Document created: 26 July 01
Air University Review, May-June
1981
a concept for a multipurpose autonomous fighter
Colonel Richard M. Suter
United States Air Force fighter forces face a threat that continues to grow in size and technical sophistication. Threat predictors estimate that the ratio of U.S.S.R. to U.S. tactical fighters ranges from 2:1 to as high as 5:1.1Traditionally the United States has attempted to overcome numerical disadvantages through better training, adroit tactics, and superior versatile weapon systems.
Technological advances by the U.S.S.R. advanced fighter aircraft have nearly reached parity with the United States. Any additional performance in fighter aircraft may require more of the pilot than human physical and mental limitations allow. We may have reached the limit in pilot performance. Now only a major scientific breakthrough can tip the balance.2Present U.S. military planners cannot anticipate a scientific breakthrough before a possible outbreak of hostilities. Therefore, innovation and technological improvements are needed now, to provide a kill capability to counter the quantitative advantage of an enemy that enjoys or soon will enjoy qualitative parity in fighter aircraft.
The validity of present strategy in Central Europe of fighting a purely defensive battle over NATO territory is being questioned. It is recognized in various Air Force circles, specifically Red Flag, USAF Fighter Weapons School, and Air Force Project Checkmate, that U.S. fighters must be capable of penetrating Warsaw Pact high-threat airspace to defend NATO territory successfully. This requirement to fight an offensive battle in a sophisticated enemy threat environment may increase the pilot’s task load beyond the limits of a single aircrew member. Various approaches to this problem have been suggested, but three obvious, traditional approaches question their practicality:
The first option is obviously cost prohibitive. To achieve the fighter parity goal, the United States must increase its present fighter production by a factor of at least four.3 The total production cost increase plus the training of associated aircrews, ground crews, and purchasing support equipment is too high for any realistic chance of funding by Congress.
The second option is probably impossible to attain. History indicates that hundreds of fighter pilots must be screened to find a single ace. The cost of screening, training, and maintaining a force of potential aces is therefore unknown and would surely be so high as to be unobtainable from Congress.
The third option is that of increasing aircraft performance. Fighter aircraft performance, however, is rapidly approaching pilot capabilities—if it has not already surpassed them. A sustained seven-G environment taxes human physiological capabilities to the limit; it surely exceeds the capabilities of a single pilot in a radar-saturated, surface-to-air-missile intense, communications-jamming, multiplane environment. This option is thus not feasible; the physical limits of the human body preclude it.
Given the prohibitive cost and improbability of attaining the foregoing impractical options, this article explores a more viable alternative —an innovation in aircraft design that will allow a major change and produce a major U.S. advantage—in fighter employment concepts. This change can provide a credible capability to conduct offensive missions over enemy territory and counter Soviet quantitative superiority.
Examination of the birth of fighter tactics presents a clearer picture of how we got where we are today and may provide the insight needed to achieve a conceptual breakthrough. At the onset of World War I, combat aircraft were used primarily as scout or reconnaissance aircraft.4 This use continued until each side decided to deny the other the valuable intelligence thus obtained and started a campaign to destroy enemy aircraft.
The beginning of air-to-air combat as we know it today occurred on 5 October 1914 in the skies over Rheims, France. Sergeant Joseph Frantz positioned his French Voisin pusher behind a German Aviatik biplane, permitting his gunner, Corporal Louis Quénault, to accomplish the first air-to-air, forward-firing machine kill from directly astern—the enemy’s six o’clock "blind spot."5 From this brief but deadly encounter evolved the requirement for protecting the vulnerable blind spot, so-called because it was to the pilot’s rear where he could not see. The requirement for six o’clock protection has driven the design of aircraft, weapon systems, and tactics ever since.
The German counter for the six o’clock blind spot attack was to arm the observer with a flexible machine gun. This resulted in the C-class aircraft, in which the pilot sat in the front cockpit and the gunner behind. The machine gun was mounted on the cockpit coaming, and the gunner’s field of fire was backward, upward, and sideways.6 The German C-machines set the pattern: a forward-looking pilot and a rearward-firing gunner. After unsuccessful British experiments with a machine gun-armed observer in the front cockpit, the Allies followed suit. This first "fix" was effective, but it had flaws.
The most basic drawback of this arrangement stemmed from the weight of the observer, his machine gun, and his cockpit accommodations; the weight sharply reduced speed, climb rate, maneuverability, and service ceiling.7 This forced the multiseater down into the lethal envelope of "Archie" (antiaircraft fire) and gave single-seat fighters a considerable advantage in dogfights. It was thus inevitable, though not immediately apparent, that the single-seat concept would prevail.8
The next alternative for countering the blind spot attack was to develop effective counter-tactics. Captain Oswald Boelcke, an early ace and the father of German fighter tactics, was the first to systematically investigate defensive fighter tactics and put them into practice in actual combat. Boelcke found that he was very susceptible to surprise attack when stalking his prey. The total concentration required for the attack necessarily degraded his ability to cover his own six o’clock. He had to choose: concentrate on the kill and expose himself to attack or divide his attention and run the risk of losing the kill. Not satisfied with either alternative, Boelcke requested the assistance of a fellow officer, Max Immelmann. They agreed to patrol as a pair. When Boelcke attacked, Immelmann would cover his six o’clock; the roles were reversed when Immelmann attacked. This was the genesis of mutual support or fighter team tactics.9
Later, larger formations were organized to benefit from additional sets of eyes. When an intruder was spotted, the pilot who made visual contact would pull to the front of the formation and rock his wings. This would alert the formation to turn on the enemy.10 Flying in large formations had great offensive benefits because of the enhanced ability to see the enemy and the potential for outnumbering him, but it was impossible to control large formations once they were engaged. Combat between formations quickly broke down into a chaotic swarm of individual contests.
The early stages of World War II saw further sophistication of team tactics through the use of interplane radio communication, pioneered by the Luftwaffe during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. Mass formations of aircraft were employed on patrol, but one-on-one attack was still the primary method of engagement. Radio was used primarily as a warning device. As in World War I, preoccupation with accomplishing a kill left the pilot with no time to check his or anyone’s six o’clock. Mutual support was frequently lost, with predictable results. This situation produced the commonly accepted—and still valid—axiom that most air-to-air kills are accomplished on an unaware target, and 90 percent of those shot down did not know they were being attacked.11
The Germans made some progress in coordinating tactics by radio within a four aircraft Schwarm. This led them to the development of the "finger four" formation, extending their existing mutual support doctrine by enabling one two-plane element to support another. Similarly, and apparently independently, General Claire L. Chennault trained his American Volunteer Group to fight in elements of two. These tactics were quite successful, particularly in small engagements. Still, the problem of vulnerability while concentrating on a kill remained.
As they became aware of these facts, American fighters accepted and used Boelcke’s mutual support tactics. John C. Meyer, an Eighth Air Force P-47 ace, stated:
Mainly it’s my wingman’s eyes that I want. One man can not see enough. It takes the leader’s entire attention to destroy an E/A (enemy aircraft). If he takes time to cover his own tail, he may find the enemy has "flown the coop." Effective gunnery takes maximum mental and physical concentration.12
This reiterates what World War I pilots had learned: an air-to-air kill requires maximum pilot concentration on the target.
During the air war in Korea, a further refinement of Boelcke’s tactics—again, based on interplane radio communication—surfaced in the form of the "fighting wing" concept.
The first element (two aircraft) flew ahead and below, about a thousand feet below, and the wingman, who was two or three hundred feet back and to one side, watched the rear. He seldom fired unless he was told to do so or found himself alone by some unusual circumstances.13
By the Korean War, these tactics were widely accepted, and teamwork was indispensable to survival. With the advent of jet fighters, high-altitude combat, and flashing closure speeds, the lone wolf fighter pilot became a historic curiosity.14 In 1955, then Major Frederick "Boots" C. Blesse, a respected fighter tactician and an ace with 10 kills in Korea, defined the role of the wingman as that "of supplying the eyes to the rear for the lead aircraft."15 The "welded wingman" theory was taught as the primary method of employment at the USAF Fighter Weapons School through late 1970. This theory was the dominant fighter employment method in Southeast Asia and proved effective so long as it was used in a low-intensity air-to-air scenario.
More flexible tactics—the "loose deuce," "double attack," and "fluid two"—emerged late in the Southeast Asia conflict and have become the vogue.16 Although these tactical concepts attempt to define both aircraft as "shooters"—that is, they are allowed to attempt a kill under certain circumstances—the major responsibility of the "free fighter" is still to protect the attacking fighter while he concentrates on the kill.17 This mutual support or "shooter cover" represents no great change from Boelcke. Most of the time the wingman —be he "welded," or "fluid," or "loose"—is nothing more than an extra set of eyes in an airborne, radio-equipped warning device. The theory of using two aircraft to kill one still prevails.18
Blind spot coverage deserves further discussion. Most fighter pilots consider blind spot solely in terms of lookout capability in the six o’clock quadrant. The F-15 and F-16 were therefore designed to minimize or eliminate the restrictions to rearward vision that existed in earlier fighters such as the F-4, F-5, and F-105. Nevertheless, the great importance attached to their wingman’s eyes by earlier aces such as John C. Meyer and "Boots" Blesse, both of whom flew aircraft with a bubble canopy and good six o’clock visibility—the P-47 and the F-86 respectively—leads us to a penetrating question: If the 360° visibility in a horizontal plane which a bubble canopy confers is the answer to six o’clock coverage, why their intense concern? They already had that visibility! The answer can be found in Meyer’s statement, "It takes the leader’s entire attention to destroy an enemy aircraft." He was concerned not so much about his lookout capability as with "division of attention."
Indeed, historically increased lookout capability has never solved the six o’clock problem, an implicit perception that goes back to Oswald Boelcke. Captain Boelcke began his career in cockpit visibility, even in comparison with the F-15 and F-16. His entire upper body was free of the cockpit without so much as a canopy to impair his field of view. He could even see below his aircraft by leaning over the side and straining a little. Yet with this superior lookout capability, Boelcke elected to solicit another set of eyes to cover his blind spot. Why? The answer lies in the terminal phase of the attack, the requirement for "total attention to the kill."
Any experienced air-to-air fighter realizes that one of the most important steps in air combat, whether offensive or defensive, is to divide the opponent’s attention. When a pilot’s attention is divided, his game plan breaks down, resulting in maneuvers performed solely on conditioned reflex. Reflex action is predictable almost by definition, and a predictable target is an easy kill. For example, a conditioned reflex familiar to all fighter pilots is the left-hand break. It is more natural for most pilots to go left; left-hand landing patterns and left-hand gunnery patterns are easier. It is easier to push on the control stick than to pull, and a right-hand world likes to go left. For whatever reason, there is and always has been a left turn mind-set in the fighter community. Call "break" without stating the direction, and an entire squadron will break left as a group. The left-turn reflex became so obvious in Southeast Asia, that enemy ground gunners would automatically lead our fighters to the left as they pulled off from a bomb pass. The reason? The pilots’ total attention had been on tracking the pipper. It was a "natural" reaction after bomb release to pull back on the stick and "push" it to the left.
A familiar example of the consequences of division of attention is the two-versus-one air battle. It is much easier to kill the single aircraft, not just because he is outnumbered but because he must also divide his attention between the actions of two threats—even if one attacker is not shooting. Similarly, it is easier defensively to avoid attack at 100-feet altitude than at 10,000 between you and the rocks and trees. Therefore, it appears that it was not a lack of visibility that prompted Boelcke’s desire for a wingman but his need to devote undivided attention to the execution of the kill.
Observations by successful Israeli fighter pilots (10 kills or more) concerning air combat tactics reinforce this point. In a multiplane engagement, shots of opportunity are more the rule than the exception, and a pilot’s free-dom of action was his key to success. One pilot cited at least five kills lost because he had to check his six o’clock during the terminal phase of the attack, causing him to lose his position of advantage or disrupting his tracking solution.19 World War II fighter pilot Major Walker M. Mahurin sums it up quite well:
In regard to looking behind and around, I realize that it is a subject that has been harped on by every guy that has spent one measly hour on a combat operation. It is an absolute necessity. The result is most obvious. The Hun will never bag an American fighter if the Yank sees him coming in time to take proper evasive action. "It is still a bad thing to spend all one’s time looking behind. The idea behind fighter aircraft is that they will seek out the enemy and destroy him. A pilot will never accomplish this aim by looking behind him all of the time."20
Now recall what started Boelcke’s dilemma: the loss of his observer. The observer provided the pilot with two major benefits: he freed the pilot’s attention so the pilot could concentrate totally on his kill and provided a formidable threat to the six o’clock attacker.
Firing from such a steady platform, the observer’s fire was deadly, so much so that pilots who attacked two-seaters from an angle covered by the observer’s field of fire seldom desired to repeat the performance if they survived.21
The reason for the abandonment of the rear gunner was the need for increased aircraft performance, but does this reason still apply? Today’s power plants are capable of providing huge amounts of thrust at all realistic combat pounds of weight represented by an additional crew member is no longer critical.
Today, U.S. tactical fighter forces are blessed with three new weapon platforms, and these "thoroughbreds" do their specialized jobs well. The F-15 is a great air superiority fighter, but the only aircraft in history to approach the A-10 as specialized close-air-support tank killers were the Ilyushin I1-2 Sturmovik and the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka.22 The multinational F-16 was designed as a lightweight, low-cost, export fighter with an all-round capability. Taken individually or together, these are highly capable aircraft, but with the phaseout of the F-4, U.S. fighter forces lack a capable "workhorse" fighter, a long-range, multirole aircraft capable of fighting its way in and out through a serious air-to-air threat.
How can we best satisfy this requirement? We have pressed tactics for our existing aircraft about as far as they can go; dramatic technological breakthroughs are unlikely in the near term. A reevaluation of the observer’s role is necessary to help alleviate the numerical disadvantage the United States faces. Aircraft power plants are capable of providing excess thrust, and the state of aerodynamic art is such that aircraft are being built that exceed pilot capabilities. In a central European war scenario, where we will have to fight outnumbered, two-ship employment represents an unaffordable waste of valuable resources. The United States can no longer afford the luxury of two multimillion-dollar fighters providing support to each other in the combat arena, especially with odds from 2:1 to 5:1 against us and our allies. If every fighter aircraft could be made mission effective by providing its own blind spot lookout, these odds could be dramatically improved. Additionally, strike aircraft entering highly defended enemy territory cannot afford to mass for mutual coverage. The more dispersed the greater the freedom of action, target provided by large masses of aircraft. The concept? Janus, an autonomous tactical fighter, which makes use of back-to-back seating in a "workhorse," multipurpose platform.
The question of one seat versus two has been debated since World War I. In the 1960s and ‘70s, this issue divided the tactical fighter community. Advocates of the single-seat fighter aircraft inveigh against cockpit confusion and additional weight; they support the premise that it does not take two men to handle the job.
These arguments deserve an answer. The "cockpit confusion" objection to a two-seat fighter rests on concern that the need to take periodic votes between cockpits would delay the decision-making process, perhaps fatally. In fact, Air Force and Navy experience with the F-4 in Southeast Asia demonstrates—at the very least—that this problem can be overcome. There are strong counterarguments that the extra set of eyeballs in the F-4 made it a more effective air-to-air fighter and a safer air-to-ground vehicle, particularly at night.
The weight penalty argument can be similarly answered. Today, the state of the art of engine design and aerodynamics is such that these problems are easily overcome. The point is made by comparing the single-seat F-15A to the two-seat F-15B. Energy/maneuverability charts show that the performance of the two aircraft is virtually identical. The total combat weight difference averages approximately 800 pounds, and the difference in specific energy (Ps) is less than 100 feet per second, a negligible amount when comparing aircraft that can maintain energy rates as high as that of the F-15.23 The two aircraft are so close in performance that the flying qualities test and evaluation for the singleseater was accomplished in a B-model two-seat F-15.24.
A final pro-single-seat argument is that, although there are many pilot tasks to accomplish, they do not all come at once; therefore, a fighter pilot can handle them alone.25 This argument most single-seat arguments, turns out to be limited to the visual day arena and low electronic-warfare threat environments.26 Even the F-X Fighter Decision Coordinating Paper 19 took this stand:
During F-X Concept formulation, numerous studies were made to determine optimum crew size. They showed that, given sufficient automation, one man could perform standoff and all-weather counterair missions, "except" in a high false alarm environment as might result from heavy ground clutter jamming causing radar interference.27
The increasing all-weather night requirement and the increasingly dense electronic-warfare/surface-to-air missile environment have been passed off as "we won’t do that." When the USAF single-seat community admits that this threat must eventually be faced, they generally conclude that someone else should do it— and probably in a two-seat fighter. The Navy consensus is on somewhat different lines:
. . . Navy fighters, in contrast, require two men because of the recognized need for a high target kill probability in Forward Air Defense (FAD) versus massed bomber raids, which could use heavy jamming and occur in any visibility situations. The second man concentrates on fire control sensor returns "looking through" the adverse effects of weather, clutter and electronic counter measures.28
Single-seat advocates in general tend to concede that in weather, night, and heavy electronic warfare the two-seat fighter is needed, but they still support the single-seat aircraft as a day fighter. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, speaking in 1965 as Secretary of the Air Force on the lessons learned in Vietnam, stated that a fair-weather, day-only fighter was not a major Air Force need:
Our objective is to be able to pick up and destroy any type of tactical target, day or night, in any weather and in any terrain. The Army doesn’t stop fighting at sundown or when it rains.29
To conclude the discussion of single-seat versus two-seat fighters, quotations from two reliable studies support the two-man configuration as the most desirable for the multirole fighter of today.
A second crew member can contribute to the success of the mission in many ways, such as identifying targets (visually or radar), operate the guidance and control of standoff weapons, and operate sensors, ECM, defensive armament as an aid to penetrating some kinds of enemy defenses.30
Based on the studies to date, it is recommended that the advanced multimission aircraft weapon system have a two-man crew.31
In the past we have produced two-seat fighter-aircraft, but the question of optimum aircrew placement was not systematically addressed. Side-by-side seating, as in the F-111, not only restricts the vision of both crew members to the rear but also restricts the visibility of one flank for each crew member.
Tandem seating with both aircrew members facing forward offers real advantages but also leaves much to be desired:
Probably one of the most advantageous aspects of the two-crew member fighter is the extra search capability of the world outside the cockpit. Because of the increased visual area of search, two observers should be able to detect an object much sooner than one observer. In order to gain full utilization of a second crew member, he must be provided with little obstruction to his search pattern. Should one of the crew member’s view be blocked, such as in a tandem arrangement, then he value of an extra man for visual search is reduced.32
Why limit the rear member’s vision with the front seater’s headrest as well as his own? An observer seated facing the rear would have a full field of view of the most vulnerable area of a fighter. By moving the "wingman’s" eyes into the rear cockpit of the "lead" aircraft, one would create a powerful force multiplier. A single aircraft would then be capable of engagement in air-to-air or air-to-ground missions autonomously without the distractive over-the-shoulder lookout problem.33 The natural significantly, back-to-back. It is very rare indeed to find two men fighting a crowd "front-to-back," with one swinging over the other man’s shoulders.
However, there is apprehension over the physiological aspects of back-to-back seating in a fighter, relating specifically to whether man can withstand the observer’s tolerance to G-forces and vertigo in backward maneuvering. The widespread use of dive bombers with a rearward-facing gunner in World War II provides the answer.
These aircraft were designed specifically for erratic maneuvering. Most dive bombers were designed for a 70° dive angle, and the Ju 87 Stuka was a natural at 90°. Not only was the dive exciting, the pullout was a real attention getter. Nor was the experience limited to Axis aircraft; the Douglas SBD Dauntless, designated the A-24 in U.S. Army service, was perhaps the most successful dive bomber of the war. Some versions of the Russian I1-2 Sturmovik, a highly successful ground attack aircraft not ordinarily used as a classic dive bomber, had a rearward-facing gunner. In all cases, the results were the same; dive bombers tended to be vulnerable in the air-to-air arena—mostly because of weight/power limitations—but no adverse physiological effects on the rear seater are mentioned in any relevant contemporary accounts.34 Practical World War II operational experience substantiates the point that flying backward is simply a matter of acclimatization and faith in the man up front. The Human Resources Laboratory considers the difference between jet and conventional aircraft to be just a question of degree and a matter of training.35
The question of left-right orientation is invariably raised by doubters of the Janus concept. What is the left to the man facing the rear is right to the man facing forward. This problem seems more formidable than it is; a solution to the problem used with the Dauntless was to paint the canopy rails on the right side of the aircraft green and the canopy rails on the left side red. Bogey or threat calls were given first in color code and then in clock position, the clock position running only from zero to six o’clock. A typical call might be "Bogey at green three o’clock level" or "Bogies at our red four o’clock high." This way both crew members initially looked in the same direction .36
Another question is the one that addresses aircrew ejection from a back-to-back fighter. Again, World War II experience provides relevant data, this time in the form of the Heinkel He 219 night fighter. The He 219, an extremely successful night fighter, was an advanced aircraft with many innovations, one being the new pilot escape system. This system, featuring back-to-back seats and using compressed air cartridges, was the first ejection mechanism used in an operational aircraft.
From personal inspection of the last existing He 219, it is apparent that the back-to-back seats could eject both aircrew members together in an A-frame configuration or each as a single, a remarkably sophisticated setup for 1944.37 The back-to-back ejection-seat state of the art is hardly in its infancy.
Why did the Navy abandon the rearward-facing backseat when they developed the F-4 and F-14? During the development of the F-4s, the Navy considered the era of the dogfight to be a thing of the past. There was a general acceptance of the missile-shooter concept, replacing the "gunfighter" philosophy. The Navy considered the primary F-4 mission to be that of a fleet defense interceptor, where a fulltime radar operator was needed to handle the excessive task loading. Since the F-4 was built without guns and with the rear cockpit facing forward, no thought was given to using the operator for anything but looking at the radarscope. During the development of the F-14, the only consideration given to cockpit placement was whether the pilot and radar operator should be placed side-by-side or tandem. Consideration was apparently never given to a rearward-facing aft cockpit, possibly for the same reasons as with the F-4--or was it because of forgetfulness of lessons learned?38
A positive look at the Janus-configured aircraft reveals many additional spin-offs and advantages. The change to back-to-back seating is not purely a defensive move; on the contrary, it will provide an increased offensive capability. By eliminating the necessity for the pilot to divide his attention, more time, flexibility, and attack opportunities will be available. The pilot will be able to press the attack immediately on targets of opportunity without first having to clear himself. The concept also allows or better control of a greater proportion of a tighter force for a longer duration during the developing stages of an engagement. Single Janus-configured aircraft can be released from formation to engage threats while the integrity of the formation is retained. The Janus configured fighter is not formation dependent, negating the problem of a single intruder’s drawing off a strike force’s escort, two aircraft at a time.
Other recent changes in air-to-air combat also point to the inherent advantages of Janus. First, the intelligence community predicts that Soviet forces will make extensive use of communication jamming. As a result, our current tactics manuals outline elaborate "chatter mark" procedures that will at best only partially alleviate the problem, a "last-gasp" attempt to salvage mutual support tactics. Mutual support through radio contact may well be almost nonexistent in a communication-jamming environment.
Another problem for which Janus offers a solution is the dilemma posed by the need and the ability to maintain high sustained G-loads for extended periods. Under high G-stress, a pilot cannot move his head as freely and rapidly as under normal circumstances. His ability to check his six o’clock is degraded, thus increasing the time necessary to make the kill. A Janus-configured aircraft could partially relieve this problem.
The additional man seated backward in the attack role of a fighter would have definite advantages. Obvious advantages are increased target acquisition and a more accurate navigation capability. A Boeing study in 1968 concluded:
A two-man crew consisting of a pilot and NFO (Navigation Flight Officer) visually acquired the test targets at a significantly greater range than one-man crews (pilot only). The one-man pilots acquired targets at an average acquisition range of 5,818 ft. while two-man crews acquired them at 7,576 ft. . . .two-man crews performed significantly better than one-man crews. Two-man crews failed to update on only five of 40 occasions, while one-man crews missed 15 out of 35 update requirements.
Based on the studies to date, it is recommended that the advanced multimission aircraft weapons system have a two-man crew.39
Red Flag experience regularly demonstrates not only that two-seat fighters acquire target sooner and more reliably than singleseaters but that first-strike delivery accuracy is better, as is reattack accuracy.40
The value of a rear-facing observer for warning of possible surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery threats is also apparent. In the air-to-ground mode, a fighter’s most vulnerable time is just prior to bomb release and during pullup immediately after the release.41 Prior to bomb release, the pilot faces the threat and can vary the flight path in response to it. After bomb impact, however, with the enemy on the ground no longer immobilized by the fighter’s weapons, the pilot’s back is toward the threat and his actions are only a "best-guess." With an observer seated backward facing the threat, however, an accurate picture can be passed to the pilot, who would then have lifesaving information he has previously been denied. Another advantage of Janus is the assistance given during low-altitude flying. When flying at 500 knots and less than 100 feet above ground level, a pilot must concentrate all his attention on terrain following to avoid impact with the ground. The luxury of having his six o’clock constantly and automatically cleared relieves him of a dangerous diversion of attention vital to survival.
The inherent advantages of Janus could be further enhanced by low-risk adaptations existing technology such as forward-1ooking, ground-map, and air-to-air radar for the observer. If the radar possessed a "track-while-scan" capability, the pilot could concentrate on the attack of a hostile aircraft while the observer searched for additional targets or bogies that may pose a threat to the attack. A rear-viewing radar and TISEO (target identification system, electro-optical) combination scope could provide the observer with a rearward, beyond-visual-range detection and identification system that could cover not only the direct six o’clock but also the "belly blind spot" beneath the aircraft. Flares, directional electronic countermeasures, and even rearward-delivering weapons could be employed by the observer. A ram-air delivered, high fragmentation, white phosphorous dispenser munition such as the CBU-2, designed to distract and deter rather than destroy, is another possibility. Other observer functions can be postulated, but the major benefit is the acquisition on rearward-looking eyes and an additional brain these are vital—the rest represents added potential and should be carefully evaluated so as not to "over-gadget" a new-found asset.
The United States Air Force fighter forces face a Soviet threat that continues to grow in quantity, quality, and technological sophistication. Fighter aircraft performance and system sophistication are rapidly surpassing man’s physical limitations. Thus, increased performance may require replacement by changes in aircraft design. These design innovations must complement and enhance our tactics, providing us with the capability to offset soviet numerical superiority.
The need for undivided attention while flying fighter aircraft is critical and has been repeatedly verified; the concept of team fighting emerged as the solution for this problem. Early experiments with two-seat, back-to-back fighters were abandoned due to thrust-to-weight limitations; our present technological capability has bypassed this problem. We can now produce two-seat fighters with performance characteristics essentially identical to those of singleseaters. Back-to-back seating is therefore worthy of serious evaluation. This seating arrangement effectively eliminates a major vulnerability that has been inherent in fighters since World War I: the blind six o’clock position.
A Janus-configured aircraft provides impressive advantages:
The impact of these advantages would be a substantially increased air-to-air capability, a more effective air-to-ground strike capability, and an increased force survivability. Even perfunctory analysis suggests a synergistic cumulative impact, making Janus a potent force multiplier. The ability to use multi-milliondollar fighters autonomously offers enormous advantages which cannot be ignored.
The total benefits of a Janus-configured fighter using today’s technology cannot be ascertained without comprehensive testing under actual flight conditions. Measured in light of the potential for increased fighter effectiveness, the cost of the test would be minuscule. We cannot afford to ignore the potential of Janus.
Hq PACAF
Notes
1. Justin Galen, "The Art of the Impossible," Armed Forces Journal International, September 1978, p. 32.
2.TAC Manual 2-1 Tactical Air Operation (Langley AFB,Virginia: Hq Tactical Air Command, April 1978), p. 2-15.
3. Ibid., p. 2-18.
4. Alan Clark, Aces High (New York, 1974), p. 48.
5. Francis K. Mason and Martin C. Windrow, Air Facts and Feats (Garden City, New York, 1970), p. 31; Clark, p. 21.
6. Group Captain John E. Johnson, Full Circle (New York, 1964), p. 12.
7. Ibid., pp. 27, 35.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., pp. 18-20.
10. Ibid., p. 44
11. Major General W. E. Kepner, The Long Reach---Deep Fighter Escort Tactics, VIII Fighter Command, 29 May 1944. (The USAF Academy Library has one copy of the manual. It contains accounts of World War II fighter tactics by American combat pilots such as John C. Meyer, Walker M. Mahurin. Hubert Zemke, etc. Quotations from these fighter pilots will be annotated by their name, organization, type aircraft, and The Long Reach); Lieutenant Colonel Mark F. Hubbard, 20th Fighter Group, P-38, TheLongReach, p.10;
Colonel Hubert Zemke, 56th Fighter Group, P-47, The Long Reach, p. 33.
12. Lieutenant Colonel John C. Meyer, 32d Fighter Group, P-47, The Long Reach, p. 39.
13. Edward H.Sims, Fighter Tactics and Strategy 1914-1970 (London, 1972), p. 222.
14. Raymond F. Toliver and Trevor J. Constable, Fighter Aces (New York, 1965), p. 268.
15. Major Frederick C. Blesse, "No Guts, No Glory," USAF Fighter Weapons Review, Spring 1973, p. 4.
16. TACM/PACAFM/USAFEM 3-1, Volume II, 1 April 1976, Department of the Air Force, TAC, PACAF, USAFE, pp. 2.27-2.45, 3.24.
17. Ibid.
18. Major Barry D. Watts, A Comparison of "Team and Single-Ship" Approaches to Aerial Combat, U.S. Air Force Academy, December 1976.
19. Personal interviews with unnamed Israeli pilots, Tel Aviv, November 1975.
20. Major Walker M. Mahurin, 63d Fighter Squadron, 56th Fighter Group, P-47, The Long Reach, p. 24.
21. Captain Burr W. Leyson, The Warplane and How It Works (New York, 1943), p. 56.
22. Hans Ulrich Rudel, Stuka Pilot, translation by Lynton Hudson (London, 1952), pp. 75-87.
23. John Boyd, Advisor, OASD-PA&E, interview, October 1976 and March 1979.
24. "F/TF-15 Flying Qualities Air Force Development Test and Evaluation," vol. 1 (Alexandria, Virginia: Defense Documentation Center, July 1977), p. 10.
25. Major Jim B. Paschall, "An Analysis of the Single Seat Fighter vs. the Double Seat Fighter" (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Library, 1968), Air Command and Staff College thesis No. 0910-68, p. 5.
26. Major John C. Morrissey, "Optimum Crew Size for Tactical Fighters; Visual Close Air Support and Interdiction" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army War College Study, April 1974), pp. 9, 23.
27. DCP #19, AF/RDQ, Hq USAF, Pentagon, 15 September 1968, p. 8.
28. Ibid.
29. "Secretary Brown Speaks about the Importance of Tactical Aviation," Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, No.12, December 1965, p. 4.
30. G.K. Smith, T.E. Greene, and M.G. Weiner, An Analysis of Ground-Attack Aircraft for USAF Operations (U) (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, November 1965), p. 51.
31. "Crew Utilization Multimission Fighter/Attack Aircraft Phase II Part C: VFR Multimission Flight Simulator Tests" (Seattle: Boeing, May 1968), p. 11. Hereafter referred to as "Crew Utilization."
32. Paschall, p. 5.
33. Major Walker M. Mahurin, 63d Fighter Squadron, 56th Fighter Group, P-47, The Long Reach, p. 24.
34. Peter C. Smith, The Stuka at War (New York, 1971); Heinz J. Nowarra and Edward T. Maloney, Junkers JU-87 (Fallbrook, California, 1966).
35. Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. O’Donnel, Human Engineering Division, Aeromedical Research Laboratory, AMRL/HEA, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, interview, March 1977.
36. Colonel P.C. Davis, USAF (Ret), interview, July 1976.
37. Personal visit to the Smithsonian Institute aircraft restoration facility at Silver Hill, Maryland, August 1976.
38. George Haering, OP 96, Deputy Director Systems Analysis Division, Assistant for Special Analysis, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, interview, July 1976.
39. "Crew Utilization," pp. 3-11.
40. Red Flag Profile, Recurring Report 78-1 (Nellis AFB, Nevada: USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, May 1978), pp. 1-18.
41. Ibid.; Real-time Ballistics of Selected Enemy Anti-Aircraft Weapons (Langley AFB, Virginia: Hq Tactical Air Command, March 1966).
Colonel Suter’s article was developed from an Air War College course paper.
Contributor
Colonel Richard M. Suter (B.S.E., Arizona State University) is Deputy Director of Tactical Operations, DCS Operations and Intelligence, Hq PACAF. His previous assignments include operational tours in PACAF and USAFE in the F-4 and F-101C; training tours in TAC in the F-4 and F-15; and staff tour with the Tactical Division of the Director of Operations, Hq USAF. He has served as Squadron Commander and Assistant Director of Operations for F-15 training at Luke AFB, Arizona, and participated in the development of the Aggressor Force, Red Flag, and Hq USAF Checkmate. Colonel Suter is a graduate of Air War College.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor