Air University Review, March-April 1984

The First Rules of Air Warfare

Major Richard H. Wyman, USAF

FLYING, an age-old dream of mankind, evolved rapidly as an instrument of war once the dream became reality. The French were perhaps the first to use aircraft as weapons of war in 1794. These lighter-than-air machines enhanced observation, but, without a means of locomotion independent of wind speed and direction, they proved of little tactical value.1 Yet, development of the first heavier-than-air craft at the beginning of this century signaled the tremendous wartime potential of the airplane. The battlefield suddenly became three-dimensional.

Early combat usually took the form of personal encounters between belligerents who customarily observed mutually accepted rules. But the industrial revolution introduced increasingly complex weapon systems and an impersonal element to war: the enemy became a faceless "they" who had to be destroyed.2

Belligerents recognized that the threat of reprisal could prevent unnecessary suffering. For example, in September 1915, the French notified the inhabitants of Sofia, Bulgaria:

Our aircraft observe the rule of bombarding only military establishments and those serving the national defence. The German Zeppelins and aeroplanes, however, drop bombs on Salonika and Bukharest, assassinating old men, women, and children. . . . Such acts, such crimes, call for vengeance. . . . If such crimes are renewed, they will be followed by the same punishment.3

As an alternative to increased brutality, nations sought to epitomize the practical value of humanity and restraint. Peace followed war, but uncontrolled devastation of an enemy during war sustained hatred to the point that it obstructed normal relations. Furthermore, warfare without limits was contrary to the moral values of most civilized countries. But, most important, brutality bred brutality. For example, the German terror bombing against England that led to the 1917 Gotha raids over London may have contributed to indiscriminate allied bombing of Rhineland towns--or vice versa. However, warfare conducted at recognized levels of moderation and humaneness would encourage similar enemy behavior and ensure at least minimum protection for noncombatants. Potentially, international agreements could provide the necessary framework.

Hague Peace Conferences

The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was the first significant attempt to regulate aerial bombardment. The conference unanimously adopted a declaration to prohibit "for a period of five years . . . the discharge of projectiles or explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature."4 Later, the Hague Conference of 1907 renewed this declaration only after considerable debate. Why the change? Aviation apparently had little military value in 1899, but, with the advent of powered flight in 1903, its potential began to be recognized. By 1907, technology had developed so rapidly that countries with strong aviation programs were unwilling to restrict their deployment options. But weaker countries were quite willing to accept prohibitions, since they possessed virtually no offensive air capability.5 Thus, conflict of interests among powerful and weak nations complicated these early attempts at regulation.

Further efforts to regulate aerial warfare came with recognition of its potential for destruction. The Conference of 1907 thus modified certain articles prepared at the Conference of 1899 and concluded that the remaining articles were so general that they, too, could be applied to both land and air warfare. This conclusion seemed logical since bombardment from the air was not unlike artillery bombardment.6

As a result, articles contained in Convention IV of the 1907 Hague Conference were considered binding on all nations, since they were "merely declaratory of existing laws and customs of war . . . [and were] of course binding independently of the status of the conventions of which they were a part." Thus, the articles, in effect, were customary law, but, according to provisions of the conference, they were binding only in conflicts involving signatory belligerents.7 This apparent inconsistency proved unfortunate during World War I. On the one hand, France and Germany could claim that the articles did not apply, since neither nation had ratified the convention. On the other hand, either belligerent could logically accuse the other of violations, since the articles conformed to customary international standards. This double standard undermined the effectiveness of the rules.8

Problems
Posed by Air Power

The use of air power during World War I introduced a number of unexpected problems. In early conflicts, fighting was more or less limited to well-defined areas, and it progressed at a slow rate. Noncombatants were generally aware of the areas where battles were likely and could, therefore, leave the scene. To some extent, their deliberate decision to remain absolved the belligerents of responsibility for injuries.9 But the speed and mobility of the airplane allowed sudden bombardment of cities, towns, and villages far from the normal lines of fighting, and noncombatants were unexpectedly caught in the midst of fighting. Another result was the destruction of historical monuments, private homes, hospitals, etc., that might not have occurred in land warfare. This destruction often resulted from imprecise target location as well as bomb delivery error.10

Worst of all was the tactic of deliberately bombing cities to terrorize civilian populations. The rationale was that the psychological effect of these attacks would bring demands for peace. Interestingly enough, the tactic generally strengthened the enemy's resolve and prolonged hostilities in World War I. But what was the alternative? Total abolition of air warfare was unlikely, since no country wished to renounce its development and possible use of such a versatile and potent weapon system. Stricter regulation of air warfare was another solution, although the laws of war have not always been effective. Finally, many jurists recommended that air warfare should be treated as an extension of land or naval warfare and thus regulated by existing land and naval warfare laws. This approach required strengthening the rules governing land and naval warfare, but it also implied other more serious problems.11

Army aircraft in support of land forces should logically be regulated by rules of land war, and naval aircraft in antisubmarine or antishipping operations should be covered by rules of naval war. But what about naval aircraft in support of ground operations or the reverse? Would a pilot be required to switch rules as he passed over the shoreline? The range and mobility of aircraft to operate over both land and sea during a single mission further complicated the problem. Consequently, most military experts and world jurists concluded that existing regulations could not satisfactorily control air warfare. Just as the air over land and sea forms a single medium, a single set of rules independent of land and sea boundaries must control aircraft.12

Although jurists disagreed on precise ways to limit air warfare, they generally agreed that existing prohibitions against aerial bombardment of cities were inadequate. The fundamental question centered on what constituted a defended city, since Article 25 in Convention IV of the 1907 Hague Conference prohibited aerial bombardment of undefended population centers. Was a city defended if military forces were deployed in or around it even when there was no real antiaircraft capability? How could a pilot determine whether a city was defended? Even the absence of antiaircraft emplacements was insufficient, since the city might be defended by interceptor aircraft. But there was a logical paradox. A manufacturing center for some critical war material deep in the enemy's rear would be immune to destruction if it was not defended, but a city of no military value with thousands of people and one antiaircraft gun could be bombed to the ground.13

Therefore, Article 25 failed its most basic test because it was illogical. Not only could an enemy use it to protect his most vital assets, he could also use it to justify inhumanity. It was unworkable, since the criteria for defining a defended city were too vague. Moreover, if rules "are to commend themselves to observance by fighting men, they must be based as much on considerations of military expediency as upon considerations of humanity."14

The Commission of Jurists
(1922-1923)

At the end of World War I, a need existed for international arms limitation. The bitter experiences of the war, such as the terror bombing of population centers, showed clearly that massive suffering could result from poorly regulated bombardment, and a far greater potential for destruction appeared likely in the future. This desire for arms limitation led to the Washington Conference on the Limitations of Armaments in 1921 to consider limits on naval war vessels and other matters.5 The conference recognized that any attempt to limit the size or number of nations' military aircraft would be difficult, since commercial assets might be quickly converted to wartime use. Consequently, comprehensive rules that conformed to accepted military practice and were consistent with established principles of warfare would provide the most effective control.

Because of the technical nature of aviation, the Washington Conference recommended a separate session concerned exclusively with these new methods of war.16 It thus established the Commission of Jurists to consider:

(1) whether existing rules of international law adequately covered "new methods of attack or defense . . . [developed] since the Hague Conference of 1907," . . .; and if they did not, (2) "what changes in the existing rules" ought . . . to be adopted. . . . 17

The commission decided in the planning phase to restrict consideration to aircraft and radio, since the Washington Conference had already issued declarations concerning submarines and chemical warfare.

Delegations from six countries--Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States--met at The Hague during the period from 11 December 1922 to 19 February 1923. Each delegation included one or two jurists and various technical advisers. This diversity proved fortunate because the jurists were generally idealistic with little or no combat experience, but the technical advisers were military men of considerable experience in the use of aviation and radio in warfare. Thus, ideas ranged from the most idealistic and impractical to the most pragmatic.18

This philosophical balance was fortunate for another reason. Following World War I, the general public of the various countries was probably more interested than the military in establishing controls on the use of aviation and radio. Many people had had firsthand experience in the tragedies of war, and aviation and radio played especially prominent roles in these experiences. Consequently, the balance between civilian and military interests established credibility with the civilian population.19

The commission formed two committees: one to draft rules for the regulation of aviation and another to do likewise for radio. Both committees included one voting member from each delegation and various national experts to provide technical advice. Several of the jurists participated in the committee sessions. Although this tended to impede the work of the committees, since the jurists required considerable time to consult with their technical advisers, it did ensure the balance and credibility mentioned earlier.21

The commission also established a number of guidelines early in its deliberations. It agreed that no new code should contradict, at least in principle, existing rules for land and naval warfare; that is, it sought to draft a body of rules that conformed to actual practices but agreed with the spirit of existing regulations and was consistent with the basic principles of war. However, as desirable as it was to limit suffering and destruction, the commission recognized that rules should not restrict the legitimate rights of belligerents to defeat enemy forces--a basic principle of land and sea war. Otherwise, they would lose credibility, and belligerents would refuse to apply them in wartime.21

The Hague Rules of Air Warfare

The final report of the Commission of Jurists consisted of two parts: Part I provided rules for the use of radio in warfare (12 articles), and Part II contained a highly organized, comprehensive code for control of aviation in warfare (62 articles). Interestingly, the report included no provision to preclude application of the articles to belligerents who did not accept the convention. The commission noted that similar provisions in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 unnecessarily weakened their applicability and expressed hope that, in any conflict involving parties that were not signatories to these rules of air warfare,

the contracting parties, instead of treating their agreement as having immediately ceased to be binding, . . . would offer it to a non-contracting belligerent as a modus vivendi; and if the offer were declined, they would still be at liberty to consider the . . . [actions] of the non-contracting belligerent [and to continue to obey] a treaty which had not automatically ceased to operate. . . .22

Perhaps the most urgent issue confronting the commission was the regulation of aerial bombardment. From the beginning of the conference, the delegates agreed that regulation was necessary. Certainly, indiscriminate bombing practiced at times during World War I caused unnecessary suffering and destruction and violated existing rules of war. But what should be done? Any attempt to prohibit bombing was unreasonable and even impractical. The committee on aviation was unable to resolve the problem, and the issue was debated and finally settled before a full session of the commission.23

Two of the five articles adopted by the commission regulating bombardment read as follows:

Article 22: Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants is prohibited.

Article 24: (1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective. . . . (2) Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the following objectives: military forces; military works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and well-known centers engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctively military supplies; lines of communication or transportation used for military purposes. (3) The bombardment of cities . . . not in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited. In cases where the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so situated, that they cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment. (4) In the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces, the bombardment of cities . . . is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger thus caused to the civilian population. (5) A belligerent State is liable to pay compensation for injuries . . . caused by the violation . . . of the provisions of this article.24

The commission agreed that "a belligerent ought not to direct his attacks against the civil population who take no part directly or indirectly in the operations of the war, or against private property or institutions of a charitable, educational or religious character. . . ."25 This principle suggested three guidelines: the distinction between combatant and noncombatant was critical; indiscriminate bombing and bombing to terrorize were unacceptable; and only targets of military value should be attacked.26

The rationale for Article 22 is obvious, but Article 24 is more complex in the sense that it makes a significant distinction between bombing in the immediate neighborhood of operations (tactical) as opposed to more distant bombing (strategic). Part (3) of the article severely limits strategic bombing when it prohibits bombing that poses substantial danger to noncombatants.27 In Part (4), however, tactical bombing that may cause heavy civilian casualties is permissible if the military objective is sufficiently important.

Aviators were also given major discretionary power in deciding such questions as these: Will substantial danger to noncombatants result? Is the target outside the neighborhood of operations? Does the value of a target outweigh the danger to noncombatants? Furthermore, the article seeks to balance protection of noncombatants against military realities. Presumably, noncombatants near the front lines could evacuate prior to tactical bombardment and thus required less protection than noncombatants in more distant cities that might be bombed with little or no warning.

Significantly, the new rules did not mention the criterion of defended versus undefended to determine target legitimacy. Instead, they introduced the criterion of military objective in stating that bombardment is essentially legal only if i t is directed at military objectives. Moreover, the risks of injury to noncombatants must be weighed against the military importance of the objective. This new criterion is more reasonable, since "it is in accord both with current practice and with sound strategical and tactical common sense. A belligerent will not wish to risk his planes and pilots . . . [except on those targets] of military importance."28

Other articles provide for the protection of historical buildings and monuments, places of worship, and hospitals; prohibit attack on crew members parachuting from a disabled aircraft; give rules for aircraft markings; and discuss use of tracer and explosive ammunition as well as rescue of aircraft at sea. Also included are such topics as espionage, escape and evasion from disabled aircraft, protection of civilian aircraft, neutral airspace, and perfidy. Even a casual comparison of the rules for air warfare with current practices reveals striking similarities. (See Air Force Pamphlet 110-31.) But the Hague rules were never ratified by the signatories. Why?

Evaluation of the Hague Rules

The Hague rules received general approval by most of the world's jurists, who recognized them as a legally consistent, comprehensive code for the regulation of air warfare.29 Popular opinion was also favorable, but the rules were subject to extensive criticism.

Although the concept of military objective to test for target legitimacy was widely praised, many critics considered it too narrow. According to Article 24, military objectives are activities or objects designed primarily to support the military effort. To cope with the complexities of modern warfare, the military effort requires support from a country's total industrial base. But the commission excluded such objects as blast furnaces, boot factories, electric works, and grain silos, as well as oil wells, refineries, and depots. These objectives have a significant impact on a belligerent's ability to wage war even though they are also vitally important in a nonmilitary sense. Critics cautioned that belligerents would ignore this definition of the military objective, since it was not comprehensive. Consequently, violations by one side would lead to reprisals by the other, and warfare would degenerate into a barbaric struggle with little respect for humanity.30

The U.S. military also expressed concern. It was risky to establish rules, since the airplane was advancing rapidly and no one could be sure of its future capabilities. The argument was that no country should be expected to deprive itself of a future technological leap that might shorten a war or mean the difference between victory and defeat. In fact, such regulations would suppress the natural, technological evolution of warfare. Some sources even felt that rules of aerial warfare were unnecessary because the combatants themselves experience the horrors of war. Consequently, there is a natural self-interest in preventing unnecessary suffering. The fear of retaliation will effectively control future use and "there is no need for jumping hastily at conclusions and saying that the next war will be an aerial war and a horrible war."31

Perhaps the most significant criticism concerned a lack of precision in the language of certain articles, but some sources considered this looseness a strength, since too much detail would complicate compliance. As noted earlier, almost everything is directly or indirectly related to the modern war effort, and, thus, virtually anything can be considered a legitimate military objective. Bombing would ostensibly almost always be justified. But an increase in barbarism will inevitably lead to increased human suffering. Consequently, rules could actually make matters worse.32

In any event, the signatories did not ratify the final report of the Commission of Jurists. In fact, "the valuable work of the Commission appears to have been all but forgotten. Even the learned societies . . . apparently ceased to concern themselves with the problem. Public opinion . . . appears to have become in large measure indifferent."33

The United States enthusiastically supported formation of the Commission of Jurists, but it refused to ratify the report. Why? Even though the delegations to the commission reached unanimous agreement on the proposed code, the agreement was substantial but not total.

There were compromises, and some articles were clearly not in the best interests of all participants.34 Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby indicated in a 1923 memorandum that the proposed codes were acceptable to the Navy Department but that one of the powers represented at the commission did not consider regulation necessary and might be "willing to permit the work . . . to be forgotten."35

Secretary Denby's remark reflects U.S. suspicions that other powers less than enthusiastically supported the commission's findings. Only the United States and Japan expressed willingness to accept the rules of the commission without change. The Dutch maintained that the rights of neutrals were not adequately protected. The French felt that other existing international agreements adequately regulated air warfare. But most serious was the British refusal even to consider these rules pending further international discussion.36

Some U.S. military aviators were also skeptical of regulation. Since technology had developed rapidly, no nation wished to restrict its future options, especially if other powers used the regulation to gain an advantage. Thus, despite widespread praise for the proposed rules in the press, in official statements, and in public support for the rules, many government and military leaders had serious doubts. (See footnotes 22 and 27.)

Timing was another factor. The General Report of the Commission of Jurists was submitted to the Secretary of State on 26 February 1923. But since the final session of the Sixty-seventh Congress ended only six days later, the Senate did not consider the report. Before it could be considered by the Sixty-eighth Congress on 3 December 1923, the death of President Warren G. Harding and his replacement by Calvin Coolidge brought about an unexpected change in administrations. President Harding had expressed pride in the "helpful part we [the United States] assumed in international relationships"37 and had supported the Washington Conference. President Coolidge advocated a "policy of drift with regard to Europe"38 and may not have given priority to the air rules. Whether this reflected a change in positions of the two administrations is not clear, but the turmoil and disruption brought by the sudden change in administrations may have led to reduced emphasis on the rules.

OTHER factors relate to the spirit of the times: the war to end all wars had come to a victorious end, and problems in Europe had become "their" problems. The country was returning to its traditional isolationism, based in part on wide ocean barriers that precluded air attacks against American cities.39 Some experts even claimed that the new economic interdependence stemming from increased industrialization would reduce the likelihood of serious conflict even without regulation.

Although the public feared indiscriminate bombing, it was in love with the airplane and excited by its glamour. Fear of bombing was quickly overshadowed by concern for chemical warfare. The nation's thoughts turned to the death rain of chemicals that could possibly exterminate entire urban populations in a few hours. As a further diversion, a successful attempt by the League of Nations to abolish all aerial bombardment would effectively eliminate the need for rules.40

No definite reason has been found for the U.S. failure to ratify the rules. Certainly, the difficulty in obtaining Dutch, French, and British concurrence in the rules was a factor. But the rules conformed to the U.S. government's position and, in general, were favorably received by the public. Perhaps the real reason lies hidden in a combination of factors and events of the time. One of the most important considerations was the country's rapid return to an isolationist philosophy with its general abandonment of an international role. A contributing factor was the skepticism of the U.S. military, which was highly respected and exerted considerable influence at that time. This lack of support for regulation by those who knew best was probably very significant.41

The importance of those early rules can be appreciated somewhat in terms of their effect during World War II. Although the rules were not ratified, both sides publicly acclaimed their adherence and accused their opponents of violations. Indiscriminate bombing did occur, but, as mentioned earlier, fear of retaliation was a restraining force. Most nations now apply rules based on this early prototype; even a casual review of the Law of Armed Conflict and its application to the U.S. Air Force underscores the similarity. Essentially, these first rules and their minor modifications form the basis for all current regulation of air warfare. What caused the long delay? Perhaps the words of Admiral William L. Rodgers, a U.S. technical adviser on the Commission of jurists, offer a partial explanation:

The group of rules of international law based on humanitarian practice are already well tried out and likely to endure. Another group of rules deals with new instruments and agencies of warfare. Such rules, if introduced too hastily into codes of war before experience of war has tried the new agencies, will probably be denied observance in the next war, until the new agencies have been used and have shown their value.42

Air Command and Staff College

Notes

1. John B. Moore, International Law and Some Current Illusions (New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 192.

2. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, third edition (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947), pp. 109-12.

3. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), p. 199.

4. Frank E. Quindy, "Aerial Bombardment of Civilian and Military Objectives," The Journal of Air Law 2 (1931): 482.

5. Wo-Chiang Lin, "Aeronautical Law in Time of War," The Journal of Air Law 3 (1932): 82-84.

6. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

7. Ibid., pp. 86, 92; James B. Scott, editor, Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1915), p. 103.

8. Paul W. Williams, "Legitimate Targets in Aerial Bombardment," The American Journal of International Law 23 (1929): 573-74.

9. James W. Garner, "International Regulation of Air Warfare," Air Law Review 3 (April 1932): 122-23.

10. Ibid., p. 112; Captain Elbridge Colby, "Aerial Law and War Targets," Journal of International Law 19 (1925): 709-11. Naval and artillery bombardment shared similar accuracy problems, although critics tended to ignore that fact. For further discussion, see M. E. Royse, Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare (New York: Harold Vinal, 1928), pp. 168-73.

11. Garner, pp. 112-13, 115.

12. Spaight, Air Power, 1924, pp. 32-35; Garner, p. 115.

13. Colby, pp. 704-05.

14. Williams, p. 571.

15. Howard S. Leroy, "Limitation of Air Warfare," Air Law Review 12 (1941): 24-25.

16. Quindry, pp. 485-86.

17. Moore, p. 185.

18. Rear Admiral William L. Rodgers, "The Laws of War Concerning Aviation and Radio," The American Journal of International Law 17 (1923): 630-31, 633.

19. Ibid., pp. 630-31.

20. Ibid., pp. 631-32; Moore, p. 191.

21. Rodgers, pp. 632-35; Moore, p. 190.

22. Moore, p. 208. Many European politicians and military professionals may not have shared the view that the articles did not apply to warfare involving nonsignatory combatants. In fact, many feared that this provision might be tantamount to unilateral disarmament by the signatories. However, the commission clearly recognized this danger, but it only wished to preclude an automatic disregard of the rules provided that both sides observed them in practice.

23. Ibid., pp. 194-96.

24. Ibid., pp. 241-43.

25. Garner, p. 114.

26. Then, as now, there existed advocates for targeting civilian population centers for the express purpose of breaking the enemy’s will to resist it. This was seen as a deterrent to future warfare. The commission recognized but did not intend to preclude psychological terror experiences by civilians living near legitimate military targets, which were suddenly and unexpectedly bombed by aircraft.

27. This part of Article 24 was perhaps the most controversial provision of the entire code and resulted only after lengthy and heated deliberations. The difficulty was that it attempted to impose severe restrictions on the distinct advantage of aerial bombardment—the rapid and unexpected destruction of objectives deep in the enemy’s rear. The lesser restrictions on targets in the combat zone merely allowed engagement by aircraft to targets that could perhaps be more economically and effectively engaged by artillery or other means. (See Part 4.) Thus, Part 3 may have unintentionally violated the principle of economy of force by preventing the most efficient use of a weapon system. Moreover, strict interpretation of collateral damage to noncombatants as evidence of indiscriminate damage might, for all practical purposes, eliminate aerial bombardment. As a result, bombardment by aircraft was more restricted that bombardment by other means. Royse, pp. 227-29 and 232-34.

28. Colby, p. 709. Note the reference to economy of force, a basic principle of war.

29. Leroy, p. 30. Unfortunately, acceptance of the rules by jurists is not sufficient since warring nations must voluntarily abide by them.

30. Quindry, pp. 489, 508-09.

31. Colby, pp. 712-13; Rodgers, p. 633.

32. Williams, p. 576; Colby, p. 715.

33. James W. Garner, "International Regulation of Air Warfare," Air Law Review 3 (July 1932): 317.

34. Rodgers, p. 639.

35. U.S. Government Printing Office, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States I (1922): 88.

36. U.S. Government Printing Office, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States I (1925): 93-107.

37. U.S. Government Printing Office, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States I (1923): XVIII.

38. Oswald G. Villard, editor, "The President and the Progressives," The Nation CXVII, 19 December 1923, p. 703.

39. Manley O. Hudson, "Aviation and International Law," The American Journal of International Law 24 (1930): 237.

40. Garner, p. 321; Charles Warren, "Belligerent Aircraft, Neutral Trade, and Upreparedness," The American Journal of International Law 29 (1935): 204.

41. Colby, pp. 713-15.

42. Rodgers, p. 639.


Contributor

Major Richard H. Wyman, USA (B.A., M.A., University of Maine, Orono) is an operations research staff officer with the Personnel, Plans, and Systems Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C. He has served as commander of a Nike Hercules battery in Germny and as an Assistant Professor of Mathematics, U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Major Wyman is a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College and an Honor Graduate of the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Officer’s Advanced Course.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


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