Air University Review, March-April 1983

A NATO Division of Labor

There was much talk a year ago about a division of labor in NATO, but it has quieted by now. We believe the United States should not let this happen. The Europeans have very important national interests outside the NATO area, and often these interests parallel those of the United States. Yet there is no question that collective interests can be protected better when nations work collectively.

The term division of labor is a German invention in its most recent context. Unlike many German terms, this one lacks precision. When we use it—and most people use it when referring to the current world situation—we are talking about a concept that means consonance of purpose for the alliance but a differential application of military forces, while viewing the worldwide interests of NATO nations.

Many point to Afghanistan when they talk of the origins of division of labor; one needs to be cautious about that. The Soviet military buildup in Afghanistan may have brought an awareness to Europeans, as well as Americans, but it is only one element.

One can trace the origins of the need for a division of labor to three trends in the world situation in the last fifteen years. The first trend is a political one. After the last Berlin crisis in 1962, the Soviet Union has tended to shift the focal points of East-West political competition to places other than Europe. The second is economic. The basic fact is that economic centers of gravity have shifted. The final trend is a military one. We do not refer to the overall growth in Soviet military capabilities, we refer to a more specific aspect. Even more important to the overall growth in size is the growth that has taken place in Soviet capabilities to project power. One may conclude here that we are going to suggest that the United States military presence in Europe is not as important as it once was. As a matter of fact, we believe just the opposite.

We need always to keep in mind that the military threat to NATO is not in any respect less than it has been. It has expanded, it is more sophisticated, and indications are that it will expand and require more of us to counter. Because of this, we believe that the basic elements of the alliance must now and for the foreseeable future remain untouched.

Our basic point, and an important one, is that division of labor is not possible without a strong foundation. The first major element of the foundation is the continuation of our NATO strategy: forward defense and flexible response. The members of the alliance must have the forces necessary to implement this strategy. This means we must have adequate in-being conventional forces in NATO-Europe. There must be adequate reserve forces along with the mobility assets and an effective centrally directed air defense system; not just a wartime air defense system but an all-time air defense system. And we must have a tactical nuclear weapon delivery capability that does not invite preemption. Cooperation to deter the Soviet Union outside NATO must start with deterrence within the NATO area.

We do not believe that the solution lies in extending the geographical boundaries of the alliance; most people agree that this is not a good solution. The nations of the alliance do not have congruent interests outside the NATO area. Because of that, it is conceivable that the nations could not agree on a unified objective or unified course of action. Lack of agreement would in fact encourage the Soviet Union, and disunity would be reflected in the progress we have made in our current area of responsibility.

The United States has the military capability and the broader national interests that clearly put her in the position to lead the nations of the alliance in protecting the collective and consonant interests outside NATO. There has been considerable discussion about the ground force level the United States should commit for operations outside NATO. The levels generally discussed are between three and six divisions. It would take quite some time to procure the resources for six divisions. For that reason, we base our concept on the lower and, for now, more realistic size of force.

If the United States dedicates three divisions for areas outside NATO, there are two questions that need to be answered. Is that force enough to establish a non-NATO deterrence? How should we replace these divisions to maintain the NATO deterrence? Most of us who have looked at Soviet capabilities in depth do not believe three divisions are an adequate force. We would like to explain how we believe this can be solved and describe some possible contributions to the divisions of labor of some members of the alliance.

• Americans generally underestimate the role France does and can play. France has capabilities to project forces, and she is accustomed to the role. As a matter of fact, the French Navy already makes a major contribution to projecting the military capabilities of the members outside NATO. For example, it is with the added French combatants that we are able to maintain approximately a 2 to 1 advantage over the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean.

• The United Kingdom has forces, a tradition, and the inclination to represent the interests of the nations of the alliance outside the NATO area.

• Italy has some forces that could be deployed outside the NATO area but at the present time would not have the inclination to do so very extensively.

• Denmark and Norway would probably not provide military forces for out-of-area missions.

• Belgium has a history that would prepare her for non-NATO responsibilities, but her political problems would most likely keep her from doing so in the near-term. The present preoccupation of the Belgian government is with the country’s economic and cultural problems. A request to support the deployment of forces would probably be rejected with financial arguments, though Belgium could provide some of the U.S. reinforcement capability. We would propose asking Belgium to form an additional reserve brigade, to make up for the loss of the U.S. divisions in Europe.

• The Dutch probably could not be counted on to support an operation out of the NATO area, but they could furnish a reserve brigade.

• Portuguese forces are incapable of conducting operations against a well-equipped enemy outside NATO, though Portugal does have a commando regiment, as well as other units, that could relieve the units of other NATO nations for duty on the continent during wartime, another portion of the offset for the three U.S. divisions.

• Turkey has an army of approximately one-half million. Although there are serious problems with equipment, this country offers an excellent source of manpower for the alliance. An increased military aid program for Turkey and Greece could not only strengthen the southern region, it could do more. It would provide a greater alliance deterrence close to possible problem areas; we must not forget Turkey’s location. It could also, when combined with mobility assets from other nations, provide a force for out-of-NATO operations. We say mobility assets from other nations because of the obvious problem that could be caused within the alliance if the aid also included mobility assets.

• The Canadians might contribute to an out-of-NATO mission.

• The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) could also probably participate in the division of labor.

Article 115 of the German constitution prohibits the employment and deployment of German forces outside the NATO area. There is little likelihood of a change in this basic law very soon, but we still see it necessary for the FRG to do its share in the division of labor. Our specific proposal for the FRG is to form six reserve brigades. The equipment, armament, structure, and training would correspond to active FRG brigades. They would be given identical tasks.

We would envision creating these units as units. Individuals would do their fifteen months of basic military service together, and when they go to standby readiness Category I, they would do so as a unit. The unit would remain as a unit for twelve months. During this time, the Minister of Defense could call within 48 hours, without mobilization. Also during this period, the next unit would be trained. After one year in readiness Category I, the individuals would go to Category II. In this status, they could be called on as replacements.

The advantage of our proposal for the FRG is that it would take advantage of the cost effectiveness of reserve forces. It would enable the creation of additional combat forces within the active duty manpower limits the FRG has. Finally, if we ever achieve a mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) agreement, it will most likely apply to peacetime force levels against which these units would not be counted.

The need for a framework for cooperation could provide a forum to coordinate on the military and political aspects of protecting the collective interests of the individual member of the alliance.

About a year ago the European press picked up a report that the United States was considering assigning the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to General Bernard W. Rogers. This was misreported in Die Welt as well as in Le Monde as being a step toward expanding the NATO area. This incident highlights the sensitivity of the question of where military cooperative planning should take place. We are of the opinion that we cannot do this planning within any of the existing NATO military frameworks, either international or superimposed on an existing national framework. Our feeling is based on a strong belief that our actions outside NATO should not, in any way, weaken our military and political strength within NATO.

A framework for military cooperation should begin quietly, in a low key, and with U.S. leadership. It should be in the form of an invitation by the United States for appropriate member nations to become familiar with the planning of the Rapid Deployment Force. The United States could invite liaison officers to be located with the RDF. The next step could be joint exercises, which would mean building slowly on the U.S. organization.

The political framework is not quite so easy. We believe that the political framework used will be dictated by the situation. In some cases, the NATO political structure could serve for consultation. Where there is general agreement on an issue, consultations in this forum would strengthen the position. In some situations, the best forum would be bilateral discussions. Basically, there is strength in agreement, not disagreement. The forum should be chosen accordingly.

Division of labor does not start outside of NATO. It must have its foundation in the strengthening and renewing of deterrence we have built over, the years. As for European responsibilities, we cannot expect the same from each nation: There are some who could and should substitute for U.S. reinforcements; there are some who could and should support operations outside NATO.

Lieutenant General Lothar P. G. Domroese, German Army (RET) retired form active military service in March 1981 as Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, at SHAPE Headquarters, Germany. He held positions as spokesman of the Ministry of Defence; the Federal Ministry of Defence; Commander, 2d Armored Infantry Brigade; Chief of Northern Army Group; and served as Vice Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces, Bonn. Forces Command and General Staff College and the Royal College of Defence Studies in London.

Colonel Samuel B. Gardiner (B.B.A., University of Wisconsin; M.B.A., California State University; M.S.I.A., George Washington University) is a member of the faculty, Department of Military Strategy, of the National War College, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. His previous assignments were at SHAPE Headquarters, Bonn, Germany, in Programs and Plans on the Air Staff. Colonel Gardiner is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Armed Forces Staff College, and National War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor