Air University Review, January-February 1984

Winnowing Fact From Opinion*

*The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Staff Sergeant John Simpson.

WILLIAM S. LIND'S response here to my disagreement with his original article is more stale wine in the same old bottles. Most disconcerting is his "matter-of-fact" style woven throughout both the first piece and his answer to my retort. Many of his "facts" are simply opinions, and many of these are not grounded at all in solid research.

One example, which I will dwell on at length, speaks volumes, demonstrating Lind's superficial understanding of military history. Lind objects to my comment that "technological superiority has often provided the margin for victory." He argues, conversely, that if my statement were true, he would "be working for the Reichstag, not the Senate." German technological superiority during World War II is a myth. There were, of course, singular German technological successes (e.g., the Me 262 jet interceptor), but the weight of technology was on the Allied side and it contributed to our victory.

The Germans believed in the aerial bombing theories of Giulio Douhet yet failed to develop an adequate, let alone superior, bombsight, and Germany failed here with outstanding optical facilities. In addition to the fact that Germany had no bombsight equal to the American Norden, all attempts by Germany to build a heavy bomber were tragic farces. (One notes also the German failure to produce an atomic bomb.) The Germans, furthermore, failed to see the utility of the British Chain Home radar system until it helped defeat them in the Battle of Britain. Moreover, although the Germans believed the United Kingdom to be their key enemy in the late thirties through mid-1941, they failed to produce forces capable of conquering an island seapower. Furthermore, German tanks and artillery were often inferior to those used by their opponents, especially in 1940 when the Germans achieved their greatest triumph.

The truth is this: Germany was defeated by technology in large part, and by logistics in the main, and the latter is affected greatly by the former. Certainly the British and American operational research departments were successful in defeating every piece of Germany's wizardry during the war except the V-2 rocket. The relatively light load (2000 pounds and less) of the V-2 and its wild inaccuracy reduced the need to develop a countermeasure. One needs to look no farther than the Normandy invasion to gain a full appreciation of the depth of Allied technological superiority. One explains the German victories (except for the significant defeat in the Battle of Britain from 1939 through the autumn of 1941) by superior German land-fighting doctrine (especially armored doctrine); troop cohesion, leadership, and training; and tactical (as opposed to strategic) genius--certainly not technology. It was not that Germany did not have brilliant scientists and technologists, but rather that the Nazi regime between 1933 and 1945 was so inept and corrupt that it could not effectively use its many resources.

Similarly, Lind is unable to separate fact from opinion regarding the F- 15 and F- 1 6. He writes, matter-of-factly, that the F-16 is the better airplane. One asks: better how? The F-15 is an all-weather airplane that climbs faster to a higher altitude, is faster straight and level, has the greater range, carries the larger payload, and is more adaptable because of its greater capacity. The F-15, furthermore, has a slightly higher in-commission rate.

Lind's implication that the F-15 is of poor tactical quality does not square with the views of Air Force fighter pilots. The F-15 has a superior radar/avionics suite that enables it to have twice the detection range (four times the detection volume) of the F-16. Perhaps more to the point is the fact that these two airplanes do not perform the same mission. For all-weather interception the F-15 is superior, but for close-in air-to-air combat the F-16 is better (although the F-16 is being used today more and more as an air-to-ground fighter). The F-15 will, over time and with the advent of superior standoff weapons both air-to-air and air-to-ground, probably prove more useful to the Air Force because of the flexibility that its size and internal space give it.

Lind's argument that he can buy twice as many F-16s for the money as F-15s is inaccurate: an F-16 costs more than 70 percent the price of an F-15. More significant, he fails to deal with the questions of finding, training, and paying the extra pilots and mechanics to fly and fix all these extra aircraft. Where, furthermore, is the ramp space to store them, the shelters to protect them, and especially, in Europe, the airspace to train the pilots?

Regarding the rest of Lind's retort, my remarks are essentially a repeat of my first answer. He argues that if the chiefs really cared about their people, they would have offered the Congress systems to be cut and then applied the money saved to pay raises. Lind knows better. To offer any system because it had a relatively low priority would mean simply the loss of the system; the saving would not be used to give the military a pay raise. The chiefs are not in a bargaining position. Regarding the qualities of military people serving as strategists, I would offer the differential promotion rates for those in strategy-formulating positions to counter Lind's opinion that the services put weaker people in these positions. On DOD opposition to the so-called "independent" director of operational testing and evaluation, I would note that the office proposed in the legislation would be within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, under the Secretary--so much for independence. There is such an office now in the Under Secretary of Defense office for Research and Engineering. DOD opposed the legislation because it found the new office to be duplicative in some senses and to divide the operational testing and evaluating process in others. Ultimately, they believed, such a new office would fragment an already difficult job.

The services are criticized by Lind because they request fewer weapons than they say they need. The needs, however, are expressed in their respective planning force documents, which are fiscally unconstrained evaluations of the forces required to defeat the threat with a reasonable assurance of success. When the services begin to build their programs, however, they are given strict financial guidelines in which to schedule their requirements against their resources; and there is never enough money.

Finally, nobody wants complexity--everybody wants simplicity--but the way to achieve simplicity with effectiveness is through technology. Everybody opposes increasing technological complexity if it costs more and produces fewer numbers that are also less effective (Lind's straw man). But given the fiscal and manpower constraints facing the United States, the relentless pursuit for technology to multiply effectiveness is essential. In the near future, standoff weapons will allow our forces to kill more tanks safely than in the past. The long-range radar of the F-15 allows it to assess enemy formations at great ranges and employ ordnance (like the long-range, all-aspect, supersonic AIM-7) beyond visual range and in all weather conditions. Ask a fighter pilot how important it is to get the first tallyho and the first kill.

Lind's criticism is that of one who has not participated in the hurly-burly of developing a force structure, who has never been confronted with choosing a system when faced with the inevitable compromises with which a democracy must contend. It is much easier to criticize the results of this process than to devise a better approach. After all, Lind and his criticism are a part of the process. We need critics like Bill Lind to keep us on our toes by constantly challenging our choices and forcing us to rethink our decisions.

Hq USAF

Contributor

Colonel Alan L. Gropman (Ph.D., Tufts University) is Deputy Director of Air Force Plans for Conceptual Development and Planning Integration, Hq USAF. Previously, he was Director of Research and Associate Dean of the National War College. Colonel Gropman has written two books, numerous book reviews and articles, and has been a frequent contributor to the Review. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the Air War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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