Institution Building in the All-Volunteer Force

The two great democracies of North America, Canada and the United States, are concerned with the issue of an appropriate evolutionary model, or blueprint, for the all-volunteer armed forces.³While rather obvious differences between the two countries exist in international salience, scale, and military traditions, they share a common "crisis of adaptation" in their volunteer military institutions. The litany of military manpower difficulties, both in regular and reserve segments, is remarkably the same in both countries.⁴

It is extremely difficult to assess the current all-volunteer force (AVF) situation without a model of desirable future institutional parameters. With notable exceptions, those engaged in the shaping of AVF manpower policies do not appear concerned with longer-term developmental goals or trends.⁵In their headlong rush toward the future as part of the social scientific growth industry involved in solving the discrete bureaucratic problems of AVFs, they have lost sight of the military as an institution in society.⁶ Policy choices are being induced rather than deduced from a model of institutional development, with the result that there are no guarantees other than blind faith in bureaucratic rationality, that a particular policy choice will articulate with others in the longer term. The institution begins, in essence, to drift out of control. A central focus here will be on policies and organizational changes likely to achieve the apparently contradictory goals of increased civil-military integration and increased internal integration within the military, especially in the ground force segment.

One further point is in order: I support Morris Janowitz’s argument that in the longer term the idea of national service⁷—a military manifestation of Daniel Bell’s Civitas⁸—must provide the ideological umbrella for military participation and manpower supply. At the same time, Janowitz’s assessment that the immediate concern must be with the survival and adaptation of the AVF concept remains valid:

Although one can agree in principle with Professor Janowitz’s assessment, difficulties remain with the term "success of the all-volunteer force."

Success and Control of AVFs

The debate between critics and advocates of the AVF concept has gradually changed through time into a debate over the relative success and effectiveness of current practices. What is now controversial is not the decision to implement an AVF model but rather the need and scope for institutional change. It is here that the same indicators of manpower supply are interpreted in completely different lights.

Charles Moskos has asserted that the AVF in the United States is "on the ragged edge of survival," at least if we consider various human resource indicators.¹⁰This is surely a controversial diagnosis and one that many would question. Yet one is not so sure that the AVF as a complex federal bureaucracy is on the ragged edge of survival, for it is quite clearly a going concern. It is a beehive of activity, as studies proliferate, recruits enter and are trained, and military personnel flit through its structure. Its technology does not seem in danger of imminent collapse, and the process of acquiring new technologies is proceeding apace. Nor can one say with any degree of authority that the AVF is on the ragged edge of survival as a deterrent or effective "fighting" force. The assessment of cohesion and operational effectiveness in peacetime is a complex undertaking.¹¹

But even the most ardent defender of the current status quo would not deny that there is room for improvement in manpower practices and personnel policies, for the limited set of manpower indicators of some reliability and validity do suggest there is a gap between goals and performance, both in the regular and reserve components. This holds for both Canada and the United States. It is more important, though, to ask questions about the blueprint for organizational adaptation and the degree of control being exerted over what Moskos would call the "emergent military." In short, where is the AVF going, and who is shaping its development?

One’s tentative answer to this question may be far more worrisome than Dr. Moskos’s assertion, for the AVF appears to be drifting out of control toward the paradoxical shoals of social isolation and unrestrained civilianization. A blueprint for institution building seems to be lacking despite the policy-planning effort being expended. One has the impression that civilian and military leaders are on a runaway stagecoach. They have neither a grip on the reins nor a map of where they are going in relation to the environment. In the stagecoach itself, there is bedlam as the passengers are bounced about and the horses are frothing at the mouth.

This is only an impression, for it is hard to document the degree of control being exercised over the developmental fate of the AVF, just as it is difficult to document the degree of cohesion in military units in North America. One indicator, though, lies in the discrepancy between public and private viewpoints of members of the officer corps, those individuals who nominally are in control of such development. Having just completed a fairly extensive survey of serving Canadian officers, I am struck by the fact that the majority of experienced officers, especially in ground combat units, decry current trends when interviewed in private.¹²They do not like what they perceive as a trend toward civilianization and are in fact estranged from the very institution they are deemed to control. Yet (and this is perhaps the ultimate paradox of the AVF) they are precisely the same group that is making the system a going concern and shaping its future by a "can-do" approach to the implementation of policies. It is this estrangement which suggests that there is some validity in the "out-of-control" proposition. In effect, it represents the particular trap sprung upon an officer corps that accepts an ethos of uncritical loyalty on the part of subordinates.¹³

The issue of control over developments in the AVF is raised because it appears central to any discussion of strategies for institution building in the longer term. One must presuppose that the ability and the willingness to control and shape future development exists, otherwise we are engaged in a purely academic exercise. It is clear, though, that there are limits to the degree of control which can be exerted over the AVF institution-building process. For example, the shaping of future events will be constrained by the requirement to operate within the traditions of democratic social control and voluntaristic military participation, both of which are essential features of liberal democracies. At the same time, bureaucratic inertia will have to be overcome, and military and civilian leaders will play a key role in this process. It is difficult to project any meaningful institution building without assuming consensus and commitment among leaders regarding long-term goals.

Some of the strategies for institution building outlined here will not, of course, require agreement among military and civilian leaders. Some, like concrete steps to reduce personnel turbulence at all levels of the AVF, do not require civilian approbation at all, and the only consideration is the military’s willingness to bring turbulence under control. However, involvement of civilian, political, bureaucratic, and educational leaders would be necessary to implement strategies of the type advocated by Moskos in his article on "saving" the AVF because legislative and budgetary allocation changes would be required. In the same way, one suspects that the creation of a viable regimental system for the American Army would require extra departmental support.

Internal and External
Integration of the AVF

A sociological concern with AVF institution building requires the examination of the interdependent issues of the linkages between the armed forces and society and the internal cohesion and effectiveness of the military as a unique social system with combat goals. The requirement is to develop a blueprint for shaping both convergent and divergent trends¹⁴to create an emergent military that is operationally effective as a deterrent or combatant force and firmly embedded in a society where the public perceives military service as an essential component of adult political life. It requires a blueprint which fuses civitas and the traditional military ethic of unlimited liability for those in uniform.¹⁵In the long run, the AVF should reflect high internal and high external integration.

These objectives are not, as many analysts would have us believe, mutually exclusive and contradictory.¹⁶ I do not agree with those who argue that institution building in the AVF should be only concerned with developing internal cohesion and martial virtues in the armed forces, in effect treating the military in isolation from society. Many of the manpower problems of the AVF are linked to qualitative trends in recruitment from society as marginal citizens become problematic soldiers.¹⁷There are enormous risks in concentrating solely on building up linkages between the military and the wider social order without considering the issue of operational effectiveness. As one analyst has pointed out, we need to seek the middle road:

The task is difficult but not impossible, and it does not necessarily have to involve an attempt to socially engineer a segmented military of the type advocated by William Hauser, for example.¹⁹

It is crucial that AVF planners break away from the traps inherent in "zero sum" thinking about developmental thrusts for the AVF. An attempt to increase internal cohesiveness does not necessarily have to mean a corresponding decrease in linkages with civilian society. A cohesive and committed military does not necessarily have to be isolated from contamination by civilian values, and highly committed members of the military profession need not live out their careers in splendid isolation within the military community on posts or bases. Similarly, we must not assume that attempts to increase military-civilian linkages always and irrevocably lead to a corresponding decline in operational effectiveness, cohesion, and commitment within the military. Both lines of thinking represent what I would term the tyranny of concepts and what others might well refer to as a fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

In thinking through the issue of AVF institution building, it seems appropriate to focus our thinking on the idea of integration. Integration, despite its definitional ambiguity, implies a drawing together of disjunctive elements in society and as such is related to the analysis of linkages between the military and society and within the military itself.²⁰In this regard, the distinction between internal integration and external integration is of particular usefulness in thinking through these issues. (This distinction provided the conceptual basis for an article by John D. Blair on attitudes among members of the AVF in the United States.)²¹ External integration refers to social and normative linkages between the military and society, while internal integration refers to linkages within the military, and thus implicitly to the issue of internal cohesion.

Employing the traditional categorization of levels into high and low along each dimension, we obtain a two-by-two matrix which can be useful in orienting our thinking about the current character of AVFs and their future developmental alternatives. These possibilities— which are rudimentary ideal types—are shown in Figure 1.

Four possible images of the AVF are indicated in Figure 1: (a) military which is low on both internal and external integration; (b) a military which is low on internal integration and high on external integration; (c) a military which is high on internal integration and low on external integration; and (d) a military which is high on both internal and external integration.

Where one places the current AVFs of Canada and the United States will obviously depend on one’s frame of reference. It is possible, as Moskos and Lissak have shown, to identify indicators of both convergence and divergence in current AVF dynamics.²²One might suggest, though, that a review of a wide range of indicators points to one classificatory alternative rather than others in assessing the current AVFs, and it has already been argued that the long-term development or adaptation of the AVF concept must be toward the high external and high internal integration model.

Searching for the middle ground between analysts who see the AVF as becoming more isolated from society and those who see the military’s traditional institutional character being eroded by the process of civilianization, one is pushed toward the conclusion that the current AVF approximates the low internal and low external integration type. It is high on neither dimension but has become a specialized bureaucracy with weak ties to society while, at the same time, exhibiting low internal integration due to a high degree of structural and attitude differentiation. In slightly different terms, its linkages to society and its internal cohesion have both suffered in recent years.

A number of indicators that point in this direction have been drawn from the literature. No attempt has been made to weight them, and their classification into external and internal types is left deliberately inexact, for there are indicators that are linked to both. Some indicators of low external integration are the following:

My reading of the literature suggests that these AVF integration indicators are virtually the same for Canada and the United States.

The list represents a series of areas where there is scope for improvement. In this sense, it becomes obvious that scope for improvement exists along both the internal and external dimensions. The process of AVF institution building requires that we be concerned with strategies oriented toward the improvement of both internal and external integration; the blueprint must be aimed at both sets of indicators. Again, one must break away from the trap of zero sum conceptualization: there are some strategies that contribute to increases along both dimensions, even though their primary focus may be on one or the other.

Strategies for
External Integration

The immediate adaptive problem faced by all-volunteer forces is the management of a recruitment crisis brought on by demographic shifts and by the increasing competition between military service and post secondary opportunities. This problem takes priority over that of manning the reserves. The need is to expand the recruitment base and achieve a more representative distribution of backgrounds among recruits. As it stands now, the participation of middle-class youth is low and the quality of recruits problematic, creating high loss rates in the in-house training system for enlisted personnel.

The definition of military service as a job rather than a stage in the transition to political adulthood in a democracy simply reinforces this crisis. It is the educational system, itself facing a decline in enrollments, that beckons middle-class youth as a steppingstone to civilian careers. In this context, the overreliance on economic incentives to attract a career force tends to perpetuate existing patterns of marginal recruitment.

Although a future objective could be the development of a concept of national service, in the short run strategies must be found that increase the integration between military service and educational institutions. This strategy seems most appropriate for broadening the social base for participation in the AVF and improving the quality of recruits. This approach is currently being developed in Canada²³and has recently been advocated by Moskos in the United States.²⁴

Essentially, this strategy involves a shift in emphasis from a "career" professionalized force ideal to acceptance of the concept of a two-tier career system as the main building block in manpower plans. It is a social fact of life in industrial democracies that most youth will turn their backs on a military career, however economically attractive that career may be. On the other hand, there may be many, especially with the appropriate combination of incentives, who would find a short military tour attractive. If military participation for this group were to be linked to funding of educational benefits, as Moskos advocates, participation would likely increase.

This external integration logic underlies strategies being developed in Canada to broaden the recruitment base. Again, we are not aiming at procuring a great increase in the number of career personnel but only at expanding the recruit market through a better fit between military and civilian educational structures. Among other things, the Canadian military is developing concepts of lateral entry, whereby individuals are brought in for a short service period into trades that match their civilian qualifications. Another experimental strategy being tried is a program to have military technicians trained in civilian vocational schools in two- and three-year-courses. Civilian administrators have shown an interest in adapting existing programs to meet military requirements (these adaptations are relatively minor), and students are enrolled in the military throughout their course and spend their summers training in military settings. At the end of their course, these students serve a period of obligatory service.

What is unique about this training program is that the participants are enlisted personnel destined for employment in that capacity in the regular military. The program builds linkages between the military and society by placing military personnel in civilian settings and sensitizing civilian educational authorities to aspects of military service as well as reducing training costs by transferring them from military to civilian institutions.

Whether recruits are attracted to military training by the prospect of subsequent educational benefits or attracted to civilian schools by the prospect of military benefits is not really the issue here: in both cases the result is an increased integration of the military and society. One suspects that this form of institution building in the AVF will increase through the coming decade, although internal resistance can be expected as career personnel decry benefits offered to those who have not "started at the bottom." Its general impact will be to increase external integration. However, we cannot assume on a priori grounds that such strategies will weaken internal cohesiveness. Again, the trap of zero sum thinking looms on the horizon.

Another factor that may undermine this institution-building strategy is an insensitivity to national strategic goals on the part of civilian political, educational, and media leaders. The AVF replaces the moral nexus of national service and citizenship with the cash nexus of the marketplace, and since military participation rates are lowered, civilian leaders are less likely to have served in the military. Today, the great majority of middle-class youth enter adult roles without military experience. One can expect them to be insensitive and apathetic toward the issues of military service and military manpower supply.

Perhaps the preceding comments are more applicable to Canada, with its three decades of AVF experience, than to the United States. I am continually struck by the fact that the great majority of adults I meet in this middle-class segment of life have had no military experience. (This does not apply, of course, to the older generation with World War II experience.) In many instances, especially in a university setting, I have found myself the first military officer ever encountered by participants. These recurrent personal experiences are more convincing than survey data, and they illustrate the fact that under the AVF scenario, military service and middle-class life are disconnected. One suspects that this will become the situation in the United States as the years of AVF experience accumulate. But unless the middle class comes to define military service as a social problem, public support for strategies of external integration is unlikely to be mobilized.²⁵

It is in this context that a further strategy for external integration merits consideration even though it will be reacted to negatively in some quarters. The military should consider encouraging a high proportion of its career personnel, i.e., those who manifest high internal satisfaction, to live off-base and interact with the civilian community. It is important to distinguish between the first-termer, who requires immersion in the military community, and what we in Canada are coming to conceptualize as the "mature serviceperson." The latter has demonstrated a commitment to military service and is also locked in after approximately ten years due to pension considerations. There is not much risk in encouraging career military personnel to live off-base, and a considerable number of potential benefits can accrue to the external integration of the AVF.

Zero sum thinkers who advocate an isolated AVF will see this strategy as potentially contributing to further civilianization and erosion of the military community which has such nostalgic appeal. Yet one is not so sure that such would be the case if the personnel involved were what have been termed "mature" servicepersons. The argument that isolation of the military throughout their careers is necessary for maintaining promilitary values is not supported empirically by research.

Such a strategy could also be linked to institution building in the less visible segment of the military: the reserves. Residential stability and community involvement of regular military personnel might facilitate transition into local reserve units after a period of professional military service. If reserve service of exprofessionals were linked to educational benefits, as Moskos advocates, this possibility would be increased.

The manning of the reserves is one of the most difficult institution-building tasks facing the AVF. Without the pressure of the draft, there are few current incentives to participate. Middleclass community participation is negligible, and, in Canada at least, the majority of reserve soldiers are high school and university students earning tuition money.²⁶They constitute a highly unstable manpower pool, and annual turnover is high. Reserve service tends to be a steppingstone to service in the professional AVF rather than vice versa. In Canada, roughly 40 percent of professionals have reserve experience prior to enlistment.²⁷ The professional military feeds on the reserves and returns little to its feeding ground.

One of the compounding factors is the trend toward professionalization of the reserve system. Citizen soldiers find their lives increasingly controlled by military professionals and centralized controls. The self-esteem of the enthusiastic amateur suffers in such a situation, and the incentive for participation is eroded. Overall, an arguable case can be made that success in strengthening the reserves under the AVF concept will hinge on the professional military’s willingness to relinquish control over local systems.

There does not appear to be an easy solution to the "withering away" phenomenon of reserves under the AVF umbrella. One must agree with Moskos’s conclusion that ". . . without much greater reliance on prior-service personnel, there seems to be no way to salvage Army reserve components in an all-volunteer context," but the current dynamics are all in the other direction. Support is needed, for the reserves, as citizen soldiers whose voluntarism is grounded in local communities, constitute a crucial factor in external integration of the AVF. Their problems will not be solved by making them a more attractive "moon-lighting" alternative.²⁸

Strategies for
Internal Integration

Economic solutions are unlikely to provide an effective institution-building strategy for increasing internal integration in the AVF. During the 1970s, pay increases for Canadian personnel consistently exceeded rises in the consumer price index, and yet manpower problems also increased. Research in both Canada and the United States consistently points up the role of noneconomic factors in personnel retention and unit morale. Economic incentives disproportionately attract a segment of the potential recruit market which has a lower probability of first-term survival and successful integration into the AVF. Low-quality recruits produce high training wastage rates, which create turbulence, etc., in a vicious circle.

Three issues stand out when considering institution building along the internal integration dimension: retention and first-term attrition, especially in the ground combat arms; internal value cleavages; and unit instability and personnel turbulence. The AVF planners have to develop adaptive strategies for coping with or reducing first-term attrition, reducing attitudinal conflicts, and lowering current levels of personnel instability in military units. Some strategies for internal institution building address more than one of these issues. The Canadian practice of streaming recruits into the combat arms for three years, followed by voluntary reassignment to technical and administrative support trades, is a case in point, for it improves manning of the combat arms and reduces attitudinal tensions between combat and support elements.

Youth in industrial democracies exhibit a tendency toward job experimentation in the initial years of work. The question then centers on the degree to which AVF planners can adapt to this social phenomenon by either distinguishing in personnel and career policies between temporary citizen soldiers and career soldiers, or by building opportunities for job shifting into career trajectories. In either case, one is moving away from the single-track career pattern toward a dual track, or even multitrack, career system.

The case for a two-track (or tier) career system in the United States Army has been put forward by Moskos and will not be discussed here. This system accepts the evidence that the majority of new recruits to the AVF cannot be expected to become career personnel—despite the decided preference of planners for this outcome—and proposes a policy change in light of it. Whether it will have consequences for internal integration, one cannot say. It does seem to be a segmentalist approach, in that it implicitly accepts differences in career values and military sentiments among junior and senior personnel.

The two-track system used in the Canadian Forces since 1976, on the other hand, increases internal integration within Canada’s AVF. Originally proposed as a solution to problems in combat arms recruitment, it has since been broadened to include naval trades. Basically, an increasing proportion of recruits are streamed into the combat trades for a first tour of three years. At enlistment, they are given guarantees that if they meet standards they will be reassigned to a technical or administrative support trade after that period and given the appropriate trade training, continuing their military careers in that second path. Correspondingly, recruitment of individuals directly into support trades is reduced. A cadre of career individuals is retained in the combat arms and given the incentive of accelerated promotion to command positions. Its formal title is the Land Operations Trade Reassignment Program, abbreviated to LOTRP (pronounced low-trip).

LOTRP represents an adaptation for the AVF that increases the numbers and quality of recruits to the ground combat arms, the force segment historically plagued by shortfalls and low-quality recruits. Recruiting objectives have become easier to attain in the Canadian context since 1976, and, moreover, wastage rates on support training courses have been extremely low among individuals transferring from the combat arms. This means that training costs (which tend to be higher in technical support trades) are reduced. As one senior trainer commented during a recent survey of attitudes in Canada’s Army: "We’ll take all we can get; they are already soldiers and keen as hell to learn a support trade." Similarly, a commander in a service battalion (combat support unit) wrote that "The LOTRP Master Corporal with an arms background stands out like a sore thumb in this unit. . . you can be confident that he will pull his weight in the field."²⁹

These comments point up the further institutional consequences of the LOTRP program: it reduces attitude cleavages between combat and support personnel by leavening Army support trades with personnel experienced in land combat units. As such, it acts to increase the internal integration with Canada’s AVF. Crosscutting ties are being forged which will have significant payoffs in the longer run for the social cohesion of the field army.

Personnel turbulence, or instability, is another focus for AVF institution building along the internal dimension, both in Canada and the United States. It is linked to career management practices that emphasize individual mobility and career development over unit cohesion, as Kurt Lang noted somewhat prophetically in the mid-sixties:

These disruptive impacts are becoming increasingly visible and call into question the practice of uncritically applying civilian managerial techniques to military systems: organizational effectiveness and combat effectiveness are not the same thing.

Differences exist between instability at the unit level and instability at the senior command and staff levels. Instability in the former instance reduces unit cohesion and alienates those led from their leaders, especially in combat units.³¹ Instability at the senior officer level—what Lewis Sorley terms the "Will-o’-the-Wisp General" phenomenon—weakens the accountability of senior officers for their decisions and contributes to institutional drift.³²

The adaptive solution in both instances is clear and entirely within the control of AVF authorities: slow down what Canadian troops derisively call the "ping pong game" at all levels of the AVF hierarchy. This logically implies decisions to extend tour lengths, to increase geographic stability, and to deemphasize the use of short-run statistical indicators in the assessment and allocation of promotion opportunities. The key question, however, is whether senior AVF authorities will be willing and able to make those decisions. If they cannot implement institution-building strategies in this particular instance, then the chances of success in other, infinitely more complex, areas will be minimal. Increased personnel stability is an essential ingredient for team building within the AVF deterrent force; a team that makes wholesale changes in players and senior management year after year is unlikely to win many pennants.

The current concern for increased stability provides an organizational climate for the implementation of a modified regimental system for the combat arms of the U.S. Army and for the strengthening of the existing regimental system in Canada. Regiments can provide geosocial stability for the career employment of combat personnel and a focus for commitment. The attachment of Canadian soldiers to their regimental system remains high; even after a decade of change in which regimental symbols and practices were downplayed, more than 75 percent of all Army personnel and 100 percent of senior combat officers believe that it "has an important place in a modern force and should be retained at all costs."³³

Probably a modified regimental system along British and Canadian lines could be implemented in the United States. A recent study coauthored by Canadian and British liaison officers assigned to TRADOC reached this conclusion and presented specific plans for its implementation.³⁴They estimate that full implementation would take a decade or so, a period which would converge with Janowitz’s proposed citizen-soldier concept.

Paradoxically, this most divergent of institution-building strategies can also increase external integration between the AVF and society. Since regiments are geographically stable, the possibility of interaction in local settings is increased, especially when tours are lengthened. Communities have been known to take pride in the local regiment, and it is possible to have reserve units affiliated with regular regiments in the same general locality. If regular and reserve service were to be linked, as Moskos has suggested, those linkages could become part of the community social fabric. In effect, an institution would have been built.

The image of a cohesive military with wide public support and participation has a great deal of intrinsic appeal, but its realization in Canadian and American society is a long way off. Visions of the future are comparatively easy to produce: it is much more difficult to implement them. This article provides only a rough blueprint, blurred at the edges, and an extraordinary amount of effort both within and without the military will be required to ensure that the future comes to approximate that blueprint. Even then, we have no guarantee of evolution along the line suggested here. The stability of the international order in an age of scarcity cannot be assumed, and the process of institution building may well be violently interrupted.

This article was adapted from a paper presented at a conference on National Security, National Purpose, and Military Manpower at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 5-7 March 1981.

C.A.C.

1. Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York, 1941), p. 6.

2. Charles C. Moskos, "How to Save the All-volunteer Force," The Public Interest, Fall 1980, p. 74.

3. An arguable case can also be made to include the United Kingdom, although this will not be done here. See Jonathan Alford, "Deterrence and Disuse: Some Thoughts on the Problem of Maintaining Volunteer Forces," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1980, pp. 247-56.

4. This statement cannot be documented in any detail here. A comparative examination of indicators in the two systems would, however, support this general conclusion. Compare, for instance, Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos, "Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-78," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1979, pp. 171-217 with Charles Cotton, R. K. Crook, and F. C. Pinch, "Canada’s Professional Military: The Limits of Civilianization," Armed Forces and Society, Spring 1978, pp. 365-90.

5. Especially the discussions supported by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS). Here one would note the work of Janowitz, Moskos, Segal, and Harries Jenkins.

6. See, for instance, the discussion of social science policy research in Europe and America by Harold Orlans, "The Advocacy of Social Science in Europe and America," Minerva, Spring 1976, pp. 6-32.

7. Dr. Morris Janowitz, "The Citizen Soldier and National Service," Air University Review, November-December 1979, pp. 2-16.

8. Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York, 1976). Bell argues that ". . . Western society lacks both civitas, the spontaneous willingness to make sacrifices for some public good, and a political philosophy that justifies the normative rules of priorities and allocations in the society." (p. 25)

11. Sam C. Sarkesian, editor, Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress and the Volunteer Military, Sage Research Progress Series of War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, Vol. 9 (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1980).

12. Charles Cotton, "The Divided Army: Role Orientations among Canada’s Peacetime Soldiers," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Carleton University, 1980. Also see Charles A. Cotton, "Institutional and Occupational Values in Canada’s Army," Armed Forces and Society, Fall 1981, pp. 99-110.

13. See Malham M. Wakin, editor, War, Morality and the Military Profession (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979) on this point, especially the chapters by Sam C. Sarkesian and Thomas M. Cannon and Lewis S. Sorley.

14. Charles Moskos distinguishes between these terms in "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, and Plural," Pacific Sociological Review, vol. 16, 1971, pp. 255-80. Also see the perceptive discussion by Moshe Lissak, "Some Reflections on Convergence and Structural Linkages," paper presented to the 9th World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala. Sweden, August 1978. Lissak’s paper points up the pitfalls of simplistic assumptions about social change and the AVF concept.

15. Sir John Hackett, "The Military in the Service of the State," in Wakin, editor, War, Morality and the Military Profession, pp. 107-26.

16. Notably, Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage in Crisis in Command (New York, 1978).

17. Stephen D. Wesbrook, "Sociopolitical Alienation and Military Efficiency," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1980, pp. 170-89.

18. R. C. Gard, "The Military and American Society," Foreign Affairs, July 1971, p. 707.

19. William Hauser, America’s Army in Crisis (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1973).

20. See, for example, G. A. and A. G. Theodorson, Modern Dictionary of Sociology (New York, 1969). Integration is a somewhat shopworn concept in sociology but remains of considerable use as a conceptual tool in the analysis of strategies for organizational development and adaptation. The standard approach is set out in Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action (London, 1969).

21. John D. Blair, "Internal and External Integration among Soldiers," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Fall 1980, pp. 227-42.

23. Cotton et al., "Canada’s Professional Military." Also see Charles Cotton, "Educational Change and the Military Labour Market in Canada," Interchange, vol. 11, no. 3, 1980-81, pp. 42-54.

25. It seems that one of the key factors reducing the sensitivity of the middle class to military service as a social problem is the tendency of the AVF authorities to suppress data and studies dealing with manpower problems and internal tensions in the AVF. This chronic bureaucratic defensiveness creates an impression that everything is going well; and thus the middle class continues to sleep complacently at night.

26. T. Willett, "A Sociologist Looks at the Militia," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Autumn 1980, pp. 36-41.

27. Charles Cotton, unpublished results based on the survey reported in Cotton, "The Divided Army."

28. For Canada, see Willett. For the United States see Fans R. Kirkland and Jerene Good, Army Reserve Component Retention, University City Science Center, Philadelphia, July 1979 (done under contract for the U.S. Army Research Institute).

29. Charles Cotton, Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada, Report 79-5, Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, Toronto, 1979.

30. Kurt Lang, "Technology and Career Management," in The New Military, Morris Janowitz, editor (New York, 1965), p. 78.

31. For example, a survey of Canadian junior combat troops indicated that 68 percent had changed direct leaders four or more times in the previous two years. For a discussion of findings and their organizational consequences, see Cotton; Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada.

32. Lewis S. Sorley, "The WiIl-o’-the-Wisp General," paper presented at the Twentieth Anniversary Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, October 1980.

33. Charles Cotton, Military Attitudes and Values of the Army in Canada, pp. 56-60.

34. P. W. Faith and D. I. Ross, Application of the Regimental System to the United States Army’s Combat Arms, mimeographed, Hq TRADOC, April 1980. For a general argument in favor of regimental structures, see D. C. Loomis and D. T. Lightburn, "Taking into Account the Distinctness of the Military from the Mainstream of Society," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Autumn 1980, pp. 16-22.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles A. Cotton, Canadian Forces (Ret) (B.A., Bishop’s University; M.A., Ph.D., Carleton University) was Head of the Department of Military Leadership and Management at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, at the time of his recent retirement. As a former infantry officer, he served with the United Nations in Cyprus and as a research coordinator at the Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit in Toronto. Colonel Cotton has published articles in Armed Forces and Society as well as research reports about military personnel problems.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.