Air University Review, September-October 1983

Analysis by Hyperbole

I object to William Lind’s "Quantity versus Quality’ Is Not the Issue" on the grounds of his rhetoric and on the basis of his core belief. Lind’s rhetorical approach is a sure turnoff to all those honest officers and civilians in the Pentagon and elsewhere who are maligned by Lind and other so-called reformers because they believe that advanced technology is the correct approach to enhancing the capabilities of our fighting forces. Calling such people "technology junkies," as Lind does, is likely to be seen as an insult and will not improve the atmosphere for this serious debate. Lind’s basic antitechnology bias, furthermore, is ahistorical and, I believe, a prescription for failure in the twentieth century. I will begin with his rhetoric.

Taking Lind’s parting shot first: just who are those in the Pentagon who want the U.S. military to buy and use "a small number of relatively ineffective weapons" over "a larger number of effective weapons?" Who are these male-factors of national trust? Of course, Lind is writing rhetorically for he knows, as do we, that nobody in the Pentagon is deliberately choosing small numbers of inferior weapons over larger numbers of better ones. But stating it Lind’s way is bound to exacerbate tensions and add only heat to the debate and no light.

Beyond his hyperbole, Lind creates strawmen. He and the reformers, he asserts, believe that "people are most important, strategy and tactics come second, and hardware is only third"; therefore, "the reformers are more concerned with people and ideas than with defense procurement." This is an unfair, invidious comparison. All the uniformed leaders and nearly all the ranking civilians I know put matters in the same priority. The desperate fight to raise pay and keep it livable and an increasingly higher percentage of the defense budget that goes to people are evidence. The fact that all the chiefs recently told the Secretary of Defense that they would rather cut back on procurement than see their people suffer a pay freeze testifies to their regard for people.

Regarding ideas, all the services put officers at least equal to their best in their respective doctrine and strategy offices, and the U.S. Army demonstrates its emphasis by assigning a four-star general to its Training and Doctrine Command. Lind and the reformers are right: people and ideas are more important than things, but the people in charge believe that, too. Lind cites a quotation from a military reform briefing— "weapons that don’t work or can’t be bought in adequate quantity will bring down even the best people and the best ideas"—which would suggest that the Defense Department leadership thinks otherwise, and that unstated assertion is false.

Lind establishes an equally insubstantial strawman when he argues that the services see themselves as forced to buy "very expensive, very complicated weapons: The Army’s M-1 tank, the big nuclear carrier, the F-15 fighter." Nonsense. The services do not buy weapons because they are big and expensive, they buy because they believe that the system will improve mission capabilities. The M-l tank comes in response to the size and numbers of Soviet tanks. The big carrier comes from the need for the United States to be able to project real power around the globe. The F- 15 comes from the need to defeat large numbers of enemy aircraft threatening us and our allies.

One would think that in light of brilliant Israeli victories with the F-l5 and F-16 aircraft over large numbers of Soviet lesser-technology aircraft without a single loss (81 to 0), critics would find another bone to pick. Similarly, the large carriers are built that size because of Navy doctrine. I know the debate in the Navy continues at levels below official statements and that there are distinguished former four-star admirals (like Stansfield Turner and Elmo Zumwalt) who advocate smaller carriers, but small carrier advocates do not argue that big carrier enthusiasts want such systems just because they are expensive.

Lind asserts that weapons should be small and hard to detect. Well, no first and yes second, because weapons, before they are so small the enemy cannot see them, must be big enough to do the job. He writes "big ships, be they the Bismarck or the Nimitz, tend to become the hunted rather than the hunter." This is bad history. The Bismarck was hunted not because it was big but because it was a hunter with a devastating record of success. One is forced to ask, how small is the small carrier? If it is half the weight of the Nimitz, it is still heavier than the Bismarck, and it carries enough aircraft to make it an exceptionally attractive target.

The length and width of the carrier, moreover, will still be defined by the size of the carrier deck because of the need to take off and recover aircraft simultaneously. While the Harrier is a superb vertical take off and landing fighter, it will be decades before the necessary tankers and airborne command and control aircraft will be similarly designed (if ever). Satellites or Backfires using radar will have no trouble finding carriers half the weight of the Nimitz.

More germane is the effect that halving the size of the carrier has on mission capability. Because more than half the aircraft on a carrier are either defensive fighters to defend the carrier and its battle group or support airplanes (interceptors, tankers, command and control aircraft, etc.), the size of the strike force on a carrier is limited. A small carrier will still need a great amount of protection, and, necessarily, its strike power will be limited.

Lind’s other strawman is his assertion that the "defense establishment largely and the contractors with which it works define quality in technological terms. The reformers define quality tactically, by looking at what is important on the battlefield." I do not know to whom he has been talking in the "defense establishment," but they are not the people I have worked with or known. There is only one way to define quality and that is tactically, and I know no ranking officers who do not think of it in that way. How could it be otherwise? Most uniformed leaders got to the top by demonstrating success in combat by inherently adhering to real combat qualities.

Regarding Lind’s argument on what he calls "unrealistic proving-ground experiments" or "computer studies," in the absence of real combat, testing provides the only way. Naturally, one would want to make all tests as realistic as possible. Once again one reaches for the F-15, because here again the tests were computer- and proving-ground-based, and one finds that the aircraft is an enormous success. Because I disagree with Lind does not mean that I believe all is well in this arena, because it is not. Systems attract advocates, and too often these are either involved in or responsible for testing and evaluation; and the services need to be vigilant in this arena.

Lind’s comparison of the size and capability of the F-15 and the allegedly "smaller, and more agile" F-16 that supposedly cannot be seen by F-15 pilots is similarly faulty. Anybody who thinks the F-16 is small has not seen one. While it is about half the weight of the F-15, it is three quarters of the length, has three quarters of the span, and stands 83 percent as tall. The F-l6 is eminently visible to both the F-15 pilot and his radar—as would be any airplane that can compete in the skies with either the F-15 or F-16.

On Lind’s approach to technology, I would argue in opposition that the military-technological frontier must be relentlessly pushed. Good people with sound ideas need better technology than their opponents if they are to fight outnumbered and win. That is a clear message from military history. I am concerned that the so-called reformers—most of whom have not seen battle and have no sense of what superior technology does for morale and improving the fighting man’s spirit—will stunt the traditional emphasis in our military. From ancient times when the Bronze Age superseded the copper only to fall to the iron, technological superiority has most often provided the margin for victory. Does technology complicate matters? Certainly— as the British radar in 1940 and its command and control network complicated the Royal Air Force approach to defense. But looking back on the summer of 1940, it is known that technology—radar—provided the narrow margin of victory in a titanic battle with enormous consequences. There are dozens of similar examples. Do we need to improve our approach to using technology? Certainly. Must we constantly scrutinize test and evaluation in order to prevent human weaknesses expressed by parochialism and advocacy from invalidating tests? Of course. Do we need to resist technological gold-plating? Always. Are there problems with a relentless technological push beyond mere expense? Absolutely. But the consequences of turning away from the highest technological approach could have the most condign consequences for our way of life in these dangerous times.

Hq USAF

Colonel Alan L. Gropman (Ph.D. Tufts University) is Deputy Director for Doctrine. Strategy, and Plans Integration, Hq USAF. Previously, he was Director of Research and Associate Dean of the National War College. Colonel Gropman has written two books, numerous book reviews and articles, and has been a frequent contributor to the Review. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor