Air University Review, March-April 1981

Inside The Walls

I want to talk about the VAN bomb. No, VAN does not stand for Vanadium Anhydrous Nucleus. VAN stands for van, as in Chevy, Dodge, delivery, or moving. Call it a truck bomb if you like. My main point, which I will put right here to ensure understanding, is that the U.S.S.R has some fine nuclear delivery vehicles (pardon the pun, but it fits in every form) that are perfectly invisible to ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS), sound and surveillance system (SOSUS), or satellites. Not only are we open to nuclear devastation but we have little or no way to respond.

The name of our national defense strategy has gone through many contortions. We have heard the creative name game go from massive retaliation, through essential equivalence, to mutually assured destruction. These names share one feature: commitment to second strike. We have vowed not to strike the first strategic nuclear blow. This position has led us to invest great sums and energies in tactical warning devices. These warning devices are meant to detect incoming missiles so we can give our own military forces and elements of national power a few precious minutes to launch, hide, or harden. Sophisticated radars scan space, space satellites watch the ground, and ground radars watch for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack. SOSUS aids in keeping track of SLBM submarines. We have erected electronic trip wires that will give warning if the enemy tries to sneak into our camp. But, as an old saying goes, the best way to penetrate a fortress is to be on the inside when the gates are closed. If the enemy is inside our fortress walls and our ring of warning devices, and then if our warning devices survive, they might tell us only of the incoming second strike.

For purposes of this discussion, we will assume that the enemy is the Soviet Union. Actually, there are many foreign governments and organizations operating within the geopolitical borders of the United States that could fit the scenario, but we will name the U.S.S.R as the hypothetical enemy. The Soviets have held a steady course in foreign policy and military affairs. As Joseph also put it:

Since the Grand Prince of Moscow first claimed sole rule of Muscovy, the Russians have always pushed forward; have often been pushed back; but have invariably ended up by pushing forward farther than before.¹

The Russians continue to use all of their elements of national power to benefit their expansion. Correspondingly, the United States will use its instruments of power to counter Soviet expansion moves. The confrontation of opposing goals is bound to bring instability. If the conflict reaches the "sticking point," where neither side will back down, it could escalate to the use of conventional armed force. Being able to think a move or two ahead, the Soviets probably realize that if U.S. forces begin to lose, the nuclear threat will become a more inviting option to U.S. leaders.

At this point, we have to step in and conjecture that the U.S.S.R does not want an all-out nuclear exchange. They may talk about surviving such an exchange, but it would certainly be less than a winning proposition. At the very least, they would like to limit severely any destruction of their homeland. One way to preclude an opponent from taking such a threatening position is to occupy that position first.

The delivery of nuclear weapons can be viewed as a logistics problem. You have an item (a warhead) you want to have at a certain place at a certain time. If you think like a logistician, you see you have many alternatives for delivery. You can use special messengers (like missiles and bombers), which are expensive; you can rely on common carriers (truck, rail, etc.); you can preposition the item; or you can use all three approaches. We think a lot about stopping (or at least spotting) the special messenger, but we are wide open to delivery of unwanted goods by the common carrier and to prepositioned devices. But, then, we could hardly expect a U.S. common carrier to deliver a Soviet nuclear warhead, could we? We could indeed!

The Soviet Union operates at least five commercial companies in the United States which do business in freight. Amtorg (New York) is the oldest. It was incorporated in 1924 to trade in U.S., Soviet, and third country goods. It is wholly owned by the Soviets and has a branch in Moscow called Mosamtorg. Other companies in the United States with open Soviet interests include a tractor company, Belarus Machinery of U.S.A., Inc. (Milwaukee); a shipping agency, Morflot American Shipping, Inc. (New Jersey); a fishing and fleet service organization, U.S.-U.S.S.R Marine Resources Company, Inc. (Seattle); and a chartering agent, Sovfracht (U.S.A.), Inc. (New York). These companies use their own trucks and ships, lease and charter transportation, and consign shipments to other carriers. If I were a Soviet logistician trying to deliver a package in the United States, I would certainly consider using these companies. Other countries and power groups have similar, but perhaps not as extensive, commercial connections.

If we were to develop a scenario for the use of van bombs, we would start with the United States and the U.S.S.R. eyeball-to-eyeball in some part of the world—with neither side blinking. We would postulate a dangerous but conventional military conflict in progress or threatening. We could see the Soviet leaders wanting another option besides nuclear destruction or backing down. As insurance, they would have inserted a number of nuclear devices into the United States during more quiet times to provide the "other option" or an element of surprise. These could be brought in under diplomatic seal, disguised in freight shipments, or by simple smuggling. (If thousands of tons of marijuana can enter the country successfully over predictable routes, certainly a determined power could bring in a few tons of contraband.) Standard commercial shipping orders would start some large crates moving from pre-positioned locations within the United States to places like Washington, D.C., Omaha, Grand Forks, Great Falls, Bremerton, Norfolk, and Honolulu. These crates would be large and heavy, perhaps needing power attached for "refrigeration." A suitcase- or satchel-size nuclear weapon may exist, but not in practical form. A warhead capable of being handled safely, going off when planned, and doing considerable damage (20 kilotons as a minimum) is still a large, heavy package. But it could be handled by truck. A twenty-kiloton surface burst can destroy armored vehicles and hardened structures out as far as 550 meters. It can destroy airplanes in the open and communication facilities at many times that distance. The bomb size could be practically several times 20KT.

The United States depends on warning and real-time command and control. Warning will allow the use of existing communications to launch bombers into survivable positions and will tell us who the enemy is. Warning will also enable the National Command Authorities to get into safe havens. If we are deprived of warning, our command, control, and communication systems will be very lucky to survive. If we are simply deprived of communications, we will be in a very poor position to survive blackmail or coercion. The van bomb could be used as either a first strike or as a blackmail weapon. In either case, the targeting strategy would be to destroy the retaliatory weapons on the ground (missile capsules and bombers), destroy the links to the survivable forces (communications), and prevent the National Command Authorities from reaching safety. Certain "deliveries" would involve a little deception: a truck breakdown on a rough Montana highway a few hundred yards from a Minuteman control capsule, for instance. But most deliveries in cities like Washington, D.C., could be to previously rented offices and garages and to legitimate freight depots. The target planners will have no problem obtaining an adequate circular error of probability with this delivery system.

The Russian approach to military operations concentrates on shock, surprise, and mass. Blackmail is not their style, but the use of infiltrators, deception, and surprise certainly is. If we ignore the complex blackmail scenarios and simply examine a first strike from within by perhaps two dozen van bombs, we can easily postulate the loss of the

top leadership, the loss of much of the bomber and some of the ICBM force, and the almost complete severing of the standard communication links to the remaining retaliatory forces. The confusion factor over the source and nature of the destruction would be tremendous. The identity of the striker could only be inferred, and then not hastily. By the use of this one simple, inexpensive weapon-delivery system, the Soviets (or any other power so inclined) could achieve total surprise, create chaos, and greatly reduce the counter-strike capability of the United States.

The "command link" to a van bomb can range from the absurdly simple to the esoteric. Most large cities in the United States have direct distance dialing with Moscow. Agents could simply receive orders over the telephone. The appearance of a certain ad on network TV could be a message to move. Direct commands relayed by satellite to the van bombs could also be used. Links like these could enable the plan to be initiated without automatically going full course.

Now we come to the point where we must ask what action is appropriate and practical to stem this threat. We are an open and free society. We cannot shut down commerce and restrict trade because of "what if" scenarios. We will probably never espouse a "first strike" strategy. Prudent action would, however, close a few "chinks" in the armor. I cannot speculate on covert actions or actions to provide for the increased survivability of the National Command Authorities, but these should be considered. One of the most obvious holes to be patched is in the area of vulnerable communications. Our national web of communications is much like cotton candy—it is thick and made up of millions of threads, but terribly soft. When exposed to any heat, it melts away. We have some stronger threads embedded in that cotton candy, but we need to add a few bands of steel to strengthen the survivable communication links to all nuclear strike forces. We have a credible retaliatory capability only if we can control and launch our retaliatory forces. Communication satellites are still physically survivable, but their transmission paths are certainly vulnerable to the atmospheric effects of nuclear explosions. Extremely-low-frequency (ELF) radio signals seem to be usable despite atmospheric disruption, but the installation of any meaningful ELF system has been put off by environmental factors. We must get our priorities in order and find the solutions needed to provide solid links of communication that will survive the intrusion of a Trojan horse into our fortress. We must be able to pass the order to fight even if the alarms do not ring first. Providing adequate and survivable communications is the most effective practical solution to the threat of surprise attack from any source.

The prospect of internal sabotage leading off a nuclear exchange has not been discussed very often, but it certainly is a potential avenue of attack in a free society. We can do little to limit commerce and the movement of goods and people, but we can shore up our own internal system so as to better withstand attack from inside our own walls.

Note

1. Newsweek, November 13, 1978, p. 35.

Author’s note: After this article was submitted for publication, the White House issued a series of Presidential Directives concerned with continuity of government, flexible response, and telecommunications policy for national security.

Other Sources

Information on Soviet industries in the United States came from an unclassified Central Intelligence Agency Report, "Soviet Commercial Operations in the West," ER 77-10486, September 1977.

Information on the effects of a 20 kiloton nuclear weapon came from Department of the Army Pamphlet 39-1, "Nuclear Weapons Effects and Analysis," May 1959.

Major Frank J. Derfler, Jr. (M.Ed., University of South Carolina), is assigned to Hq USAF. He has served as Chief of the Tactical Communications Operations Division at Hq PACAF. Major Derfler is a frequent contributor to technical, hobby, and professional military publications and a writer on technological matters with military, social, and economic implications. Major Derfler is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a previous contributor to the Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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