Air University Review , November-December 1980

A Transparent Figleaf

Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Jürgen B. Arbeiter
Federal Republic of Germany

RECENT events in Afghanistan have caused Western analysts to reflect on Soviet intentions worldwide, especially as manifested against NATO. This analysis deals with the goals and aims of Soviet foreign policy in general terms and with both the contents and development of the defensive and offensive way of thinking in Soviet military doctrine. This has been done as a basis for further analyses and evaluations of Soviet actions and probable intentions in the future.

Soviet Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union as well as that of the Warsaw Pact countries is based on the concept of peaceful coexistence. By means of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social and political systems, Soviet theory states that a "specific form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism"¹ can be made possible on the international level.

While peaceful competition between the systems is aspired to in the political, economic, and social spheres, ideological coexistence is explicitly excluded from this competition, as the "sphere of ideology. . . has become the front-line in the battleground of the most severe ideological conflict."²

In Marxist-Leninist terms, peaceful coexistence has two components: cooperation ("peaceful competition of the system") and confrontation ("the specific form of the class struggle"). Thus, peaceful coexistence is intended to sustain the socialist revolution in countries of the capitalist world and to create preconditions favorable for victory. This is the main task of Soviet "socialist foreign policy." The Soviet Union, as the leading power of the East European states, coordinates this socialist foreign policy between all Warsaw Pact countries by using the centralistic structure of the Warsaw Pact organization as the "main center of coordination," for instance, the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee, Council of Foreign Ministers, and Council of Defense Ministers. There the Soviet Union cracks the political and ideological whip, a clear manifestation of her hegemony, based mainly on her vastly superior military strength. Her forces in most Warsaw Pact countries have a dual function: to ensure conformity and to hold the Pact together. Thus, there is a clear interconnection between Soviet foreign policy and Soviet military policy. Both are identical in long-term goals, such as the creation of favorable preconditions for victory, but differ in their implementation. Military policy deals with terms of protection, safeguarding, and the realization of the interests of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These interests, measures, and tasks are defined in the military program and in military doctrine.

Analyses of speeches made by leading politicians and military men of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries demonstrate clearly that, on the one hand, peaceful coexistence eliminates the doctrine of the "unavoidability of war"; but that, on the other hand, it does not exclude armed conflict as the most extreme form of class struggle. Class struggle does not necessarily have to result in war; for the stronger socialism becomes, the less cause there will be for overcoming capitalism by means of wars.

This ambiguity is the underlying reason for the problem experienced by most Western analysts trying to understand Soviet attitudes, as evidenced in debates concerning the military potential and military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries. Clearly, the correct assessment and consideration of both these aspects are of vital importance to the West-and not only with regard to Western policies concerning security and defense.

By means of carefully directed agitation and propaganda, controlled by the Soviet Union, and by overemphasizing their desire to cooperate, the aspect of confrontation is played down to the point where it is virtually imperceptible. It is significant, nevertheless, that this aspect of Soviet doctrine is never explicitly denied.

Soviet Military
Doctrine

Soviet military doctrine has its origin in Marxism-Leninism-the doctrine of reshaping the world by revolution-and is considered to be a system of fundamental views on the preparation for and conduct of war. During and after the October Revolution and the civil war, Lenin formulated the lessons formed from experience gained concerning the structure and deployment of the army. He then catalogued these findings and adopted them as principles. They were subsequently laid down as the fundamentals of Soviet military doctrine. These are, inter alia, control of the armed forces by the Communist Party, class approach in the organization of the armed forces, centralization of military command, and allegiance to proletarian internationalism.

The Party and military commanders were given the joint task of preparing a military potential that would not only guarantee security but would also assist in achieving the aims of foreign policy. Military doctrine and strategy are thus closely linked with political objectives.

The transformation and realization of Lenin's principles led to obligatory views on the character, preparation, and conduct of war. In accordance with the orthodox doctrine of war as outlined above, Soviet military doctrine recognizes three types of war:

(1) Military aggressions caused by the policies of "imperialism" force the class struggle to assume the military form of war between the "camp of imperialism" and the "camp of socialism."

(2) The camp of socialism then wages "just war," as the annihilation of imperialism is one goal of the revolutionary workers' movement. Furthermore, national wars of liberation and wars of revolution are considered to be "just" wars.³

(3) "Imperialist wars" are, therefore, "unjust wars," as they are conducted as "wars of conquest by a public enemy."⁴

At present, Marxist-Leninist military science considers that basically two main categories of war between countries of the two opposing social systems are possible: worldwide nuclear war⁵ and limited war without deployment of nuclear arms.⁶

Regardless of the distinctions made between these main categories, Soviet soldiers are prepared and trained for both types of war. In the Soviet Communist view, it is considered probable that a limited war without deployment of nuclear arms would be expanded into a worldwide nuclear war. The Soviets believe that the uncompromising ruthlessness by which war, as a decisive class struggle between socialism and imperialism, must be waged, as well as the determination to reach political objectives, will eventually force one side into deploying its entire military potential.

The principle of this military doctrine contains both political and military components and demonstrates their inseparable and organic connection within Soviet military policy. The pronounced class-conscious nature of Soviet military doctrine in the political sphere-and this is still completely valid today-supplies this doctrine with strong, unmistakable offensive characteristics aimed at the opponents of socialism. Class struggle, the consequence of the antagonism of the classes between the two systems, is inevitable. The policy of detente neither cancels nor alters the laws of the class struggle.

In the Communist view, imperialism has no future in its historic conflict with socialism. Imperialism cannot arrest this historical process by either peaceful or military means. The process will inevitably lead to the victory of socialism. This belief also constitutes an essential factor in the Soviet soldier's conviction that he will be victorious.

According to the doctrine of war ("just" and "unjust" wars), the opponent of the socialist system is always responsible for the outbreak of the war. Viewed from a military standpoint, military doctrine is the result of a process of development of political ideas that will achieve solutions to military problems and assumes concrete application in military strategy. It is geared to war and includes the following main factors: surprise attack on the enemy, securing and maintaining the initiative from the outset, strategic attack, swift and purposeful operations, and complete destruction of the enemy in his own territory.

After the civil war of 1917-19 and the warding off of foreign intervention in 1919-20, the stabilization of Soviet power required concentrating all its energies on the consolidation of its internal system. At the same time, provisions had to be made for defense against further impending military dangers from outside. At that time, military doctrine, in the absence of a strong potential in the military area, naturally possessed predominantly defensive features.

The first signs of .a reorganization of the military contents of military doctrine, caused by a change in military strategy, emerged increasingly from 1936 onward. This change consisted of an increased use of tanks in combat-effective formations for offensive action. According to the Field Service Regulations of 1936, tank units "by making use of their speed and impetus should penetrate deep into enemy territory and pave the way for the infantry following them."⁷

For the Soviet Union, the Second World War began with the German surprise attack that resulted in heavy losses and serious destruction on Soviet territory.

In the second phase of the war, the application and efficient mastery of these new requirements of military strategy brought about Soviet successes. By concentrating all efforts on the current main thrust, the Soviet attack on various fronts was led by powerful tank units in large-scale operations.

By mid-1943, the Soviet tank corps had become the main force in the Soviet ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk (July 1943),

all five tank armies existing at the time as well as 15 armored or mechanized corps were brought into action, as well as additional independent armored brigades or regiments. This was certainly the decisive battle in the Second World War: it lasted for approximately 50 days over an extent of 500-600 kilometers. After this battle, Germany was never again able to begin a major offensive.⁸

From 1943 on, the Soviet Air Force, too, underwent basic changes, such as the integration of the small squadrons of battle planes and bombers that formerly fought in isolation. Within the framework of an air offensive, a "massive strategic and tactical use of airplanes" took place, "closely coordinated with the operations of the ground forces."⁹ This concentrated employment of the air combat forces took place with up to 90 percent of disposable forces engaged in the direction of the main thrust, thus enabling the tank armies to penetrate deeply into enemy lines.¹⁰

At the end of the war, buffer zones necessary for the protection of the Soviet heartland under the conditions of a conventional war were established and enlarged (Manchuria, the Baltic States, Finland, and the Warsaw Pact countries). The Soviet Union had gained 275,000 square miles with 24.5 million inhabitants.

After 1945, the Soviet Union was faced with a new problem in that only the West possessed nuclear capabilities. This lack of weapon technology for equivalent strategic possibilities was reflected in the military orientation of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, even in the main theater of war. In its main thrust, at first, the doctrine for operational command provided for defense by accepting territorial losses at the beginning of a war, followed by a change to an offensive after having been reinforced by a supply of additional troops from deep inside the Soviet heartland. But, as the Soviets gained first nuclear and then thermonuclear capabilities, doctrine changed. Along with mounting Soviet nuclear armament, the demands on military strategy increasingly moved toward the direction of offensives right from the outset of hostilities.

This has been the basis of Soviet military doctrine since the beginning of the 1960s; it is still valid today.

THIS glance at history demonstrates that, from the October Revolution until the present day, Soviet military doctrine, in the political arena, has adhered doctrinally to the principle of Marxist-Leninist teachings within the framework of the class struggle. During the period of détente, the offensive nature of these policies was neither curtailed nor abandoned.

In 1975, Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko, the former Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, summarized the essential elements of this military doctrine in the following words:

As we know, . . . military doctrine is understood to be an officially accepted system of views in a given state and in its Armed Forces on the nature of war and methods of conducting it and on preparation of the country and army for war. The entire content of Soviet military doctrine can be divided into two interconnected groups of questions--political and military. The political content of Soviet military doctrine stems from the socialist system of the USSR, from the policy of the Communist Party and Soviet State, and from the fundamental interests of the Soviet people.

. . . With regard to the military content of Soviet military doctrine, . . . [the] Ideas of activeness of offensive and defensive operations, and of resolute and total defeat of an enemy permeate the entire development of the Soviet Armed Forces-their technical equipping, organizations and methods of training and educating personnel. . . .¹¹

The military component of military doctrine changed with the strategic and military potentialities of the Soviet Union. In the course of continuing development, the structures of the Soviet armed forces, inclusive of the utilization of the military potential available in the Warsaw Pact countries, were increasingly and unmistakably adjusted to meet the demands of offensive objectives in strategic dimensions. Soviet military literature published in the West reveals this without a shadow of a doubt.

According to this literature, Soviet forces must at all times be capable of hitting the enemy hard, especially at the beginning of a war. This requires a continually high state of combat readiness on the part of all troops and staffs. The goal is to cause the enemy to sustain heavy losses by smashing his main forces and nuclear weapons, annihilating strategic industrial plants, and destroying the political and military command system.

In doing so, favorable conditions are created for a subsequent attack. Thus, the first few hours of a war are of the utmost significance for victory. At the same time the Soviet Union's own losses are reduced to a minimum. The strategic offensive is the basis of all Soviet operations. Technical improvement and continuous development of the conventional armed forces serve to strengthen offensive capabilities. The Soviet leadership's only concern is to win, not to deter. Victory can only be achieved by total destruction of the enemy's armed forces. Consequently, maintaining the classical strategy of destruction remains an integral part of Soviet military strategy, even in the atomic age, and it demonstrates the offensive character of the Soviet conduct of war.

Mindful of the impact of a surprise attack on the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the Soviets will never again let their territory be the place where war is waged. The principle of not permitting the Soviet Union to be the object of a surprise attack and of retaining the initiative from the outset contains within it a preemptive option. Western experts agree on the conventional military supremacy of the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

In spite of détente, the Soviet Union has intensified her re-armament efforts during the past 10 years. From the principle of offence of Soviet military strategy and the structures and potentials derived therefrom, we must conclude that, in the case of war, her armed forces will be deployed offensively.¹²

The Soviet armed forces are also attempting to establish quantitative superiority in the area of strategic nuclear warfare by introducing new weapons.

A concerted threat of war, however, cannot be established solely by the offensive structure of the armed forces or by military and strategic capabilities. Rather, this depends on political intentions.

For the Soviet leadership, military force represents the only means to carry out its political aims. The West can employ the economy as an additional instrument of power. Thus, military instruments are of absolutely vital importance for the Kremlin. By means of the totality of the desired military supremacy, political pressure can be intensified in order to acquire the positional gains desired.

The justified fear in the West--the myth of the Soviet threat-is supposed to be defused by statements and propaganda actions of Soviet politicians. With half-truths and dishonest methods, they have already succeeded in some Western circles in creating the impression of a credible Soviet love for peace. However, the reality of the Soviet love for peace has been severely challenged- by recent events in Afghanistan. Moreover, this case reveals that the Soviets use the same military methods both against states that are considered their enemies and those which are their friends.

1. DDR-Hanhuch, Cologne, 1975, p. 338.

2. Ibid.

3. Just wars are above all those that agree in their political objectives with the interests of the revolutionary working class and which also contribute to the shifting of the international balance of power toward socialism.

4. In such a war, imperialism, by continuing its aggressive policies, would destroy socialism politically and militarily. Its objective is the destruction of all revolutionary and anti-imperialistic movements, in order to regain its individual position of power in the world.

5. A worldwide nuclear war can result in unlimited deployment of all available nuclear weapons. In the Soviet view, the decision as to whether to deploy nuclear arms must be examined and made at the beginning of a war. It cannot be ruled out that the war may also be a long one and that it may be continued with conventional weapons.

6. In a limited war without deployment of nuclear arms, the transition to a nuclear war is possible at any moment.

7. E. Sobik, "Sowjetische Panzertruppe," Part I, in Truppenpraxis, November 1978, p. 869.

8. E. Sobik, "Sowjetische Panzertruppe," Part II, in Truppenpraxis, December 1978, p. 959.

9. H. J. Barakling, "Die Sowjetische 16. Frontluftarmee 1942-1945," in Truppenpraxis, February 1978, p. 145.

10. Ibid., p. 146.

11. A. A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: A Soviet View (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 272-75.

12. Dr. Hans Apel, Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, in his speech on 4 May 1979, Borkum Island, West Germany.

Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Jürgen B. Arbeiter is Chief of Staff, Panzergrenadierbrigade 17 with the Federal Armed Forces, Federal Republic of Germany. He was Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University at Kingston, Ontario, Canada, for 1979-80. Colonel Arbeiter is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Hamburg, the junior staff officer course in the British Army of the Rhine, the Federal Armed Forces Military College, and is a Distinguished Graduate of the United States Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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