Air University Review, March-April 1983

Serving the National Interest

a strategy for reequipping the Air Force

Decisions concerning new programs and projects for the armed forces, despite whatever sophistication may be brought to bear on the approach to the problem, are always riddled with projections, estimates, forecasts, and, above all, extrapolations.

One must always bear in mind the ramifications of the fact that such decisions are made with respect to materiel that will most likely become operationally useful a decade after the decisions have been made. And, further, the areas that will be studied in the course of that mental exercise will undergo technological advances that can only be forecast on the basis of current available data: arms, tactics, aerodynamics, motors, metallurgy, and even geopolitics and geostrategy. Certainly the single constant factor in the whole process is man and his behavior.

Having mentioned these self-evident aspects, it is still essential to accept as constant certain rules established by experience in dealing with this kind of problem (long-term planning and projections), such as the following:

—The normal development period for a new arms system is at least five to seven years. To this must be added another two to three years to make the system totally operational: maintenance, training, and use.

—The aging process of an arms system begins at the very time that its operational use is at a maximum, due to the current pace of technological development reached in aerospace military products. This means that the lead-time and the onset of obsolescence overlap.

—Efforts to modernize aging arms systems have produced only a palliative and never definitive results. Modernization is usually attempted in the fields of applied electronics, armament, or automation; however, improved performance profiles are rarely achieved, or achieved to the degree of efficiency dreamed of by project directors and (especially) operators.

—Given the overlap of the various phases of the project (initial idea, concept, outline, specification, production, operational use, obsolescence, and mortality), it is tacitly accepted that an arms system has an updated life of at most eight years of its fifteen years of useful life, given that almost four years are development/ maturity and three years aging/mortality.

—The financial process that underlies the process of reequipping the Air Force, due to the aforementioned cycle, is weighty and intimidating and is not easily accepted or understood by budget-planning authorities.

In spite of the incongruity of the process, the end result is irrefutable: advance planning is extremely difficult. By not planning, however, modernization becomes a painful, and often impossible, process.

—Badly executed or incomplete projections, estimates, and forecasts are at the source of the most rapid obsolescence of any arms system.

Rebuilding the Fleet:
"modus operandi"

The long and uncertain process of creating and designing a new product in the field of arms systems for the Brazilian Air Force can be reduced by the simple, direct acquisition of the finished product.

This course of action is adopted whenever the time factor outweighs other considerations. When this is the case, the accepted practice is to resume planning for reequipment at the stage of selection and evaluation of equipment, adopting specifications already established as valid by others.

On the other hand, it is necessary to tacitly accept that simple, direct acquisition proportionally shifts to the buyer all the financial burdens carried by the producer during the development period of the equipment. Moreover, acquisition of fleet packages is not an immediate solution, since this also entails a lead time that can be as long as 23 to 30 months!

For countries already in possession of a consolidated aeronautics industry, simple, direct acquisitions are an option of the government. Despite the seemingly reduced costs of such acquisition, it must be understood that only the performance of design and planning activities associated with new projects produces a positive residual result in this complex process. The rest is comprised of a simple commercial/ financial operation.

The question should be posed in terms of considerations such as the following: "Rather than in industrial parks elsewhere, why not invest in our own?" "Rather than creating jobs elsewhere, why not do so here?" "Why amortize the inflationary process of other countries?" "Why transfer the geographic seat of the decision-making process?"

Another potential formula to adopt for reequipping is found in the form of associate industrialization: Brazilian enterprise/foreign enterprise.

Such a partnership could be implemented with focus on either a finished product already tested by the foreign enterprise (and the specifications of which are adjusted to the formulation of the project of interest to the Brazilian Air Force) or a new product to be decided on by the consortium (based always on the specifications of the air force).

One aspect of the industrialization partnership formula (or binational enterprise) is the adoption of a vehicle created and designed jointly by two countries (Brazil and partner) that has operational requirements defined by agreement of the partners.

This method is widely used in Europe (Jaguar, Tornado, Alphajet, Airbus, Atlantic, F-16 projects, etc.). They have never been characterized by rapid implementation, however. The long period required to create, define, specify, and produce makes the consortium’s product vulnerable to internal policy changes in each partner-country, and it has been difficult to obtain partners with the same kind of operational needs.

One example of an industrial partnership with a finished product was that used by EMBRAER to launch the Italian Macchi-326GB aircraft, and that undertaking was unquestionably successful. The same course could be followed to produce combat aircraft for future decades.

On the one hand, this formula guarantees the elimination of certain steps in the process of manufacturing new products. It is also based on the premise that the specifications used by the foreign enterprise to produce its material are compatible with those set by the Brazilian Air Force for its new combat vehicle. It further results in a reduction of the time required for the finished product and, initially, a simplification of the new industrial program. And, most important, it allows the consultations needed for the administrative-technological transfer of the product of common interest to proceed at a tranquil pace. On the other hand, it requires careful study to define not only the product itself but also to evaluate the potential partner.

A third approach to rebuilding is to launch a new product, from drawing board to flight line, suited to current national needs.

The development policy of the Brazilian aeronautics industry, which has been objectively guided and supported by the federal government, made possible the implementation of a program of adaptation of aircraft to the operational conditions of Brazilian infrastructure, and met the need for reequipping of the Brazilian Department of the Air Force and of certain parts of the civilian market that are closely linked to the country’s social and economic development.

As the principle instrument of the industrial policy of that sector of activity, EMBRAER will be actively involved in producing the Bandeirante, Xavante, Ipanema, etc., which fully meet the aforementioned requirements. It is also conscious of its purpose of promoting the development of the aeronautic industry and is always attentive to the real conditions of the Brazilian and international markets, and to the needs of the armed forces, with a view to being in a position to respond in a timely fashion to demand prospects as they arise.

The fiscal incentive given to EMBRAER in the law that established it has enabled it to grow rapidly and has ensured it sufficient resources for capitalization. This factor is of considerable importance for the future development of EMBRAER, since it allowed it, by 1975, to build a modern industrial infrastructure that is highly productive and of a size compatible with the country’s real needs in the field of aeronautic material. Thus, the introduction of new industrial programs, in the context previously described, is indispensable at this stage of guaranteed capitalization, which would bring EMBRAER the following advantages:

• diversification of its product line to enable it to meet the needs of broader sectors of the market;

• increased gross earnings, to keep pace with the growth of capital stock, ensuring a suitable rollover thereof, and the profit margin estimated for current programs;

• in the case of programs of interest to the Brazilian Air Force, the preservation and continuity of the line of military products.

Analysis of each of the options shows that the one most suited to the goal of both the federal government and the Brazilian Air Force itself is that of maximum nationalization.

That is the solution that will guarantee the desired, sought-after, and expected capability to keep decision-making within our national borders. It will guarantee the uncompromised survival of the capacity to manage Brazilian air power to the benefit of Brazil.

That is the way! That is today’s strategy that will bear fruit into the next century.

Major-GeneraI Lauro Ney Menezes is Director of the Aerospace Technical Center, São Paulo, Brazil. Earlier he was Commandant of the Brazilian Air Force Academy; faculty member of the Squadron Officer School; and Chief, Evaluation Team of the Mirage III in France. He has also served in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and the Vice President of Brazil and as Air Force Vice Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs. General Menezes is a fighter pilot with more than 7600 flying hours and a graduate of the Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff School, Brazil; USAF Basic and Advanced Navigation Course, Carswell AFB, Texas; and studied English at Cambridge University, England.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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