Document created: 25 July 01
Air University Review, May-June 1981

Professionalism in the Air Force

In The Solider and the State, Samuel Huntington characterizes a military professional as one who has expertise, responsibility for the military security of society, and a sense of corporateness. He further states that "officership is strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal."¹

In my opinion the officer corps of the United States Air Force falls seriously short of the ideal in all three areas identified by Huntington. One major reason for this development is the failure of the Air Force to require, or even encourage, the study of military history.

Unfortunately, for many history is a turn off. The mere mention of the word reminds them of hours spent memorizing seemingly meaningless, dry facts required by an ignorant or unimaginative teacher. But history properly taught is not boring and can be of unlimited value. The serious study of military history shows how, while weapons have evolved through the ages, man has not. By learning how man has adapted to his military environment, the student comes to appreciate how this adaptation is really professionalism, which leads directly to successful doctrine and strategy. Equally important is the lesson that adaptations copied out of context, without understanding, often result in disaster.

Because the value of military history is unappreciated and the lessons ignored, the professional expertise of much of the officer corps has experienced serious erosion. Evidence of this erosion accumulates. One such indicator of degraded professionalism is the low retention of pilots, clear proof of a declining sense of corporateness. Or again, consider the belief, held by too many junior officers, that senior officers lack integrity. These manifestations of a lack of dedicated professionalism raise serious doubts as to the ability of the Air Force to carry out its national security responsibilities.

The responsibility of the military professional for the nation’s military security is his most obvious function. Without sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel, the military, and specifically the Air Force, would be unable to perform this vital function. The current retention problem as it relates to rated personnel is a clear threat to the Air Force’s ability to perform this responsibility and has concerned Air Force leadership. General Lew Allen, Air Force Chief of Staff, stated to a congressional committee, that the primary "people problem" in the Air Force is retention. He further stated that the Air Force would be short more than 2100 pilots by the end of FY 1980. General Allen forecasts that if current retention rates persist, for every 100 pilots beginning their sixth year of service, only 25 will remain by their eleventh year.²

I believe much of the current retention problem is primarily due to the failure of the Air Force to instill, teach, and nurture true professionalism and corporateness in its officer corps; not, as some seem to feel, inadequate pay. According to Huntington, society should offer sufficient pay to its officers; however, financial remuneration cannot be the primary incentive of the military professional. The desire to serve and devotion to skill should be his primary motivations.³

Consecutive administrations with the acquiescence of Congress have failed to maintain the quality of life (QOL) of military personnel comparable to that of the civilian sector. Only recently, when the military leadership could point to declining retention and a considerable decline in QOL indicators, did personnel programs become politically popular. Unfortunately, in order to draw the appropriate political attention to QOL problems, the Air Force appeared to stress purely materialistic motivations for their officers. This emphasis has muddied the waters, insofar as the motivations of Air Force officers are determined, creating a red herring. The more the Air Force stressed the materialistic motivations of civilian society, the less it was able to maintain the proper climate that encouraged the growth of true professionalism. The fact that various polls show more and more officers concerned about declining pay and benefits does not mean that the best or only way to solve the retention problem is to provide increased pay. Fiscal realities make it obvious that the state can never provide enough money to compensate fully those who experience the dangers and hardships of military service. Therefore, instead of concentrating on increased pay, the leadership of the Air Force should regard the retention problem as an indication that more and more Air Force officers have not sufficiently developed the sense of corporateness of a professional and thus the professional motivations of service and devotion to his skill. When the retention problem is approached from the perspective of improper motivation, a new insight is provided and is further evidence of the low state of Air Force professionalism.

One reason fewer officers are motivated by service and devotion to their skill is leadership or, more properly, the failure of leadership. To be fair, it must be realized that in today’s society all authority is under attack. No longer is authority accepted without question; more than at any time in our history, those in positions of leadership must continually demonstrate their right to command. So it is unrealistic to expect the junior ranks of the officer corps to develop and maintain the motivations of professionalism without worthy models. Members of a military organization must have complete trust in the ability and integrity of their leadership. Without confidence in its leadership, a unit will have a low morale and in battle face disaster. Unfortunately, there are disquieting signs that Air Force leadership has lost the trust of many of its junior officers.

A survey of Squadron Officer School (SOS) Class 74D found a significant lack of faith in the integrity of Air Force leadership. Sixty-one percent of the officers surveyed felt they were required to sacrifice their integrity in order to satisfy job requirements. Specific complaints were the requirement to document training that was never accomplished and overlook apparent abuse of privileges by senior officers. These junior officers felt that senior officers and the "system" were the cause of our ethical problems.⁴

A more recent example is from an Air Force survey of pilots leaving the service, who expressed "a strong undercurrent of concern about degradation of mission capability, a concern which these pilots feel is not shared by Air Force senior officers." The survey found that a growing number of Air Force officers "view senior officers as self-centered individuals more concerned with promotion and looking good than with mission essential items of force readiness."⁵ The fact that this perception seems to exist among so many junior officers has grave implications concerning the state of and trust in Air Force leadership.

Unfortunately, the present promotion system reinforces this perception. The up-or-out system forces an officer to gain rank in order to continue to serve in the military. According to Air Force Pamphlet 36-26, "Evaluator’s Handbook," an evaluator’s impression of the ratee, not actual job performance, is the important determinant in reaching a rating decision of promotion potential. Since promotion potential is determined by senior officers rating their subordinates, too many officers may take action (or inaction as the case may be), motivated primarily by the knowledge of how such action will look to his superior, with little or no regard for how his subordinates will react. This type of behavior too frequently results in the methods of management criticized in the SOS survey, namely that characterized by emphasis on personal loyalty to an officer’s supervisor rather than on the honesty and integrity required for good leadership.

In an article, "Are Professionalism and Integrity Only a Myth?" Lieutenant Colonel Raymond F. Hamel mentions how a commander at Air University’s Leadership and Management Development Center candidly remarked, "Commanders are not martyrs. We did not make it this far by telling it like it really is."⁶ This devastating remark indicates that there is a reason for concern about the level of Air Force professionalism.

In his book Soldiers, Statesmen, and Gold War Crises, Richard K. Betts extensively documents how careerism often triumphed over professionalism and caused faulty intelligence and thus serious misperceptions in Vietnam.⁷ According to Betts, promotion is the principal careerist incentive. He documents sobering examples of those who told disappointing truths to their superiors and were rewarded with personal ruin. It is unreasonable to expect men to remain dedicated to a profession that may require them to forfeit their lives when they feel that their superiors are unwilling to risk their careers by telling it like it is.

The evidence from the war in Southeast Asia concerning statistics, such as body and sortie counts and the covering up of bomb shortages, only reinforces the perception of the lack of integrity at high levels. One wonders why realistic dissimilar air-to-air training was not standard in Tactical Air Command units until the last days of a war that saw frequent air-to-air combat.

General Richard B. Ellis, in recent testimony before the House Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee, suggested that beginning in the sixties a "fuzziness" developed in the line between those who make national security policy and those who carry out that policy.⁸ It is in this area that integrity is often questioned, perhaps unfairly. Concerning integrity, General T. R. Milton states that "a standing on principle will sometimes be at odds with expedience, and thus be an unpopular position. It may result in disfavor with the politicians and hence in a shortened military career, but it is the single most essential quality we must have in our military leaders."⁹ Besides unquestioned integrity, General Milton also finds a requirement for high intellectual capacity in military leadership. He believes the military requires such a capacity in order to be persuasive as well as to avoid the disastrous results of military stupidity.¹⁰

I feel that the Air Force has done too little to develop this high intellectual capacity or, as Huntington labeled it, expertise. Specialized skills such as flying ability alone do not make an officer a military professional. Huntington states, "The direction, operation and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence, is the peculiar skill of the officer."¹¹ He emphasizes the requirement for a broad background in general knowledge, stressing the history of war and military affairs.¹² Unfortunately, the Air Force has done very little to increase an officer’s knowledge of military affairs and history.

Beginning at the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force exhibits a surprising disregard for the importance of history. The core curriculum there involves only five military history courses (only one of them required) out of 394 courses offered.¹³ The ratio barely improves in follow-on "professional military education" programs where political science and management are in preponderance. Base education courses and advanced degree programs, such as the Air Force Institute of Technology, do not allow for the study of military history. In rebuttal to this fact, a member of the Air Staff stated that such courses ". . . are predicated on the needs of the Air Force and the personal interest of the airmen involved; fields which many believe are pertinent to AF careers."¹⁴ Obviously, to this individual and the Air Force at large there is little need for or interest in the study of military history as a vital part of professional education. Further, this individual states that "common sense dictates the majority of graduate education be in science/technical degrees or management-related (MBA)."¹⁵ It is difficult for me to understand how the Air Force can learn lessons from previous conflicts if it fails to study those conflicts. General Douglas MacArthur felt that,

More than most professions, the military is forced to depend on intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts charting the future. Devoid of opportunity, in peace, for self-instruction through actual practice in his profession, the soldier makes maximum use of the historical record in assuring the readiness of himself and his command to

function efficiently in emergency. The facts derived from historical analysis he applies to conditions of the present and the proximate future, Thus developing a synthesis of appropriate method, organization, and doctrine.¹⁶

General S. L. A. Marshall stated that "realistic training derives only from the continued study of what has happened in war." He discussed this fact when pointing out to a commander that an exercise the commander was conducting had unrealistic objectives if the men were engaged in actual combat. General Marshall then noted that "it is out of such plans and exercises in peacetime that we create our own myths about our potential, and that when war comes the men who discovered the bitter truth the hard way are all gone. Voilà, we’ve got to learn all over again."¹⁷

Napoleon emphasized the importance of the ability of a commander to see the situation through the eyes of the enemy, "seeing the other side of the hill."¹⁸ The Soviet military, which has borrowed extensively from the German General Staff system, gives the study of history strong emphasis, as compared to the U.S. military.

Therefore, if only to understand the Soviet commander’s thinking, it is vital for the U.S. military leadership to study history, and especially Soviet military history. A military professional aspiring to high command should have more than a passing acquaintance with all aspects of warfare: naval, land, and air. Unless his background is broad, his limited perspective and parochial viewpoint would make him ineffective and dangerously ignorant. A member of the Air Staff who scoffed at the importance of the knowledge of history for senior officers asked "whatever happened to military experience and leadership qualities accumulated over time."¹⁹ An appropriate answer to such an opinion was expressed by Prince Otto von Bismarck, the "Iron Chancellor," who said that "Fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by others’ experience."²⁰ B. H. Liddell Hart noted that even in the most active career, "the scope and possibilities of direct experience are extremely limited." He added that direct experience is inherently too limited to form an adequate foundation either for theory or for application.²¹

The final ingredient for the development of Huntington’s military professional is a sense of corporateness. The liberal character of America, which believes in the ability to change human nature, remains ignorant of the demands of the military profession and has done much to limit the hierarchy of rank. Unfortunately, the Air Force has done little to counteract this tendency of liberalism. The Air Force must nurture the consciousness of the military officer corps as a group apart. More emphasis on military history would aid in this shared sense of organic unity as would a greater emphasis on tradition. Only with a thorough comprehension of the differences of his profession from all others can a military officer begin to understand the need for the spirit of sacrifice and responsibility that makes the military a unique part of society.

Up to this point, reasons for the decline of professionalism in the Air Force have been emphasized. As a start, I would recommend that education is needed. Once the nature of professionalism is fully understood by the Air Force, the emphasis in recruitment and training would be radically altered. The Air Force would stress the unique nature of the military profession and attempt to eliminate any comparisons to civilian occupations. Following recruitment, throughout initial training and for the remainder of his time in the military, each officer would be steeped in professionalism. One method would require periodic, perhaps twice a month, unit seminars led by unit commanders. Using prepared texts, professional books and articles, and videotapes of speeches from the nation’s resident military schools, the commander could inspire his officers into further comprehension of the unique nature of the art of military science. By the study of military history, officers could better understand the nature of elements such as morale, comradeship, tradition, initiative, courage, fear, integrity, and most important, leadership.

The present promotion systems should be revamped to eliminate the up-or-out concept. Allowing officers to remain in the military as long as they are effective would reduce the present tendency toward careerism. It would also have significant economic benefits for the individual and the nation through its effect on the current retirement system. The present system, in which the majority of officers are forced to retire in their forties or early fifties, wastes precious talents. In addition, these individuals are now forced to find a new way to support their families, often just when faced with new financial burdens such as college tuition for their children. Since few industries are eager to hire these individuals, it is difficult for many retired officers to find a position that has the same prestige, responsibilities, and income as their recent military duties. I believe that some of the current retention problems may, in part, be due to officers who are otherwise satisfied with the Air Force choosing to leave while they still are young enough to be acceptable to civilian industry (e.g., airlines). With a little imagination, it would be possible to reorganize positions to better utilize the talents of older officers. One solution would be to rotate older pilots from combat to airlift, refueling, and training units and the various wing staff jobs, such as training and scheduling.

Unit integrity must receive new emphasis, also. Continuity and increased emphasis on tradition would aid in the development of a sense of corporateness in the officer corps. Unit reunions should be officially encouraged. Through radical change to the personnel assignment and promotion process, a two-track system could be developed. Only selected officers, identified by capability and inclination, would receive a broad range of assignments and education leading to high staff and command positions. Other officers would be allowed to specialize and would not normally receive career-broadening assignments. As a result, unit experience and continuity would receive a major boost, resulting in a valuable increase in combat cohesiveness and effectiveness. Overseas responsibilities would be covered by unit rotation, causing fewer individual permanent changes of station.

By this action, individuals and families could establish more permanent local roots and eliminate a major source of friction between family and military. Other advantages would be the savings in moving expenses. Also, by having increased continuity, units could conduct more elaborate training. Deploying to overseas locations would allow more units to exercise fully their mobility capabilities while familiarizing themselves with the locations in which they may be assigned wartime responsibilities. In addition, such actions would reduce the number of dependents located in possible zones of conflict. While I realize that rotations in the past caused many problems, the changing situation demands its renewed study. Perhaps only the most forward and exposed areas would be covered by rotation, and then by squadrons rather than an entire wing. The present overseas system, characterized by rapid personnel turnover, high training requirements, and a resulting low unit level of experience and cohesiveness, demands that rotations be reexamined as a possible method for increasing readiness and professionalism.

Finally, to develop professionalism fully, the leadership of the Air Force must scrupulously avoid any actions that could cause doubt as to their integrity. Any officer discovered abusing his position and trust must be promptly and severely disciplined to avoid the immense damage to trust such actions can cause. The importance of loyalty down as well as up must be recognized and practiced. Those in command positions must recognize that the perceptions of those being led are extremely important; therefore, to be an effective leader, one must continually strive to ensure that the perceptions of his leadership are in agreement with reality.

To prevent the abuse of position and aid the elimination of careerism, a three-tier evaluation could be developed as a tool in the selection of those for higher levels of command. In addition to superiors rating subordinates, carefully selected peer and subordinate personnel would rate officers in command positions. Although not given the same weight as the superior’s evaluation, these additional evaluations would provide another perspective. Officers continuously receiving poor grades from peers and subordinates might be subjected to more intense scrutiny before being raised to higher levels of command.

The Air Force is a demanding profession that requires tremendous dedication. In the past, it has attracted many highly capable individuals, often motivated by a well-developed sense of idealism and service. Yet in a few years, these same individuals have left the service, often due to their disappointment with the realities of the Air Force. This accumulating evidence of a weakened officership, combined with an increasing international threat, demands that the Air Force move immediately to encourage the development of true professionalism. The idealism and integrity of the officer corps must not be allowed to be choked out by the weeds of ignorance and careerism.

1. Samuel P. Huntington. The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1957), p. 11.

2. Air Force Times, February 18, 1980, p. 3.

3. Huntington, p. 15.

4. Major Peter Henderson, "What the Captain Really Means," Air University Review, January-February 1976, pp. 96-101.

5. M.L. Craver, "No Surprises in Why Pilots Leave Service," Air Force Times, June 4, 1979, p. 23.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond F. Hamel, "Are Professionalism and Integrity Only a Myth?" Air University Review, May-June 1978, p. 65.

7. Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, Cold War and Crises (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977).

8. Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Ellis Suggests US Try Britain’s Secrets Act," Armed Forces Journal, October 1980, p. 77.

9. General T.R. Milton, "Dissent and the Soldier," Strategic Review, Spring 1979, p. 22.

10. Ibid.

11. Huntington, p. 11.

12. Ibid., pp. 12-14.

13. Jeffrey Record, "The Fortunes of War," Harper’s, April 1980, p. 20.

14. Letter, March 17, 1980 and comments from the Department of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, concerning "Professionalism in the Air Force," by Major Price T. Bingham, Attachment 2. Hereafter referred to as "Professionalism."

15. Ibid.

16. Report presented to the Secretary of War, 30 June 1935, quoted in MacArthur on War, by Frank C. Waldrop (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), p. 305.

17. S.L.A. Marshall, Bringing up the Rear (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1979), pp. 207 and 208.

18. Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), p. 3.

19. Bingham, "Professionalism."

20. B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), p. 23.

21. Ibid.

Contributor

Major PriceT. Bingham (USAFA) is a member of the Air Staff in the War and Mobilization Planning Division, Hq USAF. He has flown fighters in Tactical Air Command, United States Air Forces in Europe, and Southeast Asia. Major Bingham is a previous contributor to the Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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