Air University Review, November-December 1981

General Aviation Assets Are Overlooked
 in PostNuclear Attack Planning

AMERICAN military strategists have long been aware that their Soviet counterparts do not rule out the possibility of a nuclear exchange between the two countries nor the fact that the Soviets view a nuclear war as being winnable.

While it is impossible to predict precisely how the "winner" in a global nuclear war will be determined, certainly one important criterion is how well the United States (or Soviet) economy can function and ultimately recover in the postattack period. In this context, it behooves the nation’s leaders to assess candidly the country’s likely strengths and weaknesses after a nuclear exchange and, in particular, identify and maintain in peacetime those assets identified as being essential to economic recovery. We believe the value and utility of one particular asset—the nation’s general aviation resources—have been neglected.

A general survey of the literature on post-nuclear attack planning found that in the early 1970s some directives were issued and plans formulated on how general aviation assets would be used in an economic recovery effort. In 1970, for example, the Department of Defense issued a federal civil defense guide. Among the missions envisioned for general aviation was "air support to satisfy essential priority commercial, corporate, industrial, health and welfare, and agricultural requirements in military and civil defense survival and recovery operations.¹ However, missions and directives became dated, and by the late 1970s any contribution general aviation might make in the postattack period was, for all practical purposes, forgotten.

A large part of the problem, however, was not that general aviation had been overlooked but that the importance of ensuring a functioning economy following a nuclear attack had not received the attention it deserved. In this respect, in 1977 the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded that "current programs emphasize preparedness to meet attack and do not adequately consider (perhaps because of funding constraints) preparedness for recovery following attack."²

In 1980 there were more than 202,000 general aviation aircraft in operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that this fleet will increase to 297,000 aircraft by the year 1990. Equipment in this total includes everything from single engine piston to turbojet to rotorcraft aircraft.

There are more than 14,500 airports in the United States including seaplane bases, heliports, public, private, and paved and unpaved fields. Of the 3159 airports included in the National Airport System Plan (NASP), 2224 are general aviation airports. Airports included in the NASP are deemed essential to the U.S. transport system and are eligible for development funds under the Airport Development Aid Plan (ADAP). However, although more than $2 billion has been dispensed for grants-in-aid to airports since 1970, a total of only $314.1 million went to 930 general aviation airports. In 1979 the FAA had aid requests from 490 general aviation airports totaling $255.7 million. However, only $65 million was funded. Airports not included in the NASP are ineligible for ADAP funds and must rely on state and local support for maintenance and operation.

The third component of our general aviation resources is the general aviation pilot. In 1980 there were more than 361,000 private pilots, and that total is expected to exceed 492,000 by 1990. While comprehensive personal data are not available (i.e., nonflying skills and occupations), a study conducted in the mid-’70s found that as a group general aviation pilots come from every walk of life and that the occupation of the aircraft owner was either professionally or technically related.

Before considering the arguments supporting general aviation as a valuable but neglected asset in the postattack period, it is necessary to recap briefly the Soviet targeting doctrine. Essentially, it is a counterforce strategy. In order of priority, the Soviet objectives against U.S. forces in a nuclear war are as follows: the destruction of enemy nuclear attack capability, destruction or disruption of the enemy troop basing system, destruction of enemy military-industrial support facilities, destruction or disruption of enemy control of state and other military activities, and the destruction and disruption of enemy services and transport.³

Two arguments are put forward for reevaluating the role of general aviation in a post-nuclear attack period. First, general aviation assets in some areas of the continental United States would be vital to any meaningful recovery effort. In multitargeted, high-population-density areas where target locations are in close proximity, counting on surface transportation systems for even minimal operations in the first three to four weeks following a nuclear attack is unrealistic. In terms of fallout radiation intensity alone, the absolute advantage of aircraft over surface transportation is significant. At 1000 feet above ground, fallout radiation intensity is only one-thirtieth of that found at the five-foot level. This ratio generally would hold throughout the contamination period.

Are any transportation options open for what will probably be the hardest hit parts of the country? Using the eastern FAA district composed of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, and the District of Columbia as an example, one could piece together an immediately operative system from the estimated 22,000 general aviation aircraft, 1900 landing facilities, and the 49,000 private pilots and flight instructors located in the district. While these assets would suffer losses, it is still likely that a viable system could be put together. First, all of the components making up the system are geographically dispersed, and, second, where airports were destroyed, makeshift strips could be fashioned using highway construction equipment. Moreover, a number of alternatives to runways for small planes exist— highways, pastures, parking lots, and it is probable that even major airports in targeted areas might still have runways or taxiways capable of handling light planes. By and large, general aviation assets in total are more likely to survive a nuclear attack than air carrier assets located in large metropolitan areas and surface transportation system feeding into hub cities, e.g., railroads into Chicago. The key, as stated above, is that general aviation resources are geographically dispersed. Table I indicates the extend of dispersion of general aviation resources in the continental United States.

Table I also indicates that some geographic imbalance exists between general aviation resources and areas likely to be hardest hit in a nuclear attack. For example, the eastern United States will be the more heavily targeted but has fewer planes and pilots than does the South. Where imbalance does exist, however, the compensating factor is the mobility of the assets.

South Carolina is probably typical of most states in having disaster and contingency plans and a state agency responsible for implementing them, but there is no comprehensive plan operative to use the state's probable surviving general aviation assets effectively in the postattack recovery period.⁴

In 1980 the state had a total of 90 airports plus 35 air strips. Forty-eight airports were included in the NASP. Airports in 19 of the 46 counties had runways of 5000 or more feet. The latest South Carolina Aeronautics Commission data indicate that 1883 nonair carrier aircraft were registered in the state as well as more than 6700 licensed pilots, 2500 of whom were classified as private pilots.

Under present Soviet targeting priorities, the following areas (cities) in South Carolina could expect attack with nuclear attacks: Charleston (port and base); Columbia (capital city, base); Myrtle Beach (base); Aiken (nuclear storage site); Sumter (base); possibly Greenville-Spartanburg (interdict north-south mainline rail and highway system); and Beaufort (base).

Figure 1 indicates targeted areas and the extent of blast damage, assuming that major destruction will occur up to 10-15 miles outward from ground zero. Also shown is the location of airports that would probably be operable in the postattack period and the number of surviving aircraft in each country. A conservative estimate is that 46 airports, 931 aircraft, and 3000 pilots would survive a nuclear attack on the state. The question is: Could they be efficiently utilized? In our opinion, at present, they could not.

Also, in our opinion, general aviation assets could play a significant role in the postnuclear attack in every state as an in-place, however organized, transportation system. But funds to enhance this capability must come from somewhere, either as an addition to the federal budget or by reductions in other problems.

In this context, consider fiscal year 1980 federal ADAP funding for airport construction/maintenance. Of $640 million authorized, $98 million was allocated to general aviation airports. Keep in mind also that the FAA estimates for the period 1980-89 that $520 million will be needed just to maintain NASP general aviation airports, another $750 million to bring these airports up to standard, and an additional $1.95 billion to expand the system.⁵

If we consider general aviation airport funding for a single year and assume that an additional $50 million is a fair estimate of what could have been effectively utilized for general aviation airport improvements in FY80, then where could the money come from? The funds might have been obtained by cutting Amtrak's subsidy approximately 7 percent, by making do with 5 percent less information about our energy policies, or by reducing our contribution to multilateral development banks by 5 percent. Possibilities are almost infinite. The point, however, is that if a strong case emerges for additional funding of a particular budget item, then all items in the budget must be reexamined in terms of their costs and benefits. In our opinion, the argument for increased funding of general aviation assets and airports in particular, could withstand the closest scrutiny. Parenthetically, it might be noted that making such adjustments (more for defense, less for other programs) is precisely the exercise President Reagan's economic advisers are running in 1981 as they shape the federal budget to reflect the priorities of the new administration.

In our opinion, federal, state, and local contingency planners should specifically update and reevaluate the role general aviation might play in a postnuclear attack period. Should such an evaluation indicate that general aviation is a considerably undervalued asset in this regard, budget authorities at all levels should reconsider their budgets, paying particular attention to where marginal savings can be made in other programs. Even some relatively small additions to general aviation funding could significantly increase our recovery capability.

The FAA should require that critical nonflying skills possessed by all pilots be listed on their licenses, e.g., doctors, nurses, engineers, scientific personnel. This inventory would then be made available to state and local disaster contingency planners.

State authorities, building on data supplied by the FAA, should compile a detailed inventory (data back) of all pilots in the state, including pilot qualifications, business and home addresses, telephone numbers as well as critical nonflying skills. Equally, if not more important, state and local governments should compile a data bank on nonpilot individuals who possess critical skills and reside within less than 25 miles of general aviation airports, particularly those airports identified as being most likely to survive a nuclear attack.

State authorities should develop plans for the rapid installation of amateur radio stations at all general aviation airports. At a minimum, antennas should be in place. Airport managers should be instructed in wash-down procedures with respect to decontaminating aircraft.

Furthermore, state authorities should designate a number of strategically located general aviation airports as aviation fuel depots and fund the acquisition and holding of an additional gasoline inventory. A major location criterion would be the likelihood of the depot airport’s being able to distribute fuel to other airports over a surviving highway system.

State and local authorities should have in-place agreements or understandings between airport authorities and highway departments regarding the priority use of highway equipment at airports.

This is not an exhaustive list of recommendations even as these thoughts are but a first cut at focusing attention on a relatively neglected asset in our postattack recovery planning. Be that as it may, it is indeed ironic that we have given so little thought to a potential asset that the Soviet Union does not possess and under its present form of government could never allow to develop. In this respect, it is hard to imagine the Kremlin’s encouraging the creation of a pool of over 350,000 private pilots with access to over 200,000 aircraft.

1. Civil Non-Air-Carrier Aircraft Support of Civil Defense Emergency Operations (Washington: Department of Defense, 1970), Part E, Chapter 14, Appendix 2 with Annexes 1, 2.

2. Comptroller General of the U.S., Civil Defense. Are Federal, State and Local Governments Prepared for Nuclear Attack? (Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1977), p. iii.

3. Lewis Allen Frank, Soviet Nuclear Planning: A Point of View on SALT (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), pp. 12-13.

4. General G. R. Wise, Director, Emergency Preparedness Division of the South Carolina Adjutant General’s Office, indicated that "no real plans exist for utilizing general aviation assets in the post nuclear attack recovery period."

5. National Airport System Plan, Revised Statistics, 1980-89 (Washington: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1980), p. v.

Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr. (B.S., M.A., Florida State University; Ph.D., University of Virginia), is Professor of Transportation and Defense Studies, Department of Industrial Management, Clemson University, South Carolina. He has served as consultant to the U.S. General Accounting Office on Transportation Readiness and as an adjunct scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. Dr. Whitehurst has published three books and numerous professional articles.

Michael W. Broadway (B.S., Auburn University; M.S., Clemson University) is an operations research analyst for the Advanced Programs Planning Department, Lockheed-Georgia Company, Marietta, Georgia. He has served as a naval flight officer and S-3A mission commander and is an active private pilot.