Air University Review, May-June 1983

Air Base Survivability: A Question of Strategy

"Can unsafe survive and fight?" After raising this critical question in his article,* Major Stephen C. Hall accurately exposed the vulnerability of runways/taxiways and the critical logistics support resources essential to combat operations as our Achilles’ heel. Although the problem was well presented, the proposed solution (procurement of survivability equipment and facilities) fell short of the root cause, USAF basing strategy itself.

* Major Stephen C. Hall, "Air Base Survivability in Europe," Air University Review, September-October 1982, p. 36.

We have doggedly maintained our forward basing concept even though the technology of war has been revolutionized and Warsaw Pact capabilities substantially expanded. This forward basing policy has led to entrenchment of traditional support concepts despite compelling logic to the contrary. Consequently, more complex support requirements have been introduced, adding to the vulnerability and inflexibility of an already corpulent logistics tail.

War-fighting strategy must integrate two coequal, interdependent elements: operations strategy and logistics. Logistics must be consistent with operations strategy; conversely, operations strategy must take into account logistics capabilities and, if necessary, be changed to maximize the combat potential of available resources. Logistics considerations now compel a change in two aspects of traditional USAF war-fighting strategy. First, an in-depth basing concept for all war scenarios (similar to the A-10 European forward basing concept), consisting of two generic types of air bases distinguished by operational function and distance from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), promises significant advantages. Forward fighting bases (FFBs) would be located within 250 nautical miles of the FEBA for the single purpose of rapid, high combat sortie generation with logistics support limited to dearm, service, refuel, load, and rearm. Primary wing infrastructure would be provided by main operating bases (MOBs) located beyond 250 nautical miles of the FEBA to support 6-10 FFBs.

Second, elimination of the traditional USAF three-level maintenance concept in favor of substantially reduced repair activities at the FFBs and MOBs would enhance war-fighting capability. The increased complexity of off-equipment maintenance has imposed fatal liabilities.

These two strategic initiatives would substantially ameliorate vulnerability and enhance flexibility removing forward deployed logistics assets from the field. Dispersal and extensive camouflage of logistics assets at forward fighting bases and hardened logistics facilities at MOBs would enhance survivability. Flexibility would also be enhanced by the opportunity to use a "chessboard" strategy, rapidly concentrating and dispersing forces at various FFBs in the increased depth of the modern battlefield. The primary advantage of the strategy to reduce off-equipment repair would be to permit a reallocation of investment resources to procure more of the assets used directly in war (e.g., spares) and correspondingly less of the assets used indirectly in war (e.g., support equipment, skilled technicians). In other words, greater combat leverage could be achieved for an equivalent logistics resource investment.

The solution to the air base survivability problem, then, is not simply more resources but a strategy that employs our resources in a mode more sensitive to the realities of an environment characterized by a more lethal threat and a dynamic technology.

Colonel Gregory is Director of Plans and Programs at the Ogden Air Logistics Center.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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