Air University Review, November-December 1982
Dr. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
This question emerged in the late 1960s during the reaction to the U.S. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) policy. People had grown concerned that while MAD might be a good deterrent, it did not provide much guidance for national survival should deterrence fail.
Serious questions were raised about how "mutual" the philosophy really was, and whether it would maintain its credibility in a crisis if the Soviet Union had different beliefs. As the Soviet forces grew both quantitatively and qualitatively, and in a manner in both regards quite different from what the MAD proponents had projected, the concern grew further and triggered a succession of U.S. nuclear war policy studies.
Such studies, whether they be for emergency management, continuity of government, force survivability, targeting, or recovery and reconstitution, depend most heavily on the scenario. The scenario lays out what is expected to happen or what appears prudent to anticipate. Policies and plans are both conceived and evaluated as they enable the nation to cope with the scenario or influence its development.
In recent years, the scenario for nuclear war that appears to have received almost exclusive attention in the policy and planning process is the limited Soviet preemptive counterforce attack scenario. In this scenario, the Soviets mainly attack the U.S. strategic nuclear capability. They strive to reduce collateral damage and, where possible, avoid targeting cities. The strike is usually limited or carefully restricted, but in some cases it can even be fairly massive when command/control, communications, and other military targets are assumed to be targeted.
In January 1974, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger announced a new selective targeting strategy for nuclear war. The basis for this change was the limited counterforce scenario. The rationale was that the President should not have to choose between an all MAD or nothing response in such a scenario. Greater flexibility was required to cope with the less than all-out attack. This flexibility was the essence of the new selective targeting strategy.1
Following the unanticipated growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities in the mid-1970s, especially their improvements in payload capacity and delivery accuracy, this scenario became even more popular. With the Soviet improvements, Minuteman and bomber survivability became serious issues. This, in turn, imparted increased concern that the Soviets might be able to target and destroy these strategic components while holding our cities hostage to coerce the President into not responding with what then would be regarded as a suicidal decision. Again, the driving scenario was a limited counterforce preemptive strike by the Soviet Union.
Further consideration of this scenario led to these questions:
• How should the United States use whatever residual capability remained after such a strike?
• What residual capability or strategic nuclear "reserves" were required?
This shifted policy and planning attention into the previously neglected realm of protracted nuclear war. Again, the main scenario is a limited counterforce exchange in which both sides exercise mutual restraint out of their own self-interest, and both search for ways of resolving the conflict short of total destruction.
To a considerable extent, the reason these scenarios are selected is not necessarily that they are quite likely. Rather, reading between the lines, they seem to be selected because they are interesting. They are not trivial, they are not impossible, they stimulate the imagination, and, in general, they have a more or less (relatively speaking) "happy" ending.
And thus it is with the scenarios involving limited nuclear counterforce attacks. Where mutual restraint is exercised, there exists the possibility of intrawar negotiation. There also exists the possibility of substantially altering the consequences of war by not basing missiles in one’s backyard. The counterforce scenarios do not signal the end of the world, and, therefore, it may be worth allocating effort and resources to prepare for such possibilities. While challenging, they are not totally demoralizing and almost appear workable.
The possible problem is that while they may be interesting, logical, and even sensible, there is very little support for them evident in Soviet military doctrine, which is Soviet state policy, or in Soviet military strategy, as expressed in their military writings that we have obtained. This is not an isolated opinion. Several professional analysts have searched for interest in limited strategic nuclear war, or in counterforce exchanges, in the available Soviet military and party literature and have been unable to identify any even moderate support.2
Certainly, these limited counterforce scenarios are all possible, if for no other reason than no one knows what will happen once nuclear weapons begin flying between the Soviet Union and the United States. In fact, the best way to lose one’s credibility is to argue that any scenario is much better or poorer than someone else’s scenario.
On the other hand, the types of scenarios that would reflect more fully Soviet statements on military doctrine and strategy (i.e., that would reflect how they say they will fight the war where the audience appears to be their own officer corps) rarely seem to be addressed in U.S. policy or nuclear deterrence studies. And even should the United States become prepared for the counterforce variety of scenario, we might still be unprepared for the type of war the Soviets discuss in their literature. Moreover, by being unprepared, we might ultimately encourage the Soviets to plan to wage exactly the type of war we would like to avoid and which makes the counterforce variety interesting in the first place.
The priority goal of the United States is to deter nuclear war. But deterrence, like beauty, "is altogether in the eye of the beholder"— here, the Soviet Union. While U.S. analyses and scenario constructs are valuable, useful, informative, and the essential input to the policy planning process, it still seems important not to lose sight of what the Soviets may believe. Therefore, in the process of conducting the various nuclear policy, targeting, force modernization, and civil defense studies, it would seem prudent to give equal time and attention to scenarios derived from evident Soviet military thinking. Even if many of these Soviet concepts seem inconceivable, they are still worth studying, if for no other reason than to isolate the qualities that make them inconceivable and, subsequently, to ensure that these qualities are not forgotten or allowed to atrophy.
With this in mind, the following discussion examines and contrasts various aspects of Soviet military thought, as discussed in their internal literature, with related aspects of the U.S. counterforce scenarios currently in vogue. The purpose is not to present a straw-man alternative, but rather to illustrate some types of complicating factors and problems that are rarely contained in the scenarios that seem to be used in the policy and planning process and that could be significant, should deterrence fail.
The importance of surprise dominates Soviet military thought. In launching an attack, the Soviets explain, it is important to catch the enemy by surprise so that the attack succeeds in destroying the enemy missiles before they can be launched back in an organized response.
Surprise and preemption tend to be incompatible concepts. This is inherent in the concept of preemption. To preempt is to strike when the enemy is poised and judged to be about to strike. Preemption, while better than striking second, is not a preferred Soviet strategy, because it is the enemy who is basically choosing the time of war.3 Moreover, because the enemy is by definition ready for war, he is maximally prepared to launch on warning a counterstrike. Thus, in preemption, the possibility of achieving surprise in general is minimized.
In Soviet strategic writings, surprise is far more important than preemption because in preemption, independent of who initiates, the Soviet and U.S. missiles "pass each other overhead," as the Soviets would say, and the main benefits of striking first are lost.4 All that preemption does is to prevent the other side from successfully seizing the initiative.
In the counterforce scenarios, the Soviets preempt during a crisis. Both sides tend to be alert or fully generated in this scenario. One is led to this type of scenario because surprise is often equated with a "bolt-out-of-the-blue" attack, which comes in peacetime and as such is considered unreasonable. Unfortunately, a Soviet surprise first strike during a crisis, which could be a local war in some area of the world, actually may be a more difficult case to prepare for than a peacetime, bolt-out-of-the-blue attack. To the extent the Soviets assess that the United States is about to strike, the preemption scenario would be consistent with Soviet military writings. However, it would not seem to be Soviet preferred strategy because it loses the element of surprise. A scenario more in line with Soviet writings might be for the Soviets, within a crisis and having decided to go to war, to deflect the attention of the key decision-makers and prepare the grounds for a successful surprise first strike. This preparation could extend over several months.
One approach might be to attempt to defuse the situation and eventually propose that the U.S. President meet with the Soviet General Secretary in a neutral city such as Geneva, to negotiate a mutually acceptable accommodation. Then, after U.S. forces come off alert or stand-down, or when the President is en route to Geneva—that is, at the most unlikely moment—the Soviets strike first.
But this is not a preemptive strike. Rather it is a cool, carefully executed and concealed first strike. This scenario was specifically suggested by a former high-level East European political officer during a discussion of how the Soviets might go to war. Two very similar scenarios, with the United States cast as the bad guys, have been identified in the Soviet General Staff literature.5
In the United States, while considerable attention is given to strategic warning, the primary focus of the decision process appears to be the receipt of timely tactical warning information from sensors, for example, warning of missile launchings from the early warning satellites. This appears to differ from the Soviet thinking in two regards: First, the decision information considered most important in Soviet writings is strategic warning information from in-place agents. The Soviets want to know about a decision to attack before missiles are launched. Second, while warning information is essential, equal emphasis is placed on the decision to take action as part of the warning process. As the Soviets have analyzed surprise in the past, what was critical was not so much the lack of information but rather the failure to make decisions and take actions based on what information was available.
Consequently, to achieve surprise, in addition to employing secrecy to withhold important information, many actions to deflect or inhibit the opposition’s decision process should be anticipated, such as the deliberate insertion of distracting and conflicting information and misleading the key decision-makers and their advisors regarding Soviet intentions. For example,
In modern conditions, surprise action is of importance for the successful execution of strategic missions and the subsequent achievement of strategic goals. The concealed execution of all preparatory measures and the deeply planned, active supply of misinformation to the enemy side about the true plans may catch the enemy troops unaware, lower their resistance potential and their effective counter-action, and at the same time ensure the successful execution of the assigned mission.6
Another especially important dimension of surprise that receives emphasis in the Soviet literature is military intelligence, in which the Soviets strive to disable, covertly if possible, both the sensors that otherwise would warn the United States that an attack was under way and the major command communication links that would be used to direct time-critical events such as warning, launching airplanes, and directing a response.7
This activity probably only needs to succeed for twenty minutes to be successful. It clearly is called for in the Soviet literature and is an identified activity for both in-place and inserted sabotage teams as reported in the early 1970s by a former KGB officer who had been responsible for operating the sabotage network in Great Britain. His plans included the sabotage, immediately before a surprise attack on Great Britain, of radar stations, communication centers, and other essential defense installations. One specific high-priority target was the Fylingdales ballistic-missile early-warning radar. His plans coordinated the activities of teams of British traitors (several hundred) and in-place Soviet agents as well as Soviet assault forces that were to land from the North Sea with explosives.8 The importance of this activity also was reinforced by a second KGB officer who had served as captain of an elite KGB spetsnaz (sabotage, etc.) team.9
Such activities could be undertaken to accomplish important strategic missions before the war really starts. For example, production, transportation, and communications are directly tied to electric power. A dozen sabotage teams directed by knowledgeable and competent power engineers could make the Northeast power failure of 1965 look like child’s play— and this power failure has not gone unnoticed in the classified Soviet General Staff literature.10 A concerted Soviet effort could also be undertaken to disrupt U.S. reconnaissance, warning, and emergency communication capabilities prior to or coincident with the launching of Soviet missiles.
Another neglected dimension of this problem includes political, ideological, and subversive actions that might be undertaken on the eve of war. The Soviet logic is quite straightforward. Such measures deteriorate the enemy’s political and morale state and "the lower this state is, the easier it will be to achieve surprise and the more serious consequences it will produce."11 The types of measures called for include propaganda, protest marches (perhaps even bordering on insurrection), and sabotage.
If one considers the relative ease with which people and material can be smuggled into the United States, the increased training of indigenous U.S. terrorist groups by the Soviet Union and its surrogates,12 the dismantling of U.S. internal security apparatus in the mid-1970s, and so forth, the potentially harmful consequences to the decision process of even uncoordinated activities in a severe crisis should raise a number of uncomfortable questions. The panic that could be produced could be orders of magnitude more severe and uncontrollable than was experienced in October 1962.
It is not inconceivable that such activities could seriously disable the United States’ ability to go to war. And such activities directed toward exactly such a goal are called for in the Soviet military and party literature.
The inherent potential for disruption and distraction in the United States either overtly or covertly under the cover of protest seems large and is not treated in the counterforce scenarios and nuclear war games. Rarely do any games or studies seriously address the range of problems that might emerge before the "button" is pushed.
Nuclear war scenarios in the United States normally address only the nuclear exchange. While peripheral activities sometimes are included to add context and provide a degree of realism, they are at best just that—peripheral. Again, the Soviet approach appears to be quite different from the U.S. approach.
First, the Soviets do not appear to approach nuclear war as just a nuclear exchange. As counseled in their basic party-military text, Marxism-Leninism on War and Army,
Such a war should not be thought of as a gigantic technical enterprise alone—as a launching of an enormous number of missiles with nuclear warheads to destroy the vital objectives and manpower of the enemy, or as operations by the armed forces alone.13
All forces are to be used and coordinated in their plans—army, navy, air force—and all means are to be used—chemical, conventional, electronic, and intelligence—each to its best advantage.
And, second, the latter portion of this concept, nonmilitary forces are also included in their general war plans.
Nuclear war is a complex and many-sided process, which in addition to the operation of the armed forces will involve economic, diplomatic and ideological forms of struggle.14
With the outbreak of war all means of policymaking are directed towards victory, towards achieving the political aims of the war. They are not achieved by the armed forces alone. Economic and ideology struggle, open and secret diplomacy, and other forms of struggle, are used not only to further the armed struggle but also to supplement it, and in aggregate with it they are able to break the will of the enemy to resist, and thus secure victory.15
Included as a part of the ideology and other forms of struggle are the propaganda, sabotage, and revolutionary actions discussed earlier.
Third, nuclear war is discussed as a global war between two opposed coalitions in the Soviet literature. All areas of the world are involved and prepared in advance as part of the Soviet concept for general war. This preparation is called "preparing the territory." It even may include the development of revolutionary centers in various strategic regions during peacetime, including within the United States. As described by a former East European political officer, these centers, besides being bases for the revolutionary movements in peacetime, also have important roles in general war, specifically, in the disruption of U.S. communications and intelligence facilities overseas and in the overseas movement (staging) of Soviet military forces.16 This could be very important in a prewar stage, assuming that the war could grow out of a crisis in some limited area of the world, and especially in a postwar or protracted war phase where recovery may depend on the availability of overseas resources.
While "peripheral" Soviet activities may be peripheral insofar as the basic missile exchange portion of the scenario is concerned, which itself may be incorrect, this does not seem to be true during the threat period, wherein they might materially affect the U.S. capability going into the exchange, or soon after the conclusion of the major opening nuclear salvos. The non-ICBM forces that remain and the relative ability of the Soviet and U.S. high commands to husband these resources at the beginning of the war and direct them in a coordinated and meaningfully focused manner from a national rather than major command perspective following the main exchange could be an important factor in defining the command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) requirements for fighting after the initial exchange and in determining how the war ends.
At present, these aspects of Soviet strategy seem to receive but scant attention in the U.S. counterforce scenarios, although their importance is constantly stressed throughout the Soviet party and military literature.
How one characterizes the first strike is an especially critical aspect of the scenario. The counterforce scenarios that are in vogue range from the strictly counterstrategic missiles variety to the massive counterforce attack in which other military and C3I targets are included. The common ingredient is hypothesized Soviet interest in limiting collateral damage and in holding U.S. cities hostage as negotiating leverage to deter the United States from striking Soviet cities. This notion of mutual restraint is central to the "interesting" scenarios.
Unfortunately, Soviet thinking about nuclear war as reflected in their literature appears to be quite different from U.S. thinking. If it comes, the Soviets say it will be the decisive battle. That is, it will determine which system, capitalism or communism, will triumph and which will be defeated. The Soviet objective is the total defeat of capitalism. This is to be accomplished rapidly, in the first strike if possible.
Gradualism does not appear to be a Soviet concept. As explained in 1968 by the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal M. V. Zakharov,
As we know prenuclear strategy had to be content with gradualness in its actions and with an accumulation of tactical and operational results, thus building the structure of victory brick by brick. The core of this strategy can be expressed in the demand that only blows of ever-increasing force can crush the enemy.
Nuclear strategy demands otherwise. Only the maximum concentration of force in the first strike (or strikes) can crush the enemy.17
The possibility of achieving strategic results at the start of the war is the essence of the revolution in military strategy brought about by nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Soviet doctrine calls for constant readiness to deliver nuclear strikes and the attainment of victory in the "shortest possible time.’’18
Western counterforce scenarios tend only to consider the readiness requirement. They almost totally ignore the Soviet objectives of victory (which by definition the United States considers impossible)19 and of achieving it in the shortest possible time.
The most immediate Soviet strategic goals appear to be selected to bring about or at least determine to the extent possible the total defeat of the United States and our allies right at the beginning of the initial period of war. As explained by Marshal N. I. Krylov, head of the Strategic Missile Force in 1967,
The mass use of nuclear weapons in the first moments and hours of a war which has begun will undermine the economic might of the enemy, put out of commission centers of control of its armed forces and state, and lead to the destruction of the main groupings of troops, including strategic nuclear forces. This will insure achievement of the main strategic goals of war in its very beginning and will determine the entire subsequent military-political situation.20
The strategic nuclear military forces are to be destroyed mainly to limit real and potential damage to the Soviet Union. All other military forces are to be destroyed to disarm the enemy so that he is unable to defend himself or offer any organized military resistance to subsequent Soviet actions; and, as a derivative of this process, to demoralize any residual enemy military forces and the surviving population.
Additionally, the capability to rebuild military forces (i.e., the economy) also must be destroyed both because of its importance in the postexchange struggle for supremacy and, again, because of its obvious effect on morale.
The economy, which is one of the main spheres in the struggle between socialism and capitalism, has become the most important target of armed combat. Destruction and neutralization of the enemy economic potential have become one of the basic missions in war. A change in the economic conditions of a country or coalition of states is immediately reflected in political conditions and in the moral-psychological condition of the population and army.21
The morale needs to be so utterly destroyed that the entire people give up and do what they are told without opposition. This is the evident Soviet goal, and it is to be accomplished rapidly, immediately if possible, at the start of the war. Strategic success, the Soviets state, is achieved not only through destroying the enemy’s nuclear strike potential and major enemy troop concentrations but also by simultaneous annihilation of the enemy’s war-economic potential and by disorganization of governmental and military control.22
Unfortunately, neither counterforce targeting nor mutual restraint are concepts that one encounters in Soviet military thought, except as treated in their analyses of U.S. concepts. This is not to say that the Soviets are not interested in limiting damage. They most certainly are. This is why surprise is so important in their strategy. But, in Soviet strategy, one limits damage by destroying the enemy’s forces, by "tearing the nuclear stings from the jaws of the enemy" before they can be used against the Soviet Union.23 The Soviets do not appear likely to depend on the good graces of the enemy for their basic survival—especially considering the gross uncertainties, confusions, and problems of control that they believe (as does the United States) will characterize a nuclear war environment.
Precisely what the Soviets would target and which targets would be struck in the first, second, or third wave are unknown. As a start toward building a representative scenario, analysts might ask how most effectively and efficiently they might target to destroy the U.S. military and economic potential, to disrupt all government and military control, and to disorganize the activities of the United States as a whole.24 In such a scenario, all means should be employed in attacking targets, not just nuclear means. Depending on the target, its location, and the nature of destruction required, nonnuclear means such as chemical or biological agents, radio electronic combat (REC) measures, and so forth, might be preferable to nuclear strikes.
Also, the Soviet approach appears to be mission, not target, oriented. One mission might be to paralyze military production; another, to disrupt communications. The Soviets do not talk about destroying classes of targets, such as power plants or all military-industrial centers, to accomplish such missions. Rather, they talk of targeting important centers and "critical branches" where the critical branch might be some distance from the intended target. The Soviets also write at length about sectionalizing the country by strikes on key transportation centers (airfield, rail, and road networks) and of destroying critical people (e.g., scientific and technical) and special industries (e.g., nuclear and chemical).25
If the Soviets follow their expressed strategic logic, in addition to strikes against military and C3I targets, one should expect substantial strikes (in terms of effectiveness) against selected facilities and even regions as required to eliminate the United States as a military power for a long time and to destroy the people’s will to continue the war and possibly even to resist the introduction of a Soviet surrogate government and related occupational forces—that is, to "subjugate the United States to Soviet will." The strike might well be directed to destroy most electrical power or its distribution to key segments of the country, oil refineries, communication and transportation centers, selected large high technology and industrial centers, and even segments of heavy industry and strategic material stockpiles (e.g., petroleum). Areas spared or not struck would be either of secondary importance or possibly would be important areas that the Soviets would like to preserve for their own use.
Because of the anticipated severe nuclear environment—especially as regards possible disruption in communications, intelligence, and command—the missions designed to accomplish the most immediate Soviet strategic goals would appear to be largely preplanned.
But preplanned does not mean rigid or mindless. The Soviets stress the importance of maintaining control. This is reflected in their enormous investment to ensure the survival and continued functioning of their command, both party and military, or more specifically, of the Politburo, Secretariat, Defense Council, and General Staff and their counterpart organizations at all lower levels.
Survivability and flexibility in command are essential to enable the Soviets to manage their forces to achieve more effectively, efficiently, and quickly their most immediate goals. While this battle-management capability would have the flexibility to play the tit-for-tat exchange or mutual restraint games, this facet of their capability should not be confused with or used to obfuscate what appears to be the real intent behind their capability, nuclear war fighting.
There is a tendency to confuse Western concepts of flexibility, i.e., options, with Soviet concepts of flexibility. Soviet battle-management capabilities are not discussed as providing options—different buttons to push at the start of the war—but rather to fight a nuclear war after it has started. This requires not only that one seize the initiative, i.e., strike first with surprise if possible, but that one maintain the initiative until total victory is achieved. Maintaining the initiative is as important in Soviet writings on military and political strategy as seizing the initiative. The enemy is not to be allowed the opportunity to recover. No quarter is to be given, except possibly as a temporary expedient to improve the Soviet position.
Again, as is typical of Soviet writings, the logic is clear and straightforward. The Soviets state that it would be wrong to assume that the enemy will cease operations after the main nuclear strike. It is more likely that the enemy will continue to launch nuclear strikes, will seek to recover his remaining forces, and mobilize to continue his aggressive acts. Therefore, it is essential to maintain the initiative with the delivery of successive nuclear strikes while the ground forces shift to a decisive offensive designed to complete the aggressor’s defeat.
The counterforce scenarios rarely seem to credit the Soviets with pursuing their expressed war aims, with striving to accomplish their most immediate strategic goals, or with maintaining the initiative. Most of the dialogue in the West, particularly that in the United States about options and flexibility, only seems to sidestep the basic reality; namely, that the West is unwilling, unable,26 or possibly even afraid, especially in the sense of possibly making nuclear war more likely,27 to address nuclear war fighting.
This discussion will clearly upset proponents of selective targeting and options. An enormous amount of effort has been expended to get away from the one-button capability that we had for many years. Getting people to think in terms of options and selectivity has been an enormous, uphill battle. What is forgotten is that the original work that identified the need for options and selectivity took place when the United States was vastly superior. In that time frame and context, it may have made sense as a U.S. strategy. It may still make sense, although it is not clear that serious questions might not exist when it is put forth as a U.S. strategy in the context of substantial Soviet superiority and war-fighting strategy and capability. This becomes a very practical matter when preparations are made for one type but not for the other; or when preparations for one type detract from or disable preparations for the other type.
In today’s world, the Soviets might even find a U.S. focus on options, selectivity, and mutual restraint to their advantage in the sense of improving the Soviet prospects for more effectively accomplishing their main strategic goals, as previously discussed. If this were the case, the Soviets might follow the development of such possibilities in U.S. nuclear strategy very carefully and possibly take whatever actions (or inactions) they felt might be most effective (from their point of view) in assisting the U.S. strategy evolve to their advantage.
In Soviet strategy, this is called influencing or controlling the opponent’s decisions.28 The Soviets emphasize the importance of using all means to win the war. Strategic deception used to influence the opponent to make decisions to Soviet advantage is a very important tool. But this is discussed in terms of its effectiveness in enabling the Soviets to triumph more effectively, not in terms of negotiating the rules of the game, which the Soviets state are not negotiable.29
This use of strategic deception to influence U.S. actions could be most difficult to detect because it might well combine apparently inconsistent themes, i.e., strong approbation in the open press coupled with indications that they agreed and were moving in the same direction in classified data or in exercises that they expect the Western intelligence agencies to follow and analyze. Unfortunately, few people in the United States concern themselves with Soviet deception. No analysts are known to have the experience and access to deal adequately with the problem. Nor is the problem limited to the analysts. Convincing people at the political level and at the high or medium-high decision-making level within the intelligence organization that deception is a real problem, is the nub of the problem, as explained by the former CIA deputy chief of counterintelligence.30
After the short-war phase, which could last just hours or days, and assuming that the war is not resolved, the protracted phase begins. Almost by definition, protracted nuclear war refers to a nuclear war that does not end quickly.
In Soviet writings, the short war and protracted war appear to be directly connected. A short war in which the objectives are not achieved seems to be the beginning of a protracted war. Thus a protracted war scenario should begin with Act I, in which the Soviet short-war strategy is implemented but for one reason or another is not successful.
In contrast, U.S. counterforce protracted-war scenarios often seem to be drawn out, or phased, short-war scenarios. Certain missions, for example, those involving collateral damage or attacks on the political leadership, are delayed or withheld. While one can find support in the Soviet literature for withholding strikes even against very important military targets, in applying such statements to the design of a specific scenario, it is essential to explain why this makes sense in the specific case and to do so in Soviet terms using Soviet logic. Unfortunately, the builders of counterforce scenarios rarely if ever do this, and there is little in the Soviet literature that supports controlled or gradual escalation, as indicated earlier.
Other possible problems with protracted war in Western studies may be associated with the success of Soviet preparations to survive a U.S. nuclear strike. Western studies rarely address the relative postures, other than those of the principal nuclear forces, following a nuclear exchange. That is, relative preparations to survive and recover are almost never addressed.
These preparations receive great emphasis in the Soviet literature and plans, to the extent that we occasionally are able to obtain inside information on them. Many of these preparations as discussed in their literature are highly dependent on mobility and secrecy. Important elements of forces, command/control, industry, and so forth are to change locations on the eve of the war and again in several cases a few days later. Most relocations depend on secrecy for their survival, which in turn puts a very high premium on destroying the enemy’s intelligence capabilities in the initial strike.
Duplication (in the sense of mothballing) is also key in important areas such as critical industry, strategic material, and even electric power. Where these types of mothballed facilities, material, or ready capabilities would be located is also a hard intelligence question. Two obvious approaches are the massive use of underground facilities and imbedding operations where they are easily lost (perhaps, for example, in cities).31 U.S. analysts have very limited insight into such Soviet preparations and almost no knowledge of how extensive they might be. Accordingly, such considerations do not enter into Western nuclear war scenarios.
One of the aspects of Soviet preparations for protracted war that has gained some attention in recent years is their strategic nuclear reserves. The current interest is mainly in reloads or refires from previously used missile silos. While this is certainly a valid possibility and concern, there is another interpretation of the data that may be worth some attention.
In the Soviet armed forces, reserves are divided into emergency and mobilization, strategic and government reserves. Emergency reserves are kept directly in the units and commands and are to be sufficient for the conduct of military operations for a specific period, for example, for the initial period of the war. Mobilization reserves are to replace losses or expenditures resulting from operations during the initial phase of the war. Strategic reserves are part of government reserves that have been placed at the disposal of the high command, and the remainder are termed state reserves.32 "Reserves" per se can refer to all of these stockpiles or to very specific ones.
The mobilization and emergency reserves generally are what the Soviets expect to use to fight and win the war. Strategic and government reserves are extras for the disaster scenario and are of special importance for protracted war. These reserves are to enable the Soviets to dominate the postwar world and as such are said to "win the war."
What or where the strategic and state reserves are poses a bit of a problem. One of the characteristics of these reserves is that they should be unknown to the enemy—unknown both regarding location and quantity. They are something extra that the enemy should be unaware of and that the Soviets still have after the mobilization and emergency reserves have been exhausted through use or attrition. Therefore, it seems that nuclear strategic and state or government reserves are important (i.e., the Soviets would have them in considerable quantity) and that they might not be associated through manufacture, storage, or operations with any of the known missile fields.
With this background, the missile silo reload/refire possibility can take on a slightly different color. First, reloads would seem to be more a mobilization reserve than strategic reserve. Second, having a reload capability could serve a second purpose, in a deception sense, by providing a good sink for U.S. warheads—i.e., the used missile silos are no longer just empty silos. They have become refillable silos and hence are valid targets for U.S. strategic missiles and bombers. That is, they are also a good mechanism to draw both fire and attention, in a sense dummy targets. The importance of dummy targets to draw fire and attention is consistently stressed in the Soviet literature. And what other strategic missile dummy target candidates are there?
Still further, why would the Soviets plan to reconstitute a force in the main areas where rubble and fallout radiation levels should be expected to be most severe. Following a nuclear exchange in which vulnerable U.S. reconnaissance capabilities can reasonably be expected to be destroyed, missiles and erector-launchers in the open or under light cover would seem to be adequately survivable.
The problem of reserves is additionally severe because of certain beliefs as to how large is large, or when a stockpile is unreasonably large. For some time, both the U.S. and Soviet stockpiles have been reported in the open literature to be in the range of 20,000 to 30,000 warheads, with the U.S. stockpile the larger of the two.33 These figures generally are considered to be very large. Even if they were halved, many people would still regard them as unreasonably high. Given such high levels, to assume there might be still more weapons that are hidden would be both unreasonable and unmeaningful.
The fact is, however, that we have little information on the Soviet stockpile.34 The figures are probably derived by estimating how many warheads go with their delivery systems that we believe exist, and ensuring this estimate is within their production capacity, again, that we believe exists. However, it is possible to reach quite different figures if the problem is approached from an aggressive military requirements point of view. In this case, the figures could easily range in excess of 100,000 warheads.
While it should not be too difficult to develop rough estimates of Soviet stockpile requirements based on Soviet military doctrine and strategy, this is not known to have been done. Were it to be done, the resulting range and variety could well differ substantially from the current stockpile estimates in both quantity and quality. Considering the importance attached to reserves in the Soviet literature—that is, reserves end the war as they would like to see it end—this question of reserves might warrant considerably more attention in U.S. scenarios.35
The preceding discussion illustrates just a few of the myriad concerns that come to mind when comparing the counterforce scenarios that appear to be used in many U.S. studies with the available Soviet military and political literature, both classified and unclassified, and, to a lesser extent, Soviet capabilities and defector testimony. The discussion is not meant to be alarmist; it is meant only to indicate that there may be an enormous gulf between the policies, plans, strategies, and capabilities for nuclear war as appear to be reflected in Western thinking vis-à-vis Soviet military and political thought.
The preceding is also not meant to sell short Soviet recognition of the problems in nuclear war. The Soviets are well aware of how things can go wrong. In fact, one of their constantly emphasized principles of war—conformity to the conditions—is not to overplan, overestimate their own capabilities, or underestimate those of the enemy. In this regard, Soviet writings are even more cautious and more realistic than those of the West.
The difference is, they do not believe war is impossible. They believe war is definitely possible, and because of the enormity of the attendant consequences, they believe they should prepare for it. And while one may be hard pressed to find clear indications that they believe they can win a war today, they do believe that a war can be lost if insufficiently prepared for.
Perhaps because of reluctance of the West to come to grips with the possibility of nuclear war, for many years there has been a parallel reluctance to analyze with any degree of seriousness what the Soviets say, and many arguments are raised in opposition to placing much faith in the data. On the other hand, the data have exhibited a marked consistency over the years. In reviewing the military and party literature, especially that associated with the General Staff, the General Staff Academy, and the Lenin Military-Political Academy, from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, the basic discussions on first strike, surprise, characteristic features of the war, war aims and goals, missions and means are almost invariant.36
The most significant change emerged in the mid-l970s when the Soviets began censoring out of their literature that the West was known to be analyzing nearly all topics associated with nuclear war fighting. At the same time, strong propaganda was introduced, especially in the more public media such as Pravda and Izvestia, which stressed that the Soviets did not have and never have had a first-strike strategy, and that they agreed with the détente notions that nuclear superiority was meaningless, that war winning was impossible, and that it was essential to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals through arms control agreements. As indicated elsewhere,37 this is believed to have been (and still is) carefully orchestrated Soviet disinformation designed to cover their real intentions and allow them to achieve a major shift in the balance of power through détente, as the British warned might be the case in 1973.38
Additionally, the Soviet military and party literature is consistent with their capabilities that have emerged, both hardware and command/control as demonstrated in strategic force exercises.39 And, of special interest, one finds the same logic and thought processes, more specifically, careful attention to laws of war and principles of military art, in discussions of Soviet war plans and related documents.
This is also how constructing a Soviet scenario might well be approached, that is, with due regard for all the laws of war and principles of military art,40 using all forces and means— military as well as nonmilitary. As an example of the range of topics that probably should receive attention in constructing such a scenario, consider the following:
• Soviet overt and covert actions to achieve a successful surprise first strike during or following a severe crisis;
• coordination of sabotage, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic initiatives;
• war aims and goals, military strategy and operational concepts, including missions and command responsibilities in all the different theaters of operations;
• use of revolutionary centers around the world, including within the United States;
• initial nuclear strike, subsequent nuclear strikes, and exploitation by ground and air forces, that is, seizing and maintaining the initiative;
• simultaneous subversion and ideological warfare; and
• Soviet concepts of reserves, reconstitution, recovery, war termination, and victory.
Two thousand years ago Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu wrote, "Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy . . . ."41 It would seem that central to any planning for war should be analyses of the enemy’s strategy for war, his preparations to implement the strategy, and assessments of the consequences of its implementation, including under conditions of extensive employment of nuclear weapons. In fact, this almost would seem to be a mandatory prerequisite to evaluating the efficacy or credibility of the U.S. deterrent forces, to estimating the cost of redressing deficiencies, to setting meaningful strategic goals for plans and policies, to designing and evaluating civil defense strategies, to developing survivable C3I, to establishing continental defense priorities and plans, and so forth. However, such an analysis or assessment is not known to exist.
Over the past few years, there have been a few notable efforts to "think like the Soviets." These, however, generally have been isolated and minimally supported. They have been focused mostly in the technical areas of weapons effects and initial nuclear strike modeling. Although recently there have been some notable excursions into other areas, none appear to have had much impact on the policy and planning process, at least as can be inferred from the various congressional hearings, statements of high-level officials, and open press reports.
Admittedly, preparing for just the interesting counterforce case is probably better than doing nothing and hence should increase the deterrent value of our capabilities. On the other hand, however, how significant such an increase would be, especially when most important in a severe crisis, and whether different strategies, plans, and expenditures might significantly improve U.S. ability to cope with what the Soviets say will happen, are unknown. The simple fact is that we have not and are not addressing the types of scenarios that fit the Soviet writings on how to fight and win a nuclear war.
McLean, Virginia
Notes
1. U.S-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, March 4, 1974 See also, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, September 11, 1974.
2. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Selective Nuclear Options in American and Soviet Strategic Policy, Rand Report R-2034-DDRE, December 1976, p. vi; and Leon Gouré, "The US. Countervailing Strategy’ in Soviet Perception," Strategic Review, Fall 1981, p. 60.
3. One of the first and best analyses of this point is Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking," Foreign Affairs, January 1958.
4. Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 100,
5. Ibid., p. 104. See also the manner in which the Soviets terminated the war with Finland in 1940, p. 104.
6. Major General V. Kruschinin, Contemporary Strategic Theory on the Goals and Missions of Armed Conflict," Voyennaya mysl’,No. 10,1963, FDD965, July 20, 1966, p. l8 (Emphasis added.); reprinted in Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973, Studies in Communist Affairs, Volume 5, Part 1, U.S. Government Printing Office (USGPO), 1982. See also M. M. Kir’yan, "Surprise," Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Volume 2, Voyenizdat, 1976.
7. Douglass and Hoeber, pp. 46, 78-80. See also Joseph Albright, "Message Gap in Our Crisis Network," Washington Post, October 19, 1980, p. C1.
8. Chapman Pincher, Their Trade Is Treachery (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981), p. 181.
9. John J. Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in the Eighties: The Paramilitary Dimension," Orbis, Winter 1981; and Aleksei Myagkov, "Soviet Sabotage Training for World War III," Soviet Analyst, December 20, 1979, and January 9, 1980.
10. Colonel A. Kol’tsov, "Preparation of the U.S. Economy for War," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 12, 1972, FPD0047, November 21, 1973, p. 98.
11. Colonel Dr. L. Kuleszyneski, "Some Problems of Surprise in Warfare," Voyennayamysl’, No. 5, l97l, FPD00I6, March 18, 1974, p. 104; reprinted in Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973, Studies in Communist Affairs, Volume 5, Part 2, USGPO, 1982.
12. N. C. Livingston, "Taming Terrorism: In Search of a New U.S. Policy," international Security Review, Spring 1982.
13. Marxism-Leninism on War and Army (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), reprinted USGPO, 1976, p. 12.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 11.
16. Interview with General Major Jan Sejna.
17. Marshal of the Soviet Union M. Zakharov, "Soviet Military Science over Fifty Years," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 2, 1968, FPD0042, April 25, 1969, p. 51.
18. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, edited with an analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978), p. 304.
19. See, for example, Statement of Mr. Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 31, 1982, p. 3; Fred S. Hoffman, "U.S. Strategy Aimed at Ending Thoughts of War," Philadelphia Inquirer, June 1, 1982, p. 1; and "Weinberger Disavows Idea Atomic War Can Be Won," Baltimore Sun, June 4, 1982, p. 5.
20. Marshal of the Soviet Union N. Krylov, "The Nuclear Missile Shield of the Soviet State," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 11, 1967, FPD0157/68, p. 17.
21. Colonel M. Shirokov, "Military Geography at the Present Stage," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 11, 1966, FPD0730/67, p. 59; reprinted in Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973, Studies in Communist Affairs, Volume 5, Part 1, USGPO, 1982.
22. Colonel M. Kir’yan, "Factors Influencing the Organizational Structure of Ground Forces," Voyennaya mysl’, No, 1, 1966, FDD966, p. 36. See also excerpt from Colonel S. Taran, "Leninist Theoretical Principles of Soviet Military Strategy," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 6, 1971, in Leon Gouré and Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Strategic View," Strategic Review, Spring 1980, pp. 103-6.
23. V. Ye. Savkin, Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View), USGPO, 1974, p. 260.
24. Major General N. Vasendin, "Comment on Types and Forms and Combat Operation," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 8, 1965, FDD958, p. 32.
25. Colonel M. Shirokov, "The Question of Influence on the Military and Economic Potential of Warring States," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 4, 1968, FPD0052/69; reprinted in Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973, Studies in Communist Affairs, Volume 5, Part 1, USGPO, 1982; for excerpts, see Leon Gouré and Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Strategic View," Strategic Review, Winter 1980, pp. 81-83.
26. See Statement of Mr. Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pp. 4-5.
27. Bernard T. Feld, introduction to Colin Gray, "Issues and Non-issues in the Nuclear Policy Debate," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1981, p. 47.
28. Major General M. Ionov, "On the Methods of Influencing an Opponent’s Decisions," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 12, 1971, FPD003, January 17, 1974; and Colonel A. Vereskin, "On Controlling the Actions of an Opponent," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 11, 1972, FPD 0049, December 3, 1973; both of these are reprinted in Selected
Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973, Studies in Communist Affairs, Volume 5, Part 1, USGPO, 1982.
29. Gouré, p. 60.
30. Raymond Rocca, "Discussion" in Roy Godson, editor, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980’s: Analysis and Estimates (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, 1980), p. 157.
31. In "Begin Describes Soviet Arms Cache," Washington Post, July 7, 1982, p. Al3, Israel is reported to have found in Damour, Lebanon, hidden in deep cellars and galleries, enough war stocks to equip 5 or 6 divisions—l0 times more Russian weapons than were previously reported by Israeli intelligence. Also, in Lieutenant Colonel Kh Adam and Lieutenant Colonel R. Gebel, "Military Camouflage," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 11, 1971, FPD0004/74, January 24, 1974, the possibility of camouflaging a supply base as a town is discussed, and such actions are said to be particularly applicable "at the strategic echelon." Reprinted in Selected Readings from Military Thought 1963-1973, Studies in Communist Affairs, Volume 5, Part 2, USGPO, 1982. See also Richard S. Soll, "The Soviet Union and Protracted Nuclear War," Strategic Review, Fall 1980, p. 24.
32. Sokolovskiy, p. 314.
33. For example, The Defense Monitor (vol. X, no. 8) states that the "U.S. has about 30,000 nuclear weapons today." And in an interview in 1982, former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara stated that he read that the total U.S./U.S.S.R. inventory was "on the order of 50,000," Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1982. In comparing U.S. and Soviet stockpiles, see also Arnold Kramish, "America’s Plutonium Predicament," Strategic Review, Summer 1982, p. 48.
34. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, July 22-23, 1971, pp. 131-32.
35. See also Soll, p. 19, and Niles Lathem, "Space Spies Bare Red Nuke Scam," New York Post, August 23, 1982, p. 13.
36. See, for example, Index to and Extracts from Voyennaya mysl’ (1963-1969) Volume I and (1971-1973) Volume II, Defense Intelligence Agency Report DDB-2245-l-82, 1982.
37. John J. Dziak, Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice (Washington: National Strategic Information Center, 1981), p. 66; and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Disinformation," Strategic Review, Winter 1981, pp. 19-21, and "The Growing Disinformation Problem," International Security Review, Fall 1981, pp. 345-48.
38. William Beecher, "Brezhnev Termed Détente a Ruse, 1973 Report Said," The Boston Globe, February 11, 1979. See also, Brian Crozier, Strategy of Survival (London: Temple Smith, 1978), pp. 76, 8 1-82.
39. See, for example, Michael Getler, "Soviet Missile Test: Scenario for War," Washington Post, June 21, 1982, p. A1; and, "Soviets Stage Integrated Test of Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 28, 1982, pp. 20-21.
40. See, for example, V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View), USGPO, 1974; Colonel V. Chervonobab, "Principles of Military Art and Their Development," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 11, 1971, FPD004, January 22, 1974, for excerpts, see Leon Gouré and Michael J. Deane, "The Soviet Strategic View," Strategic Review, Summer 1981, pp. 84-93; and Colonel V. Morozov and Colonel S. Tyushkevich, "On the System of Laws of Military Science and Principles of Military Art," Voyennaya mysl’, No. 3, 1967, FPD1224/67, December 26, 1967.
41. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, translator ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). p. 77.
Contributor
Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.
(B.E.E., M.S., and Ph.D., Cornell University), is Scientific Advisor at IRT Corporation, McLean, Virginia. His previous positions include Director of the Policy and Strategy Analysis Division, System Planning Corporation; Deputy Director of the Tactical Technology Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; and posts with the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Research Triangle Institute, and Sandia Corporation. Dr. Douglass is author of Soviet Military Strategy in Europe (1980), Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War with Amoretta M. Hoeber (1979), The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive (1976), and other books and articles.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor