to Congress on 24 January 1967 may have been the turning point in the path the United States seemed to be following. The President had decided to continue intense research and development but not to deploy a BMD system. The historically more significant announcement, however, was the initiation of arms control discussions with the Soviet Union. Of course, the administration left open the option to reconsider BMD deployment if these fledgling discussions should fail to bear fruit.¹

In a speech before a group of United Press International editors in San Francisco later that year, then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara promulgated a doctrinal pronouncement that has guided and constrained the nuclear deterrent strategy of the United States even to the present. McNamara's main purpose may have been to announce the administration's decision to deploy a thin Chinese-oriented BMD system. But when questioned about the Soviet threat, his remarks also reflected a major doctrinal shift.

Many analysts of nuclear strategy accepted McNamara's remarks during that speech as the official pronouncement of the nuclear deterrent doctrine known as mutual assured destruction or MAD. (Actually, the genesis of MAD occurred much earlier. MAD as a concept was presented in writings of Bernard Brodie as early as 1946.) Specifically, McNamara claimed that "assured destruction" was the "very essence of the . . . deterrence concept." Furthermore, he believed that the strategic nuclear capabilities of the two superpowers had grown to the point that the United States and the Soviet Union could deter each other (thus, mutual assured destruction).²

When questioned about arms control negotiations, McNamara asserted that, as a result of what he called an "action-reaction phenomenon," both sides had force levels exceeding requirements of a credible second-strike capability. He viewed this action-reaction phenomenon as the "intrinsic dynamics of the arms race" observable in the way U.S. planning had influenced Soviet planning and vice versa. His conclusion was that an arms limitation accord was preferable to an unceasing arms race because such an accord would arrest the dynamism of the arms race.³

McNamara hoped that BMD deployments could be limited under the provisions of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. But if SALT success failed to materialize, he believed the proper U.S. response to massive BMD deployments by the Soviets was to increase offensive capability rather than trying to match the Soviets defensively. McNamara argued against a thick Soviet-oriented BMD system on two grounds: first, that such a system would be technically imperfect and penetrable, and second, that the Soviets would probably respond with more offensive deployments (the action-reaction phenomenon).⁴

In view of McNamara's description of the action-reaction phenomenon and his arguments against deployment of a thick BMD system in response to the Soviet threat, one must wonder why the Johnson administration opted for a thin system against a nonexistent Chinese threat. The Chinese-oriented Sentinel system was essentially a fallback position. The administration surmised that should BMD deployment be forced upon it eventually by circumstances, this deployment would reflect at least some degree of prescience and prudence. In addition, a thin defensive system, coincidentally providing some very limited defense of the Minuteman force, would fulfill at least a common part of the various deployment schemes advanced by ballistic missile defense proponents. The primary objectives of the administration were to prevent large-scale BMD deployment that could be construed as provocative by the Soviets and, at the same time, to provide a hedge against defeat of continued funding for research and development in lieu of production and deployment.

The Sentinel system was the product of the Nike-X research and development efforts. Sentinel would have applied both area-defense and terminal-defense concepts. Area defense, using the long-range Spartan missile with a multimegaton nuclear warhead, would have involved midcourse detection and tracking of incoming objects and interception exoatmospherically. Terminal defense would have taken place endoatmospherically when, after sorting from chaff and decoys, sprint missiles would intercept reentry vehicles (RVs) and kill them either by the air blast or by penetrating neutrons emitted by Sprint's nuclear kill mechanism. Target acquisition, initial tracking, and trajectory prediction would have been the functions of perimeter acquisition radars (PARs), while missile site radars (MSRs) would have provided shorter-range tracking and interceptor guidance.

The Chinese-oriented Sentinel system would have included seventeen sites--fifteen in the continental United States (CONUS) and one each in Alaska and Hawaii. Each site would have had its own MSR, and six PARs would have been deployed along the northern tier of the CONUS. Sprint missiles were to be deployed to the Hawaii site and each PAR for terminal defense of the radar itself. All other sites were to be equipped with the Spartan interceptor.

The year 1968 saw continuation of the Johnson administration's effort to stimulate SALT negotiations for both offensive and defensive weapon systems. On the domestic front, the administration struggled to evade competing pressures regarding BMD deployment. From one end of the continuum came pressure to move beyond the limited Sentinel deployment to a full-scale, Soviet-oriented system; the other end was represented by an emerging congressional movement to cut BMD funding.

Nixon's victory in the fall of 1968 set the stage for review of Johnson's positions on foreign affairs and defense issues. On 14 March 1969, President Nixon identified several perceived deficiencies in the Sentinel system and announced a replacement system, Safeguard. Perhaps the most significant criticism levied by Nixon against Sentinel was that it was too heavily Chinese-oriented. Three specific examples were offered to support his position. First, the north-facing perimeter acquisition radars provided no coverage of sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) trajectories. Second, many missile site radars lacked terminal defense. Third, no Sprints were provided specifically for defense of Minuteman.⁵ To place Nixon's criticism in perspective, one should recall that during this period the perceived Soviet threat to land-based U.S. forces was growing more rapidly than forecast, while the converse was true for the Chinese threat.

The Nixon administration also criticized deployment of ten of the fifteen CONUS sites in or near major metropolitan areas. For one thing, there were indications that Spartan's multimegaton nuclear warhead had generated some public alarm. Additionally and probably more important, the administration believed that the Soviets could perceive deployment in or near cities as a threat to their deterrent. This belief was based on the MAD premise that maintenance of a stable deterrent balance required each side to offer its industrial and population centers as "hostage" to the assured destruction threat. Finally, Sentinel's fixed, predetermined deployment schedule disturbed the administration because it lacked the flexibility for periodic reassessment of the need to continue a step-by-step deployment.

President Nixon concluded that the concepts on which Sentinel had been based should be modified substantially, that the United States should proceed with a new system (Safeguard) in a carefully phased program, and that the new program should be reviewed annually in view of new technology, the threat, and SALT developments. Nixon believed that it was impossible to protect population from a determined Soviet attack (even with a thick system that could be unnecessarily provocative) but that a thin, expandable system could strengthen the U.S. deterrent without threatening the Soviet deterrent if it were deployed in defense of nuclear retaliatory forces rather than cities.

Safeguard's objectives were threefold. First, Safeguard would be deployed to protect land-based retaliatory forces, particularly the Minuteman force, against direct Soviet attack. This was the overriding objective. Second, the new system would defend population centers against the anticipated Chinese threat. And, third, Safeguard would protect the country from an accidental attack from any source.

Safeguard was to be deployed at twelve sites. Seven perimeter acquisition radars with eleven faces were planned. Six of these faces would be seaward to cover the SLBM threat to bomber bases. Although somewhat fewer Spartan interceptors were planned, twice as many Sprints would be deployed, primarily for terminal defense of Minuteman. All Safeguard components would be located away from major cities but still would provide sufficient area defense capability to deal with the Chinese threat. Finally, deployment would be implemented in phases and related to actual threat development. Phase 1, for example, would include only the sites near Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, and Malmstrom AFB, Montana.

This, then, was the immediate background of the congressional debates in 1969. The U.S. nuclear strategy of assured destruction required secure second-strike-capable forces. Stability of the condition of mutual deterrence was seen as desirable. And, finally, an asymmetry in need of redressing jeopardized both of these goals. Déjà vu? An answer to that question requires a much closer look at the arguments presented to Congress by BMD proponents and opponents. Their testimony concentrated on four issues: system effectiveness, effects on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, effects on arms control negotiations, and the impact on deterrence.

One particularly articulate witness before Congress rather bluntly summarized his opposition to Safeguard when he labeled it "a prime example of a weapon system that will at best do very little good; most likely accelerate the arms race; and, either way, waste large sums of money." His opposition was based on his judgment that Safeguard could not be made to function reliably, that it could be easily overwhelmed, that it was not needed to protect deterrent forces, and that it would ultimately reduce U.S. security, complicate the arms race, and make arms control more difficult.⁶

President Nixon's announcement of his decision to deploy Safeguard perhaps best summarizes the pro position. Proponents agreed with Nixon's assertion that active defense of U.S. retaliatory forces was needed to protect against the projected Soviet ICBM and SLBM threat. They perceived that an increase in U.S. offensive forces would threaten the Soviets and thus stimulate a more intense offense-offense arms race. Safeguard, they argued, would merely secure the U.S. deterrent and would not affect the Soviets' deterrent. Furthermore, BMD deployment would not impede but might actually help the SALT talks for two reasons: it would restore the mutuality of deterrence, and phased deployment would permit agreements limiting the potential for an accelerated offense-defense arms race.⁷

Obviously, proponents of Safeguard believed that the system would be capable of performing its assigned missions, but opponents were not convinced. Many saw a mismatch of mission and capability. They argued that Safeguard had been designed more for thin area defense than for terminal defense of Minuteman. The radars were vulnerable to direct attack. The system would be easy to overwhelm because of its limited radar-tracking capacity, the limited data-handling capacity of computers, and the relatively small finite number of interceptors. The Soviets could penetrate Safeguard easily with penetration aids and eventually with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Additionally, opponents were concerned that a high-altitude nuclear detonation (perhaps even by U.S. Spartans) could degrade the system by creating a radar "black out."

Although there were two opposing schools of thought on the implications of Safeguard deployment for the strategic balance (or arms race), there was substantial agreement in the late sixties about the state of that strategic balance. By the middle of the decade, U.S. observers generally believed that a tenuous stability had emerged. The arms race had evolved into a strategic balance or plateau. That arms race had been characterized as repeated and reciprocal new deployments by both sides--an action-reaction cycle--as each side sought to achieve temporary advantage, to redress a vulnerability, or to blunt an anticipated escalatory move by the other side. The strategic balance perceived by the United States was not a symmetry of deliverable warheads or megatonnage; it was the existence of a secure deterrent (i.e., second-strike capability) by both sides.

There were indications, however, that the broad stability of mutual deterrence was about to end. Continuing Soviet missile deployments, for example, were perceived as threatening to U.S. retaliatory forces. These deployments included the SS-9 ICBM, an expanding force of SLBMS, and fractional orbital bombardment systems. On the horizon was the possibility of Soviet deployment of MIRV-equipped missiles. Compounding the perception of threat (based largely on faulty intelligence) were Soviet BMD deployments.

One group of U.S. analysts believed that phased deployment of a BMD system would redress the perceived vulnerability of land-based retaliatory forces and thus ensure the stability of mutual deterrence. Such a phased deployment could correspond to the Soviet threat as it developed. Moreover, the advocates of this school of thought denied that BMD deployment would elicit a Soviet response. Terminal defense of retaliatory forces, they argued, would not threaten the Soviet deterrent (provided, of course, the Soviets embraced the MAD premise that cities and industry were indeed the assured destruction hostage).

Those who belonged to the opposing school of thought were convinced that deployment of the Safeguard BMD system would accelerate the arms race and exacerbate instability in the strategic balance. They denounced the argument that BMD deployment by the United States would restore stable mutual deterrence, calling it an errant belief based on the "fallacy of the last move."⁸ While attributing the dynamics of the arms race to an action-reaction phenomenon, these analysts blamed the United States for setting the pace. The effect of Safeguard would be a continued upward spiral of U.S. and Soviet efforts into further technological advances that were becoming available: accuracy, range, and yield improvements; MIRV technology; and military use of space and the ocean floor. Participating in this spiral, they argued, would be both costly and destabilizing.

To its opponents, then, Safeguard was a symbol of the arms race. It could lead to a new round of penetration aid development, an increase in numbers of offensive systems, and almost certainly to Soviet MIRV deployment. The result would be a period of uncertainty and instability during a new offense-defense arms race, followed eventually by restoration of a stable strategic balance at a new, higher, and more dangerous plateau. Thus, overall national security would actually be lessened by BMD deployment, not enhanced as the BMD advocates proclaimed.

Closely related to the strategic balance issue was the arms control issue. On the arms control issue, however, there were three (rather than two) schools of thought. One group believed that Safeguard deployment would interfere with success of the SALT negotiations. These analysts saw in SALT a less expensive and longer lasting solution to the projected instability in the strategic balance. At the same time, they theorized that U.S. deployment of BMD in tandem with MIRV deployment might lead to Soviet perception that the United States was giving them a "double whammy."⁹

A second group of analysts disagreed substantially with the first group. By emphasizing different potential implications of BMD deployment, these analysts argued that Safeguard would enhance the possibility of successful SALT negotiations. Deployment away from cities would show the Soviets that the United States had no first-strike intent but that any effort on their part to attain first-strike capability would be fruitless. Thus, BMD would serve as an incentive to negotiate by depriving the Soviets of any first-strike capability without threatening their second-strike deterrent.

A third group of analysts believed that BMD deployment would do more than serve merely as an incentive to negotiate. Rather, they asserted that Safeguard would strengthen the U.S. hand in SALT. Phased deployment of a BMD system would provide not only flexibility but also a hedge against failure of the talks. That is, if SALT negotiations failed, the United States would be in position to move beyond the first phase of Safeguard deployment to protect the U.S. deterrent.

Since the fundamental objective of U.S. national security policy is deterrence of general nuclear war, it is not surprising that the impact of BMD deployment on the U.S. deterrent posture would arise as the fourth key issue in the Safeguard debates. Nor is it surprising that there were several (some diametrically opposed) positions on that issue. It is perhaps ironic, however, that most analysts shared a common doctrinal belief (i.e., MAD) and that their arguments seemed to be different interpretations of the constraints that doctrine placed on military strategy. Those who argued against Safeguard in the name of MAD may have shared beliefs rooted in the past when cities were the assured destruction hostage by default because early offensive systems were not sufficiently accurate or responsive to threaten retaliatory forces credibly. Safeguard proponents who adhered to MAD doctrine, on the other hand, may have been more future-oriented. Perhaps they recognized the potential impact of large numbers of accurate Soviet missiles on the ability of the United States to maintain a credible second-strike deterrent force.

Many opponents of Safeguard reasoned that deterrence and defense were incompatible. These MAD adherents tended to assume that the Soviets "mirror-imaged" U.S. dogma about nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. According to these analysts, the concept of mutual deterrence was the central organizing principle of each side's nuclear strategy. Moreover, static long-term strategic stability was attainable if each side had confidence that its second-strike forces could inflict unacceptable damage on the population and industry of the other side. Such mutual vulnerability was the most effective deterrent because it made the idea of nuclear war unthinkable. Any form of defense was undesirable, these analysts argued, because it suggested belief in the possibility of a preemptive first-strike. Deploying BMD systems (whether accomplished simultaneously by both superpowers or phased in gradually by one of them) would lead to instability, providing both sides with incentives to initiate a preemptive nuclear strike.

In contrast, MAD advocates who favored deployment of the Safeguard system contended that BMD was neither incompatible with MAD logic nor potentially destabilizing. Indeed, these analysts believed that defending one's second-strike forces (rather than cities) was totally consistent, if not laudable, under mutual assured destruction doctrine because such a defense would strengthen the security of second-strike forces without threatening the other side's deterrent (i.e., without eliminating one's own societal vulnerability). Safeguard, therefore, would maintain the basis of stable mutual deterrence.

Irrespective of their doctrinal beliefs, some analysts opposed Safeguard on the grounds that deployment was unnecessary. These strategists maintained that Minuteman was not really vulnerable and that the Chinese threat was not credible. Furthermore, the other legs of the Triad were more than adequate to carry out the assured destruction threat.

A small minority of strategists believed that MAD itself represented errant thinking. They considered the American belief that the Soviets had been tutored in "correct thinking" about nuclear war as arrogant, ethnocentric, and false. The incompatibility of deterrence and defense was valid, they argued, only if the American doctrine of short war (i.e., mutual assured destruction) was accepted by both sides. According to these critics, however, the Soviets espoused a long-war doctrine of deterrence based on maintenance of a war-fighting capability, not a doctrine that envisioned a spasmodic and massive retaliatory strike designed to inflict "unacceptable damage." If their appraisal of Soviet strategic thinking was correct, there were important implications to consider. First, there would be no incompatibility between deterrence and defense. Rather, defense could enhance war-fighting capability by limiting damage to one's own offensive forces while attriting enemy offensive forces. Second, strategic balance could not be a static phenomenon. Instead, it would fluctuate with changes in the "correlation of forces." Finally, if nuclear war were viewed as possible rather than unthinkable, nuclear weapons could have political utility beyond simply deterrence of aggressive attack.

When the issue of deploying Phase I of the Safeguard system finally came to a vote on the Senate floor, the senators were as divided as the many defense analysts who had testified before the committee. Funding for initial deployment was approved in a fifty-fifty tie vote with the vice-president casting the tie-breaking vote in favor of the administration's position. Funding was approved again in 1970 by only a fifty-two to forty-seven margin. On 26 May 1972, however, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty limiting deployment of BMD systems. A 1974 revision further constrained BMD, and a year later, only months after its construction, the United States dismantled its only Safeguard site near Grand Forks, North Dakota.

BMD may be making a comeback. What's changed? Will the renewed interest in BMD prove to be déjà vu? Although probably the same four issues will dominate a new debate on BMD deployment, many analysts argue that the context has changed enough that substantially different positions on these issues may be presented.

The effectiveness of Safeguard was questioned on four grounds: penetrability, radar vulnerability, data-handling capability, and the nature of its nuclear kill mechanism. Proponents of a new BMD system claim that all of these have changed. They envision a layered defense system that would be effective against large numbers of reentry vehicles. Using a variety of sensors (including optical and infrared types), the exoatmospheric interceptors would be guided internally to points in space along the path of Soviet vehicles. These interceptors would use such nonnuclear mechanisms as debris and other barriers to destroy target vehicles. The endoatmospheric interceptors (Sprint counterparts) would employ new technology and sensors. The need for a network of large, vulnerable, high-powered radars would be negated by terminal guidance systems on board the interceptors. And, finally, contemporary high-speed computers could provide requisite data-handling capacity.

Many analysts believe the strategic balance issue, like the effectiveness issue, must be reviewed in light of some significant contextual developments. One widely held perception is that the United States gave up Safeguard and agreed to BMD limitations in hope that the Soviet Union would limit MIRV deployments and increases in the number of offensive launchers. However, the Soviets have proceeded with deployment of so many accurate warheads that the United States now perceives a serious first-strike threat potential against its ICBMS.

Although belief that U.S. land-based ICBMs are vulnerable to direct attack (or that they soon will be so) is widespread, it is by no means universal. Some skeptics remind analysts of the vulnerability school about what "circular error probable" calculations really mean. Others cite the problems of unpredictable meteorological influences (e.g., jet streams, thunderstorms, winds, solar flares, barometric pressure variations, and other conditions) and a yet untested theoretical north-south trajectory bias that would degrade RV accuracy. Still others, rather than attacking the validity of the vulnerability argument, discount the implications of ICBM vulnerability by espousing the adequacy of the air-breathing and sea-launched legs of the strategic Triad to deter the Soviets.

Whereas BMD was perceived by many to be destabilizing in 1969, it may appear to be restabilizing today in the minds of the believers in ICBM vulnerability. By altering Soviet perception of gain achieved by deploying more offense, an effective U.S. ballistic missile defense system might discourage continuation of the course the Soviets have followed throughout the last decade. At the very least, BMD could reduce potential gain by offsetting any Soviet advantage in hard-target kill capability.

However, as many BMD opponents point out, deployment of an effective U.S. system could stimulate a renewed arms race. Such an arms race might be a reciprocal defensive systems race, but it could include more offensive deployments, particularly by the Soviets. Why might such an outcome occur?

Many analysts now believe that the Soviets view strategic balance differently from Americans. Balance to the Soviets is determined not only by a static equivalence of offensive inventories but also by what would remain after initial counterforce attacks. An effective U.S. ballistic missile defense system could create significant uncertainty in Soviet calculations. To restore confidence and gain a more favorable correlation of forces, the Soviets could feel compelled to counter the U.S. system with more offense or with their own ballistic missile defense system. Even more ominous to the Soviets would be U.S. deployment of a counterforce-capable ICBM (e.g., MX) in tandem with BMD. From a Soviet perspective, such a move by the United States might appear to be a "double whammy" in the equation.

American acceptance of the reality that the Soviets view the nuclear world differently has taken an ironic twist. Under pure MAD, the United States tried unsuccessfully to tutor the Soviets on "correct thinking" about the best way to deter nuclear war and to maintain a stable strategic balance. Today, however, the United States pursues a declaratory strategy (albeit based ultimately on an assured destruction doctrine in an environment of mutuality) that prescribes counterforce capability and strategic force endurance--essentially deterrence based ultimately on the assured destruction threat and enhanced by fully flexible response options (which the United States may not yet have). Some analysts call this "deterrence plus." The irony is that whereas the United States once tried to coax the Soviets into adopting its view of the nuclear world, it now seems to be espousing declaratory strategy using language and concepts more akin to long-held Soviet beliefs.

In addition to the implications of BMD deployment for the arms race, there are also some arms control implications that would be unavoidable in any new debate on active defense against missiles. Most obvious, of course, is the ABM Treaty. The original treaty, signed in 1972, allowed each side to maintain two BMD sites with no more than 100 launchers each. The 1974 protocol agreement reduced the authorization to one site per side. With a view to the future, the treaty also prohibited development, testing, or deployment of space-based BMD systems or components. Any BMD deployments beyond the treaty limitations would necessitate renegotiation or abrogation of the treaty.

Some analysts have no compunction about abrogating the treaty, if necessary. They tend to view as patently unsuccessful U.S. attempts to use restraint and arms control as the preferred means of maintaining strategic stability. Their common perception is that arms control agreements opened opportunities for the Soviets, which the Soviets used advantageously to deploy offensive systems capable of credibly threatening U.S. ICBMS. The ABM Treaty aggravated the situation by denying to the United States what may have been the best remedy for this growing vulnerability.

That SALT II has been essentially rejected by U.S. decision makers attests to the extent of the perception that SALT agreements have hurt more than helped. What about the future then? Although most Americans appear to support the resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) initiated by the Reagan administration, some defense analysts are skeptical about the potential advantage of such talks for the United States. These analysts would prefer some sort of hedge against failure of new arms control negotiations. Many see redressing real or perceived asymmetries as just such a hedge against a future made uncertain by the murky outlook for arms control and the thrust of the recent buildup of Soviet offensive forces. BMD is only one of many alternatives that they suggest. A few analysts see ballistic missile defense as more than a hedge, however. As in 1969, some see BMD as a stimulus to negotiation.¹⁰ Déjà vu?

To answer that question now would be premature without considering the contemporary context relevant to the fourth major issue of the BMD debate--deterrence. In conjunction with their reassessment of Soviet nuclear war doctrine, U.S. strategists and decision makers have been reevaluating how to best deter the Soviets from initiating a nuclear attack against the United States. Perhaps the most obvious result was the Carter administration's countervailing strategy and Presidential Directive-59. Both seemed to reinforce the need for a secure, second-strike-capable ICBM. At issue has been what is the best way to ensure ICBM survivability. Some analysts advocate novel basing schemes for missiles; others, BMD. Still others support a combination of both. Overall, a significant number of analysts see in BMD a cost-effective way of maintaining the credibility of the ICBM leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear Triad.¹¹

Colin Gray, when he was Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute, provided a succinct summary of the arguments in favor of reopening the debate on BMD deployment:

. . . BMD technologies which the United States . . . could deploy in the 1980s and 1990s have little in common with the Safeguard ABM technology that was debated in 1969-70. Moreover, our knowledge of Soviet "strategic culture," and of Soviet strategic "style" in arms competition, had undermined the plausibility of a good many of the anti-ABM arguments popular ten years ago; and the disadvantageous evolution of the multi-level military balance in the 1970s, in an era characterized by intensive arms negotiations, has cast significant doubts upon the value of a Western concept of strategic stability born in an era of US strategic superiority. In short, BMD technology has changed, Western understanding of the Soviet Union has changed, and Western appreciation of what is, and is not, an adequate strategic concept, has changed.¹²

Further:

There are many reasons why a new debate on BMD deployment would be more than simply déjà vu. The contextual changes identified in this discussion make reopening debate both necessary and potentially fruitful. On the horizon, the implications of weapons in space such as directed-energy weapons for BMD--strengthen this imperative. Thus, it might be wise for potential participants in such a debate to adopt a comprehensive analytical framework for considering the merits of any proposed BMD deployment.

Such a framework demands consideration of a rather wide range of issues and concern. Ideally, military strategy should guide decisions on force development, force deployment, and force employment. However, military strategy is constrained by several outside influences, some of which seem particularly relevant to the BMD question. What, for example, does current military doctrine say about BMD? How do "pure MAD" advocates and "deterrence plus" advocates differ in their views? What about the economic factors? What, for instance, is the marginal utility of an additional dollar's worth of offense versus defense? How significant is the current Soviet threat? Is Minuteman really vulnerable? Can future ICBMs be deployed in a survivable basing mode without BMD? And what of the national culture? Will the public accept a defense of forces but not of people? Finally, is BMD technology sufficiently advanced to permit deployment of an effective system?

Beyond these concerns are other matters to consider. Certainly, any BMD deployment holds the potential for affecting the arms control process. Would it enhance the prospects for meaningful arms control or complicate the process? Ballistic missile defense also has implications relating to the strategic balance. Would an American BMD deployment restabilize the balance or destabilize it? Is the action-reaction phenomenon real? Would deployment start a new arms race? If so, would it be a defense-defense race or an offense-defense race? Is either preferable to an offense-offense race?

IT should be apparent that the question of whether to deploy a BMD system is indeed complex. The potential for clear answers to critically important questions is probably very low. Decisions perhaps must be based on the so-called bottom line. What is the bottom line? Hopefully, it is this: What would be the contribution of BMD to the national objective of deterring nuclear war? Or stated more broadly, what is the best way to deter? That is the fundamental question.

Notes

1. U.S. Congress, House of Representative, Committee on Appropriations, Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, Hearings before subcommittees for the Committee on Appropriations, 91^st Cong., 1969, p. 19. Hereafter referred to as Safeguard System.

2. Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology and Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington: Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 120.

3. Ibid., p. 121.

4. Ibid.

5. Safeguard System, p. 24.

6. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Part II, 91^st Cong., 1969, p. 408. Hereafter referred to as Implications of ABM Systems.

7. Yanarella, pp. 1-7.

8. Implications of ABM Systems, Part I, p. 78.

9. Ibid., p. 319.

10. See, for example, arguments by Jack Kemp, "U.S. Strategic Force Modernization: A New Role for Ballistic Missile Defense," Strategic Review, Summer 1980, pp. 11-17; and Raymond L. Garthoff's views in "ABM Revisited: Promise or Peril?" Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1981, pp. 53-85.

11. See, for example, arguments by Raymond L. Garthoff and William R. Van Cleave in "ABM Revisited: Promise or Peril?" loc. cit. For one analyst's description of the Reagan administration's position on BMD for ICBMs, see Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Administration Pushes ICBM Defense," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 11 October 1982, pp. 113-18.

12. Colin S. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense," Survival, March-April 1981, p. 60.

13. Ibid.

Lieutenant Colonel James F. Bryden (B.A., University of California; M.S., North Dakota State University) is Chief, Operations and Programs Branch, Inspection Division, Directorate of Nuclear Surety, Kirkland AFB, New Mexico. His previous assignments include Chief, Strategic Operations Branch, Warfare Studies Division, Air Command and Staff College; standardization/evaluation missile combat crew member; 4315^th Combat Crew Training Squadron instructor; and various positions at Hq SAC in the command control and missile attack warning functions. Major Bryden is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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