Air University Review , September-October 1980

A Response

Major Charles W. Specht

MAJOR Leslie J. Hamblin's article in support of the indirect strategic approach is only one of several related articles that have recently appeared in this journal. And all of these articles, to some extent, misconstrue the argument for grounding NA TO strategy on firepower/attrition doctrine. Thus, my purpose here is to clarify my position and offer some additional comments on forward defense and deterrence.

William S. Lind, one of the leading critics of present NATO strategy, distinguishes between firepower/attrition and maneuver in these terms:

According to firepower/attrition doctrine, the object of military action is physical destruction of the enemy. This is not the object of maneuver doctrine, where firepower is used only when necessary to create opportunities for maneuver.¹

In short, advocates of the indirect approach emphasize maneuver over destruction, but I support the opposite concept. The heart of the argument is whether maneuver is more likely to lead to victory than attrition.

Major Hamblin quotes Clausewitz to emphasize that the "will of the enemy must be subdued," and he implies that advocates of firepower/attrition doctrine ignore the psychological dimension of warfare so central to Liddell Hart's thought. But what is the best method of subduing the enemy's will? Advocates of maneuver doctrine believe that creation of "surprising and dangerous operational or strategic situations" can destroy the enemy's will.² But I believe that substantial destruction of the enemy's forces is still the only sure road to victory:

There is one thing that is clear to all of us-if you can annihilate your enemy, you will be successful in combat. The ability to outmaneuver your enemy does not necessarily lead to the same conclusion.³

Major Hamblin points out that Clausewitz admits a variety of means, not only attrition, to destroy the enemy's will. But the argument that firepower/attrition is the surest way to accomplish this objective does not deny that maneuver can also contribute indirectly by disrupting "operations to generate confusion, disorder, panic, and chaos"⁴ and directly by positioning firepower to destroy the enemy. It is not a matter of choosing between maneuver and attrition. Maneuver should enhance attrition because "modern armies and states are too resilient to be defeated by psychological means alone; their destruction must be more literal."⁵

And contrary to Major Hamblin's view, support of the firepower/attrition doctrine is not synonymous with support for forward defense. It is not necessary to stand and slug it out with a superior force because maneuver is a primary element of firepower/attrition doctrine. The decision to use forward defense is political; therefore, NATO strategy must reflect political reality until the Federal Republic modifies its position. The challenge is to build the best military strategy within existing political constraints.

Furthermore, any reformulation of NATO strategy must involve an analysis of its impact on deterrence, a consideration thus far largely ignored. As shown clearly in Major Hamblin's discussion, the Soviets expect to achieve victory only after "a great expenditure of material" and" mass losses of troops and equipment"; and Soviet doctrine states that the "task of every operation and battle is the destruction of the enemy. . . ." If attrition and victory are synonymous in the minds of the Soviets, would a NATO strategy based on the indirect approach and maneuver provide a credible deterrent? The credibility of our deterrent would not depend on our faith in a maneuver doctrine. We would still have the difficult job of convincing the Soviets of its efficacy, and it is "difficult to show that we can be victorious in battle simply by out-maneuvering our enemy."⁶ In seeking to influence Soviet perceptions, NATO would have a more credible deterrent if it retained a doctrine of attrition rather than a doctrine of maneuver.

But present NATO strategy is confused. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, has been criticized for not reflecting any clear doctrine,⁷ and there are myriad ideas on how to use tactical air power. A consistent strategy must be developed that integrates air and land operations. Any new plan should be based on firepower/attrition doctrine as the surest way to deter or win, and it must reflect the Federal Republic's concept of forward defense until that government can be convinced to support a more enlightened policy. Furthermore, while we do not have to match the Soviets tank for tank, we must narrow the quantitative gap by procuring the systems that best support our ideas on how to fight. Finally, NATO planners should resist the temptation to substitute a risky strategy of maneuver for the more difficult task of resolving the problems resulting from the policies of forward defense and limited defense budgets.

1. William S. Lind. "Military Doctrine. Force Structure. and the Defense Decision-Making Process," Air University Review, May-June 1979, p. 22.

2. Ibid.

3. Lt. Col. Donald L. Hutchinson, "Responsibility for Defense," Air University Review, January-February 1980, p. 102.

4. Lt. Gen. Raymond B. Furlong, "Strategymaking for the 1980's," Parameters, March 1979, p. 14.

5. Russell F. Weigley, "A Response," Air University Review, November-December 1979, p. 80.

6. Hutchinson, p. 102.

7. Weigley, p. 80.

Major Charles W. Specht, USAF, is a C-5 pilot assigned to the 75th Military Airlift Squadron, Travis Air Force Base, California.

A Response

John F. Sloan

IN RESPONDING to this dialogue, I feel there is little value in windmill flailing at one another's primary points; but there is value in broadening the areas of discussion, defining terms precisely, and surveying the number of options available. To Messrs. Specht, Lind, Furlong, and now Hamblin we owe thanks for getting the fire started. Now it is time to stoke it up and properly heat the structure. Pardon the metaphor, but it is more valid than not.

The following points need clarification prior to further discussion:

1. A broader definition of strategy is necessary. Strategic means more than just a count of our intercontinental weapons inventory. In fact, I consider the Soviet effort through SALT to reinforce the misconception that strategy is limited to such weapons to be a master stroke of their deception apparatus. Furthermore, I maintain that the indirect approach is synonymous with strategy. The direct approach may be a policy, but it is surely no strategy worthy of the name. It is no accident that strategy and stratagem stem from the same Greek word, and both refer to the essential business of the strategus, the leader of the people.

2. Several of your commentators have criticized the U.S. "low combat power per man" circumstances. This idea needs expansion. Considering the civilian industrial plant as the analogous user of capital and labor, we would consider a capital-intensive industry to be one in which the manpower to machine ratio is low, but only if the ratio of labor cost to machine cost was also low. It does no good to bring in more machines if the costs of training skilled workers exceeds the returns from the more sophisticated machines. In the military context the analogous counterpart of the machine is firepower, not a weapon as such. It is firepower that does the work. Thus, a capital-intensive military force will have a high firepower-per-man index, but again only if the firepower is in the hands of relatively inexpensively trained men. This fact was recognized very early by Soviet military theoreticians. They constantly strive to increase the firepower-per-man ratio and have achieved notable success in the effort. The key to this success has been their ability through clever engineering to increase this firepower with a minimum of increase in the level of training of the operators-with some exceptions such as the Sagger. The United States on the other hand is already facing a crisis brought on by the fielding of super-sophisticated weaponry with an even greater increase in the cost of training the operators.

By the way, I should point out that the Soviets spend a very much larger percentage of their military budget on development and fielding of hardware than do we. So in this sense, also, they have a much more capital-intensive force than does the United States.

The relationship of the military and society is reciprocal. Rather than adapt the military to society's weaknesses, it is time we addressed those weaknesses that sap military capability and design a military force that will help restrengthen our society. In this context universal military service should be considered with emphasis on all three words. To some the proposal to use the military structure in a conscious effort to shape society will sound shocking. However, this is already a major factor in U.S. military policy formulation. The military is constantly the plaything of decisions made on sociological or political grounds unrelated to defense considerations. Thus, base closings, procurement contracts, racial and sexual programs, etc., mayor may not contribute to national defense.

Another issue previously mentioned is that the U.S. can become more capital-intensive by reorienting our national strategy from land power to sea power. It may be true that by adopting a sea power strategy we would redress the "U.S.-Soviet capital expenditure gap." This sounds like an argument to spend capital for its own sake. Who cares if we integrate our defense structure with a capital-intensive society by building sea power if the majority of the threat is on land? Calls to rely on sea power strike me as isolationist panaceas based on unwillingness to confront the danger where it lies--namely, inside the fabric of society in dozens of nations around the world. Granted, we do need to build up our sea power, but not because it is capital-intensive. Rather we need it as one component, along with the ability to project power on land, in order to influence events on land.

3. The American way of war is also important to continuing this discussion. Strategy, indirect approach, capital-intensive warfare, manpower-minimal tactics, and conflict theories can all be irrelevant if they do not fit the national mode. I quite agree that the U.S. military has historically conducted its business without a clear theory of what it is about. This is in general the American way, i.e., just do things without worrying about why. Once again, I must point to the contrasting Soviet situation in which an elaborate theory is developed to support every field of action. But the U.S. failure to conceptualize its actions does not mean theories of conflict were not already well known to military leaders even in ancient times.

I have had the pleasure of listening to Colonel Boyd's formal presentation twice and of discussing his ideas with him on several other occasions and do not want to denigrate his efforts in any way. However, I believe the facts that he gained his insight as a result of are relatively recent (in his career) self-tutoring; and the fact that his concept is taken as something of a revelation by so many senior officers speaks volumes about the abysmal ignorance of military history of our "professional" military services. He is actually restating the most fundamental of concepts firmly grasped by even second-rate leaders throughout history and second nature to the great captains.

War is above all a psychological activity that takes place in and for the minds of the participants. As such, it is being waged full tilt at the present moment on a worldwide basis. Much of our national security problem stems from the leaders' failure to realize that we are even in such a war. The Soviets are already inside our "decision cycle," confronting us with one unexpected situation after another and eliciting a combination of inappropriate responses and resigned acceptances of defeat.

Of course, war is psychological. Any examination of the activities of the Assyrians let alone the Greeks will show this, and Professor Turney High demonstrated that primitive man also was fully conversant with the principles of psychological warfare. I ascribe our unwillingness to understand this or to recognize the need for strategies based on this to our stubborn refusal to overthrow the prevailing Rousseauistic conception of the purity and goodness of man which underlies so much of the established American world view. Thus, we still have the most contorted apologetics being offered by national policymakers to explain Soviet behavior in Afghanistan.

The psychological manipulation of the U. S. public through the use of prisoners of war and hostages is a typical example of the warfare going on now. However, psychological warfare is not just explicit psywar activity but the psychological dimension of all activity. Widespread recognition that war does have a psychological dimension has been responsible for the massive proliferation since World War II of psychological warfare theories, studies, and schemes; but the questionable results to date indicate a lack of understanding of what the content should be. It seems safe to assert that Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Caesar, among many, knew more about psychological warfare than our Ph.D.-armed psywarriors today.

Along with the fact that war is a psychological activity, we should recognize that deception is one of its principal characteristics--again the link between strategy and stratagem. The United States attitude toward war, demonstrated again in recent books on World War II, has been that deception is somehow dirty business. For the Russians, like Caesar or Genghis Khan, deception is of the essence in warfare; while Americans generally assume, like Louis IX or Richard I, that main force will do the job, and trickery is unchivalrous.

4. I am led to several suggestions that I need to make at this point. We need to formulate an offensive policy (and the strategies to implement it) of our own which would include a technological dimension designed to change the very nature of the battlefield itself. Let us force the Soviets to compete on our terms on an entirely new battlefield. For instance, rather than try to outproduce the Soviets in sophisticated tanks, let's make the tank itself irrelevant.

The concept of national security through technological superiority is a chimera. The diffusion of military technology across national boundaries has almost always been too rapid for any state to gain more than a fleeting advantage from the introduction of new technology. The only example of prolonged and pronounced technological superiority that comes to mind is that of Western Europe and Russia in general over the Asian, African, and American peoples during the resulting age of colonialism. But states having relatively equal socioeconomic levels have not succeeded in maintaining military superiority through technology. Psychological superiority sufficient to achieve victory in battle is a much more attainable goal.

While technology has not varied significantly among states, it has had variations in content of sufficient significance to affect all the states of a given era. This variation has been between essentially offensive and defensive technologies. When offensive (mobility enhancing) technologies were ascendant, states achieved expansion at the expense of others that were technically equal but psychologically weaker. However, when defensive (mobility inhibiting) technology prevailed, states contracted and proliferated as each local center of power was able to defend itself.

We must assume that any technology we develop will also be employed by the U.S.S.R Then the problem becomes one of developing technologies that will enhance our ability to achieve our objectives but will not be of material assistance to the U.S.S.R even if adopted. We must seek technological superiority not just in an overall sense but by focusing it to support a particular strategy. This, for instance, is why technologies for antiballistic missiles would favor the U.S. far more than the U.S.S.R, hence the Soviet eagerness to block our development of them.

In considering technology and its relation to mobility, one needs to make a distinction between tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The offense and defense and the relative mobility associated with each are achieved by different technological means at each of these levels. Furthermore, the national interests of the U.S. and U.S.S.R in mobility at the three levels are also different.

In the present situation, U.S. and NATO national objectives require high mobility at the strategic level to enable us to deploy forces rapidly throughout the world. Development of the technology to achieve this objective is essential. However, it would be of only marginal value to the U.S.S.R as it projects its power overseas. through different means and for different purposes.

At the tactical level there is a standoff. Both sides have the same objectives resulting in similar technological requirements, namely a mix of offensive and defensive measures to allow the soldier to move and survive on the battlefield.

But at the operational level there is a clear divergence in objectives sufficient to generate differences in technological requirements. A Soviet offensive campaign in Western Europe would be based on achievement of a high (unprecedented) level of operational mobility. The NATO defender who seeks merely to hold his territory, not conquer Eastern Europe, can do so with a minimum of operational level mobility. Thus, if NATO developed technological means that could be used to reduce enemy operational mobility to near zero, such technology would be of relatively little value to the U.S.S.R even if they copied it. There are several weapon systems currently under development that have exactly this effect. However, I believe their development is coincidental, not consciously planned to achieve the purpose indicated, since we are also developing systems which enhance operational mobility and when copied by the Soviets will only result in a net gain for them. Moreover, in building them the Kama River truck factory, we gave them the largest single boost to their operational mobility imaginable.

FINALLY, rather than merely rely on capital-intensive force and weapons structure (even using the firepower rather than cost concept for capital), we need to establish a policy of fundamentally altering the nature of the battlefield to render Soviet forces obsolete. Rather than follow a socioeconomic policy to adapt our military forces to increasingly unfavorable social conditions, we must have a policy for altering those conditions to enable our society to generate maximum defense capability. Rather than focus merely on the psychological aspects of the violent battlefield phase of conflict, we should recognize that psychological warfare is continuous. We are being defeated in this war right now to such an extent that the battlefield phase may not even occur. The Soviet formula for conquest has been stated most succinctly by Dr. Fred Schwarz: "External encirclement, plus internal demoralization, plus thermonuclear blackmail, leads to progressive surrender." Rather than focus only on institutional arrangements within the military designed to raise the intellectual level of the officer corps, we must take steps to educate the public and our national leadership in the realities of the world in which conflict is endemic, and complacency is a prescription for eventual slavery.

John F. Sloan is Managing Editor of History, Numbers, & War, Springfield, Virginia.

A Response

Dr. Phillip M. Flammer

I MUST progress from several ideas to more specific thoughts in order to respond adequately to the range of ideas and concepts Major Hamblin presents in his thesis.

From within the upper realms of modern U. S. military theory and strategy--particularly at the level of grand and nuclear strategy--a melancholy fact emerges: As a rule, the highly educated, easily articulate civilian theorists who enter this arena of uncertainty and speculation lack the extensive experience and familiarity with military matters that best serves to distinguish between what is militarily practical and what is not. At the same time, highly experienced, action-oriented U.S. military and naval officers almost invariably lack the combination of inclination, ability, and time to probe the societal, political, and economic factors essential to the formulation of sound theory. As a rule, they are unable to criticize civilian theorists effectively or present cogent and articulate arguments why a particular theory or proposal mayor may not be acceptable. Put another way, a broad chasm exists between the theoretical and the practical. At present, that chasm is too wide for either side, operating from its particular perspectives and capabilities, to bridge the gap. This is important to understand as we work to build a new concept of war or as we delve into alternative approaches.

Let's look at some of the basics in these several arguments. We obviously need to do more with less but without arguing against social mores and societal factors which are very difficult to modify. For example, the American society demanded and got the volunteer army which, in turn, carried heavy costs. We must appreciate this point and remember that any reduction in force could perhaps be offset by maximizing the "impact of technology and capital equipment" and by maintaining a "very rapid cycle for developing and fielding new weapons." In so doing, however, we invoke highly theoretical and potentially dangerous assumptions about the adequacy of U. S. force structure. The German experience in World War II, it will be recalled, has much to say about the hazards of an excessive search for new weapons at the expense of proven ones. By the same token, the ongoing U.S. experience with modern weapons has much to say about the astonishing and often unpredictable costs of moving advanced technology through "known unknowns" let alone "unknown unknowns." It is quite possible that hasty movements in this direction may not reduce costs at all, nor are they likely to avoid the temptations and multiple dangers of taking risky shortcuts. If Admiral Gorshkov's maxim that "the best is the enemy of the good" has meaning, it would do well to remember that the admiral, like the Russian space scientists, could speak authoritatively about the possible consequences of hasty money and/or timesaving shortcuts.

Another issue we need to address is that many of those, including Hamblin, who advocate new theories fall back on Colonel John Boyd's highly theoretical approach to combat. If Boyd's lengthy and complicated thesis is indeed the only major improvement in understanding the nature of combat beyond the stone age level, it is not nor should it be acceptable as such at this point. Certain ambiguities remain to be resolved. For example, saying that the F-86 won over the MiG-15 in Korea because it could more easily transition from one maneuver to another begs the issue of pilot skill, a factor no experienced pilot would dare ignore. The German use of the blitzkrieg does support Boyd's thesis up to a point. There is question beyond that point, however, for Colonel Boyd fails to mention that the well-thought out "tactics of space and gap" worked only under certain circumstances and rarely succeeded against forces aware of what was happening and which took measures against the blitz. Moreover, Boyd's apparent unwillingness to condense his performance or accept freewheeling criticism of it indicates that he too may have misgivings. In any event, while Boyd's thesis is excellent in some areas and may well be viable in others, to accept it at face value at this point would be foolhardy in the extreme.

It is suggested here that the U.S. military establishment itself may be a strong force mitigating against change in direction and that perhaps a look at the structure would be beneficial. Every institution could use updating and streamlining, and the U.S. military may well be near the top of the list. But once again the theoretical clashes with the practical. There are some very solid reasons why military institutions are remarkably similar across time and cultures, the main one being that military purposes remain unusually constant. Thus, while there is much justice in our dissatisfaction with internal problems and the often detrimental effect of such things as interservice rivalry, careerism, and the promotion game, hasty renovations may do more harm than good. Existing rank structure in the U.S. Armed Forces, for example, while better than most, causes plenty of heartburn. Still, no balanced army has ever been effective without an effective rank structure. The very nature of military activity, in or out of combat, requires it; and rank cannot be separated from pay, prestige, and hence competition. Under the circumstances, some careerism is unavoidable, and it is highly unlikely that careerism, among other things, could be rooted out without negating the effectiveness of the armed forces.

To conclude I must add that part of our anxiety with high-level military strategy should stem from the fact that neither the civil theorist group nor the military establishment is presently able to bridge the chasm between the theoretical and the practical. To do that, both sides need to broaden their perspectives. Whatever reasons either side may have for not doing so, until that broadening takes place, we are in constant danger of trying to correct one defect with another, which could well be the most dangerous strategy there is.

Phillip M. Flammer (Lt. Col., USAF, Ret; Ph.D., Yale) is military historian at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, and recently served on the faculty of Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

A Response

William S. Lind

MAJOR HAMBLIN'S article is well-written, and its main point is valid; we must be prepared to move east. However, two major questions should be raised:

- What do the Soviets mean by "destruction"? Is it piece-by-piece, man-by-man destruction, or destruction of the unit as a cohesive and functioning entity? The Review debate on firepower/attrition versus maneuver has been plagued by use of the one term, destruction, to mean both, when they are very different.

- Is the standard CIA/DIA picture of the threat "steamroller" doctrine, which Major Hamblin presents, outdated and incorrect? A number of analysts, including Dr. Steven Canby and German intelligence, argue that the Soviets now use a "flexible reinforcement" system rather like the German system in World War II. The breakthrough is made be the first echelon using Lücken and Flächentaktik, shifting the (multiple) axes of advance in response to opportunities (which the "active defense" provides in large quantity). The second echelon is now just the consolidation force. If these analysts are right, the whole current Army/Air Force scheme of focusing on the second echelon is useless.

These questions should be thought about and discussed.

William S. Lind is Legislative Assistant to Senate Armed Services Committee.

A Response

Major James M. Simpson

HAMBLIN raises the issue of the weakness inherent in our basic strategic position in Europe and the defensive doctrine which supports that strategic posture. In other words, he takes exception to a position that most writers accept as an assumption either overtly or implicitly, in which we are tied to a forward defense that eschews both the defense in depth and defense through tactical offense.

Granted, the article deals with other issues--attrition/annihilation or maneuver, to cite the obvious; but the salient one is that it questions the basic factors which underlie the defense of Europe in its currently accepted form. The point needed raising and now that it has been raised, we should go to work on it.

Major James M. Simpson is Director of Military Studies, United States Air Force Academy.

A Response (A Second Thought)

John F. Sloan

MY FIRST response, like Major Hamblin's, was directed at what I perceived to be a confusion over means and ends. I think we have adequately explored that so now I want to address Hamblin's work specifically.

- I agree with' his characterization of Soviet offensive plans and the inadequacy of our current methods of dealing with it, either via position warfare or the shallow, on-battlefield maneuver.

- I agree with his view that NATO's agreeing, in effect, to conduct the battle on its own territory is suicidal.

- I agree that neither the attrition nor maneuver ideas as commonly held are adequate and that the will of the enemy is the correct target. Psychological warfare is the key.

- I disagree with the reference to Liddell Hart when speaking of the indirect approach. Why does everyone think he invented this just because he wrote about it?

- Above all, I wholeheartedly agree that NATO must develop and display the capability to carry the war deep into the Warsaw Pact territory. This can be done by creating a fortified zone along the entire border, capable of causing significant delay and prior massing of the attacker. This would allow the border to be defended by far fewer troops on the front line. The rest would then be used to create an operation-level counterattack force (not tactical-level, please) capable of conducting sustained operations in East Europe clear to Warsaw (not just Berlin).

IN ADDITION, we should create significant numbers of joint German/U.S. special forces units capable of generating widespread uprisings in East Germany.

- Furthermore, we must reduce our vulnerability to surprise by manning the frontier defense adequately, by dispersing the POMCUS and supply bases, by creating many more multiple air bases, by deploying cruise missiles widely, and by improving redundant command and control nets. The Air Force in particular must reduce its vulnerability to surprise attack and must develop realistic plans for assured basing of the reinforcing units to be deployed from CONUS.

- While Major Hamblin has the right approach to the battlefield problem in the event of war, consideration of the indirect approach and psychological war should generate awareness that the real Soviet threat is to use these to preclude a shooting war from ever starting. Their objective is to destroy our will to fight without having to do so. And conversely, if we would only wake up, we would see that our most powerful weapons are exactly the same. Properly used, the indirect approach and psychological warfare employed right now by the United States could not only prevent the Soviets from obtaining sufficient assurance to attack but also generate internal disruption capable of destroying their system without war. In my opinion the "really better way to win a war in Europe" is to do it right now (we must first admit to ourselves that the real war is already under way) by using psychological warfare, backed with economic and political weapons, to regain the initiative from the Soviets and go on to break up their system.

And may I have the last thought on war, strategy, and ends versus means? Let's start at the end and work backward. The single objective in war is victory. This is achieved by obtaining the acquiescence of the enemy to your objectives. This acquiescence is a psychological phenomenon generated in the relevant decision-makers, be they one or many. It is achieved by force which deprives the opponent of the will to resist. How much of his means of resistance needs to be destroyed before his will is destroyed is a highly variable commodity. But presumably, at least, a significant portion of his means must be destroyed. Destruction in this context means rendered hors de combat, not necessarily killed. There are two principal approaches to achievement of the necessary destruction of the enemy. Both have the same objective--victory through needed destruction. They differ not in attriting the enemy but in the willingness to suffer friendly attrition in the process. The so-called "indirect approach" strives for minimum friendly attrition, rather than for attrition on either side; while the direct approach, usually termed attrition strategy by these writers, connotes a willingness to take casualties. It is true that there are examples of campaigns in which the modest goal of wearing down the enemy was sought and other campaigns in which the more ambitious goal of his rapid total destruction was desired, but in both instances either direct or indirect approach might be used.

Thus, in Vietnam, our attrition strategy while using the direct approach resulted in high friendly losses which sapped our own will faster than the even higher enemy attrition sapped his. Whereas an indirect approach could have destroyed his means and will with few friendly casualties. In fact, the successful measures we occasionally used, such as harbor mining, were also attrition strategy but using indirect approaches. (In war we do not particularly care how many enemy casualties are sufficient for victory, but we do care, as do the Russians, about friendly casualties.) So, too, the FM 100-5 approach, which I also deplore, will result in a too-high friendly casualty rate even if achieving its hoped for higher enemy rate.

THESE are just a few of the specific issues with which I have varying degrees of disagreement. In spite of this, I agree with the main thrust of the discussion, that one way or another the U.S. and NATO are desperately in need of a strategic doctrine (practically any would be better than none) and a concerted policy to carry it out.

John F. Sloan is Managing Editor of History, Numbers, & War, Springfield, Virginia.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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