Air University Review, January-February 1983
the Air National Guard and the 1968 reserve mobilizations
We had a different breed of cats when we got the Guard over here. You know these airline pilots that you got, they haze been flying instruments all of their lives. We have to spend a lot of time getting people the way they can fly. These kids fin the regular Air Force] we have to watch like hawks. We don’t have to do that with the Air Guard. We can turn them loose. They can go on because they can understand how to fly . . . .Their average pilot time in the F-100 is 1,000 hours. In my squadrons here, my average time in the F-100 is 150 hours.1
General George S. Brown
TODAY, America relies heavily on its military reserves. In the all-volunteer era, they must fill the gap between active duty forces and military requirements until additional trained manpower becomes available in an emergency. All policymaking, programming, and budgetary decisions within the Department of Defense are supposed to be based on an equal consideration of the capabilities of both active duty and reserve forces. The ambitious objective of this total force policy is to ensure the best mix of these forces in the event of war. To work, the policy requires high-quality reserve forces that can be employed immediately upon mobilization. However, America’s reserve forces, historically, have been ill-prepared to play this demanding role. Plagued by materiel and manpower shortages, inadequate training, and the apathy of military professionals, the reserves have usually taken substantial periods of time after mobilization to prepare for combat. Despite the total force policy, many of these problems persist today, leading some observers to doubt whether the reserves could be relied on in the early stages of a conflict.
However, the Air National Guard is truly a "different breed of cats.’’ It has emerged as an exception to the historic inadequacies of America’s reserve forces. Since World War II, the Air Guard has evolved into a proficient military organization, relied on by the Air Force to help fulfill a broad range of demanding missions. For example, 65 percent of the fighter interceptor force, 57 percent of the tactical reconnaissance, 36 percent of the tactical air support, 30 percent of the tactical airlift, and 17 percent of the aerial tankers available to the Air Force in 1980 were flown by Air Guardsmen. During the limited reserve mobilizations following North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo and the Tet offensive in 1968, selected Air Guard units performed superbly while others had a difficult transition to active duty. An examination of their record in that period suggests some of the prerequisites and pitfalls for successful reserve programs under the auspices of the total force.2
The Air Guard is an anomalous military organization. Although controlled by the states when not mobilized, its missions are almost entirely federal. Its organization, training, and equipment are prescribed by the U.S. Air Force. Almost all of its funding is provided by Washington. Despite its professional military orientation, the Air Guard is also a highly political force, It owes its very existence to the politics of postwar defense planning during World War II. Under pressure from the National Guard Association and its political allies, General George C. Marshall had agreed that the National Guard would retain its prewar position as the Army’s primary combat reserve force. The Army Air Forces, cultivating support for its goal of postwar independence, reluctantly agreed to General Marshall’s plans. Against its better professional judgment, it had accepted a dual-component reserve system consisting of an Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.3
Plagued by inadequate budgets, poor planning, active force neglect, and squabbles over command authority, the Air Guard was little more than a glorified flying club before the Korean War. These factors prevented it from molding the wealth of World War II combat fliers and relatively modern aircraft available to it into an effective military organization. However, that so-called Asian "police action’’ stimulated its evolution into a viable combat reserve force. Stunned by the mobilization fiasco in 1950 and prodded by the Guard’s leadership, the Air Force moved to strengthen its reserve programs during the fifties. Abundant Air Force appropriations under the Eisenhower administration’s New Look helped provided the means to implement this policy. The role of the National Guard Bureau’s Air Division was especially critical. Led by Major Generals Earl T. Ricks and Winston P. Wilson, it pressed the Air Force to revamp the Air Guard’s missions, training, and facilities. Gradually, the Air Guard evolved into a viable reserve program with a limited, albeit real, operational capability.4
The three most significant policy innovations in the Air Guard’s long metamorphosis from flying club to air combat force were its participation in the air defense runway alert program, the gaining command concept of reserve forces management, and the selected reserve force program. The first of these was an outgrowth of discussions between the National Guard Bureau and the Continental Air Command, the Air Force command responsible for supervising all air reserve forces’ training. It began in 1953 as an experiment designed to improve training by augmenting the Air Defense Command’s runway alert program with Air Guard crews and aircraft from two fighter squadrons. Despite initial Air Staff doubts and resistance, the experiment was an outstanding success. It was expanded into a full-fledged permanent program that included 25 of the Air Guard's fighter squadrons participating on a round-the-clock basis by 1961. The runway alert program was the first large-scale effort to integrate reserve units into the regular peacetime operating structure of the armed forces on a continuing basis. This limited integration with the active force during peacetime later served as a model for the total force.5
The second major innovation, the Air Force’s gaining command concept of reserve forces management, was grudgingly adopted in 1960, primarily because of budget cuts and public criticism of the air reserve programs by General Curtis E. LeMay, then Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. The gaining command concept was implemented after years of Air Force opposition. Essentially, it made organizations such as the Tactical Air Command responsible for the training and operational readiness of all reserve units assigned to them in contingency plans. These units would be held accountable to the same rigorous standards as their active duty counterparts. Previously, Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units had all been trained by the Continental Air Command (CONAC), an organization having no direct stake in their wartime performance. The gaining command concept contributed significantly to the Air Guard’s operational readiness by giving Air Force commanders direct personal incentives to enhance its performance. Furthermore, it signaled the beginning of across-the-board Air Guard peacetime support of Air Force missions. The gaining command concept established firm precedents for the total force by integrating reserve units into the daily operations of the active Air Force.6
The final major innovation reflected Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s determination to create an elite force of immediately deployable reserve units that could support DOD’s flexible response policy. Unlike his predecessors, McNamara was convinced that a prolonged and massive World War II-style mobilization was somewhat unlikely. To improve readiness, he sought to shrink America’s large reserve establishment as well merge its National Guard and reserve components. When Congress frustrated these proposals, McNamara ordered creation of the selected reserve force. It provided a major segment of America’s strategic military reserve in the continental United States while the active duty establishment was increasingly tied down by the escalating war in Southeast Asia. 7
The Air Guard’s portion of the selected reserve force consisted of nine tactical fighter groups, four tactical reconnaissance groups, and on tactical control group. Like other elements of the force, these Air Guard units had priority access to equipment, could recruit to full wartime strength, and were authorized additional paid training periods each year. Their objective was to develop the ability to deploy overseas within 24 hours of a mobilization. Despite some substantial problems, the program proved its value in 1968.8
On 23 January 1968, the North Koreans seized the USS Pueblo, an electronics surveillance vessel collecting intelligence data along its coast. The seizure was a painful setback for the United States. Already struggling to balance military commitments against inadequate sources and hold together declining public support for the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson had no wish to be drawn into another inconclusive conflict for murky purposes in Asia. Unlike the response to the capture of the United States Embassy in Teheran years later, low-keyed official statements signaled that the U.S. would rely on quiet diplomacy to free the Pueblo hostages.9
Despite President Johnson’s desire to downplay the Pueblo crisis, the South Korean government had to be reassured by an overt display of American resolve. Fearing that the capture of the Pueblo was a prelude to a North Korean invasion, the South Korean government proposed withdrawal of its troops from South Vietnam. To placate our ally, the President dispatched some 350 Air Force tactical aircraft to South Korea and mobilized approximately 14,000 naval and air reservists. The reservists replaced regular units from the depleted strategic reserve in the continental United States. Although war was avoided on the Korean peninsula, the Communists’ Tet offensive in South Vietnam during February 1968 soon placed additional pressure on U.S. military resources. In March, the President decided to mobilize 22,200 more reservists.10
The Pueblo crisis confronted the Air Guard with its third partial mobilization since World War II. Its performance in 1968 was demonstrably superior to its showing either during the Korean War or the 1961 Berlin crisis, the Air Guard’s only other mobilizations. Without warning, the President issued Executive Order No. 11392 on 25 January 1968, mobilizing 9343 Air Guardsmen. Within 36 hours, approximately 95 percent of them had reported to their units. They manned eight tactical fighter and three tactical reconnaissance groups. The fighter units were members of the selected reserve force. Unlike their counterparts in 1950 and 1961, they were rated combat-ready by the Air Force when activated and could have been deployed overseas within a few days. The reconnaissance units were not immediately classified combat-ready, primarily due to equipment shortages, but within one month they could have been deployed abroad.11
For nearly three months, the fate of the mobilized Air Guardsmen remained uncertain. The Pueblo crisis failed to escalate into a war. In South Vietnam, the Tet offensive devastated Communist forces on the battlefield but enabled them to score a stunning victory with American public and elite political opinion. Tet caused a palpable shift of popular sentiment in the United States against the war. This encouraged a furious policy debate within the Johnson administration. Meanwhile, military planners scrambled to find new uses for the mobilized Air Guardsmen who languished in limbo at their home stations.12
In late April, the fate of the mobilized Air Guardsmen was finally resolved. Four Air Guard fighter squadrons were alerted for deployment to South Vietnam. The first stage of this movement ended on 3 May when 20 F-100 Super Sabres from Colorado’s 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron landed at Phan Rang Air Base in South Vietnam. By 1 June, all of its pilots were flying combat missions. Meanwhile, three other Air Guard fighter squadrons--Iowa’s 174th, New Mexico’s 188th, and New Yorks 136th—had also deployed to that war-torn nation. Moreover, 85 percent of the personnel in the Vietnam-based 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron, nominally an active Air Force unit, were Air Guardsmen.13
Air Guardsmen were quickly and effectively integrated into Air Force operations in South Vietnam. Their tactical fighter squadrons saw combat there from June 1968 through April 1969. Air Guard pilots flew 24,124 sorties and 38,614 combat hours during that period. If the preponderantly Air Guard 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron was included, those totals climbed to approximately 30,000 sorties and 50,000 combat hours. Scheduled missions included close air support, aircraft escort, and landing zone construction (i.e., bombing landing sites so helicopters would have places to set down in the jungle). Air Guard squadrons also maintained aircraft on alert to respond quickly in emergencies. During their active duty service in South Vietnam, seven Air Guard pilots and one intelligence officer were killed by enemy fire; fourteen aircraft were lost. Each of the five guard-manned fighter squadrons completed its combat tour without a reportable accident due to pilot, materiel, or maintenance failure.14
The Air Force was highly impressed by the Air Guard’s combat performance in South Vietnam. The 35th Tactical Fighter Wing's official history praised their professionalism and skill. The Air Reservist magazine reported that Air Guardsmen were:
…flying more combat missions than other [ i.e., regular Air Force] squadrons at their bases, and in-commission rates, bomb damage assessment, and other criteria by which tactical fighter units are judged, rate higher than other F-100 squadrons in the zone. 15
Shortly after the Air Guard units arrived, General George S. Brown became Seventh Air Force Commander in South Vietnam in 1968. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee during his confirmation hearing as Air Force Chief of Staff in 1973, General Brown gave a glowing assessment of those units. He emphasized that:
I had… five F-100 Air National Guard squadrons…Those were the five best F-100 squadrons in the field. The aircrews were a little older, but they were more experienced, and the maintenance people were also more experienced than the regular units. They had done the same work on the same weapons system for years and they had [ personnel] stability that a regular unit doesn’t have.16
Two Air Guard fighter squadrons— the 166th from Columbus, Ohio, and the 127th from Wichita, Kansas—were dispatched to Kunsan Air Base in South Korea with their 50 F-100Cs during the summer of 1968. These squadrons, with Air Force Reservists and individual Guardsmen who had been split from their own units after mobilization; formed the newly established 354th Tactical Fighter Wing. It replaced three regular Air Force tactical fighter squadrons that had been withdrawn after the Pueblo crisis cooled. 17
In some respects, Air Guardsmen in South Korea had much more difficult assignments than their counterparts in South Vietnam. With the exception of personnel in the two fighter squadrons, most Air Guardsmen in South Korea were individuals who had been transferred from their original units after mobilization and reassigned to new organizations. This wholesale violation of unit integrity had a severe impact on morale and required time-consuming reorganization. Furthermore, these new units inherited dilapidated bases almost entirely devoid of the elaborate support organizations that sustained their counterparts in South Vietnam. Ironically , they had to rebuild the support service units that had been stripped from them in the United States after mobilization. This caused many public complaints by disgruntled Air Guardsmen. Although these problems were gradually resolved, many air Guardsmen believed that they could have been avoided if their original units had deployed overseas intact.18
Aircraft maintenance and flying operations in South Korea also posed major challenges. Maintenance for F-100Cs was a problems because the Air Force had not stationed those aircraft in Korea for several years and no longer stocked spare parts for them there.Consequently, many items had to be shipped from Japan and frequently from the continental United States. Although the 354th was able to keep 84.4 percent of its aircraft operational in July, spare parts and the strain of heavy flying schedules made it impossible to sustain that rate.
By December 1968, the wing’s readiness rate fell below the 71 percent Air Force minimum. Due to an maintenance problem, all of the 354th’s F-100 Super Sabers were temporarily grounded that month. Meanwhile, the wing had been forced to drop its original operational mission. The Air Force rediscovered that the F-100C was not a good air defense aircraft. It was slow in attaining altitude and lacked an affective all-weather, air-to-air combat capability. Consequently, the 354th’s aircraft were redesignated fighter-bombers arid began supporting ground forces training in Korea. 19
Maintenance and operational problems continued to plague the 354th early in 1969. Spare parts shortages persisted. From January through March, for Super Sabres crashed and one pilot was killed. The wing failed an operational readiness inspection (ORI). Although extremely cold weather and spare part shortages contributed to the failure, the inspection report highlighted operational problems that implied lax training. For example, aircrews had flown nonstandard formations and were achieving poor bombing scores. Ground crews failed to load aircraft munitions within prescribed times. Air force inspectors rated the 354th only marginally prepared for combat.20
With the return of the Pueblo’s crew, Air Guardsmen in South Korea were scheduled for South Vietnam had been ready to assume operational roles when they were mobilized in 1968. Policy initiatives including the selected reserve force and the gaining command concept had enabled the Air Force to build some extremely well-equipped and well-trained reserve organizations. By providing adequate resources and training, the Air Force had been able to exploit the greatest latent strength of these units, the experience of their personnel.
The cutting edge of any tactical air unit is its pilots. Most of the Air Guard pilots had learned their trade in the Air Force. Many of them were airline pilots or flew their own private planes. In general, they were much more experienced fliers than their active Air Force counterparts in Vietnam. These pilots, like other Guard personnel, had gone to the same schools and trained according to the same demanding standards as active Air Force personnel. They continued to do so when they became Air Guardsmen. In effect, the Air Guard program enabled the Air Force to maintain their expensive skills at relatively low costs.
Maintenance was another key element in the success of these units. The Air Force was extremely impressed with the high quality of Air Guard maintenance in Vietnam. This was mainly due to the skill and leadership of Air Guard technicians. Technicians were full-time, quasi-military members of the Air Guard who had been responsible for the daily operations of their units prior to mobilization. They accounted for 20 percent of each unit’s total manpower. Most of them were concentrated in the critical aircraft maintenance function. Like the Air Guard’s pilots, most of these technicians were Air Force veterans. As a group, the maintenance technicians in South Vietnam possessed a level of experience with the F-100 unmatched in active Air Force units. Moreover, technicians, whether they were maintenance, supply, administration, or flight supervision specialists, provided continuity seldom found in regular units. They were the heart of Air Guard cohesion, expertise, and esprit de corps.
Despite the sterling performance of its units in South Vietnam, the Air Guard had its problems and limitations. Difficulties encountered by some Air Guard flying units during the 1968 mobilizations suggested the importance of adequate materiel support, full integration of reserve units into active force operations, and better understanding of reserve capabilities by military professionals. Air Guard fighter units deployed to Korea suffered from the absence of established support services and inadequate stocks of spare parts. If active Air Force units had been flying the Super Sabres in Korea, many of these problems could have been ameliorated or avoided entirely. The 123rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing had not benefited from the selective reserve force program prior to its mobilization. Consequently, its active duty performance was degraded by inadequate training as well as personnel and equipment shortages. Both the Korean-based fighter units and the 123rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing were hampered by sweeping postmobilization reorganizations that stripped them of key personnel and vital support organizations. Wholesale violation of unit integrity slowed the development of those units into combat-ready organizations. The F-l00s assigned to Air Guardsmen in South Korea were aging and clearly unsuited to the most pressing operational responsibilities in the event of an attack by the North Koreans.
DESPITE
problems encountered by some of its units during the Pueblo mobilization, the Air Guard had clearly emerged as a first-line combat reserve force with units capable of rapid global deployment. The performance of selected Air Guard units in 1968-69 suggested the prerequisites of effective air reserve programs and paved the way for adoption of the total force policy in 1970 by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. Air Guardsmen demonstrated that well-trained, well-equipped units firmly integrated into the Air Force’s daily peacetime operations performed up to the professional standards of their active force counterparts. Although the Air Guard could not necessarily serve as a total model for ground forces’ programs, its experience during the Pueblo crisis brought to light some premobilization prerequisites of successful reserve programs under the total force.Andrews AFB, D.C.
Notes
1. As quoted by Major General Winston P. Wilson in Air Force Logistics Command Oral History Interview #19 conducted by Charles J. Gross, 17-18 December 1978 at Forrest City, Arkansas. General Brown was U.S. Air Force commander in South Vietnam when Air National Guard Units arrived in 1968; General Wilson was Chief of the National Guard Bureau at that time.
2. "The Air National Guard," Air Force, May 1980, p. 128.
3. Charles J. Gross, "Prelude to the Total Force: The Origins and Development of the Air National Guard, 1943-1969," pp. 9-35, monograph to be published in 1983 by the Office of Air Force History, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as Gross, "Prelude to the Total Force."
4. Ibid., pp. 105-67.
5. Ibid., pp. 177-80, 213.
6. Ibid., pp. 201-9.
7. Ibid., pp.261-66. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 30. Hereafter cited as DOD, Report for FY66. Abott A. Brayton, "American Reserve Policies since World War II," Military Affairs, December 1972, p. 141.
8. DOD, Report for FY66, p. 31. Letter, Lieutenant General J. B. Lampert, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Congressman William T. Cahill, 2 August 1967, Re: President Johnson’s Decision Not to Mobilize the Reserves For Vietnam, Box 182, ND 13/FG 13, Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. U.S., NGB, Annual Report of the Chief, NGB for the Fiscal Year Ending30 June1966, p. 40. Untitled news item, Air Reservist, February 1967, p. 4.
9. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963 -1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 385-87. Hereafter cited as Johnson, Vantage Point. Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: David McKay, 1969), pp. 136-37. Hereafter cited as Hoopes, Limits. Gross, "Prelude to the Total Force," p. 284.
10. Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 385-87. Hoopes, Limits, pp. 136-37. DOD, Report for FY68, p. 39.
11. U.S., NGB, Annual Report of the Chief, NGB for the Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1968 (Washington, D.C.: Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1968), p.7. Hereafter cited as NGB, Report for FY68. "The Air Guard in the Korean Crisis," National Guardsman, March 1968, p. 2. 140th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), History of the 140th TW, 26 Jan. 1968-30 April 1969 (Buckley ANGB, Colorado: 140th TFW, June 1969), p. 1. Hereafter cited as 140th TFW, History, Jan. 1968-April 1969. Memo., Assistant SAF (Manpower and Reserve) to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve), 10 January 1969, Subj.: "Lessons Learned from Limited Mobilizations."
12. Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 385-422. Hoopes, Limits, pp. 159-81.
13. 40th TFW, History, Jan. 1968-April 1969, pp. 1, 5. NGB, Report for FY68, p.7. U.S., NGB, Annual Report of the Chief, NGB for the Fiscal Year 1969 (Washington, D.C.: Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1969), p. 11. Hereafter cited as NGB, Report for FY69.
14. 140th TFW, History, Jan. 1968-April 1969, p. 6. NGB, Report for FY69, p. 11. Gross, "Prelude to the Total Force," p. 291.
15. Untitled news item, Air Reservist, August/September 1968, p. 5.
16. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Nominations of John L. McLucas to be Secretary of the Air Force and General George S. Brown to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Hearings, before the committee, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 13 June 1973, p. 18.
17. History of 5th Air Force, July 1968-30 June1969, Narrative, Volume One (Republic of Korea: Headquarters Fifth Air Force, October 1971), pp. 112-14. Hereafter cited as 5th AF, History, July ‘68-June ‘69. "Service to the Nation," National Guardsman, January 1970, pp. 4-5. History of the 354th TFW, 1 July 1968-30 September 1968 (Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea: 354th TFW, undated), pp. 2-3. Hereafter cited as 354th TFW, History, July-September ‘68.
18. 354th TFW, History, July-September ‘68, pp. 5-7. "Service to the Nation," National Guardsman, January 1970, pp. 4-5.
19. History of the354 th TFW, 1 October-31 December l968 (Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea: 354th TFW, undated), p. 4. 354th TFW, History, July-September ‘68, p. 12.
20. 354th TFW, History of the 354th TFW, 1 January-31 March 1969 (Kusan AB, Republic of Korea, undated), pp. i, 5-9.
21. Fifth AF, History, July ‘68-June ‘69, p. 117. NGB, Report for FY69, p. 12. 354th TFW, History of the 354th TFW, 1 April-June 1969 (Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea, undated), p. i.
22. History of the 123rd TRW, I July-31 December 1968 (Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri: 123rd TRW, undated), pp. 6-9.
21. Hereafter cited as 123rd TRW, History, July-December ‘68. History of the 123rd TRW, 1 January-9 June 1969 (Richards-GebaurAFB, Missouri: l23rd TRW, undated), pp. 10-12. Hereafter cited as 123rd TRW, History, January-June ‘69.
23. 123rd TRW, History, July-December ‘68, pp. 24-26. Fifth AF, History, July ‘68-June ‘69, pp. 11-12. 123rd TRW, History, July-December ‘68, p. 9. 123rd TRW, History, January-June ‘69, p. 1.
24. 123rd TRW, History, July-December ‘68, p. 25. NGB, Report forFY69, pp. 11-12.
Contributor
Charles J. Gross (B.A., B.S., Ohio State University; M.S., Utah State University; Ph.D., Ohio State University) is a historian at Headquarters Air Force Systems Command, Andrews AFB, D.C., and a major in the Air Force Reserve assigned to the Air Force Intelligence Service. He served on active duty as an intelligence watch officer in a NATO air defense command post and as Chief of the Targets Analysis Division, 12th Reconnaissance Intelligence Technical Squadron in South Vietnam. Dr. Gross has been a historian at HQ AFLC.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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