Air University Review, September-October 1981
prospects for a "window" in the 1980s
Major Kenneth W. Engle
Former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Admiral John M. Lee, notes that the concept of "windows," familiar to space planners, can be profitably applied to arms control negotiations.1 Window conditions exist when multiple factors are in phase. In arms control, factors such as the state of technology, force structure, weapons inventories and procurement programs, verification capabilities, and political and economic incentives occasionally merge into a favorable configuration for a limited period of time. If so, they will interact to overcome inertia and suspicions and open a window through which the negotiating parties can feasibly interact in a search for agreement.
The history of arms control attempts in Europe is as perplexing as the problems are complex. The myriad factors that need to be brought in phase to reach an agreement have eluded control. Unlike the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, where an open window was perceived, seized, and nurtured, the scenario in Europe is a sequence of rebuffed initiatives followed by a seemingly endless round of negotiations leading nowhere.
These Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations* have served various interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies to a point. However, there are developments in the current political-military context in Europe that tend to make the MBFR negotiations appear inappropriate and a search for an appropriate forum imperative.
*MBFR is the western acronym for these negotiations. It will be used in place of the longer official title: Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) program for long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) modernization is carefully complemented with a concurrent program of arms control initiatives. This modernization is having a significant impact on the Soviet Union. NATO hopes the program will be a stimulus to serious negotiations for arms control rather than a continuing arms race.2
MBFR does not seem to be the proper forum to deal with theater nuclear weapons and other new challenges of the 1980s. An entirely new or extensively modified forum is needed. Several approaches have been suggested, and perhaps a window can be opened in the 1980s.
Lloyd Jensen in a 1963 study proposed that when two nations are highly confident about their deterrent capabilities, the incentives for serious consideration of disarmament and willingness to compromise are negligible.3 In light of MBFR this proposition seems to hold true through 1979, but I suggest a follow-on proposition that could emerge from the LRTNF modernization: If the perception of a significant positive change in an opponent’s capabilities disrupts a nation’s confidence in its deterrent capabilities, that nation is likely to press for serious negotiations that will relieve the threat.
I see indications that the Soviets would rather relieve the perceived threat by eventual negotiations, if their propaganda maneuvers fail, rather than an arms buildup. Perhaps there will be mutual recognition that the reinstatement of deterrent capabilities at today’s high force levels is becoming increasingly less feasible, and the Reagan administration may be able to open a window.
We have been through two principal phases of maneuvers—the initiatives taken prior to MBFR and the 1970s or MBFR decade. We are now on the verge of major changes. However, the phase we are about to enter cannot escape the legacy of past attempts.
From the Soviet viewpoint, extremely serious and dangerous developments were taking place in Europe by the mid-1950s. NATO had been created in 1949. Subsequently Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, and West Germany was rearmed through the London and Paris Treaties of 1954, which admitted West Germany through amendment of the Brussels Treaty. West Germany was authorized an army of 500,000 men. The Soviets retained their concern over German militarism and feared the idea of rearmament and possible reunification.
The Soviet response took two forms: A military alliance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact, was formed to offset NATO, and at the same time the Soviets proposed a series of arrangements for disarmament and European settlements. These proposals, designed to better the Eastern position in Europe, typically included "the elimination of foreign bases, the withdrawal of occupying forces from Germany, a non-aggression pact between NATO and WTO countries, and the permanent denuclearization of Germany."4
Thus most proposals were calculated to put positive and negative pressure on West Germany. In 1954 at the Berlin Conference, the Soviet Union proposed a European collective security pact, which would have involved a unified but neutralized Germany with removal of foreign troops and bases.
In the late 1950s Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki presented the first in a series of proposals for European arms control measures.5 He called for denuclearization of East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. He also suggested a nonaggression pact between NATO and WTO countries. His suggestions were rejected by the West with the claim that the plan tended to perpetuate the division of Germany and was too limited in scope. The United States was afraid it would create a serious military imbalance by eliminating nuclear weapons in West Germany.
The Rapacki Plan appears to have been a window the Soviets were really trying to open. The West at the time tended to view anything coming from the East as being bad for the West even if it looked good. This led to the United States reneging on its own initiatives, e.g., London 1957, when they were accepted. In 1958 a revised version of the Rapacki Plan was turned down, even though the revision responded to many Western criticisms.
In 1963 Poland’s Wladyslaw Gomulka proposed a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. In 1964 the Soviets pressed for reduction and eventual withdrawal of all foreign forces in Europe. The West feared that the Soviet Union’s geographical proximity would allow for a short notice return. There were also fears among European leaders, especially West Germans, that special limitation areas could lead to discrimination among European nations along with demilitarization and neutralization.
Another barrier was the West’s preference for security through alliance rather than by seeking agreements with the East. There was also a tendency to link reunification of Germany with arms control. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of West Germany from 1949 to 1963, continually pushed his political goal of unification. He and U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made unification prerequisite to considering arms control.
By the mid-1960s the West began to take an interest in force limitations, but this time the East responded negatively. The Soviets stressed the need for a prerequisite political solution. They wanted a European security conference.
In responding to the June 1968 NATO proposal for reciprocal force reductions balanced in scope and timing, the Warsaw Pact renewed proposals for a conference and assailed the U.S. move as calculated "to distract attention, lull the vigilance of the socialist countries, and create a political climate favoring subversion activity by imperialist agents, the fanning of nationalistic feelings, and the penetration of hostile ideology."6 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that Soviet forces were not in Eastern Europe solely for military defense but also for internal control.
In December 1969 the NATO ministers made a security conference in Europe contingent on progress in other East-West talks, such as the scheduled negotiations on Berlin. NATO then resumed the force reduction proposals in May 1970.7
Up to this point, the initiatives taken were not well received. The timing was not right, and other considerations—both domestic and systemic—were too powerful. The window remained closed.
Perhaps the most important change that made arms control negotiations possible in the early 1970s was West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. His policy reflected a new realism. He was willing to abandon past territorial claims east of the Oder-Neisse line and pressures for formal unity of the two Germanys. He brought a flexibility of diplomatic maneuver that was lacking during the Cold War period. The bilateral treaties entered into with East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union set the stage for the eventual Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which served the primary interests of the Soviet Union and parallel MBFR negotiations, the price demanded by the West.
In the Soviet Union, the decision-making process is generally hidden from view. Individual operational codes, the interplay of bureaucratic politics, and the effects of personality can be inferred only on the basis of very brief glimpses. Outside of these minor revelations, indicators of motivation must be extrapolated from actions.
Brezhnev, in a Tbilisi speech of May 1971, indicated an inclination to consider force reductions. This lead was followed later in the year by a Declaration of Warsaw Treaty States affirming that reductions of both foreign and indigenous forces in Europe would lead to increased security. Prior to this declaration, the Warsaw Treaty Organization had made no mention of national forces.
Brezhnev’s action came just in time to reverse the U.S. Senate’s action on the Mansfield Amendment, which would have led to unilateral reductions. He probably calculated unilateral withdrawal to be a greater risk than arms control negotiations. Preparatory talks for a security conference and discussions on force reductions moved forward.
The CSCE contributed to Soviet security by legitimizing the European order and status of Germany. The MBFR negotiations also have made positive contributions to Soviet security. There were two openly declared motives for Soviet acceptance of MBFR negotiations: "the belief that East-West relations in Europe might be improved by the reduction of troops, particularly foreign troops; and the belief that this could cut down defense costs."8 While plausible, they are not sufficient to explain why Brezhnev did not let the Mansfield Amendment proceed on course. Other motives must be inferred.
Perhaps the Soviets’ first concern was to prevent any weakening of their political-military position in Central Europe, one possible result from a rapid and destabilizing U.S. force reduction. They wanted to discourage Western Europe from developing a strong and independent defense structure with military integration. Such unity could be a product of the shock of U.S. unilateral reductions.
Between 1973 and 1979 little significant progress toward an agreement was made. MBFR proposals and counterproposals were tabled, but the Soviets had little incentive to do anything but keep the forum going. The Soviets apparently were satisfied with the negotiating status quo and the progress they were making in unilateral improvements to their forces. As in the pre-MBFR initiatives noted earlier, NATO and WTO desires for progress did not coincide. Some WTO interests were satisfied by the CSCE; some are satisfied by the continuation of the MBFR talks. There has been little reason in Soviet eyes to compromise.
Lloyd Jensen’s proposition noted earlier has been supported by MBFR developments. With the United States and Soviet Union highly confident about their deterrent capabilities in Central Europe, the incentives for serious consideration of an arms control agreement have been negligible. Soviet interests have been and were being served by the status quo up to 1979.
However, Soviet confidence has recently been threatened by NATO’s response to Soviet arms improvements through the NATO LRTNF modernization plans. The WTO is likely to press for serious negotiations that will relieve the threat posed by these modernized theater nuclear weapons planned for deployment. The threat is real. Soviet reactions, as in the neutron bomb proposal a few years ago, have been vehement.
There is now a different force structure than the one which opened the window for negotiations in the early 1970s. There has been a substantial buildup of WTO forces, including deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. These weapons have undercut NATO’s theater nuclear advantage. Numerous steps are under way in NATO to redress the imbalance. Primary among these and most threatening to the Soviets is the LRTNF modernization program.
NATO threat and Soviet counteractions
From a Soviet perspective, NATO initiatives are threatening to reverse the favorable balance of power the Soviets have been building. Although not yet accomplished, the NATO program calling for a 3 percent real annual increase in defense spending was worrisome. However, the major threat, as might be concluded from the vast effort expended to counteract it, was the NATO conditional decision in December 1979 to proceed with plans and programs for deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The NATO approval carried the temporary caveat wherein the Netherlands and Belgium declined, at this time, to permit 48 missiles each on their soil. This proviso will be periodically reviewed.9
The total plan "calls for deployment of 108. . .Pershing II missiles with a range of about 1000 miles as opposed to the 400 mile range of the present Pershing [Is] in West Germany. Then 464 more land-based, low-flying cruise missiles with [an approximate] range of 1500 miles would be built and deployed in Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and probably Italy."10
The Soviets’ costly buildup of regional forces that paralleled their drive for parity (at least) with the United States in strategic weapons might have produced, in their expectations, a compliant Western Europe. Instead, the Soviets are faced with the possibility of effective countermeasures from NATO.
A massive Soviet propaganda campaign has been mounted. As with the campaign against the neutron bomb, threats and warnings of retribution have been intermingled with inducements. Soviet perceptions of the high stakes involved are evident in the breadth of participation and the intensity of the rhetoric unleashed in an effort to avert the deployment of these weapons.
The major initiative came on 6 October 1979 in a speech by Brezhnev in East Berlin. In a general warning he stated that ". . .the Socialist countries would not, of course, watch indifferently the efforts of the NATO militarists. We would have in such a case to take the necessary steps to strengthen our security." In a direct warning, he asserted that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was facing a very dangerous choice: "to help strengthen peace in Europe and develop peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation. . . . It is not hard to see what consequences the F.R.G. would have in store for itself if these new weapons were to be put to use by their owners one day."11 He then said this warning applies to other European countries as well, if they allow such weapons to be deployed on their soil.
Accompanying the warnings was an offer to take measures to reduce tension and arms. Brezhnev "confirmed solemnly" that "the Soviet Union will never use nuclear arms against those states that renounce the production and acquisition of such arms and do not have them on their territory." He announced a decision to reduce unilaterally the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe within 12 months. As many as 20,000 troops and 1000 tanks would be withdrawn from the German Democratic Republic. He also called for expansion of notification about large-scale exercises provided for in the CSCE Final Act. He proposed to reduce the level requiring notification from 25,000 to 20,000 men and suggested that exercises involving more than 40,000 to 50,000 men not be held at all.
This "carrot and stick" approach played masterfully on European fears of being abandoned by the United States if the Pershing II missiles are not deployed or of being decoupled from the U.S. strategic umbrella if the missiles are deployed. West Germany was being told to choose between Ostpolitik and Pershing IIs.
The propaganda element in the Soviet counteraction has not been effective. The West is proceeding with modernization but at the same time is emphasizing the necessity for arms control as a parallel initiative.
Since the modernization program is proceeding as planned, Soviet interests would seem to require that the MBFR negotiations be absorbed into an expanded forum or that a new forum be initiated that can redress the imbalance they perceive for the future.
As Brezhnev stated,
We continue to regard a European conference held on the political level as the most suitable place for discussing a broad complex of measures of military détente in Europe. It is very pressing and, it can be said, a ripe task to prepare and convene such a conference.12
In a November 1979 interview in Pravda, Brezhnev indicated that current Soviet aims are to make
. . . headway in solving the entire complex of problems of military détente and arms limitations on the European continent. . . . As far as a practical resolution of the question of these weapons [LRTNFs] is concerned, there is only one path here—to begin talks. The Soviet Union believes that talks must be started without delay.13
In early July 1980, following West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s visit to Moscow, Brezhnev dropped the demands that NATO rescind its decision to deploy the new missiles and that the SALT II treaty be ratified prior to beginning negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles. However, he insisted that U.S. forward-based systems be included. In mid-October 1980 in Geneva, preliminary U.S.-U.S.S.R. low-key talks on theater nuclear weapons began, with the purpose of defining the scope of negotiations within a SALT III framework.
Thus, the immediate problem for the 1980s will be to establish an acceptable forum and approach.
seeking a realistic forum for the 1980s
From a Soviet perspective, any effective forum for European arms control will have to integrate actions on all levels of weaponry. Although short-term and narrow approaches might work, they will have to be part of an overall pattern. As a Soviet spokesman declared nearly a decade ago, "The ratio of conventional forces cannot be divorced from the ratio of tactical and strategic nuclear forces, and the regional balance in Central Europe cannot be divorced from the all-European and global balances."14 MBFR, as modified by one of the recent proposals, could provide the model for progress in the 1980s.
The long years of MBFR negotiations have not brought substantive agreements, but some of the by-products are very useful. Extended communications and creation of a common vocabulary should make future interaction easier as might the experience of the negotiators. The experience of allied interaction and East-West negotiations should expedite the future processes for creating agreed-on positions. The experience of dealing with the complications of asymmetrical weapon and force structures will provide an uncommon factor in the SALT negotiations experiences.
The basic problem with the MBFR forum is that it is too narrow in membership, scope, and approach. It has been overtaken by events such as other arms control negotiations and changes in military technology.
The gray-area or Eurostrategic weapons problem in particular makes it necessary to go beyond conventional weapons and force reductions. As noted above, the Soviets are not willing to separate issues.
The Soviet perceptions of threat that need to be addressed along with the interests of the West require a forum that can deal with Eurostrategic weapons as well as conventional force reductions. Intercontinental weapon negotiations might be confined to a U.S.-U.S.S.R. forum, but even that should be integrated in some manner.
Numerous proposals have been made. The French would replace MBFR with a new European arms control conference to cover the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. They propose to restructure negotiations to bring them into alignment with the current technological, military, and political environment. However, they would not include theater nuclear or naval forces. In early 1980, when still president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was quoted as stating,
France has every reason not to participate in SALT III . . . the likelihood of success for such a negotiation on the Gray Area is extremely low. . . in every case, France’s deterrent is a central system.15
Two proposals involve a tiered approach. Robin Ranger believes negotiations should be functionally distinguished according to states and weapons involved.16 He wishes to get away from the traditional American approach which, he believes, treats arms control as a primarily technical problem. He thinks that MBFR must be placed in a broader arms control context through a four-tiered approach, ranging from superpowers through NATO-WTO, flank powers, and "other European powers" forums to address relevant issues at each level.
Another tiered approach offered by Christopher J. Makins would be defined by the forces covered rather than by any geographical areas.17 Makins’s proposed Conference on Negotiated Security in Europe (CONSET) would supplant MBFR and preclude theater nuclear discussions in SALT III. The 35 countries involved in CSCE would participate in an effort to conclude "all kinds of agreements which could enhance stability and reduce uncertainty in the European theater balance and also increase the confidence of all countries of Europe."18 Like the French proposal, the idea is to establish a stronger political framework for negotiated security arrangements.
Leslie H. Gelb and Richard Burt believe that arms control has essentially failed in the way it has been approached in the past.19 Gelb’s approach is not necessarily in conflict with the forums proposed above, but he looks on agreements to be pursued as being most effective when dealing with confidence and stability-building exercises tailored to fit in with current political relationships. In MBFR, troop reductions could just as easily lead to instability as to stability. The aim should be at balancing asymmetries. Gelb believes that MBFR is blocking needed efforts to pursue realistic arms control in Europe, which should deal with confidence-building measures (CBM).
Burt is against codifying an existing balance. He believes it would be best to eliminate sources of military instability. He is against option three in MBFR (recently dropped) and believes it is unlikely to stabilize the conventional balance. He finds MBFR irrelevant and counterproductive for the defense of Central Europe. NATO countries can be targeted by weapons outside the MBFR negotiating boundaries. He also sees CBMs as the answer if MBFR is to be pursued.
The Soviets have given some indication that the CBM route might be fruitful. In the past, they have been vehemently opposed to on-site verification or any other negotiated presence of foreign observers within the Soviet Union. There is no hint of modification in that position, but the possibility of a presence in relation to CBMs might not be as strongly opposed for Eastern Europe.
In the spring of 1979, Lev Semeiko of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., wrote that,
The Soviet Union is by no means against confidence building measures. . . the Soviet Union deems it necessary to extend confidence building measures. At the Belgrade meeting (follow-on to CSCE), it proposed that major military maneuvers with the participation of 50,000-60,000 troops should not be held so as to exclude the possibility of using a massed deployment of troops as a demonstration of strength.20
The latest NATO MBFR proposal tests Soviet willingness to consider expanded CBMs. The proposal, in addition to calling for a symbolic U.S.-Soviet reduction in line with Soviet proposals, calls for agreement:
—To detect and report troop movements into or out of Central Europe, observers would be placed at exits and entry points such as ports and major rail and road junctions around the so-called Reduction Area (in the West, the territory of West Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, and in the East, the territory of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia);
—To help ensure compliance with the agreement, up to 18 reciprocal air and ground inspection trips would be permitted each year;
—To reduce tensions resulting from large unexpected troop exercises and movements, the two sides would notify each other in advance of all movements of 10,000 men or more;
—To attempt to build mutual confidence, the two sides would permanently exchange data on their military forces in the Reduction Area. The data could then be checked against independent intelligence estimates;
—To provide a forum for dialogue concerning compliance with this and future agreements, a follow-on East-West consultative body would be established.21
Acceptance of the principle of negotiating CBMs, but in a forum encompassing other levels of concern, could mean the demise of MBFR but the opening of a window for realistic and comprehensive arms control negotiation in Europe.
Moscow has traditionally used arms control as one instrument in its general political offensive. To the Soviets, it is a long-term zero-sum struggle between East and West. So long as the Soviets were confident of their capabilities, they were reluctant to negotiate other than to propose measures extremely beneficial to themselves. They had no incentive to compromise. With the NATO LRTNF modernization program, their perception of strength and advantage has been called into question. Their interests might now be served from negotiations of proposals more likely to be acceptable to NATO and the rest of Europe.
Will the scenario of European arms control now follow a positive path similar to the ABM negotiations? Most of the public pronouncements by Soviet leaders seem to contain a positive tone and careful avoidance of closing windows even in their most powerful propaganda barrages. I believe the NATO LRTNF modernization program, if diligently pursued along with arms control overtures, will produce a perception of threat on the part of the Soviets that will be positive (from our standpoint) in leading to negotiations.
While the current world situation, with the stalled and probably "dead" SALT II treaty and the Afghanistan situation, elicits short-term pessimism, I am optimistic for the long-term possibilities. President Reagan stated during his campaign,
As president, I will immediately open negotiations on a SALT III treaty. . . .My goal is to begin arms reduction. My energies will be directed at reducing destructive nuclear weaponry in the world—and doing it in such a way as to protect fully the critical security requirements of our nation.22
An expanded negotiating forum could be arranged. Emphasis on CBMs could bring some initial results in reducing tensions. A window can be opened. It remains for both sides to cooperate in the "launch."
Fort Collins, Colorado
Notes
1. John M. Lee, "An Opening ‘Window’ for Arms Control," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1979, p. 121.
2. See Catherine M. Kelleher, "Alliance Politics and Theater Nuclear Modernization: The View from Europe," November 1979, a paper presented to the Arms Control Seminar, Columbia University, for a review of allied emphasis on the arms control element.
3. See Frank J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills, California, 1973), p. 102.
4. John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler, International Arms Control (Stanford, California, 1976), pp. 251-52.
5. Ibid.
6. Statement by L. Vidayesova, "NATO on the Eve of 1969," cited in Robert Levgold, "The Problem of European Security," Problems of Communism, January-February 1974, p. 29.
7. John Borawski, "Mutual Force Reductions in Europe from a Soviet Perspective," Orbis, Winter 1979, p. 848:
8. Christopher Bertram, Mutual Force Reductions in Europe; The Political Aspects (London: Adelphi Paper No. 84, 1972).
9. Milwaukee Sentinel, December 14, 1979, p. 21.
10. Los Angeles Times, November 13, 1979, p. 5.
11. See "Excerpts from Brezhnev’s Address in East Berlin," New York Times, October 7, 1979, p. 12.
12. Ibid.
13. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXI, no. 45, 1979, p. 14.
14. Yu. Kostko, "Views on Arms Cutbacks in Central Europe," translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXIV, no. 40, 1972, p. 9.
15. Quoted in Pierre Lellouche, "SALT and European Security: The French Dilemma," Survival, January-February 1980, p. 164.
16. Robin Ranger, "An Alternative Future for MBFR: A European Arms Control Conference," Survival, July-August 1979, p. 164.
17. Christopher J. Makins, "Negotiating European Security: The Next Steps," Survival, November-December 1979, p. 256.
18. Ibid.
19. Leslie H. Gelb, "A Glass Half Full"; and Richard Burt, "A Glass Half Empty," Foreign Policy, Fall 1979, p. 20.
20. Lev Semeiko, "Force Reductions—A Soviet View," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1979, p. 73.
21. Baltimore Sun, January 3, 1980, p. 19.
22. Washington Post, October 20, 1980, p. 1.
Contributor
Major Kenneth W. Engle (M.A., American University) is assigned to the National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland. He was formerly Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies, AFROTC Detachment 90, Colorado State University, Fort Collins; and Director of Operations, Iraklion AS, Crete, Greece, USAF Security Service. Major Engle is a Distinguished Graduate of Officer Training School.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor