Air University Review, July-August 1984
Dr. Russell F. Weigley
APPROACHING the task of reviewing I. B. Holley's fine biography of Brigadier General John M. Palmer, I first contemplated tying my reflections to the general's association with a future Air Force chief of staff. (Thomas D. White, then a lieutenant of infantry, was Palmer's aide for a time in the 1920s.) Later, I considered emphasizing the Air Force credentials of the author of the biography (I. B. Holley, Jr., retired from the Air Force Reserve in 1981 as a major general, in addition to having earned distinction as a military historian at Duke University). The reason for my groping in search of a theme lay in the difficulty of finding current relevance in General Palmer's main ideas, together with my reluctance to inject even a hint of negative note about the biography of so admirable a soldier as Palmer, written by so able a historian as Holley.*
*I. B. Holley, Jr., General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy (Westport, Connecticut, and London, England: Greenwood Press, 1982, $35.00), 726 pages.
General Palmer graduated from West Point in 1892, served in China and the Philippines, gradually became involved in the pre-World War I movement to reform the Army, served on General John J. Pershing's staff and as a brigade commander in combat in World War I, and then emerged between the world wars as the leading advocate of universal military training to provide the foundation for a democratic army of citizen-soldiers. He was a principal architect of the National Defense Act of 1920; and recalled from retirement by Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall in World War II, he wrote War Department Circular 347, the basic statement of the 1940s campaign for universal military training. And in all these activities and achievements, Palmer was an admirable soldier in every way-in dedication, energy, concern for the welfare of those who served under him, concern for the improvement of the Army, and loyalty to his country and its ideals.
In his principal role as a reform-minded military intellectual, Palmer well merited Professor Holley's judgment that he was "more profound and more important than Emory Upton, though less visible than Alfred Thayer Mahan." (p. 721) Palmer's military thought began with the proposition that the army of a democracy must be an army imbued with democratic values. With that principle in mind, Palmer became the inveterate military opponent of Emory Upton's contentions that democracy and effective mobilization of military power are incompatible, and that, accordingly, democracy must be diluted in whatever measure is necessary to generate adequate military power. (Unhappily, however profound and important Palmer's basic convictions and principal ideas may have been, his ideas seem attuned and proper for his own time, but not for ours.)
Palmer's method of forming the army of a democracy was to start with universal military training. He emphasized the word training, not service. All young men (except those obviously physically or mentally unfit) were to receive military training; but in peacetime, they were not to serve in the military forces, where they might become indoctrinated into the attitudes and values of Uptonian military professionals. Instead, the trainees were to remain civilian citizens. By implication, therefore, as many as possible of those who administered the training were also to be nonprofessionals, i.e., part-time soldiers who remained essentially citizens. In fact, Palmer insisted that advancement to the highest ranks in the military services was to be open to any citizen of appropriate ability who was willing to devote whatever extra time was required for the study and experience necessary for such advancement--always, however, remaining essentially citizens rather than soldiers. If the armed forces, even to their highest ranks, were filled mainly by citizens, Palmer believed, the dividing line between the civilian and the military would blur and fade. Thus, problems of civil-military relations would fade also and the armed forces would reflect the true character of our nation. The army of a democracy should be almost completely an army of citizen-soldiers.
The trouble with this plan, as Palmer's astute citizen-soldier biographer recognizes, is that it did not pay much attention to the growing complexity of twentieth-century military activities and especially of modern, increasingly sophisticated military technology. Palmer flew in an airplane across enemy lines while visiting the Italian front in World War I, yet his military thought included no attention to developing and maintaining aviators' skills. That neglect might be partially excused if we remember that he was a ground soldier-but he paid no attention to the tank either. All through World War II and all through his post-World War II leadership in advocating universal military training, Palmer's conception of the Army remained that of the World War I Army. He thought in terms of a force composed primarily of infantry that did not change over time. Sadly, his unwillingness and inability to adapt to changes underminded his credibility eventually, despite his admirable personal qualities and his admirable dedication to democratic values.
It was characteristic of General Palmer that although he found the model for his citizen-soldier system in Switzerland, his preoccupation with general principles (rather than practical details) was such that he never visited Switzerland to observe its army firsthand. If he had, said Colonel Henri Le Comte, a Swiss officer who attended West Point with him, he would have been less enthusiastic about his model.
However, the value of Holley's biography does not depend on the practicality of Palmer's ideas. The book is a life-and-times kind of biography, and it offers much about the larger history of the Army during Palmer's long service. Holley's account of Palmer's campaign for a single promotion list throughout the Army, one of his early reform efforts, offers insights into military politics and military conservatism that are still pertinent today.
Another major issue of controversy that Holley explores (beyond Palmer's plan for a citizens' army) is that of the responsibilities of an officer who dissents from the official policies of his military and civilian superiors. How can such an officer appropriately express what his conscience demands while still adhering to the essentials of both military discipline and civilian control? Palmer had to face this latter issue most pointedly during the debates over post-World War I military legislation that led eventually to the Defense Act of 1920. Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March expected his subordinates to adhere rigidly to the plan that he himself was proposing to Congress. Supported by the Secretary of War, March favored an Uptonian scheme for an expansible regular army large enough in peacetime that its cadres could absorb and dominate any wartime expansion through conscription. In March's view, any system of peacetime training must be wholly under the control of the professionals. Having spent at least a decade thinking about the problems of an army in a democracy, Palmer was set against General March's plan for a variety of reasons. These ranged from matters simply of expediency (e.g., Congress was altogether unlikely to approve a peacetime army large enough to form the complete skeleton of a war army) to matters of fundamental principle (i.e., Palmer's conviction that in a democracy the division between citizen and soldier must be erased, and that accordingly, professional soldiers must never monopolize command and control either of citizen trainees or of the nation's military policy).
Awareness that General Palmer's convictions differed from those of General March seeped out of the private circle of Palmer's friends into the halls of Congress. This awareness soon made it inevitable that congressmen dissatisfied with March's Uptonian ideas would call Palmer to testify before Congress on the military issues of the day. When the summons from Congress came, what was Palmer to do? Should he refuse to state his dissent publicly? Should he resign his commission rather than suppress his own convictions (the most frequently recommended course of action when similar issues arose during the Vietnam War)? If he did not resign but nevertheless gave voice to his dissent, what were the implications for military discipline? For civilian control (since the War Department supported March)? For Palmer's own career? Palmer considered all the aspects of his problem carefully before he decided that his duty lay in public dissent. Biographer Holley considers the difficulties carefully also. Any conscientious officer will profit from pondering Palmer's thoughts and example.
In addition to carrying his convictions to Congress, Palmer decided to campaign for his idea of a democratic army also in writings addressed to both soldiers and the public, particularly through a series of books that remain his principal monument. These books include Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen (1930), General Van Steuben (1937), and most notably, America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization (1941). In addition, Palmer hoped to complete an autobiography that would be, in large part, yet another call for a citizens' army. The first twenty-four chapters of Holley's biography (relating Palmer's story through his arrival in Paris in 1917 as a member of General Pershing's staff) are essentially Palmer's own work--the completed portion of the autobiography--although Holley had to rework all but the first ten chapters to some extent. When it became apparent that he might not finish his memoirs, Palmer arranged for his literary executor to transfer the manuscript and working materials to an appropriate writer who would complete his life's story. Holley became that writer.
Holley has been skillful in knitting the different parts of the book together. Palmer's chapters retain the clear, direct, if somewhat old-fashioned, prose style that made his polemical works persuasive. Holley's chapters are documented (while Palmer's reminiscences are not) and are also critically analytical, yet somehow they maintain much of the tone of the early chapters, continuing to reflect Palmer's personality much as the general himself had expressed it. If the details of Palmer's efforts to influence legislation sometimes grow tedious in Holley's recounting, the personal notes provide a lighter touch and hasten the narrative along. Thus, we glimpse Palmer as a flesh-and-blood man in his move during retirement to an old New Hampshire farm, his incorrigibly inept struggles to improve his personal finances, his minor and playful evasions of his wife's ban on alcoholic beverages, and other aspects of his life.
THIS BOOK is important to those concerned with the history of the Army and U.S. military policy, yet it is also a pleasure to read. Modern-day disillusionment with the practicability of Palmer's citizen-army ideas should not obscure the book's importance. As Holley concludes: "Gen. John McAuley Palmer's great contribution was a challenge to posterity. However much the particulars might change over time, he knew that one constant would remain: if the nation wished to stay free, it must contrive military institutions suited to the genius of a democratic people." (p. 721)
Temple University
Philadelphia
Russell F. Weigley (B.A., Albright College; M.A., Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania) is a Professor of History at Temple University. He has taught at the University of Pennsylvania, Drexel University, Dartmouth College, and U.S. Army War College. Dr. Weigley is the author of The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy (1973), Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign for France and Germany, 1944-1945 (1981), and previous contributions to the Review.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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