Air University Review, January-February 1981

Soviet Perceptions of the Strategic Balance

SALT I has come and gone, and SALT II is in limbo. As the United States entered SALT I negotiations, the common American assumption, challenged by only a few analysts of Soviet strategic doctrine, was that Soviet leaders held perceptions of the strategic balance similar in most respects to those held by American leaders. Mutual assured destruction (MAD), strategic parity, deterrence, and force stability were all concepts that were accepted equally in Washington and Moscow, it was assumed. However, as negotiations for SALT II progressed, the degree to which Washington and Moscow shared perceptions of the strategic balance became the subject of considerable debate. A new literature on the strategic balance has proliferated with, on the one hand, some analysts concluding that the Soviet Union has moved beyond those concepts it allegedly adopted for SALT I and is currently preparing to fight and win a nuclear war; and, on the other hand, some analysts positing that the assumption remains valid that American and Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance are nearly identical.

Obviously, among analysts of Soviet affairs, there is considerable disagreement over what the reality of Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance actually is. This disagreement may be attributed to a variety of factors, three of the most prominent being different attitudes expressed by Soviet leaders and in the Soviet media, perceptual biases for any of a number of reasons on the part of Western observers, and legitimate differences of opinion on how most accurately to interpret the diverse signals that the Soviet Union sends out about its views on the strategic balance. Thus there is room for disagreement, and it would be pretentious indeed to argue that one’s own analysis of Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance is "the correct" interpretation. It may, nonetheless, be argued that those sources of data which provide us with most of our information about Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance—Soviet military writings, statements by diverse senior political and military leaders both in public and private, and strategic force procurement and deployment—contain within their internal contradictions a considerable degree of consistency which, to a great extent, has been overlooked by Western analysts. I will examine three areas of Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance—force capabilities, threat assessment, and employment doctrine—in an effort to delimit both contradictions and consistencies.

Strategic Policy Formulation
in the Soviet Context

Before an analysis of Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance is undertaken, it is helpful to realize that Soviet leaders have sufficient grounds to view strategic issues in a manner significantly different from the way they are viewed in the West. As Dimitri Simes has pointed out, this implies that Soviet perceptions of "legitimate defense needs" and "equal security" may differ considerably from the U.S. view.¹ Historical experiences of the Russian and Soviet states, geopolitical realities with which current Soviet leaders must cope, ideological beliefs that legitimize both the Soviet state and its ongoing military buildup, national and elite psychological characteristics, and ecotechnical capabilities of the Soviet state have all been identified as factors that may influence Soviet leaders to adopt perceptions of strategic issues which differ from those of their American counterparts.

It is on the basis of these perceptions that Soviet strategic policy is formulated. Unfortunately, however, the closed nature of the Soviet decision -making process, particularly on matters related to national security, renders it difficult to gauge the impact of various perceptions on Soviet policy and, for that matter, to determine the perceptions themselves. This problem is to some degree offset by the fact that substantive discussions of strategic issues are limited to the military and senior levels of the political elite. Perhaps the best illustration of this point was the request by a senior Soviet military officer during SALT I negotiations that the American side refrain from discussing substantive numerical issues in the presence of Soviet political representatives to SALT since the political representatives were not privy to such information. Thus, while secrecy limits our access to, and consequently our understanding of, Soviet discussions of strategic issues, the small number (according to Western standards) of participants involved in such discussions enables analysts to scrutinize what information is available in considerable detail.² These considerations are further complicated by the fact that in the Soviet Union, as in the United States, policymaking elites speak to a variety of clientele for a variety of purposes.

Despite these difficulties, analysts of Soviet foreign and military policy in recent years have identified perceptual differences within relevant Soviet elites and constructed plausible explanations for Soviet policies based on these perceptual differences.³ On an issue-by-issue basis, their analysis has indicated that the influences of disparate groups within the Soviet elite vary widely. On strategic issues, it is likely that the influence of various groups similarly changes on an issue-by-issue basis. On major strategic issues such as threat assessment, force structure, and employment doctrine, we may speculate that the Soviet Defense Council, chaired by General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and probably consisting of, at a minimum, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Aleksey Kosygin (before his "retirement"), Minister of Defense Dmitriy F. Ustinov, and one or two other members of the Party Politburo, has predominant influence if not control⁴ with other bodies and individuals such as the Soviet General Staff, senior officers of the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Navy particularly, and upper-level officials in the various machine-building ministries also having some influence.

It also appears reasonably clear that those Soviet elites concerned with strategic issues define strategic somewhat differently from their American counterparts. In the United States, strategic issues have been interpreted, through a geographical accident, to apply to those issues that are intercontinental. This is not true of the Soviet conception of strategic issues, again in part because of geography. For the Soviet Union, "strategic concern begins at the doorstep.’’⁵ This difference in conception, however, goes beyond geography and includes a much greater emphasis on political and economic affairs than do American discussions of strategic issues. Former Soviet Minister of Defense and Politburo member A. A. Grechko pointed to these distinctions in The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, saying that, in a military context, it was possible to distinguish between "overall

strategic goals" and "particular strategic missions" and that strategy must rely on "a country’s economic ability," "the conditions of a situation,’’ and ‘‘the military-political situation."⁶ Thus, when the Soviets discuss strategic issues, their conception is comprehensively defined and includes linkages to regional issues on the one hand and economic, political, and social issues on the other hand, which, as we shall see is of considerable importance.

force capabilities:
a Soviet assessment

Above all else, to most American observers, the strategic balance is a qualitative and quantitative measure in either static or dynamic terms of the relative intercontinental nuclear force capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the interrelationships among delivery vehicles and multiple warheads with their various total throw-weights, yield-to-weight ratios, accuracy, and range are complex, few analysts today deny that relative to American capabilities the Soviet Union has substantially overcome, if not eliminated, the quantitative and qualitative inferiority that confronted it as recently as the signing of SALT I in 1972.⁷ This improvement has led some American analysts to conclude that the Soviet Union is striving for strategic nuclear superiority and a first-strike capability.⁸ Indeed, given the American proclivity for measuring strategic capabilities in terms of intercontinental nuclear capabilities, there is considerable room to support such sentiment, especially when other Soviet programs such as air defense and civil defense are taken into account and viewed in conjunction with certain Soviet technical developments such as the perfection of cold-launch capabilities. Only in numbers of strategic warheads has the United States increased its early 1970s lead over the Soviet Union; and as the Soviets themselves move increasingly to MIRVed systems such as the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, it is feared that even this lead will be transitory.

From the American perspective, then, the Soviet perception of the force capabilities parameter of the strategic balance should be quite favorable and probably improving. As has been previously pointed out, however, Soviet perspectives and American perspectives on the strategic balance are likely to differ considerably. It should come as no surprise that this is true in the area of force capabilities.

From the viewpoint of the Kremlin, the contemporary strategic balance is based on the concepts of "equal security" and a refutation of efforts to achieve "one-sided advantages, directly or indirectly." During the years since SALT I was initiated, the Soviet Union has often and avidly avowed that its entire strategic doctrine and force posture have been based on these principles.⁹

Unfortunately, however, the Kremlin has not clarified its concept of "equal security" or "one-sided advantage" other than to announce that ‘‘an approximate strategic balance between the two sides now exists.¹⁰ Only rarely does the Soviet Union publicly reveal its own assessment of different quantitative and qualitative measures of the strategic balance. One of these occasions was in Pravda on February 5, 1977, when Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, referred to U.S. quantitative superiority in bombers and warheads and Soviet superiority in throw-weight and numbers of missiles. However, Soviet quantitative and qualitative advances in strategic hardware are rationalized as necessitated by U.S. efforts to upset the existing balance and "deprive the Soviet Union of the opportunity to deliver an effective retaliatory strike."¹¹ Even though there has been no detailed pubic Soviet discussion of individual measures of the strategic balance, the Kremlin apparently believes that a rough parity of intercontinental nuclear forces exists despite the numerous disparities between national capabilities.

However, from the Soviet perspective, American insistence on measuring strategic capabilities on the basis of intercontinental nuclear forces is an effort to gain, in Soviet terminology, "one-sided advantage." One need merely recall recent American debates over whether the Soviet Tu-26 Backfire and the SS-20 are strategic or theater delivery systems to understand Soviet complaints that the United States is seeking "unilateral advantage" by refusing to include forward-based nuclear-capable tactical aircraft and carrier systems in strategic arms negotiations. This gray-area problem, only recently recognized by the United States, has long been a matter of serious concern for Soviet planners.ⁱ² At the same time, however, as greater quantities of Backfires and SS-20s enter the Soviet arsenal, Soviet unease precipitated by the gray-area problem will inevitably lessen since technological upgrading of both these systems can give them intercontinental capabilities.

Alliance asymmetry presents yet another problem to Moscow when it assesses force capabilities. Soviet leaders have pointedly noted that the United States is not the only nuclear-capable country that has its weapons directed against the U.S.S.R.¹³ Moscow is concerned with the nuclear capabilities of France and Great Britain and, especially in recent months, those of the People’s Republic of China as well. While it is probable that the quantity of French and British delivery systems is less than 150 per nation and the quantity of Chinese systems is less than 200, Soviet leaders nonetheless realize that 400-500 warheads not under American control are pointed at the U.S.S.R. This cannot be a comforting thought, particularly given the new intimacy between China and the Western alliance.

Soviet force capabilities are also adversely impacted by geographical location, particularly in the area of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Soviet missile ballistic missles are almost all attached to either the Northern Fleet or the Pacific Fleet. Those attached to the Northern Fleet must navigate the Greenland-Iceland-Faeroes-United Kingdom gap to arrive at suitable launch points, and those attached to the Pacific Fleet face similar chokepoint conditions. The major exception to this is the Petropavlosk-Kamchatskiy base, which serves as a major base for Soviet missile submarines and is in fact on open water. Additionally, only by great effort are ports in both sectors kept icefree year-round. All of this, the Kremlin believes, detracts from Soviet SLBM force capabilities. To the Soviets, as they pointed out in a unilateral statement issued with the SALT I treaty, their quantitative SLBM superiority seemingly permitted under the accord was attributable to the U.S.S.R.’s geographic location.¹⁴ Although the United States rejected the Soviet reasoning five days after it was issued, geographical asymmetry in Soviet eyes reduced a quantitative Soviet SLBM superiority to parity or even inferiority. These observations imply that Soviet emphasis on ICBM development at the expense of SLBM development may be as much geographically induced as technically induced.

On the technical side, it has been well documented, even in the public literature, that Soviet missile submarines are noisier and therefore more detectable than U.S. boats and have an approximate on-station time of 10 percent as compared to U.S. on-station time of 50 percent.¹⁵ Recent U.S. breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare may even increase Soviet SLBM vulnerability.¹⁶ Thus, from the Soviet perspective, SLBMs may not be considered an invulnerable system.

Soviet emphasis on ICBM development may be explained both by the above-mentioned difficulties and by technical problems concerning miniaturization of components and low yield-to-weight ratios. Such problems could serve to explain large throw-weight boosters; Soviet proclivity for size is not sufficiently persuasive to explain them, since in recent Soviet tank and tactical aircraft construction, relatively small systems have been developed. However, it should be pointed out that as miniaturization and yield-to-weight problems are overcome, large throw-weight boosters would afford Soviet leaders with impressive MIRVing capabilities. Indeed, the SS-18 Mod 2 has been tested, and may be operational, with as many as eight MIRVs per booster.

Despite these potentials for technical improvements, it may not be argued that Soviet leaders are comfortable with ongoing technical trends. American development of the cruise missile in particular has been cited by the Soviet media as an item that could frustrate "equal security."¹⁷ With the United States pursuing force improvement programs in a number of other areas as well, Soviet leaders may be as fearful of the United States reattaining clear-cut superior force capabilities as American leaders are of Soviet attainment of superior force capabilities.

None of the foregoing analysis should be interpreted as seeking to minimize the considerable improvement in Soviet force capabilities. Rather, it seeks to illustrate that, from the Soviet perspective; a sanguine assessment of current and future Soviet force capabilities may not be possible. This, then, may be a possible explanation for ongoing Soviet force improvements; at the very least, it casts doubt on the certainty exuded by those who maintain the Soviet Union is seeking strategic superiority arid a first-strike capability.

threat assessment:
the Soviet perception

Many American analysts consider the growth of Soviet nuclear force capabilities to be not only qualitatively and quantitatively significant but also view that growth as being sufficient at its present level to influence the Soviet leaders to reduce substantially their assessment of the "capitalist threat." To a degree, this has in fact happened. Brezhnev himself has argued that growing Soviet military strength has forced the United States to "face the truth’’ that it is "impossible to solve militarily the historical differences between socialism and capitalism.’’¹⁸ A more recent Kommunist article declared that since "potential for direct application" of nuclear weapons has decreased because of rough strategic force equivalence, "recourse to talks is inevitable today."^l9 Even Soviet military spokesmen concur with this political assessment. Krasnaia Zvezda, for example, has declared that "a nuclear strike is impossible without the risk of incurring a devastating retaliatory strike,’’ while Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil has maintained that "the forces of peace [i.e., the Soviet Union, other socialist states, and to a lesser degree, national liberation movements] now have sufficient power to prevent the outbreak of a new world war.’’²⁰ In some Soviet quarters, then including senior political and military personnel in policymaking or other influential positions, there appears to be a belief that the United States --nd other potentially anti-Soviet nuclear capable powers, it should be added— is effectively deterred from an attack on the Soviet homeland by the present strategic balance.

Why, then, if the Soviet Union has improved force capabilities and lowered its perception of the external threat, does the U.S.S.R. continue its military buildup, and most particularly nuclear buildup? The easy answer—which is not to say necessarily the wrong answer—is that, again, the Soviet leaders have consciously opted to seek strategic nuclear superiority and a potential war-winning capabi1ity. As we have already seen, from the Soviet perspective, current nuclear parity may be a transient phenomenon as the United States proceeds to upgrade its force capabilities; similarly, from the same viewpoint, the low current levels of threat assessment do not preclude increased future levels of potential threat. Thus, in each of the preceding examples, the Soviet spokesmen have cautioned that the danger of a nuclear war, while reduced, has not disappeared. As Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov has asserted in one of his rare articles, Soviet nuclear might has "pushed back" but has "not eliminated’’ the threat of war.²¹

Soviet analysis of the American political process, of American force acquisition programs, and of American strategic doctrine all supports this viewpoint and further elucidates it by implying that the American threat," while currently contained, may be revitalized. Each of these avenues of analysis is of sufficient importance to warrant individual discussion.

In recent years, Soviet assessments of the American political scene have become increasingly sophisticated. Proceeding from a Marxist-Leninist framework of analysis, which by definition identifies American political and military leaders as representatives of the bourgeois class, Soviet analysts have seen fit to categorize these representatives of the bourgeois as "realistic" or "unrealistic," depending on their attitudes toward Soviet-American relations, strategic arms limitations, and related international topics. To the Soviets, the "realistic" leaders are those who recognize the "objective reality" of expanded Soviet power and seek to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. rather than confront her. Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and to an uncertain degree Jimmy Carter have all been classified as "realists."²² However, "unrealistic" leaders remain in prominent positions, Soviet analysts warn, and are once again expanding their influence at the expense of the "realists." "Unrealistic leaders" include Henry Jackson, John Connally, Ronald Reagan, and, more prominently Paul Nitze, Richard Pipes, and the Committee on the Present Danger.

This Soviet analysis has very real impact on Soviet assessments of the "American threat." Since "unrealistic" leaders again dominate the U.S. political process, then, from the Soviet point of view, that threat has again grown. Thus, the Kremlin undoubtedly feels that there is no room for complacency. (Again, from the Soviet viewpoint, Richard Nixon’s conversion to "realism’’ is pointed to on occasion to illustrate that "unrealistic" U.S. leaders may reform. Clearly, this is the Soviet hope for the Reagan administration.)

Soviet interpretation of American force acquisition programs buttresses this viewpoint. While the U.S.S.R. apparently accepts tacitly that an unspecified level of U.S. strategic capability is required to provide the United States with "equal security," it is equally clear that the U.S.S.R. views both qualitative and quantitative improvements to that capability as efforts by the United States to achieve a "one-sided advantage." During the last three years, in particular, every ongoing U.S. strategic weapons program has been derided as a U.S. attempt once again to obtain a "position of strength over the Soviet Union."²³ Proposed programs, such as the multiple aims point (MAP) system or "shell game basing," have been similarly criticized.²⁴

Perhaps of even more concern to Soviet strategists than the resurgence of "unrealistic" leaders or the continuation of U.S. force acquisition programs is the change in U.S. strategic doctrine from countervalue to counterforce targeting as set forth first by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s "limited nuclear response options" concept and more recently updated by Jimmy Carter’s Presidential Memorandum 59 (PM 59). Perceived in the United States as a method whereby a central nuclear exchange could be kept within limits in the event of a European conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, PM 59 is viewed in Moscow as a means through which the United States could rationalize a first-strike doctrine. When viewed in conjunction with the M-X, Trident 2, Mark 12A, and even cruise missile programs, all of which stress great accuracy in warhead delivery, Soviet fears of a resurgent "American threat" including first-strike capabilities may be understandable.²⁵

From the Kremlin’s perspective, alleged American efforts to reacquire strategic superiority extend to strategic arms negotiations as well. On the one hand, thc United States is seen as seeking to evade the terms of SALT I by qualitatively improving its forces and by opening "new channels" in the arms race, particularly the cruise missiles.²⁶ On the other hand, the United States is accused of structuring SALT II proposals so that it gains advantages. Thus, when former U. S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance presented the so-called "Comprehensive Proposal" for SALT II to the Soviets during his March 1977 trip to Moscow, the Kremlin rejected it as too one-sided even to serve as a basis for future discussions.²⁷ From the Kremlin’s perspective, the combined effect of the proposals to limit MIRV launchers to 1200, limit MIRVed ICBMs to 550, and permit only ICBM or SLBM test flights per year appeared to channel the Soviet MIRV program into SLBM MIRV technology, an area in which, as we have seen, the Kremlin trails the United States, while at the same time limiting the U.S.S.R.’s ability to test the SLBM MIRV technology it would have been forced to develop.²⁸

When analyzing possible Soviet views of threat assessment, one must also remember traditional Soviet fears, described by some as paranoia, of encirclement, surprise, and inferiority. To Soviet leaders, these are fears emanating from both ideological fundamentals and historical fact. While the impact of these fears on Soviet threat assessment is indeterminate, it must nonetheless be considerable. With the United States, Western Europe, China, and Japan in virtual alignment against the U.S.S.R.; with the United States adopting an apparent counterforce strategy; and with the United States continuing its effort to improve its force capabilities, it is reasonable to assume that encirclement, surprise, and inferiority are issues of some concern to the men in the Kremlin. All add to existent perceptions of external threat.

It is quite possible, then; that the Soviet leadership believes the "American threat" is real and growing. At the very least, there is considerable room to conclude that the Soviet assessment of the "American threat" is significantly greater than the American estimate of what that assessment should be.

Nuclear Deterrence and War Fighting:
The Soviet Assessment

During the past several years in the United States, considerable debate has occurred concerning Soviet views of and attitudes toward nuclear war as a continuation of politics, the deterrent utility of nuclear weapons, mutual assured destruction, targeting practices, and strategic stability. These are all issues of critical importance to American and Soviet national security. Unfortunately, Soviet authorities in policymaking positions rarely offer detailed and definitive statements on any of these issues. There is, however, considerable material available about these issues from individuals in policy-influencing positions. Often, this material presents diametrically opposed viewpoints. It is consequently understandable that American assessments of the Soviet position on these issues vary widely. Indeed, as we shall see in our examination of each of these points. Soviet discussions of these points are almost as diversified as the American assessments of them.

nuclear war as a
continuation of politics

The question of whether nuclear war is a continuation of politics is, to the Soviet Union, much more than a philosophical debate over the continued validity of a concept that Lenin borrowed, with some alterations, from Clausewitz. To Soviet leaders, the question has very definite and explicit policy implications: If nuclear war is a continuation of politics, does it become an instrument of policy? Is it possible to survive a nuclear exchange? Is victory possible in the event of such an exchange?

Throughout the nuclear age, Soviet spokesmen have regularly maintained that the advent of nuclear weapons has not altered the fundamental Clausewitzian-Leninist dictum that war is a continuation of politics. While being careful to point out that Clausewitz’s analysis was somewhat in error because he ignored the "fundamental class structures" of warfare, Soviet authors have consistently argued that even in the era of nuclear weapons, war—including nuclear war—has political meaning and is a continuation of politics.²⁹ Having answered that question, Soviet planners and strategists inevitably must address the follow-on questions of nuclear war as an instrument of policy, of the possibility of survival in a nuclear war, and the possibility of victory in a nuclear war. In the discussions of these questions, Soviet authorities offer contradictory arguments and conclusions which make it evident that, at least on the public level, none of these questions has been satisfactorily resolved.

The answer to the question of whether nuclear war is a viable instrument of policy depends to a great extent on the answer to the question of whether survival and even victory are possible in a nuclear war. Since the official Soviet line has been and is that the U.S.S.R. will never unleash a nuclear war, almost all public Soviet discussions proceed from the assumption that the Soviet Union is being attacked or has identified American preparations to launch an attack.³⁰ There is no consensus within the Soviet literature as to whether the Soviet Union could survive an American strike or whether a Soviet preemptive strike would be launched or effective if launched. This uncertainty has existed throughout the nuclear age and may be seen in the so-called Khrushchev-Malenkov disagreement of the 1950s, the Rybkin-Talenskii disagreement of the 1960s, and the civilian-military disagreement of the 1970s.³¹ In the last instance, the civilian-military dichotomy is overstated, since there are indvidua1s from both camps who support viewpoints expressed by representatives in the other. Nevertheless, it may be said that a significant number of military men state that the Soviet Union can survive and win a central nuclear war, while a significant number of civilians posit that nuclear war will by its very nature deny victory to either side. Thus, Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army speaks of "victory" in a nuclear war, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil refers to the necessity of the Soviet state developing "the conditions and means of insuring victory," and Krasnaia Zvezda admits that nuclear war would be "the greatest misfortune," but "the mood of communists is far from one of futility and pessimism" about its outcome.³² On the other hand, Kommunist has argued that a new world war could "lead to the destruction of civilization," SShA has concluded that a U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict could result in "fatal consequences for the entire world," and Voprosy filosofi warned that a nuclear war would "undermine the conditions of the existence of niankind."³³ It should be pointed out that no Soviet author has publicly argued that the United States could survive a central nuclear exchange.

Potential explanations for these obvious disagreements are several. Military spokesmen, of course, have a greater institutionalized necessity to speak of victory in the event of war than do civilian spokesmen At the same time, the inevitability of socialist victory is espoused by Marxism-Leninism, and those who maintain that victory is possible in nuclear war may simply be more ideologically doctrinaire. Even with these rationales, however, it is not possible to dismiss out of hand the argument that some influential Soviet spokesmen do, in fact, believe that a nuclear war is winnable.

With this as a background, we may now return to the question of whether the Soviet Union views nuclear war as a viable policy instrument. It should come as no surprise that those Soviet authorities who view nuclear war as leading to a possible victory generally answer the question affirmatively, while those who view it as leading to the end of mankind answer it negatively. There is yet another group of Soviet leaders, many of whom are Politburo members, who speak of the "disastrous nature," the "horrible disaster," and the "extreme destruction" of a nuclear war, while refraining from discussing either victory or the destruction of mankind. These same Politburo members, however, posit that "world capitalism" would be destroyed in a nuclear war. Thus, it may be safe to conclude that to these individuals, who either recently or currently included Brezhnev, Kosygin, Ustinov, Kirilenko, and Mazurov, nuclear war would seriously but perhaps not fatally impact the Soviet Union and without doubt lead to the demise of capitalism. This, in fact, may be one reason for the apparently large-scale Soviet civil defense program; if nuclear war can be survived, then it must be survived as well as possible. With this probable perception, may Soviet leaders consider nuclear war an instrument of policy? Even with civil defense and other defensive measures, Soviet leaders recognize that their country will inevitably suffer massive damage in a nuclear war. Although the U.S.S.R. may emerge from that war in a relatively better condition than the U.S., one must wonder whether the Soviet leaders would willingly and knowingly cause such damage to be inflicted on their country, even if a relative advantage is gained.

deterrent utility

With the Soviet assertion that the U.S.S.R. will not initiate a nuclear exchange and with the U.S.S.R.’s concomitant belief that the U.S. may, deterrence plays a central role in Soviet nuclear policy. All segments of official Soviet society concur that as Soviet nuclear strength has grown, the probability of a nuclear war being unleashed by the U.S. has receded. Soviet authors regularly assert that the threat of nuclear war has diminished because of Soviet military strength but that the threat will not disappear as long as capitalism continues to exist.

To the Soviet Union, then, nuclear forces prevent an American attack on the U.S.S.R. Their utility as a deterrent does not end there, however, since Soviet nuclear strength is also seen as deterring particularly U.S. actions directed against other areas and interests the Soviet Union favors. This second definition is a significant extension of the concept of deterrence and is a direct reflection of the broader Soviet perception of "strategic," which was discussed earlier. As Fritz Ermarth has observed, "the Soviet concept of deterrence has evolved . . . from primary emphasis on defensive themes of war prevention and protection of prior political gains to more emphasis on themes that include the protection of dynamic processes favoring Soviet international interests,"³⁴ The result of this evolution gives a fundamental political utility to Soviet nuclear capabilities beyond the context of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear relationship, at least as far as the Soviets are concerned. It is of such significance to the Soviet leaders that a separate section of this article will be devoted to it (see the following section). Unaccountably, most Western discussion of the strategic balance has ignored it.

mutual assured destruction

Western discussion has not, however, overlooked the Soviet attitude toward mutual assured destruction. Widely accepted in the United States as a fundamental basis of American strategic doctrine, mutual assured destruction has received considerable discussion in the Soviet literature as well. Once again, this literature presents a contradictory picture and has led American Kremlinologists to adopt diametrically opposed views as to the Soviet position on mutual assured destruction. Thus, Raymond Garthoff has concluded that Soviet leaders have a "new readiness" to accept mutual deterrence, while Leon Gouré maintains that Soviet spokesmen "consistently reject the US concept of mutual assured destruction," and Edward Warner argues that the Soviets have shown "no inclination to embrace the Western deterrence concept of assured destruction."³⁵ As Garthoff rightly points out, Voyennaya mysl’ had numerous favorable references to mutual assured destruction during the late 1960s and 1970s, as did other Soviet journals such as SShA, which argued even if "an aggressor, [was] well prepared for attack" it had "no chance of surviving a retaliatory strike."³⁶ As Gouré and Warner rightly point out, speculation by other Soviet writers that the Soviet Union can survive and even win a central nuclear exchange by definition negates the concept of mutual assured destruction.

Neither position has substantial enough evidence to claim convincingly that the U.S.S.R. accepts or rejects mutual assured destruction. Given the fact that the debate continues within Soviet literature, it is probable that no final decision has been reached.

Even more fundamentally, one must ask, if the Soviet Union were to reject mutual assured destruction, what would replace it? Since the Soviets perceive a high level of threat originating from the United States, nuclear inferiority must be rejected as a possible alternative. Nuclear superiority is the logical replacement. Within the Soviet literature, military writers again seem to argue most often for nuclear superiority.³⁷ This is offset, however, by regular statements by the Soviet political elites that superiority is not a Soviet goal. Brezhnev himself specifically renounced superiority at Tula in January 1977 and again in Moscow in his speech at the 3 November 1977 anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Pravda printed both speeches and reasserted on 11 February and 16 June 1978 that the U.S.S.R. does not seek nuclear superiority. Kosygin spoke at the 1978 Bolshevik Revolution anniversary celebrations and denied a Soviet desire for superiority. Again, as we have seen in the case of mutual assured destruction, there is contradictory evidence, although in this case, at least for now, more weight should perhaps be attached to the assertions of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that superiority has different meanings to different people; what may appear to Brezhnev to be ‘‘approximate parity" and ‘‘equal security’’ may to others, and particularly non-Soviets, be superiority.

Put simply, the Soviet position on mutual assured destruction is ambiguous. Soviet rejection of inferiority is obvious, and denial of superiority is a matter of interpretation. At least in the area of targeting, it may he possible to reach more definitive answers.

targeting practice

Soviet writing and commentary on nuclear targeting is relatively unified and rarely presents the stark contradictions we have seen in other areas. This may in part be explained by the fact that targeting discussions are generally undertaken only in military literature. Soviet targeting practice itself does not appear to be strictly counterforce or countervalue but rather takes on aspects of both, with military capabilities, economic centers, administrative sites, and transportation capabilities being regularly cited as primary targets. While it is reasonable to assume that Soviet planners have developed contingency plans to meet a wide range of possible nuclear exchange situations, they have not discussed them in the public literature.

The Soviet Union may have developed this "comprehensive targeting" concept because of the prevailing Soviet attitude that once a central nuclear war has begun, it cannot be fought within specific limits and will almost inevitably result in an all-out exchange. Thus, to the Kremlin, there is little sense in seeking to limit the scope of nuclear war. Indeed, as we have seen, the American limited nuclear options strategy, which seeks to provide the United States with a separate countervalue capability, was criticized by the Kremlin because, among other things, it made a nuclear exchange appear less devastating to society as a whole, and, therefore, more "thinkable" to military planners. At the same time, it must be realized that one of the most credible deterrents to a central nuclear war is the certainty that it can not be limited; when the Soviets discuss comprehensive targeting, it may be an effort to heighten the credibility of their deterrent.

stability

There is little to indicate within the open Soviet literature that strategic stability is a conscious Soviet objective. Indeed, if one examines Soviet positions on threat assessment, military-technical progress, and evolution of history, it is almost necessary to conclude that the Soviet Union has rejected the idea that strategic stability is possible. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. has rejected its pursuit as an objective.

Soviet assessments of the "American threat," as we have seen, indicate that the ‘‘threat’’ is growing because of both political and military-technical reasons. Thus, the Kremlin feels, it must act to overcome this increased "threat." Soviet officials from both the military and civilian sectors concur in this assessment and regularly maintain that Soviet forces must be continuously modernized to meet the continuing and growing ‘‘threat.’’

While the viewpoint that the political threat from capitalism may increase is clearly ideologically derived (as well as, perhaps, historically derived), Soviet views on the military-technical necessity for high levels of vigilance and for continued military research, development, testing, and evaluation are grounded in a clear appreciation that technical progress cannot be reliably curtailed, even by measures such as SALT. For example, even after concluding the SALT I agreement, Brezhnev promised that the U.S.S.R. would forge ahead with new strategic nuclear weapons programs.³⁸ During the last seven years, the Soviet Union made good on Brezhnev’s word. These Soviet programs, even during a time of alleged strategic stability, may be rendered more comprehensible by the fact that the U.S.S.R. well realized that the United Sates itself was proceeding with new nuclear weapons program. Soviet authorities are cognizant that this "vicious circle of action and reaction . . . inevitably leads to an arms race."³⁹ The Soviet fear, corresponding to a similar American perception, is that if the other side alone continues its efforts to improve its forces, it could achieve a military-technical breakthrough and obtain a significant military advantage.⁴⁰ Thus, to the Soviets, the "qualitative arms race" and "new channels" of nuclear weaponry are technological realities that preclude long-term stability.

The Political Utility
of Nuclear Weapons

American analysis of the political utility of strategic nuclear capabilities is for the most part limited to their deterrent capability vis-à-vis a Soviet attack on the United States or, through linkage to the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal, on Europe. American strategists rarely consider the utility of strategic nuclear weapons as an influence on national activities outside the immediate context of the American-Soviet nuclear relationship. At least in part, this is the result of the American view of strategic issues as intercontinental in scope and primarily concerned with military affairs. It is a narrow viewpoint and one which, to a great extent, influences United States leaders to ignore the wider perspective from which Soviet leaders view these issues.

To the Soviet leaders, both military and civilian, their attainment of nuclear parity with the United States marked the beginning of a new age, one in which the fundamental structure of international relations had been altered. Indeed, all Soviet authorities recognize the attainment of nuclear parity and perhaps as important, the American recognition and acceptance of parity as one of the three major shifts in the "international correlation of forces" that has occurred in this century. This shift, in the Soviet view, was not caused solely by the fact that the Soviet Union had finally acquired after almost thirty years of effort, a truly credible deterrent to a potential American first strike on the Soviet homeland. Such a view would merely have reflected the U.S. conception of strategic nuclear weapons as being the dominating factor only in the context of the Soviet-American nuclear relationships. Rather, the shift emanated from the fact that for the first time, because of nuclear parity, the United States was forced (from the Soviet view-point) to consider the Soviet position on all issues in the international arena and adjust its policies accordingly.

To be sure, this Soviet linkage of strategic nuclear capabilities to other international issues is not new. For example, during the early years of the American involvement in Vietnam, Soviet analysts of American global strategy implied that the United States was actively engaged in a worldwide counterrevolutionary campaign carried out under the protection of American nuclear supremacy.⁴¹ The logical corollary of this argument was that that campaign would end when nuclear supremacy was eliminated. Indeed, from the Soviet perspective, this is what transpired. American inaction during the last days of the Republic of Vietnam, during conflicts in Angola and on the Horn of Africa, during the strife in Iran, and during the Nicaraguan revolution have been regularly and specifically attributed to the growth of Soviet military capabilities, particularly intercon-

tinental nuclear forces. There can be little doubt, then, that the U.S.S.R. sees its strategic nuclear forces and the attainment of parity as being a significant factor, if not the dominant factor, inhibiting U.S. global initiatives which may otherwise have been undertaken to arrest and reverse trends and events that the United States viewed as unfavorable to its interests.

Parity, in its political impact as seen from the Kremlin, not only inhibits American initiatives but permits Soviet initiatives to support trends and events which it deems "progressive". Shortly after the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1972, Pravda exclaimed "the more powerful our Motherland becomes, the more opportunities it acquires to influence the course of world events in a direction favorable to the peoples."⁴² This refrain has been echoed frequently since then and has been used to rationalize Soviet aid and support to the MPLA in Angola and the Dergue in Ethiopia, among other places.⁴³

The political impact of nuclear capabilities is, then, in the Soviet view, considerable and may perhaps even supersede the impact of providing the Soviet Union with a credible deterrent against an American first strike. The attainment of nuclear parity in particular is seen as inhibiting the attainment of American foreign policy objectives even while it abets the attainment of Soviet foreign policy objectives. And it is in the light of these observations that the apparent internal Soviet disagreement over the question of the desirability of nuclear superiority may perhaps be best understood. With superiority, proponents of the position may argue, the political processes that parity enhances would accelerated. Opponents, on the other hand, may argue that striving for superiority would bring a response from the United States in developing new weapon systems that would reverse the positive political processes recently begun. In either case, at the very least, the Soviet perspective on the political utility of nuclear weapons is that it is considerable and, as long as parity at worst is maintained, favorable to the U.S.S.R.

What, then, may be concluded about Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance? Given the understanding that there are sufficient grounds to believe the Soviet and American leaders may view strategic issues from different points of departure, the following conclusions may be stated:

• Soviet leaders believe the current levels and capabilities of the respective nuclear arsenals are approximately equal; because of qualitative improvements and new weapon systems, they do not believe this situation will necessarily persist and do not accept Western viewpoints of "strategic stability" on a long-term basis.

• Soviet leaders believe that the "American threat" is increasing in both political and military-technical context.

• Soviet leaders do not want nuclear war; they believe that if one does occur, they must place the U.S.S.R. in a position where it could possibly survive and be victorious. There are no indications that they equate survival with victory. There is no consensus within the Soviet elite as to whether such a war could be survived or won.

• Because of the aforementioned lack of consensus, it is probable that there is an ongoing debate in Soviet policymaking circles concerning mutual assured destruction.

• The Soviet Union has adopted publicly a comprehensive targeting posture, although it is reasonable to assume that other targeting postures also exist.

• Soviet leaders accept the concept of deterrence.

• Soviet leaders are cognizant of the political utility of nuclear weapons, and, with their broader conception of strategic: issues, they believe that nuclear parity provides the U.S.S.R. with increased opportunities for global activism and at the same time dissuades the United States of similar initiatives. In Soviet eyes, strategic parity as it is defined in the United States is advantageous to Soviet global objectives.

1. Dimitri K. Simes, "Détente, Russian-Style," Foreign Policy, Fall 1978, p. 48.

2. For further discussion of these points and for a discussion of the problems Soviet analysts of American strategic policy face, see Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Fall 1978, pp. 141-43.

3. For a few of these examples, see David W. Paul, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia: A Theory and a Case Study." International Studies Quarterly, June 1971, pp. 164-65; Vernon V. Aspaturian, "International Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System," in Vernon V. Aspaturian, editor, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971), pp 491-551; Wolfgang Leonhard. "The Domestic Politics of the New Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, October 1973, pp. 59-74; Samuel B. Payne, Jr., "The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation: 1968-72," Soviet Studies, January 1975. pp. 27-45; Edward L. Warner III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 116-57; Daniel McGovern, "Socio-Economic ‘Interest Groups’ and the Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy," American Economist, Fall 1977, pp. 49-58; and Dina Spechler, "Elite Images and Soviet Foreign Policy," Soviet Union, vol. 5, no. 1, 1978, pp. 36-73.

4.The existence of the Soviet Defense Council was first specifically revealed by Krasnaia Zvezda, on April 7, 1976. It has since been formalized by the Brezhnev Constitution with the Supreme Soviet approving its composition.

5. Ermarth, pp. 146-47

6. A.A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State (Moscosw: Voenizdat, 1975), translated by the U 5. Air Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 279-81. See also N. A. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Moscow; Voenizdat, 1973), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington; Government Printing Office 1977), pp.135-41.

7. See The Military Balance 1978-1979 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978); and John M. Collins, American and Soviet Military Trends since the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington: Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1978), p. 75- 124.

8. R.J. Rummel, "Will the Soviet Union Soon Have a First Strike Capability?" Orbis, Fall 1976, pp. 579-94, and Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, July 1977, pp. 21-34

9. See, for example, Pravda, January 19, 1977, February 23, 1977, and April 26, 1978.

10. Pravda, February 11, 1978, and Krasnaia Zveda, September 15, 1978.

11. Krasnaia Zveda, September 15, 1978. See also Grechko, p. 274.

12. For a discussion of Moscow’s fears of these "tactical-strategic" forces, see M. A. Mil’shteyn and L. S Semeyko, "The Limitation of Strategic Armaments, Problems and Perspectives," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, ldeologiia, December 1974, pp. 6-12. For a more recent discussion of these concerns, see Pravda, February 11, 1978.

13. "Statement of the Soviet Side, May 17, 1972," in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander SALT: The Moscow Agreement and Beyond (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 307.

14. Ibid.

15. New York Times, October 29, 1977, p. 3.

16. See articles by Walter Pincus in Washington Post, January 1979.

17. For Soviet statements on the cruise missile, see Krasnaia Zvezda, April 21, 1977; and Sovetskaia Rossiia, June 1, 1977.

18. Pravda, January 31, 1974.

19. D. Proektor, "Socialism and International Security," Kommunist, May 1977, translated in Joint Publications Research Service 69251, pp. 141-42.

20. Krasnaia Zvezda, September 15, 1978; and V. Konovalov, Leninist Ideas of the Defense of Socialism in Action," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, November 1975, pp. 9-22.

21. D. Ustinov, "On Guard of Revolutionary Achievements, Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, November 1977, pp 5-8.

22. KGB Chief Yuri Andropov, speaking in August 1978, intimidated that President Carter fit into a category between "realists" and "unrealists." See Soviet World Outlook, August 1978, pp 5-7.

23. For a few of the numerous examples, see Pravda, June 9, 1977, October 14, 1977, February 11, 1978, August 6, 1978, and October 31, 1978.

24. Pravda, July 16, 1978, July 23, 1978, and August 6, 1978

25. For a typical Soviet response to the so-called "Schlesinger Doctrine," see M. A. Mil’shteyn and L. S Semeiko, ‘"The Problem of the Inadmissibility of a Nuclear Conflict," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia, November 1974, pp. 3-12.

26. Krasnaia Zvezda, April 21, 1977, Nedlya, April 1977, FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union), April 15, 1977, p. AA2; and Sovetskaia Rossiia, June 1, 1977.

27. Pravda, April 14, 1977.

28. Center for Defense Information, The Defense Monitor, July 1977, p.8.

29. See, for example, Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, April 1972, translated in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 56087, p. 32; and Ye. Rybkin, "The Leninist Conception of Contemporary War," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, October 1973, translated in JPRS 60667, pp.8-9. Even statement that war has ceased to be a continuation of politics as it was defined in Clausewitz’s time, which appeared in a recent edition of Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia, may be interpreted as referring to the applicability of war as an instrument of policy (as Clausewitz maintained war must be) rather than to be the fundamental relationship between war and politics. See N.I. Lebedev, "Great October and the USSR’s Struggle for Disarmament and the Contemporary State, "Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia, March-April 1977, p. 9.

30. A significant exception is Admiral A. Gontayev, who has argued that the view that "surprise is mainly associated with an attack on us by an enemy" is incorrect. A. Gontayev, Surprise as an Element of Naval Art," Morskoi Shornik, March 1973, p. 30.

31. Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (Westport, Conneticut: Greenwood, 1976), pp. 70-132; and Warner, pp. 86-89, pp. 251-59.

32. Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army (Moscow: Progress, 1972), p. 30; Konovalov, pp. 9-22; and Krasnaia Zvezda, February 7, 1974.

33. Proektor, pp. 141-42; V.M. Berezhkov, "Basic Principles of Soviet-US Relations," SShA; Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia, April 1977, p. 1: and V. Dolgin, "Peaceful Coexistence and the Factors Contributing to Its Intensification and Development," Voprosy filosofii, January 1974, p. 64.

34. Ermarth, p. 145.

35. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," International Security, Summer 1978, p. 143; Leon Gouré et al., The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), p. 35; and Warner, p.149.

36. Berezhkov, pp. 8-9.

37. See, for example, Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia, vol. 2 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), p. 253; and M. Gladko and B. Ivanov, "The Economic and Military Technological Policy," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, May 1972, p. 12.

38. Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92^d Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 393.

39. Iu. Kostko, "Military Confrontation and the Problem of Peace in Europe," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniia, September 1972, p. 20.

40. For one Soviet statement of this fear, see G. Arbatov, World Marxist Review, February 1974, p. 61.

41. For various explicit and implicit references to this linkage, see E. Konovalov, "Military-Colonial Strategy of Imperialism," Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn, December 1965, pp. 39-48, V. Matveev, "Aggressive actions of American Imperialism," Kommunist, June 1965, pp. 94-102; and A. Sovetov, "Aggressive Policy of American Imperialism," Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn, September 1965, pp. 85-89.

42. Pravda, July 23, 1972.

43. See, for example, Izvestiia, December 26, 1975, and January 10, 1976; and V. Pustov, "The Battle of Angola," New Times, February 1976, p. 8.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor