Air University Review, November-December 1982

Into The Abyss
a few great captains go to war

An edited version of this review essay appears in the November 1982 issue of Air Force. It appears here as it was originally written for Air University Review.

The Editor

World War II was the most cataclysmic event of this century—or perhaps of any century. It affected every person on the face of the earth in some way and continues to affect subsequent generations. Untold millions died, and empires crumbled in the wake of the greatest of all human conflicts. The war years were a time of unparalleled drama, with the fate of civilization hanging in the balance. For those directly involved, the war years were a time of both high adventure and pathos, a time of both crowning achievement and abject failure.

Those who write about the war face a difficult task as they attempt to capture the essence of those troubled years. Every approach seems inadequate. Popular histories often relate the drama of individual events but little else. Survey histories evoke the broad scope of the war but ignore the details that ultimately determine events. Biographies of those involved in the war relate the sense of high adventure and the depths of despair but often have a narrow focus. DeWitt S. Copp has attempted to meld the best of all these approaches as he relates the story of the strategic air war over Europe from 1940 to 1945. Copp’s new book, Forged in Fire, is essentially three intertwined and inseparable stories.* First, it is a broad survey of the strategic bombing effort in the European Theater. Second, it relates the drama of the quest for American air power and the recognition of air power as an independent military force. Third, and most important, Copp’s book is an intimate biographical look at the men who developed American air power and took it into the abyss of total war.

*DeWitt S. Copp, Forged in the Fire (New York: Doubleday, 1982, $19.95), 528 pages.

When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, air power was the newest and poorest relation of the American military establishment—a significant statement considering the meager resources available to the military. American airmen had spent the prewar years hammering out a doctrine of strategic bombardment in spite of limited interest by the nonflying Army, hostility from the Navy, and dissension among the flyers themselves. These American disciples of Douhet and Mitchell believed the destruction of an enemy’s industrial web by strategic bombing would destroy that enemy’s will and ability to wage war. Each believed such a bombing campaign would be more or less decisive. The "true believers" postulated that armies and navies would become passé, bypassed by bombers that could strike directly at the enemy’s heart. The trick was to identify the critical industrial targets (no easy task) and strike them with large fleets of long-range heavy bombers (an even more difficult task). In theory, such strategic use of air power would force any enemy to capitulate and avoid the bloodbath of surface combat. The problem was that the theory was just a theory. It could only be proved in the cauldron of total war.

When the United States went to war, American airmen fully expected to prove the theory and were sure that their fates, the future of air power, and the outcome of the war depended on their success. They went to war armed with their doctrine, a detailed plan to implement that doctrine (AWPD-1), and an aircraft they believed would make success possible (the B-17 Flying Fortress). Unfortunately, the plan had flaws, and few B-l7s were available initially.

The story of the strategic bombing campaign in the European Theater was one of frustration, experiment and change, diversion, and many failures. Overall, however, it is the story of constantly increasing pressure on the enemy and eventual thundering success. Frustration came in the form of agonizingly slow deliveries of aircraft and trained crews and the political pressure to use those meager forces piecemeal before they were ready to strike telling blows. Plans changed often as new attempts were made to identify the critical points of the German war economy. Target priorities vacillated among electric power plants, antifriction bearing factories, the Luftwaffe itself, and synthetic oil refineries. Bombing advocates were outraged when their resources were diverted to nonstrategic objectives by those who did not understand the potential decisiveness of strategic bombing. Fruitless raids on hardened submarine pens came first. Then the strategic force was literally gutted to support the invasion of North Africa, followed by diversions to tactical targets in support of the cross-channel invasion of France. In the long run, the pressure of strategic bombing steadily increased to devastating proportions and took a decisive toll of the German war economy.

Copp has done an exceptional job of putting these diverse themes together. His anecdotal style, slightly reminiscent of the late Cornelius Ryan, weaves a highly detailed tapestry picturing the men who directed the bombing campaign. We see Ira C. Eaker in England struggling to build his forces, train his crews, find the best tactics, and keep the strategic forces concentrated on strategic targets. We read Eaker’s messages to General Henry "Hap" Arnold in Washington, pleading and demanding a speedup in the delivery of planes and crews. Meanwhile, Arnold struggles with the impatient Eaker, competing global priorities, an often hostile Army and Navy, and a mercurial President. We also see Carl "Tooey" Spaatz removed from the strategic effort in England to be with Eisenhower and a tactical mission in North Africa. Spaatz later returns to lead the American strategic effort while a heartbroken Eaker is transferred from his beloved command in England to the Mediterranean Theater.

These men, and others such as Frank Andrews, Curtis LeMay, Frank "Monk" Hunter, Laurence Kuter, and Haywood "Possum" Han-sell, had much at stake. First, of course, was the war itself, a life and death struggle against a clearly defined evil. Professionally, each believed that air power and the long cherished dream of an independent Air Force was on trial. Finally, on a personal level, these men were responsible for the bombing doctrine that would put young Americans in harm’s way. Developing a doctrine in peacetime is one thing—the courage to put it to the test when men’s lives are at stake is quite another. Forged in Fire captures this personal drama but never loses sight of the larger drama of the war itself.

Nor does Copp overlook the British in this story. The reader sees the American airmen struggling to maintain the concept of daylight precision bombing while "Bomber" Harris and Churchill argue for night area bombing. Copp’s picture of the relationships between these powerful men with radically different views is well drawn and offers significant insights.

Historians will find Copp’s research thorough and his interpretations well founded. In fact, Forged in Fire should have both wide appeal and historical value. Military officers will appreciate the difficulties and frustrations encountered by the four central characters: Generals Arnold, Andrews, Spaatz, and Eaker. The modern airman can learn much from these great captains about interservice rivalry and its consequences, delicate politico-military relations, politicians dabbling in military affairs, and, finally, the art of aerial warfare. The casual reader will fully appreciate the pure drama of the story. Every reader will delight in the anecdotes skillfully chosen by Copp. No reader should overlook the notes, which appear at the end of the book, for they make fascinating reading in themselves.

I have two criticisms of the book, however. First, the opening chapters (one through four) provide a very slow start. In retrospect, the background provided by these chapters is essential to the remainder of the book. I fear, however, the author will lose many readers early on. Second, the culmination of the bombing campaign in 1944-45 is treated briefly, almost as an afterthought. Although the battle for strategic bombing had been essentially won by that time, many readers will be disappointed in the lack of detail about the thundering climax of the campaign. These two criticisms are trivial though when compared with the author’s superior achievement overall.

Forged in Fire is the second volume by DeWitt Copp concerning the history of American air power, the first being A Few Great Captains. Together these volumes form a continuous historical account. Forged in Fire is a sequel of superior quality. One can only hope that a third volume, taking the story through the independence of the Air Force, will be forthcoming.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew (B.A., Willamette University; M.S., University of Wyoming) is chief, Warfare Studies Division, Air Command and Staff College. He has served as missile combat crew commander and wing missile staff officer and at Hq SAC with duties on the CINSAC Battle Staff. Colonel Drew is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air War College and a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College. He is a previous contributor to the Review and was the Second-Prize Winner in the first Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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