Air University Review , September-October 1980

The Credibility of
Fighter Squadron Supervisors

THE importance of effective leadership at the squadron level has been recognized from the earliest days of air power. During World War I and II, in Korea, and again in Vietnam, the crucial importance of experienced, tactically knowledgeable squadron commanders, squadron operations officers, and flight commanders was confirmed again and again. Nowhere has this been more true than in our fighter squadrons, where the amount of tactical knowledge and the high level of flying skill required for survival and success in combat have always put experience at a premium. But flying fighters was and is a game for the young. Since everyone cannot be experienced, the transmission of knowledge from a few respected squadron leaders, the "old heads," to a throng of "new guys" has always been the key to success. Our squadron leaders of the past could pass on their experience and their combat effectiveness to younger followers because they knew what they were doing and because their subordinates, having confidence in them, readily learned from them. This idea is summed up in the concept of credibility, a concept encompassing reliability, confidence, and the ability to project those qualities.

This issue of credible leadership at the squadron level is particularly important today due to a steady thinning of experience in the fighter force. The growing influx of inexperienced pilots into the tactical air force, led by a growing number of squadron-level leaders with limited tactical and combat backgrounds, gives cause for concern. If the credibility of squadron leadership in the fighter force is declining, as this would suggest, then the USAF must expect adverse effects on combat readiness, retention, and flight safety. The possible safety implications are readily apparent when we consider that during 1979, operations factor mishaps accounted for 72 percent of the destroyed aircraft. Fighter/attack aircraft accounted for the majority of these destroyed aircraft (75 percent), while flying approximately 30 percent of the USAF total flying time.¹ Combine the recent influx of inexperienced pilots into the tactical fighter force with the ever-increasing tactical responsibilities of today's wingman and it is clear that squadron supervision has to be strong.

DRAWING a comparison between the tactical fighter force of today and that of ten to fifteen years ago is sobering:

The U.S. Air Force that deployed to SEA in 1964 consisted of highly qualified personnel . . . . About 27 percent of the U.S. pilots were under 30; nearly half were over 36; therefore, the average fighter pilot was well seasoned with approximately eight to ten years of flying experience . . . prior to June 1966 over 50 percent of the fighter pilots had more than 2,000 total flying hours . . . .²

This experience "picture" in the sixties has changed so that in 1979 only 22.8 percent of our fighter/attack pilots (who flew that year) had over 1000 hours of fighter time.³

The demands on a fighter pilot's performance have grown considerably since the sixties and must be put into perspective. In this age of resource scarcity and technological complexity, a saturation level is being approached. Units are trying to get the most out of every mission and may be fast approaching more than an aircrew can handle. With ever-increasing weapon system complexities (i.e., Pave Spike, LORAN, Maverick, F-15 radar), at some point a saturation level will be reached. Continued operations within the present resource constraints necessitates a strong unit leadership. The differences between the "saturation inputs" to a fighter pilot of the past and a fighter pilot of the present are vividly depicted in the accompanying chart.

It is interesting to note that the escalation of enemy threat systems somewhat parallels the escalation of our fighter aircraft systems. This is not a coincidence. In order to accept the threat escalation as a given, then one must accept the existence of fighter systems that provide a capability against the threat. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the aircrew must know how to use these systems effectively to accomplish the mission, not to mention survive.⁴

In 1978, the Change Pace⁵ study outlined actions aimed at reversing the adverse mishap trends experienced during the 1976-78 time frame. This study, by the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center at Norton AFB, California, has been useful in identifying mishap factors during the original Change Pace period of 1 January 1977-30 June 1978 (period I) and the follow-on period of 1 July 1978-31 December 1979 (period II). A close examination of the findings relating to fighters reveals a number of pointed facts:

1. The number of operations-related mishaps (destroyed aircraft) has steadily increased since 1977 and is primarily driven by fighter/attack mishaps:

*All refers to all USAF aircraft mishaps versus just fighter/attack aircraft mishaps.

2. There was a marked increase in fighter operations-related mishaps between Change Pace periods I and II:

3. Two-thirds of all 1000 hours or more (1977-79); however:

-in 1977 and 1978, only 25.8 percent of fighter pilots had 1000 hours or more.
-in 1979, only 22.8 percent of fighter pilots had 1000 hours or more.

4. Thirty-two percent of the operations mishaps (all) during Change Pace period I involved pilots serving in supervisory or staff positions at or above the flight commander level.⁶

Mishaps are extreme consequences of deficiencies that are highly visible because of their obviously destructive and costly results; but what are the less visible degradations to combat readiness? What are the combat readiness impacts caused by supervisory personnel who do not meet the high standards required?

With full recognition that there is an increase in fighter operations mishaps, that the Air Force has a large influx of inexperienced tactical fighter pilots, and that the demands on these pilots have increased, it is obvious that the flight commander is a key supervisor in continuing to operate within the present resource constraints. One keen aspect of a flight commander's responsibility is to ensure that his flight aircrews do not exceed their saturation levels; it is a job of fine tuning an aircrew member's capabilities while ensuring that he does not exceed his limits. The multiple event proficiency level required of today's fighter pilot must be closely monitored to prevent overtasking, maximize combat effectiveness, and preclude an increase in accident potential. This is no easy task and one that necessitates command.

Command encompasses the overall authority, control, and coordination to accomplish the mission. The key objective is to get the optimum return from all aircrews; but tantamount to this objective is an informed awareness of the particular environment unique to any command. If command is indeed a concept based on a continuing attempt to attain a "condition of absolute certainty,"⁷ a leader must be knowledgeable of its parochial elements. A supervisor's knowledge of these elements is a definite factor in the subordinates' assessment of his credibility and his resulting authority.

In a peacetime Air Force, the focus of attention is too often on the administrative procedures of rules and regulations, the operational management of outlined training plans. This is a secure environment because the risks are minimized by the endless bureaucratic guidance on how to operate. Effective administration is critical to a well-run organization, but as it strives for uniformity, it also has a strong potential to initiate, motivate, and communicate. One sees a problem of credibility when there is an over-emphasis in administration because it is "safe" and its strong potential attributes are not expanded on. Flight commanders whose only effective responsibility is managing administrative paperwork are examples of squadron supervisors managing peacetime functions without being "managers of violence."⁸ When a nine-year captain with 200 hours of fighter time is made a flight commander, he can only be expected to resort to the things he knows about. How can he ensure that aircrews do not exceed their limits when he has limited experience in the multiroles of a fighter pilot?

The following paragraph, extracted from the minutes of a TAC aircrew conference, expresses the concern of many fighter pilots:

Others (those entering the tactical fighter force having never been identified with a fighter weapon system) are entering the T AF without fighter experience and limited tactical background. By virtue of rank, they are eligible for flight commander/supervisory positions. Additionally they are being placed in the newest weapons systems. These two factors are producing a great deal of resentment throughout the whole fighter force. Others feel unwelcome in T AC and are pressured to perform sooner than can be realistically el'pected.⁹

A deep problem exists with the first line of supervision in fighter squadrons. Relatively inexperienced flight commanders are a reality. In one F-15 wing, 33 of the 70 mission ready (MR) pilots were first assignment instructor pilots (FAIPs), and two of the three flight commanders in one of the squadrons were FAIPs. The following survey of four Tactical Air Force units supports this flight commander credibility problem.¹⁰

In addition to the decline in overall experience and increasing numbers of inexperienced flight commanders, it is not unusual to see a squadron commander or operations officer arrive at his new command noncurrent in the squadron's assigned aircraft.¹¹ A senior squadron supervisor who is noncurrent will probably have priorities in administration and old operational procedures (the way things used to be) rather than effect strategic decisions on his unit's mission. Additionally, with ever-increasing weapon system complexities (i.e., Pave Spike, LORAN, Maverick) and a relatively inexperienced fighter force, it is hard to imagine an individual who can lead a squadron while being upgraded in his aircraft, its weapons, current tactics, current threats, and theater operating procedures.

Senior leaders need to be qualified in their units weapon system, tactically aware, and familiar with local missions and conditions. Squadron commanders should be able to lead combat missions . . . . Upon arrival in a new unit, qualifications/requalification in the UE aircraft takes time and is often disrupted by requirements to perform a full schedule of unit management duties.¹²

With this understanding, it becomes obvious that a commander must be able to lead his men as soon as he assumes command, not six months later after a currency checkout (especially when squadron commander tours seem to average only one year). Credibility, in this regard, is not only necessary today, but, more important, it is vital. These same observations were shared by a Royal Air Force officer assigned to the Tactical Air Command in October 1979:

As an Exchange Officer, I tread with caution and respect on issues of leadership within my host service. However, recent HHQ comment on accident reports suggests that I am not alone in questioning the erosion of basic flight leadership principles. One reason may be that new supervisors, i.e., Wing/Squadron CC/DOs, etc., are given inadequate training prior to assuming their positions of command and leadership. This view is perceived by "Concerned Captains" and was reinforced at the recent TAF Training Review. With the complexity of modern weapons systems, is it sufficient to expect commanders to be able to "lead" effectively whilst short on professional knowledge? If this is begging the question, I make no apology for the analogy that RAF Wing/Squadron/Flight leaders are not only especially selected for their qualities of leadership in the air, but are expected to be fully up to speed before assuming command. For example, before assuming command of a Harrier squadron following a 2-year staff job, I completed 45 hours of refresher flying plus an 80 hour RTU course. The same will apply to my predecessor here at HQ TAC, now Group Captain Taylor, before he assumes command of the Jaguar Wing at RAF Bruggen. The price? A few more in the PIT. But what price leadership?¹³

In this era of scarcity, resources must be allocated to ensure that key squadron supervisors are competent, credible, and qualified. Supervisors must be able to lead by example. Discipline, whether self, flight, unit, etc., requires quality leadership that begins at the top and permeates the entire organization. All supervisors must display a positive attitude and lead by example. Emphasis must be placed on recognizing discipline as more than compliance with written directives. It encompasses an awareness of personal limits and parameters that must be cultivated rather than legislated. Supervisors must exercise their inherent responsibility to evaluate aircrew discipline, demonstrate their personal discipline, and cultivate a high level of discipline in subordinates. This "strategy" necessitates that supervisors lead by example on the ground and in the air.

There is a generally accepted premise in the tactical fighter force that a squadron commander does not have to be the "top stick" in the squadron. Without arguing the pros or cons of such a belief, one secondary effect of this principle is that this perception of the importance of flying skills has filtered down to the line supervisor and line jock. Squadron leaders manage situations in which people are involved; to be able to get subordinates to do what they want, they must know and be able to assign priorities to what they are doing. They must be able to lead, by personal example, in combat. A squadron commander, if he is not the "top stick," must have the credible skill to fly and be effective in the operational flight environment in which his squadron operates. Assigning to squadrons key personnel who are not current in the aircraft's role, mission, and tactics is asking for a credibility conflict.

The Manpower and Personnel Center (MPC) at Randolph AFB is responsible for the resolution of manning problems of the USAF. They may have one of the toughest jobs since they must stay within the limits of available manpower. Not only do they receive more than 900 inquiries/complaints a month and approve approximately 300 humanitarian reassignments a month, but now, given the increasing shortage of rated personnel, they can only man the rated levels of MAJCOMs at 91 percent during 1980.¹⁴ Brigadier General John T. Chain (Deputy Director of Plans, DCS/Operations, Plans, and Readiness) told Air Force Times, "The manning situation is expected to get worse . . . It could get as low as 86 or 87 percent."¹⁵

The distribution of rated personnel is further complicated because in sustaining a rated inventory of sufficient size and maintaining an experienced combat ready force, line units face problems of absorption. Absorption is the maximum number of new pilots that can be assigned so that unit experience levels are maintained at minimum objectives. In recognizing the real-time pilot shortage, increasing undergraduate pilot training slots will not solve the problem because a new pilot cannot fill experienced positions. The accompanying chart shows an example of a tactical fighter experience objective.¹⁶

In light of the rated shortages, it is important to understand what constitutes experienced. An experienced fighter pilot is one who has (this definition is used by AF/MPC):

-500 hours, Primary Aircraft Authorization (PM), formerly known as Unit Equipment (UE) or
-1000 hours, First Pilot/IP and 300 hours PM.

MPC assigns personnel who meet these experience criteria without considering how long they have been out of the cockpit or how current their experience. In addition, the unit, not MPC, decides if these experienced personnel will fill any of the middle management "blocked" positions. For example, the first F-15 unit examined in the earlier TAF survey had 5 out of 12 "blocked" flight commanders who did not even measure up to the minimum definition of experienced. Since MPC is assigning the correct ratio of experienced to inexperienced, two assumptions seem to be justified:¹⁷

1. In some cases, rank alone is determining the flight commander assignment.

2. The "experienced" personnel assigned against the blocked position may have been out of the cockpit for so long that they are not sufficiently qualified to fill the supervisory role, or they are outranked by "others."¹⁸

Although UPT rates have been increased to make up part of the pilot shortage, the absorption problem will minimize their impact on increasing the experience of units. The next recourse is to draw down the rated supplement. "The inventory of rated officers (pilots and navigators) available for nonrated duty is projected to decline from today's [i.e., 1979's] 5,100** to approximately 2,200 over the next 18 months."¹⁹ The immediate problem with this necessary action is that operational commands are reluctant to employ many of these more senior officers due to their grades and time away from operational duties. There are, however, no other resources available to fill rated crew and staff billets at levels necessary to maintain readiness commitment. The credibility crisis will be further compounded as these senior officers are rushed back to the cockpit. In turn, the morale of these officers could have a detrimental effect on units.

**Approximately 3000 as of 2 June 1980.

"Others," the inability of new pilots to fill in the bottom in line units, and the supplement drawdown will all combine with the pilot shortage to complicate the problem of maintaining the credibility of squadron supervision. The picture is not entirely bleak because there are some positive steps being taken. The following efforts are under way:

-Command-tailored surveys
-Retention/spread-the-word trips
-Information programs
-Aircrew scheduling improvements
-Additional duty reductions*
-Ancillary training reductions*
-Decentralization of decision-making *
-Officer effectiveness report modified
-Increased promotion to captain
-Senior support of service benefits
-Increased primary training commitment (UPT)
-Decreased advanced training commitment
-Increase in pilot training
-Voluntary recalls to active duty*

It is readily apparent that the primary focus of these efforts is directed at retention. In fact, only the asterisked items (*) could be argued as directly affecting the credibility problem described in this article. The point to be made is that the problem of credibility of fighter squadron supervisors needs to be examined head-on and not as a secondary offshoot while trying to solve the retention problem. Both issues of retention and credibility, although related in some areas, are serious enough for each to merit a concerted USAF effort.

A fighter squadron supervisor must be able to lead in combat. A squadron commander, operations officer, or flight commander must have the technical (credible) skill to fly and be effective in flight. Officers who have been selected for key supervisory positions (i.e., operations officer or squadron commander) should never arrive at their new base without a currency checkout. If the USAF followed the example of the Royal Air Force, an operations officer or squadron commander would be mission ready prior to accepting his command position. A disservice may be done to the individual selected as a supervisor (i.e., ruin his career by being fired) if we do not ensure that each supervisor has had as much opportunity to prepare himself for his command responsibility as possible. An externality after the firing of a supervisor (who was not properly prepared) is the disrupting effect on a squadron. The key point is that resources need to be allocated to ensure that fighter line supervision is credible and competent. The USAF may not be able to afford otherwise.

Often, one meets people who refer to a "new guy philosophy" or other variations of the phrase. Basically, it is an appreciation of the differences associated with each new job. Every leader must acquaint himself with the various elements of his position: the mission, people, and procedures. Depending on prior experience, there is a certain period of time required to make this adjustment. A supervisor with limited background as a fighter pilot or a supervisor who has not flown fighters for years is definitely in need of a transition period. Rated officers coming from staff positions (nonflying jobs) must be given a "new guy" lead-in period. A prospective flight commander should be selected from within the squadron where he has already established his credibility. Operations officers should have current experience in the theater of assignment, be current in the aircraft, and be allowed a period of adjustment to their new working situations. Squadron commanders should be current in the aircraft and allowed to meet with other squadron commanders in their assigned theater for cross talk prior to assuming command.

The following courses of action are recommended:

1. Reinforce credibility as a selection criterion for squadron supervisors. Senior ranking officers should be considered first for these positions, but if they have not established themselves as current and effective leaders in flight, the job should be given to the younger but credible officer, if only until the senior officer is given a lead-in period. Younger blood could compel the senior officer to be innovative in his claims as a supervisor.

2. Establish requirements for fighter experience prior to assuming supervisory positions. No captain or major should be eligible for a flight commander position unless he is current in the aircraft, has three months on station, and is a flight lead or instructor. An operations officer should have current experience in the theater of operations, be current in the aircraft, and have at least six months on station (six months subject to command prerogative; remote squadrons excluded). A squadron commander should have a highly experienced fighter background, be current in the aircraft, and, preferably, just have come from an operations officer assignment within the theater of his new command.

3. Identify new commanders well in advance and program sufficient time to provide unit experience requalification for noncurrent senior supervisors prior to their being required to assume full responsibility for the unit.²⁰

4. Establish a comprehensive operations/squadron commander course either at a replacement training unit or a command weapons training center to ensure that squadron commanders an operations officers are mission ready when they report to their unit.

5. Revitalize the flight commander position in a fighter squadron. I believe that this position is the key to an effective, safe, and combat-oriented squadron. Operational major commands should raise the experience level required in assigning personnel to the blocked positions in a fighter squadron. The definition of experienced is not stringent enough to meet the demands placed on a flight commander. A suggested experience level for a flight commander would be 1000 hours of fighter time or 500 hours PAA and 1000 hours FP/IP. MAJCOMs should also organize middle management cross talk between units (or MAJCOM flight commander conferences), and the esprit de corps of being a flight commander must be increased, i.e., attendance at standup, more responsibility, meeting with MAJCOM commander in chief, flight deployments, etc.

6. Adopt a new Air Force philosophy (Take the Stick) regarding the pilot's responsibility and authority. Aircrew members should participate in management of individual training programs, and they should be strongly encouraged to voice their limitations when mission requirements exceed capabilities without fear of reprisal or admonishment.

7. Wing and squadron commanders cannot allow date of rank to dilute unit supervisory positions when more experienced fighter crew members are available.²¹

THE easiest, least costly way to achieve effective leadership is for commanders at all levels to ensure that experienced, well-qualified aircrews are placed in key squadron supervisory positions. Retention, mishaps, and combat readiness deficiencies find their roots in poor leadership, and leadership can only be effective once credibility is restored. The real and perceived credibility crisis must be dealt with so that the USAF can carry out its mission of flying and fighting. International affairs in the 1980s may well test the capabilities of the USAF. The leadership of all fighter squadrons must be ready to go to combat at any given time. Events may not provide much warning.

1. This information was provided by the AF Inspection and Safety Center in their "December Mishap Summary," 30 January 1980.

2. Air War--Vietnam (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978), p. 222.

3. "Talking Paper on 1979 Aircraft Mishap Experience," Air Force Inspection and Safety Center (AFISC/SER), Norton AFB, California, January 1980.

4. An argument can be made that as the threat and systems got more complicated the USAF moved from single-seat fighters (F-86/F-100) to a two-seat fighter (FA); it has only been with the advent of the electronic magic of the F-15/F-16 that the Air Force was able to return it to single-seat aircraft. This organizational breakdown of threat and weapon system complexity depiction is credited to the following source: F.J. Rider "Is Multiple Role Training Counter Productive," 1978 Tactics Symposium, Report, 1978, pp. 2-64.

5. In mid-1978, an increasing trend in destroyed aircraft was detected. TIG sent a directive memo to AFISC outlining the Change Pace effort. The program was a comprehensive study of Air Force mishaps. This analysis covered the periods 1 January 1977-30 June 1978 and was extended to cover the 1 July 1978-31 December 1979 time frame.

6. Data not available for Change Pace II.

7. James H. Carrington, Command, Control and Compromise (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973), p. 228.

8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957); p. 11.

9. Tactical Air Command, TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference II, Part II, Report, 12-15 December 1978, p. 34. 

10. This survey was requested by the Inspector General, Flight Safety (AF/IGF) on 15 November 1979. The results were provided by the Manpower and Personnel Center at Randolph AFB. This is only a snapshot look at the tactical fighter force and may not be representative of the force as a whole.

11. AF/MPC ROR provided the following information: On 9 January 1980, 36 of 41 F-4 squadron commanders were current in the aircraft just prior to their assumption of command. This is only a snapshot and may not reflect the experience of the last few years. This author was personally aware of 6 squadron commander positions (persons assigned from staff positions in 1978) in which the individuals had to have a local checkout.

12. TAC Aircew Concerns Conference II, p. 34.

13. Wing Commander Jeremy Saye, RAF, "Flight Safety--A Royal Air Force Perspective," Report, 11 October 1979.

14. Colonel Bowen, "Personal Problems: A 'Voice in the Wilderness'--AFMPC," TIG Brief, 21 December 1979, p. 8.

15. "Chain: Rated Levels May Get Worse," Air Force Times, 28 January 1980, p. 10.

16. Information given in an unclassified Rated Management Briefing provided to the Air Staff in December 1979.

17. "Rated Distribution Training Management/Executive Committee Report," Volume I, AF/XOO, Report, 26 February-l March 1979.

18. According to MPC ROR (January 1980) "others" are a phenomenon of the past. There should be only one "other" per squadron in 1980.

19. "Rated Distribution Training Management/Executive Committee Report."

20. TAC Aircrew Concerns Conference II, p. 34.

21. Ibid., p. 25.

Captain John L. Barry (USAF Academy; M.P.A., Oklahoma University) is ASTRA Officer, Office of the Inspector General, Hq USAF. He has served as an F-4 fighter pilot, F-4E instructor pilot, test pilot for the Imaging Infrared Maverick Missile, and as the award-winning William Tell pilot during World Wide Weapons Meet in 1978. Captain Barry is an Honor Graduate of the USAF Academy and a graduate of Squadron Officer School.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor