Air University Review, January-February 1984
THE resumption of consultations between China and the Soviet Union and the sharpening of Chinese rhetoric with respect to U.S. policy around the globe has resulted in numerous reassessments of the Sino-American relationship.1 Evaluations of the changing relationship generally fall into one of two categories. The first category adopts a "rational actor" approach in which both countries calculate their relationship based on the balance of power and specific interests.2 According to this analysis, China senses that the Soviet Union has become less of a threat, owing to preoccupation with problems in Afghanistan and Poland; therefore, it is no longer vital to form an anti-Soviet "united front" with the West. Moreover, China's disappointment with the United States on a variety of issues, notably technology transfer and Taiwan, has contributed toward China's loosening of its American ties. The "rational actor" approach also has the United States reevaluating the importance of the "China card" in dealings relative to the global strategic balance and relegating China to the role of regional power. The overall result is that both sides view the relationship as less crucial than it was previously deemed and have gradually drawn away from each other. There is always the possibility that changed perceptions could once again lead to a closer relationship.
Another analysis attributes changes in the relationship to issues of bureaucratic politics. In this perspective, changes in Chinese policies are a consequence of alterations in the volatile power mix wrought by ongoing factional struggles at the highest level.3 Since most of the key questions in China are domestic economic and social problems, the coalitions that win out on these issues tend also to make decisions on foreign policy issues. China's move away from the United States is a result of Deng Xiaoping's compromises with his opponents; it is the price he pays for getting his way with respect to the succession problem and related domestic political issues. Similarly, the U.S. position stems from struggles between various factions within the Reagan administration and between the administration and Congress.
Both approaches can contribute to our understanding of what has happened in the relationship during the past few years. More important for this article, it can suggest some things that we should look at in trying to understand what may well occur over the next decade. Integrating the "rational actor" approach and the "bureaucratic politics" approach will enable us to consider ways in which the relationship has developed and will develop. As a result, I shall suggest ways in which I think U.S. policies can be creatively applied to improve the relationship between America and China.
In the decade following the issuance of the Shanghai communiqué, Sino-American relations developed in an uneven pattern. Steps toward normalization were made haltingly, the Taiwan issue being a principal consideration. China, for example, refused the effort made early in the Carter administration to establish normal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China while transferring the Liaison Office to Taiwan. Nevertheless, movement toward normalization of relations proceeded very quickly in the summer of 1978. Following the establishment of diplomatic ties on 1 January 1979, China and the United States entered a period of close cooperation, especially in rhetoric. This cooperation became even closer for a brief period following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After the beginning of the Reagan administration, the relationship became more troubled, as indicated by a harshening of Chinese statements about U.S. policy.
From a balance-of-power perspective, several factors shaped the nature of specific policies during the decade. The most important factor, which has been identified by nearly all those who have commented on Sino-U.S. relations, was the increased perception of threat from the Soviet Union. The growth of Soviet military power globally, the buildup of Soviet forces along the Chinese border, and Chinese uncertainties about how the Soviet Union might use its military power to affect Chinese internal politics fed Chinese perceptions of insecurity. Under the concept of "a united front against hegemonism," Chinese leaders combined Maoist ideological principles with balance-of-power realpolitik to counteract Soviet pressure.4
In the early 1970s Chinese leaders had pronounced a "three worlds" theory of relative power and claimed that China, as part of the third world, could form a united front with other developing countries to counteract the hegemonism of the superpowers. As the threat from the Soviet Union increased, Chinese statements increasingly focused on the Soviet Union as the "antagonistic contradiction" and became less selective as to which countries qualified for united front membership. The NATO alliance was viewed as an important component in containing Soviet hegemonism. Also, particularly after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, China called on the United States, Japan, the ASEAN countries, and Australia, along with China, to form a united front against Soviet- Vietnamese hegemonism in Southeast Asia. Beijing insisted that Soviet-Vietnamese policy in Southeast Asia was part of an overall strategy of Soviet global domination and must be strongly resisted.
The manifestation of the new united front definition in concrete policy terms included hastening negotiations with Japan to conclude a peace treaty in the fall of 1978, movement on the obstacles to normalization of relations with the United States, and efforts to upgrade relations with ASEAN countries while reducing support for the Communist-led insurgencies in these countries.5 Chinese leaders argued that China was doing its share to challenge the hegemonism of the Soviet Union and called on other countries, particularly the United States, to make a greater effort to do likewise.
As is clearly evident from Chinese writings and statements, the Chinese perception of Soviet hegemonism began to shift in the early 1980s.6 Instead of Soviet power's being an unabated expanding threat to China, it became overextended in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Moreover, Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe, notably Poland, have made it highly unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would wish to embark on an offensive against China. As Chinese perceptions of the Soviet threat altered, so did Chinese policy. China became increasingly critical of U.S. global policy and was willing to escalate irritants in Sino-American relations to higher levels. Chinese rhetoric over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan increased, and issues over technology transfer, textiles, railway bonds, defecting tennis players and students, and Asian Development Bank membership seemed to dominate their view of the relationship, rather than a common sense of global threat from the U.S.S.R.7 Also, China not only opened the door for consultations with the Soviet Union but moved to improve party ties with various European parties––notably the French Communist Party––and also sought to improve state relations with Soviet East European satellites.
Closely related to China's assessments of the Soviet threat is the Chinese calculation as to the role of the United States. Many students of Chinese foreign policy believe that the basis for the urgency with which China pursued a cooperative relationship with the United States against Soviet pressure in the late 1970s was its belief that the United States was the only country strong enough to balance the U.S.S.R., but the Carter administration was not sufficiently firm in resisting Soviet expansionism. It became the duty of the Chinese to bolster the United States. Similarly, the argument is made that now that the United States under the Reagan administration has taken a firmer line against the U.S.S.R., the Chinese perceive greater luxury in taking up the cudgel against both superpowers. Other students argue that the Chinese perceive that concessions can be gained from the United States by pressure. Since the United States needs China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, the United States will eventually bend to Chinese pressures.8 They cite the 17 August 1982 agreement on arms sales, the decision to liberalize technology transfer, and U.S. concessions in reaching a textile agreement with China as evidence.
The view that China remains uncertain about the United States was expressed by Huan Xiang, Director of the International Affairs Center of the State Council and a prominent spokesman on U.S. affairs. Huan argued that the United States under Reagan "has scored some success in rebuilding American hegemony in the world," notably in developing its nuclear strategic arsenal, in intensifying its activities in Latin America, and in gaining a more favorable position in the Middle East. He also predicted, however, that contention between the United States and the Soviet Union would increase and that both would experience weakening of control over their allies. Huan predicted that Western Europe would continue to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union but that America would experience increasing friction with Japan. He also argued that while the United States had taken some limited steps to "pacify" U.S.-Chinese relations, continued American interference in Chinese domestic affairs via the Taiwan Relations Act remained of great concem.9
While highly critical of U.S. policy, the Chinese have pulled up short of strong actions that could seriously damage the relationship. Initially, the Chinese insisted that they would downgrade relations if the United States did not agree to fix a date for the cessation of arms sales to Taiwan. Yet, in the 17 August communiqué, the United States did not set a date, and China did not downgrade relations. When the United States took steps to restrict Chinese textile imports following the failure to reach a textile agreement, China reacted by restricting U.S. agricultural exports to China but in commodities which had already declined considerably.10 The U.S. decision to grant political asylum to tennis player Hu Na resulted in the cancellation of some official exchanges, but the effect was limited. China continues to attach considerable importance to acquiring technology and to sending students to the United States. The relationship with the United States is deemed sufficiently important by China that the Chinese leaders have tried to prevent irritants and problems from becoming major catastrophes.
There are, of course, other main factors that could be considered. Beijing's perceptions of the situation in the region, particularly relations with Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia, are of great importance. Briefly, though, Chinese policies have been attuned to assessments of the relations of the two superpowers and the regional and global balance. Without judging the relative merits and faults of the Chinese assessments, our "rational actor" model shows that Chinese perceptions have varied over time and that policies have been geared to evaluations of superpower intentions and policies. The Sino-U.S. relationship has been affected both positively and negatively as Chinese perceptions have shifted. In just one decade we have witnessed a jerky move toward the United States and now a jerky move toward greater equidistance between the superpowers (though I would argue that China today is closer to the United States than to the U.S.S.R. and is likely to remain so). From the "rational actor" standpoint, jerkiness is likely to remain a principal feature of Sino-American relations.
The shifts in Chinese policy are explained not merely by changes in perception of the global and regional power equation. The past decade has witnessed sharp struggles among the Chinese leadership over policy issues, including foreign policy. Indeed, factionalism among the Chinese leadership is an important variable that must be considered in any analysis. Though information on the exact composition and nature of groupings among the Chinese leadership is difficult to come by, much can be inferred from public statements, articles in the press, and so on.
My own view of factionalism in China is that there are few factions in the true sense. Certainly it is not like that of Japan, where factions within the various parties have a formal character cemented by personal loyalties and the system of fundraising and electoral districts. I see groupings in China as informal shifting coalitions; a degree of permanency is imparted by guanxi (personal relationships), but coalitions sometimes form and dissolve on policy questions. The group that most closely resembled a true faction was the "gang of four" purged after Mao's death in 1976. The dynamic of shifting coalitions is brilliantly revealed by the downfall of Lin Biao in the early 1970s, the rehabilitation of Deng and other Cultural Revolution victims in 1973, the struggle against Zhou Enlai and Deng by the "gang of four" leading to his purge in 1976; then, after the death of Mao, Hua Guofeng briefly emerged and attempted to consolidate his power, only to be undermined and eventually purged by a resurgent Deng, who is now attempting to have his preferred successors effectively installed. Many students of China have categorized the various coalitions based on personal ties, policy preferences, position in the leadership (e.g., military, region, center), and even ideological outlook.11 Without attempting to assign particular people to particular categories, I would like to suggest that there has been a good deal of bureaucratic infighting and that this has dramatically affected policy.
Specifically, since the death of Mao and the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, China has experienced a struggle between two modes of leadership. The Maoist mode is characterized by an emphasis on charismatic authority, normative incentives for economic development, and equality in social development. The Dengist reform alternative emphasizes routine bureaucratic authority, material incentives for economic development, and the acceptance of social distinctions based on productivity. Since his rehabilitation in 1978, Deng has incessantly waged war on the Maoist mode. In matters of political authority, he has pushed for the renunciation of Mao's leadership style, fostered the rehabilitation of cadres previously denigrated during the Cultural Revolution (including the arch enemy Liu Shaoqi), demanded the growth and consolidation of political institutions, and increasingly pushed to get the military out of civil decision-making. In economic affairs he has strongly supported the adoption of responsibility systems in agriculture and industry, which has given individuals more leeway in making a living. The growth of responsibility systems is already provoking differences in wealth; these, in turn, will have a social consequence.12
Deng's efforts have not been without opposition. He was able to get grudging acceptance of many of his proposals at the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee, but it was several more years before he could purge those who advocated the two "whatevers, " that is, those who were not receptive to rapid changes in policy. He finally succeeded in purging Hua in stages, as Premier in the summer of 1980 and as Party Chairman at the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1981. Deng's most important priorities have been getting his chosen successors in place and in reforming the Party apparatus. He has made compromises in other areas to obtain his objectives. He joined in the closing of "Democracy Wall" and the clampdown on the dissident movement, which he had originally encouraged. He compromised with Chen Yun over economic management issues and supported the economic readjustment of the early 1980s, though he was concerned about its implications for Chinese relations with Japan and the United States. He has also compromised over the questions of relations with the Soviet Union and the United States.
With respect to the issue of Sino-U.S. and Sino-Soviet relations, Deng apparently preferred close cooperation with the United States and strong opposition to the Soviet Union. In 1979, Deng clearly envisioned the United States as part of the united front against Soviet hegemonism. At the same time, while some of Deng's reforms were being criticized in 1980 during a period of economic reassessment and readjustment, the U.S. Presidential campaign brought up Taiwan. Deng apparently believed that the Taiwan question could be put on the back burner and resolved over a long period of time, but Taiwan was quickly made into a contentious issue among the Chinese leaders.13 Over the next two years China became increasingly critical of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan and of U.S. global policy in general. This discontent reflects Deng's compromises with other leaders, as does the decision to seek consultations with the Soviet Union.
Thus we can see that important policy changes reflect struggles among the Chinese leadership. China's attitude toward U.S. relations with Taiwan cannot be wholly explained by a rational actor model of China's assessment of the superpower balance. It is more clearly understood when the dynamic of informal coalition politics is added in. China's move to greater equidistance between the two superpowers must also be understood in the context of internal debate over alternative policies. In making predictions about the next ten years, one should remember that changing coalitions among the leadership will have a decisive influence on what policies are adopted.
Just as Chinese perceptions of the United States must be considered from the standpoint of both the "rational actor" and "bureaucratic politics" approaches, so must American perceptions of China. Both models help us understand how the relationship has developed in the past decade. In his writings, Henry Kissinger has established that the principal impetus for U.S. overtures to improve relations with China in the early 1970s was to balance the Soviet Union, "either to restrain it or to induce it to negotiate seriously."14 From the "rational actor" perspective, the development of U.S.-China relations in the early 1970s demonstrated a conscious desire on the part of American leaders to tune relations with China to relations with the U.S.S.R. Generally speaking, a policy of evenhandedness between the two countries was enunciated by successive administrations.
In fact, in spite of ups and downs noted earlier, the United States continued a gradual shift to a policy of favoritism toward Beijing. During the Carter administration, the growing power of the Soviet Union made some argue that a more cooperative relationship with Beijing was necessary to balance the U.S.S.R. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, generally credited with the "China Card" formula, strongly pushed for strategic cooperation with China, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Debates between Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance over the issue of security cooperation with Beijing continued throughout Vance's tenure, but prospects for heightened cooperation seemed to be growing.15
This trend peaked during the Carter administration and has begun to decline during the Reagan administration. While the Taiwan, textile, technology, and other previously stated issues were at the surface of the turnabout, an underlying conceptual factor was the view that the import of China in the global balance had been overstated. Or, as Ray Cline succinctly put it, "The China Card is a deuce!" China was increasingly viewed as a regional power rather than a global power. The argument that an alliance with Beijing would gain weakness rather than strength was frequently heard. American officials portrayed Japan as the linchpin of American strategy and policy in the Pacific and relegated China to a secondary role.16
The argument over whether China should be counted as a global power or a regional power by the United States continues to be debated. Brzezinski, for example, argues that "China should be treated as a genuine global partner, not merely as a bilateral squabbler over secondary issues such as textiles or even Taiwan."17 Similarly, an article by Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser faulted the Reagan administration for assigning less importance to China in U.S. global strategy and asserted that "a properly managed U.S.-Chinese strategic partnership will contribute to [the] global deterrence of the Soviet Union by increasing the likelihood of a coordinated two-front war should Moscow escalate a conflict."18 On the other hand, Ray Cline declares that the idea that China can be a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union is a myth."19 Similarly, Robert L. Downen calls for a "more realistic assessment on the part of U.S. policymakers regarding the limited strategic value of our ties with the PRC."20
Whatever side one wishes to take in this debate, there can be little doubt that the "rational actor" approach is crucial to an appropriate understanding of developments in Sino-American relations from the American perspective. Some of the issues that have emerged between the two sides in the past few years stem directly from a change in U.S. perceptions about the role China might be expected to play in the global strategic balance. However, it is also important to touch on the "bureaucratic politics" component. Indeed, the amount and openness of the literature in the United States on this component, particularly when compared with that available for China, inclines the student toward the latter approach. We are tempted to view the evolution of our China policy as the outcome of debate between Vance and Brzezinski (State vs. National Security Council) or in the current administration between the ideologues in the White House and the bureaucrats in the State Department.
While there are numerous examples of the impact of bureaucratic politics on American perceptions of and policies toward China, I shall mention only two. First, the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act and administration policies with respect to the question of arms sales to Taiwan reflect the outcome of wrangling among the White House, the Congress, and various executive departments. The decision whether to sell an enhanced FX aircraft to Taiwan, to continue the licensing arrangements for Taiwan production of the F-5, or to discontinue the sale of either had to take into account congressional interests (including the representatives from districts in which the aircraft were to be licensed or manufactured), organized lobbies, government agencies, political parties, and so on. The ultimate decision to continue the licensing of F-5s was as much the outcome of bargaining among the various groups as it was a "rational" judgment based on how it would affect Sino-U.S. relations. Likewise, the decision to grant political asylum to tennis player Hu Na involved the turf of a number of agencies, and while it was widely understood that the decision would likely harm Sino-U.S. relations, at least temporarily, the pressure brought to bear from conservative supporters of the President caused him to overrule advice from other quarters.21
We could, of course, go on at length on the role of bureaucratic politics in American perceptions, but these two examples amply illustrate the bureaucratic interplay that has always characterized the American approach. As has been noted, because of the structure and availability of information, there is a tendency to apply the "rational actor" approach when looking at the Chinese but the "bureaucratic politics" approach when viewing ourselves. Of course, nearly all of the bureaucratic actors invoke the "rational actor" approach in making their case. Thus, officials in the State Department may argue that a decision to sell certain arms to Taiwan damages the overall U.S.-China relationship and drives China closer to the Soviet Union, while others in the Congress argue that arms sales to Taiwan are necessary to promote U.S. credibility in the region and are therefore favorable to the overall balance of power.22 (Parenthetically, I would add that those of us in DOD know that such arguments go on within agencies as well as between them).
I conclude that our perceptions like those of the Chinese will also be influenced by both rationally based calculations of the balance of power––both globally and regionally––and the outcome of debates among the decision-makers. Since the two political systems are considerably different, there will be obvious differences in how these perceptions evolve, but it is important to keep both in mind as we attempt to predict certain developments in the future and suggest some approaches that might be adopted by the United States.
If we reconsider major factors that have influenced Sino-American relations in the past decade, we can predict that most of them will continue to be relevant in the coming decade. The first of these is that the Soviet Union will probably constitute the principal threat to both countries over the next ten years. The Soviet Union will continue to pose a global challenge to the United States. Also, though there will be continuing negotiations between China and the U.S.S.R. and perhaps a continuing easing of Sino-Soviet hostility, Moscow will remain as China's primary adversary.
The three fundamental conditions that China has stated as the basis for normalization of relations––namely, Soviet troop reductions along the border (including withdrawal from Mongolia), Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and cessation of Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea––are not conditions that will be easy for the Soviet Union to accept.23 Even if these conditions were to be partially met, the U.S.S.R. would still constitute the primary threat to Chinese security. Thus, from a balance-of-power perspective, Beijing must continue to seek means of counteracting Soviet pressure in the region. As long as the United States maintains its presence in the region, which it will almost certainly do in the next decade, our nation will figure prominently in China's calculations.
Another factor that will modify the first is that neither government will enjoy stability over the coming decade, and both will adopt policies reflective of political infighting and reassessed priorities independent of rational power calculations. In the United States, we will have three Presidential elections between now and 1993. There is already discussion of a Presidential visit to Beijing in 1984 as part of the campaign strategy. Electoral politics aside, each administration has gone through a China learning phase. Early in the Reagan administration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig pushed hard for a cooperative security arrangement with China, but following his departure, the importance of China was redefined. After a rocky beginning, there now seems to be some headway in reversing the downward trend in relations, but there is no guarantee that present U.S. policy will be maintained even if President Reagan is reelected.
Yet if there is a question of stability in the United States, how much greater is the issue when we consider China? Deng Xiaoping has been relatively successful in implementing administrative reforms and in getting his successors established. However, there has been strong opposition at key junctures with the result that Deng has been forced to compromise on many issues. We cannot be assured that Deng's reform structures will remain in place once he has departed the scene, which will almost certainly occur within the next decade. The Chinese Communists have not achieved a genuinely collective leadership since coming to power in 1949, and it is very likely that Deng's successors will fight among themselves after he leaves. In this environment, Chinese policy will be heavily influenced by shifts in the ruling coalition as ongoing struggles for power are resolved or partly resolved.
The principal issue between the United States and China over the next decade will continue to be Taiwan. I agree with John Garver that China will probably wage a political-psychological struggle with the United States on this issue while maintaining cooperation with the United States in balancing the power of the U.S.S.R.24 By putting pressure on Washington over Taiwan, Beijing will hope to reduce U.S. support for Taiwan and gain Taibei's acquiescence to Beijing's overtures. Inasmuch as Taiwan remains a contentious issue among the Chinese leaders, it will be used by some groups as a political weapon.
It is my belief that the issue of Taiwan is largely symbolic for the PRC. The reunification of the motherland is a nationalistic concept, and nationalism has been a fundamental premise of Chinese Communist political legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party has been jeopardized over the past few years by criticisms of past leaders such as Mao and Hua and more recently by sensational exposures of wide-scale corruption. Consequently, Chinese leaders can ill afford to give up a nationalistic appeal. There are probably few Chinese who really care whether Taiwan is brought back into the motherland; however, the Chinese Communist Party stands to suffer a loss of legitimacy, particularly among the politically active Party members, if it sustains much more embarrassment and humiliation over the Taiwan issue.25 Deng's latest appeal to Taiwan concedes practically everything necessary for complete independence, except sovereignty.26
Although there has been a great deal of criticism of the 17 August communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan, I believe it offers both sides a way to get the issue relegated to a less volatile stature. The July 1983 announcement that the United States would supply $530 million of arms to Taiwan was met with only a mild protest, evidencing Beijing's desire to cool the issue. So long as the United States carries out its arms sales to Taiwan quietly and in accordance with the 17 August agreement, I believe it will be more difficult for some Chinese leaders to use the issue as a bludgeon against others. Nevertheless, we should fully anticipate that internal political pressures on both sides will cause the Taiwan issue to simmer as an irritant in the relationship.27
A third factor will be the role played by other states in the region. Over the next ten years, Japan will become increasingly important to both China and the United States. Although Japan will fluctuate on a cooperation-competition continuum with both countries, the relationship will probably become increasingly competitive overall. Chinese leaders assert publicly that Sino-Japanese friendship is improving and will endure, but underneath significant tensions remain. The Chinese press has been highly critical of what is perceived to be resurgent militarism in Japan. Furthermore, new activism by Japan in foreign policy, combined with an incentive for improvements in Japanese military capabilities, is viewed with some suspicion in China.28 Also, the territorial dispute between China and Japan could erupt quickly if a disaffected leadership group in Beijing decided to use it as a political weapon.
Concern with a resurgent Japan will probably cause Beijing to seek moderation in its ties with Washington. China will want alternative sources of technology so as not to become over-dependent on either the United States or Japan. The Chinese leaders will also perceive that a U.S. presence in the region will act as a constraint on Japanese rearmament. Consequently, we may expect that Beijing will see the United States as a counterweight to both the Soviet Union and Japan. While the United States may well continue to view Japan as being of greater importance than China to the regional and global balance over the next decade, increasing economic friction with Japan will result in bureaucratic pressures in the U.S. government to take actions that will trouble the American-Japanese relationship. Thus, the United States may come to view relations with China in a somewhat different light. Rather than viewing China primarily in the context of superpower balance, China may be increasingly viewed in the context of our relations with Japan. The United States will seek to compete with Japan for markets in China as the Chinese economy changes, and, in another ten years, may well be looking toward China as a balance for Japanese political and military power.
Besides Japan, events in Korea and South and Southeast Asian countries will also influence Sino-U.S. relations. Because of continuing Soviet pressure, China will be anxious to maintain a cooperative relationship with North Korea; yet the United States will not lightly ease its commitment to South Korea. If both Koreas are able to achieve stable successions, then Sino-American cooperation in easing tensions on the peninsula is possible. The United States may encourage increasing contacts between China and South Korea, and both sides may work to promote negotiations between the two Korean parties. However, there are many pitfalls, and the Korean question will probably continue to pose difficulties for U.S.-Chinese relations.
The United States has been supportive of the ASEAN countries in the Indochina conflict. The ASEAN countries want a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea but do not want the return of the Khieu Samphan-Pol Pot leadership. They are hopeful that Sihanouk will consolidate his position and emerge in a post-Vietnamese Kampuchea. Beijing believes that only pressure will get the Vietnamese out and that the Pol Pot insurgents are the only viable force able to maintain pressure on the Vietnamese. For the United States, the solution of the Kampuchea question could ultimately contribute to denial of Vietnamese bases to the U.S.S.R. Several of the ASEAN countries believe that Beijing is a greater long-term threat to peace and security in the region than Hanoi. Consequently, increased U.S. cooperation with China, particularly in the military sector, could complicate U.S. ties with Southeast Asian countries. Also, if the present strategy of pressure against Vietnam to withdraw from Indochina does not begin to show results in the next two or three years, the United States may conclude that Beijing's hard line is not in the long-range interests of America.
Besides the geopolitical factors that will influence Sino-U.S. relations, we can expect that a number of specific issues will recur. I have already noted that such questions as technology transfer, railway bonds, textiles, human rights, and so on have had an impression on the record. The United States has made concessions on technology transfer, and Beijing is waiting to see how these will be implemented in fact. We have reached a new textile agreement, and I fully suspect that the Huguang railway bonds case will eventually be disposed of. Nevertheless, I believe that these kinds of issues will continue to come up from time to time. China is fully committed to maintaining a large number of students in the United States, perhaps the best approach in the long-term acquisition of technology.
The human rights issues will probably become more troublesome. A significant number of Chinese students have already sought political asylum in the United States, and a number of dissidents have begun circulating periodicals critical of the PRC. The human rights issue is one that has a strong political constituency in the United States, as we saw in the Hu Na case, and I fully suspect we will have more difficulty with the Chinese government over such issues. If Deng's bureaucratic reforms are successful, China could become organizationally more like the Soviet Union; certainly, there is no indication that the regime plans to ease its suppression of dissent in the near future. Consequently, I foresee that the human rights question will be troublesome over the next decade; however, the degree to which it is troublesome will depend on the state of the relationship in other areas. In other words, if the Taiwan issue is quiet and if negotiations over technology transfer, textiles, and other questions are going smoothly, I suspect that the Chinese will be more tolerant of inevitable criticism from American groups on human rights issues and will downplay defections.
When we bring these factors together, we come to the not-surprising conclusion that Sino-American relations over the next decade will be mostly cooperative, but with many areas of friction and disagreement. China will view the United States as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union and increasingly to Japan. It will also see the United States as an important trading partner and as a source for technology. Beijing will probably want to maintain a healthy student exchange with the United States as part of its technology acquisition program. As for the United States, even though China may be relegated to a regional role rather than a global one, no administration will go so far as to alienate China altogether. The areas of friction and disagreement will emerge from the domestic political environment in both countries. Disputes over textile imports, international organization memberships, and other problems will remain low-key unless volatile issues like Taiwan or human rights are mobilized by political interests in each country.
In making recommendations for U.S. policymakers, I am optimistic that it is possible to adopt policies that will maintain cooperative relations with China in the best interests of the United States.
My first recommendation is simply that we take into account the fundamental conclusion of this article: that policies in both countries stem from both rational calculations of power and internal political dynamics. All policies arrived at on the basis of rational calculations will be modified by domestic constraints. U.S. policymakers must remember that our policies will influence what happens in Beijing. This is not to say that we should design our policies to support a particular group of decision-makers in China, only that we must be aware that our policies will have an effect. In my view, rhetoric about our support for Taiwan and extensive publicity on arms sales provide ammunition for those who are against Chinese compromise on Taiwan. (It has done little to placate the dismay of the President's conservative political allies either.) Therefore, I believe we should adhere to the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act but do it without a great deal of hoopla and fanfare. We should especially avoid rhetoric that offends Beijing's sense of sovereignty.
More important, we must adhere to the President's pledge not to get the United States involved in the resolution of the Taiwan question between the two sides; the Taiwan question must be resolved by the two parties themselves, and we should leave it at that. Obviously, U.S. economic ties with Taiwan and continuing arms sales will have bearing on how the two sides approach each other, but to offer to mediate or assist in negotiations would only get the United States more deeply involved and increase the likelihood that internal politics would disrupt the present state of relations.
With regard to security affairs, my recommendation is that Washington avoid close security cooperation with Beijing. Although I do not believe that the China card is a deuce, I do feel that the United States has already made whatever gains it can by using China to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Closer security cooperation raises internal political pressure on both sides; it increases the prospects that opposition groups in both China and the United States will make the relationship a matter of political controversy, and it sets the stage for a dramatic falling out later on. I hasten to add that a principal reason for lingering Sino-Soviet animosity now is their attempted close security cooperation of the early 1950s. Besides, close security cooperation with Beijing now raises concern among our other friends and allies in Asia, notably the ASEAN countries. Low-key cooperation will maintain whatever value the relationship has in countering the buildup of Soviet military power, primarily the psychological value. Beyond this, I do think that we can participate in some dual technology cooperation and even in limited arms sales, but we should proceed cautiously.
Once can only hope that the next decade in Sino-American relations will be a decade of moderation. I have already suggested that it will not necessarily be one of stability because of the multiplicity of factors involved. Though there will be several difficult points of contention, I believe most of them can be weathered by gradualism and muddling through. Some have criticized the ambiguity in the Washington-Beijing relationship, but I believe that ambiguity is a natural state and need not be turned into hostility. Thus, our principal strategy for the coming decade should be to manage problems as they arise with an eye toward primarily cooperative relations. We can participate constructively in the modernization of China while avoiding excessive security cooperation; occasionally, this cooperation will require concessions on our part and also patience and even, at times, firmness. Though this participation will be difficult, it offers the best hope for securing American interests over the next decade.
National Defense University
Washington, D.C.
Notes
1. Some articles of interest include: Robert A. Scalapino, "Uncertainties in Future Sino-U.S. Relations," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp. 681-96; also by Scalapino, "In Quest of National Interest––The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China," 28th Bernard Moses Memorial Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, October 28, 1982, University of California, 1983; Allen S. Whiting, "Sino-American Relations: The Decade Ahead," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp. 697-719; Donald S. Zaboria, "Gauging the Sino-Soviet Thaw," The New Leader, November 29,1982, pp. 3-5; Edmund Lee, "Beijing's Balancing Act," Foreign Policy, Summer 1983, pp. 27-46; Harry Harding, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy," Problems of Communism, March-April 1983, pp. 1-19; John F. Copper, "Sino-American Relations: On Track or Off Track?" Asia Pacific Community, Summer 1982, pp. 13-24; Robert G. Sutter, "Future Sino-Soviet Relations and Their Implications for the United States," JXI428 China D (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, December 30, 1982).
2. For example, Thomas Robinson states: "… Since China has been the weakest of the three [superpowers], it has had to accommodate its general international orientation and many of its specific policies to power realities within the triangle. Thus, for Beijing, the most important questions have always been: which of the superpowers is the greater enemy? and is the danger so high that major compromises must be made with the other?" "China's Dynamism in the Strategic Triangle," Current History, September 1983, p. 241.
3. On factionalism in Chinese politics, see Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, 1981). Pye has reservations about the application of factional politics to foreign affairs; see pp. 34-36. Michael Ng-Quinn also argues that analyzing factions has limited utility in understanding Chinese foreign policy. He maintains that the best approach is using the international system as the level of analysis, "The Analytic Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, June 1983, pp. 203-24.
4. William Heaton, A United Front against Hegemonism: Chinese Foreign Policy into the 1980s (Monograph 80-3, National Defense University, March 1980).
5. William Heaton, "China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy," Asian Survey, August 1982, pp. 779-800.
6. Qi Xin, "From Strategic 'Alliance' to U.S.-China Bilateral Relations," Chi-Shi Nien-Tai [The Seventies], April 1983, pp. 51-54; Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) #4005, pp. 77-84. Also see Xing Shugang, Li Yunhua, and Liu Yingna, "Soviet-U.S. Balance of Power and Its Impact on the World Situation in the 1980s," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], January 1983, pp. 25-31; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, China, 21 April 1983, pp. Al-A12.
7. "Eliminate Obstacles in Sino-U.S. Relations," Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), 20 February 1983, p. 2; Daily Report, 24 February 1983, p. W1-W2. Also see "Chinese Ambassador to the USA on Sino-US Relations," Beijing Review, May 16, 1983, pp. 14-15.
8. Thomas Robinson, "Choice and Consequences in Sino-American Relations," Orbis, Spring 1981.
9. Huang Shuhai, "Huan Xiang Reviews Current International Situation," 2 parts, Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), August 16, 17, 1983; Daily Report, 19 August 1983, pp. W1-W7. Also see A. Doak Barnett, "China's International Posture: Signs of Change," China Briefing 1982 edited by Richard C. Bush (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 85-102.
10. In July 1983, a new textile agreement between China and the United States was signed, and in August, China lifted its embargo of U.S. agricultural products. Trade in the first half of 1983 had declined from the same period in 1982.
11. A recent example of factional groups is that of Victor C. Falkenheim who categorizes the groups as diehard leftists, conservative reformers, and liberal reformers, "Political Reform in China," Current History, September 1982, p. 259.
12. For an excellent analysis of Deng's reform policies, see H. Lyman Miller, "China's Administrative Revolution," Current History, September 1983, pp. 270-74. Also see Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush, "China's Political Evolution: 1972-82," Problems of Communism, September-October 1982, pp. 1-19.
13. On the development of the Taiwan issue, see John W. Garver, "Arms Sales, the Taiwan Question, and Sino-U.S. Relations," Orbis, Winter 1983, pp. 999-1035.
14. Henry A. Kissinger, "What Should Come out of This Trip," Washington Post, January 30,1983, p. C8.
15. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).
16. Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S.-China Ties: Lower Expectations," New York Times, February 2, 1983, p. 3.
17. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Convincing Europe and China," New York Times, January 31, 1983, p. 25.
18. Banning Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "The Strategic Importance of Sino-American Relations," USA Today, July 1983, pp. 15-16.
19. Ray S. Cline, "U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia," A U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia: The 1980s and Beyond, edited by Ramon H. Myers (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 1-15.
20. Robert L. Downen, "The Shifting Foundation," paper prepared for workshop of American Bar Association at Stamford, Connecticut, 20 May 1983, p. 26.
21. Developments in the decisions pertaining to the FX and Hu Na cases have been obtained through numerous discussions with U.S. government officials and involved parties.
22. A major debate within the U.S. government has been over the issue of security cooperation with the PRC and, more specifically, over the prospect of arms sales to China. For example, see the papers and discussion in "The Implications of U.S.-China Military Cooperation," a workshop sponsored by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Congressional Research Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1982).
23. In an interview with Mainichi Shimbun on 15 August 1983, CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang stated that it would take 20 or 30 years for China and the Soviet Union to normalize their relations completely and that the era of close Sino-Soviet cooperation, the early 1950s, would never be restored.
24. Garver, p. 1030.
25. For a discussion of this position, see William R. Heaton, "Assessing the U.S.-China Connection," unpublished manuscript (Washington: National War College, 1983).
26. Deng's latest offer was made in a meeting with Professor Winston L. Y. Yang of Seton Hall University. See Yang Li-yu, "Deng Xiaoping's Latest Concept on Peaceful Reunification," Chihshih Nientai [The Seventies], August 1, 1983, pp. 17-19; Daily Report, 4 August 1983, pp. Wl-W6. An abbreviated version of the key points is in the New York Times, August 21,1983, p. 20. Hu Yaobang confirmed to Mainichi Shimbun that Deng's statement was the collective position of the Chinese leadership.
27. The Chinese approach to Hong Kong is related to the Taiwan question. Although China has said that it would recover sovereignty over Hong Kong by 1997, Chinese leaders have tried to assure Hong Kong residents and foreigners that no measures will be adopted to damage Hong Kong's economic well-being. Beijing believes that a satisfactory resolution of the Hong Kong issue could help its appeal for the reunification of Taiwan.
28. In addition to the controversy over Japanese textbooks and films, Chinese media have been reporting more general "unfavorable" trends in Japan. A Xinhua commentary on 20 August 1983, entitled "A New Trend on the Japanese Political State," noted an "adverse current." The commentary observed that there was a movement within the Liberal Democratic Party to amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, that members of the Diet were making regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, that Prime Minister Nakasone had pushed for a drive to make Japan a "big political power," and that Japanese arms exporting to the United States and other countries was increasing. The commentary said that these trends were of "grave concern" to the Japanese people and were causing worry abroad. Daily Report, 23 August 1983, pp. D2-D3.
William R. Heaton, Jr. (B.S., M.A., Brigham Young University; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley), is Professor of National Security Affairs, National War College, and a major in the USAF Reserve. He has been a China analyst with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and an Associate Professor, USAF Academy (1973-78). Dr. Heaton is coauthor of books on China and insurgency and author of numerous articles on China, Mongolia, and Thailand.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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