Air University Review, March-April 1981
A Comment by Captain Frederick G. Beisser
In his article "Military Strategy, The Forgotten Art," Lieutenant Colonel William T. Rudd makes a number of very valid points which suggest much-needed changes in our military strategy.* He has, however, tasked the Department of Defense with some actions that exceed its authority but which must occur prior to the successful implementation of his major command-level strategic planning functions; he has also overlooked several potential changes at the departmental level which could be made now to increase the military strategic planning awareness and the capabilities of our officer corps at minimum cost.
* Lieutenant Colonel William T. Rudd, "Military Strategy, The Forgotten Art," Air University Review, July-August 1980, pp. 85-93.
As noted in his article, the absence of a grand or national strategy and related objectives has seriously affected military thinking and resulted in a resource allocation mode of thinking. I would add that this has also caused an unnecessarily large amount of crisis management, confused both our allies and our enemies as to our reaction to changing world situations, and degraded our weapon systems through on-again off-again budgeting support for long-term items such as the B-1 bomber and naval strategic needs.
The cure may lie in making a "purple suit"** national strategic analysis and planning system or organization which reports on an independent basis to tile President as suggested. Note, however, that we already have the National Security Council, which was created by statute in 1947, to advise the President on integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as to enable departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.1 The council is not a decision-or policymaking body, which may contribute to the problem. It is, by its nature, a crisis management forum to assist the President. But within the council there is an interdepartmental committee known as the Planning Board. Its members guard their departmental interests (on the negative side) and must resort to interagency bargaining for what the traffic will bear to arrive at final positions on policy which originated in their department and are being coordinated through the council. Budgetary considerations are very general, and proposals do not undergo cost benefit or economic analysis. Last, the Planning Board is not creative in areas of uncharted policy, only reviewing and adjusting to existing policy.2
**Consisting of members from more than one of the military services.
The President already has the option of using the National Security Council (Planning Board) as a policymaking instrument. However, to eliminate the problems of partisanship and agency parochialism, a significant term of appointment is needed that exceeds the President’s term of office and once appointed cannot be revoked. The Planning Board should become the "purple suit" of the National Security Council and should be headed by a fifteen-year appointee, as is done with the Comptroller General of the United States.
Staff members should come from a form of joint career service of carefully selected officers from Defense, State, and several other departments. These military and civilian officers (at the 06 level after reaching the Planning Board) should be groomed for this service through assignments in a number of different departments or agencies,3 culminating in a permanent switch to the Planning Board. Subsequently, these Planning Board members in "purple suits" would also serve tours with the Air Force, Navy, Army, or higher strategic planning staffs in DOD, State, and perhaps, the Office of Management and Budget, bringing with them strategic planning expertise.
The importance of making changes in developing national strategy cannot be overemphasized. This becomes painfully obvious when one realizes that "the annual budget is the basic planning document of the federal government."4 The most significant issues in defense policy are to define the military purposes of the United States forces and allocate defense resources in a manner to achieve these purposes.5 The continued dispute over these issues certainly supports Colonel Rudd’s request to improve our strategic planning. After many years, the major problem in our strategic force policy continues to be whether merely to offset U.S.S.R. capability to threaten our strategic forces or to acquire a matching capability to destroy U.S.S.R. land-based missiles. The specific implications of this (Carter administration’s) policy (countervailing at time of writing) have not been clarified. The composition of the strategic forces continues to be determined in a piecemeal way.6
A natural result of all this is that the "basic military purposes of U.S. Forces are in serious dispute."7 Our strategic force policy has proceeded on a piecemeal basis, which is no longer acceptable. Such vital factors as threat assessment, strategic stability considerations, future affordability of alternatives, and SALT considerations dictate the need in our government for a coherent worldwide national strategy for a longer term and one to which the purpose and structure of our forces is closely linked.
Improved strategic planning must also be coupled with appropriate funding, aimed to support attainment of strategic objectives. Too frequently, congressional budget cuts have been aimed at end items or commodities in operating budgets that by themselves appear innocuous. A recent article by Lieutenant General Hans H. Driessnack, Comptroller of the Air Force, explains the problem.8 Perhaps it is time for Congress to begin using a mission-oriented method of collecting budget requirements as the executive branch has done. Then, cuts in particular commodities can be readily evaluated as to their effect on meeting national objectives.
It is interesting to note that our colleagues in the U.S.S.R. have significant opportunity to study military science at advanced levels. There are over 100 military schools with courses ranging from four to five years. Major areas of study are doctrine, strategy, operational art, and tactics. It is also estimated that several hundred Soviet officers hold Candidate of Military Science degrees.9
Viewed another way, graduate military universities in the U.S.S.R. offer advanced schooling in military science at 17 locations, equivalent roughly to master’s degrees. In addition, postgraduate work is also encouraged in military disciplines at the doctoral level.10
Compare these with a review of The College Bluebook, which shows only five institutions in the United States offering a bachelor’s degree in military science and none at the master’s level.11 There must be corrective action soon.
The Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) can easily encourage more intense study of strategic planning. Several suggestions seem in order:
Interschool cooperative agreements could allow expansion to smaller base by guaranteeing transferability of course work.
If the above changes were to be implemented, a not-so-long-range benefit might be the opportunity for the doctor of military science degree to become a reality in the United States.
In General, I agree with Colonel Rudd. Strategic planning has been seriously neglected. Now is the right time to improve strategic planning at both DOD and national government levels with taxpayer support reawakened by recent world events.
TUSLOG Detachment 10 (USAFE)
Notes
1. Senator Henry M. Jackson, editor, The National Security Council (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 30.
2. Ibid., pp. 34-35
3. Ibid., p. 12
4. Joseph A. Pechman, editor, Setting National Priorities---The 1980 Budget (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. vii.
5. Ibid., p. 15.
6. Ibid., p. 16.
7. Ibid., p. 163.
8. Lieutenant General Hans H. Driessnack, "The Key to Readiness: O&M" in Air Force, October 1980, pp. 57-63.
9. American editor’s comment, The Offensive (A Soviet View) by Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, translated under auspices of United States Air Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970)
10. AFP 200-21, Soviet Aerospace Handbook, May 1978, pp. 157-58.
11. The College Bluebook, seventeenth edition (New York: Macmillan, 1979) p. 638.
Contributor
Captain Beisser is Chief, Accounting and Finance Branch. TUSLOG Detachment 10 (USAFE).
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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