Air University Review, May-June 1980

The Soviet Space Shuttle Program

IN OCTOBER 1978 the Soviet Union announced the spectacular news that it had developed the prototype of a winged, reusable manned space vehicle. Western open-source publications indicate now that the Soviet system includes the space shuttle vehicle and two launch vehicles: a vertical rocket launcher and a horizontal takeoff and flyback launcher. Years of research and development must have preceded such an accomplishment, even if the Soviet space shuttle is only remotely comparable to that of the United States. Any such system requires a major national commitment in terms of funding and engineering development. For example, total funding during the past ten years in the United States space shuttle program is approaching $6 billion.

The manned space program of the Soviets has continued actively since their first venture into space. Also, their space shuttle represents a national resource, with benefits that can be shared by both civilian and military manned space programs. A space shuttle provides the U.S.S.R with a relatively inexpensive means of exploiting space to its fullest potential. Additionally, the fact that the Soviet space shuttle program has not been publicized all these years suggests that it may have important military applications.

The purpose of this article is to review the status of the Soviet space shuttle program as reported in Western open-source literature, to describe possible applications, and to develop the implications of the Soviet space shuttle to United States national security.

Soviet Space Shuttle Objectives

The world was thrust into the space age in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union. Ever since this epochal event, the world has witnessed the rapid evolution of a new form of power which, like air, land, and sea power, has resulted in new dimensions to sociological, economic, political, and military thinking. After Sputnik, both the United States and the Soviet Union have pursued programs which demonstrate the importance of space for scientific and military purposes. The United States manned space program essentially came to a standstill after the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975; however, the Soviet manned space program has continued doggedly onward. The implication of this persistence is that the Soviets believe man's utility in space is enormous and should be exploited.

Constraints on Soviet manned space exploration since its beginning have been significantly less than those imposed on the U.S. program. A concerted effort by the U.S.S.R resulted in the first manned space flight of Yuri Gagarin's Vostok I mission on 12 April 1961. Since the United States won the race to the moon with Apollo 8 in 1968, the Soviet Union has annually launched more space flights than the United States. The Soviet space program, operating under a command economy, is apparently unhampered by economic constraints. The Soviets have performed numerous missions to demonstrate ""the concepts of resupply and crew change--psychological, more than technological breakthroughs--that make the orbiting space station an everyday, routine workshop, rather than an individual, spectacular, headline-making event."¹ Indeed, it appears that the Soviets are planning extensive earth-orbit space activities, including '"giant factories in the sky [and] orbiting stations [that] might collect solar energy and transmit it to earth or even regulate the chemical composition of the atmosphere--checking ozone depletion or monitoring the carbon dioxide balance."²

The current thrust in Soviet manned space missions has been to investigate every aspect of long-duration space exposure. Soviet scientists state that their goal is not to break records but simply to "remain in orbit, so that earth-based researchers can see what, if anything, happens to [the cosmonauts]."³ On the basis of the data obtained, "the Soviets have stated that in the very near future they will expand the Salyut space station operations by docking additional structural elements to Salyuts already in orbit to form larger space stations."⁴ But no matter what the plans for and capabilities of space stations are, any estimate of the cost of the Soviet manned space program will show that it is very expensive. The fact that the United States temporarily halted its manned space program because of the great expense of onetime manned launches has been openly discussed in the literature.⁵ When the United States began consideration of a space shuttle in 1967, the projected cost of a manned mission was even then astronomical.⁶ It is probably a safe estimate that the Soviets came to the same realization about this time, if not sooner, because of their earlier involvement with manned space systems.

Given the facts that the Soviet Union is developing a broad technology base for expanded space missions, understands the costs of numerous one-time manned launches, and is intimately aware of the development of the United States space shuttle launcher and spacecraft, it is not surprising that the Soviets would develop their own space shuttle. The Soviets have now released preliminary information about that program.

Soviet Space Shuttle
System Operation

Information on the Soviet space shuttle is limited in Western sources; however, the program has apparently never been rigidly classified in the U.S.S.R In the United States Aviation Week & Space Technology has published articles on the Soviet program, and several West European technical journals have included papers on the Soviet space shuttle during the past four years.⁷ The West European journal articles are based on interviews with Soviet scientists or cosmonauts and details vary from one source to the next. According to one author, the Soviets may not have publicized their development of a space shuttle in order to prevent another "space race." Maartin Houtman states that "if the Soviet Union were to acknowledge that a) they have a shuttle project, b) are several years ahead of the Americans, and c) that their program is better planned and more economical than the American one, this 'space race' would presumably lead, because of public opinion and its effect on American government, to hasty competition. . . ."⁸ Houtman further stated that as early as 1975, "various delegates at the latest (25th) Party Congress in Moscow were interviewed on the coming new space project that was to develop between 1976-1980 in the scope of the tenth Five-Year Plan into an operational 'cosmodrome in space."'⁹

The earliest name for the Soviet space shuttle was Kosmoljot. "Dr. Artem Mikoyan (designer of the well-known MiG aircraft) used the term Kosmoljot, i.e., spacecraft" for this project as early as 1962.10 The earliest plans for the Kosmoljot provided for two launch approaches: one by vertical launching and the other by a horizontal runway launching, both launchers being reusable after separation from the Kosmoljot. These launchers are designed to carry the spacecraft to an altitude (about 30 kilometers) from which the Kosmoljot rocket engines can be fired to provide orbital injection energy.¹¹ Thus, technically speaking, the Kosmoljot is a two-stage rocket launch system. Russian cosmonaut Shatalov has summarized the Soviet technical considerations well:

The horizontal or aircraft start is definitely preferable for a reusable spacecraft, and we (the USSR) are taking this standpoint However, the Americans chose a useful and less costly alternative, namely a vertical (rocket) start, that has the advantage that it can carry along a greater load each time. This design has undeniable advantages as well as drawbacks. . . . We have perfected the more advanced second shuttle device, which proceeds from a horizontal launching. This gives the further advantage, that the device can start from any airfield in the Soviet Union equipped for this purpose; this makes the system more flexible in mission operations.^l2

Soviet orbiter vehicle

The name Kosmoljot for the orbital vehicle is used almost interchangeably with the name Raketoplan (rocket aircraft). In 1976, Houtman stated that the Raketoplan, which is similar to the U.S. space shuttle vehicle Enterprise, was named Albatros. Every article on the Soviet space shuttle discusses the Albatros to some extent. In general, the orbiter is a delta-wing vehicle with a 7.9 meter (26-foot diameter) wingspan. The length of the spacecraft is estimated to be about 10.6 meters (35 feet).¹³ These details demonstrate that the Soviet space shuttle orbiter vehicle is substantially smaller than its American counterpart. The Soviet data further indicate that the Albatros is similar in most respects to the U.S. Air Force/Boeing X-20 Dyna-Soar vehicle.¹⁴ As Craig Covault has observed:

Successful development of this system could provide the USSR with the capability for high-frequency launch rates or a quick reaction manned launch capability for civil or military application. Although the cargo capacity of the Soviet system would be limited, high-frequency launch rates could facilitate the placement of large amounts of material in orbit for assembly into large space structures.¹⁵

The orbiter vehicle is in prototype now, and

has been drop-tested from a Soviet Tupolev Tu-95 Bear bomber in atmospheric tests designed to determine the aerodynamic and pilot handling qualities comparable to those performed recently with a US space shuttle orbiter.¹⁶

Even though these tests were announced in March 1978, some analysts believe that they may have occurred as early as 1975.¹⁷

Weight trend analysis based on vehicle physical dimensions indicates that the Albatros weighs about 6800 kilograms (15,000 pounds). Since the SS-6 booster used to launch the Soyuz spacecraft has a capability of 7500 kilograms (16,500 pounds),¹⁸ the Soviets may be considering the launch of the Albatros with an expendable verticle rocket launcher during its initial flights.

The Albatros is equipped with both chemical rocket and electric propulsion rocket motors for orbital maneuvers.¹⁹ Orbital maneuver capability would be extensive for a period of over seven days with a crew of two or three cosmonauts. Reentry will be initiated using retrorockets. The Albatros would then skip along the outer edges of the atmosphere to dissipate orbital energy and reduce speed. When descending through the atmosphere, its aerodynamic control characteristics minimize heating, thereby lessening the need to use payload for that purpose. These descent techniques and the required heat shields have been tested by the Soviets in the unmanned Zond 5, 6, 7, and 8 series of spacecraft missions.²⁰

The Soviets plan to use the lifting-body capabilities and the on-board rocket propulsion systems to change orbital planes. To change orbit, the Albatros will initiate reentry procedures. As the vehicle dips into the atmosphere, aerodynamic forces will be used to accomplish Course changes. When the new orbital plan is achieved, the rockets can be fired to insert the Albatros into a new orbit. According to Houtman, the Albatros design provides for enough fuel to make four of these maneuvers.²¹ This orbit-to-orbit capability gives it significantly more flexibility than the U.S. space shuttle, which is constrained to a single orbit for each launch.

Soviet launch vehicles

The Soviet space shuttle system includes two different launch vehicles, The simpler one is a standard chemical-rocket booster with liftoff in the conventional vertical fashion. The more complicated and technically challenging launch vehicle is a booster that takes off and returns horizontally, much like a conventional aircraft.

The vertical launcher. When interfaced with the Albatros, the vertical launch system will be, in appearance, very much like the USAF/Boeing X-20 Dyna-Soar. European analysts "expect the 'Kosmoljot' to be launched initially by an expendable booster from the Tyuratam cosmodrome."²² Unfortunately, no details of the recoverable vertical launcher are yet available. The Soviets may be planning to mate the Albatros to a conventional chemical rocket booster as with any other orbital payload. This concept differs completely from that of the United States, in which the space shuttle is strapped to one side of the booster system.

The technology to demonstrate a vertical launch and orbital insertion of the Albatros is established. It would be fairly simple to fabricate an interface module to join the Albatros with an existing launcher such as the SS-6 booster, which has been used to launch the Soyuz manned satellites as well as the Progress unmanned tanker/transport satellites. It has been pointed out that the Soviet Union used ten expensive one-time booster rockets and as many Salyut, Soyuz, and Progress spacecraft to perform the recent Salyut 6 mission.²³ Had the Albatros been used to transport cosmonauts to a Soyuz spacecraft already in orbit and to perform the crew exchanges and space resupply flights, only one spacecraft would have been required. Had the reusable vertical booster been developed, the entire mission could have been completed with only one spacecraft and one booster. An economic consideration as significant as this must be recognized by the Soviets.

The horizontal launcher. The horizontal launch vehicle is similar in appearance to the U.S. Space Shuttle/NASA Boeing 747 piggyback combination. The Albatros, in this more complicated mode, will be launched from the ground, mated to a fly-back booster. The fly-back booster will have a rolling takeoff, like that of a conventional aircraft. After separation from the Albatros, it will be flown back to its base for a conventional horizontal landing.

The available technical details of this booster are unclear, but the propulsion systems will have to be some combination of rockets and air-breathing engines,²⁴ with later phases requiring rocket or rocket/turbojet propulsion to reach the 30 kilometers (120,000 feet) altitude required before space vehicle/booster separation.²⁵ Though this is an extremely complicated booster design, a recent NASA-funded contract to Boeing has shown that new technology now available makes the idea feasible even for the U.S. space shuttle.²⁶ If so, then it will be significantly more feasible for the Soviet space shuttle, which is much smaller and one-tenth the weight of the U.S. shuttle vehicle. One important feature of this launch technique is that acceleration forces never exceed 2 to 3 G's; therefore, cosmonauts would not require special training for this phase of a space mission.²⁷

It is clear, then, that the Soviet Union is developing a space shuttle. With this fact established, some of the missions announced by the U.S.S.R for the Albatros must be considered and potential missions of the Albatros postulated.

Soviet Space
 Shuttle Missions

The Soviets have stated that the Albatros will be used principally as a "space transport ship [much] like a moving van," delivering satellites into orbit and, later, after they have completed their mission, collecting "them again as a sort of interplanetary scavenger. . . .The Albatros can presumably launch or fetch . . .dozens of large or small Kosmoses" with each mission.²⁸ In addition, the full range of scientific and technical investigation, such as visual satellite monitoring, real-time weather reporting, traffic control, earth-resources surveying, and space manufacturing can be undertaken. During the recent four-month-long Salyut 6 mission, the cosmonauts carried "a color chart and by matching up the hues of different parts of the ocean [could] map plankton and seaweed distribution, information that can provide tips on good fishing grounds."²⁹ Other experiments "involved biological studies of tissue cultures and bacterial growth, and processing of metals and glass."³⁰

The Albatros, with its extensive propulsion systems, can also be used as a form of space tug to gather abandoned Soviet spacecraft in orbit for assembly into a very large space station; numerous Salyut, Soyuz, and Progress vehicles in space could so be maneuvered into position. It is inconceivable that these expensive Soviet spacecraft remaining in orbit after only one mission will not be used in some way by the Soviets, who are known never to throw anything away. They have stated that the Salyut 6/Soyuz 25, 26, 27, and 28 mission "is a key part of a plan for establishing a permanent station in space, is designed to demonstrate, in addition to simple longevity in orbit, the ability for re-supply 'visits' by other Soyuz crews."³¹ Thus, they have a long-range plan in motion, which may soon involve the Albatros to build and supply a permanent space station. These are primarily the missions that the Soviets have openly discussed relating to the scientific and technological uses for the Albatros, but its military potentials must also be considered.

Since the Soviet space program is conducted by the military,³² some such application for the Albatros must exist. It is, of course, conceivable that the Soviet space shuttle could serve roles in such missions as space resupply and space bombing. This possibility is strengthened by the Soviets' pursuit of a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS) until 1971.³³ Further support is offered in a U.S. Senate staff study asserting that the "Soviet military planners would be unimaginative if they did not think of the whole realm of possibilities and military consequences" of space warfare systems.³⁴ Recent activity in the Soviet Union indicates that satellite interception is a capability highly desired by the Soviets.³⁵ Yet one-for-one satellite interception is an expensive proposition. Such a mission may be more realistically and inexpensively performed by overtaking and collecting target satellites with a highly maneuverable spacecraft like the Albatros. Such an operation was dramatized in the opening scenes of the James Bond movie You Only Live Twice. Conceivably, the Albatros could carry rocket projectile systems for outright destruction of satellites in orbit if they were considered too dangerous to retrieve.³⁶ Possessed with these capabilities, Albatros spacecraft could either collect or destroy U. S. satellites at a cost much less than that of one-for-one interceptors, and there would be no question of verification. Target damage and kill verification could be performed visually on site.

Aside from these clearly overt military operations, satellite surveillance by electronic ferreting and visual inspection can be performed with an Albatros spacecraft. Such surveillance data can be used to design systems that would effectively jam early warning, navigation, and other monitoring satellites used in U.S. military support activities. Finally, activities on the earth's surface, by means of real-time surveillance, can be transmitted directly to military commanders in the Soviet Union as they are observed. All of these functions represent extremely valuable capabilities inherent in the Soviet space shuttle effort. The vehicle can be used to augment Soviet space capabilities rapidly and, equally rapidly, to degrade U.S. military capabilities by the destruction or negation of military support satellites in orbit. Ultimately, Albatros spacecraft could be used U.S. deny meaningful U.S. presence in the entire space arena by destruction of every satellite launched. The flexibility associated with two launch techniques permits orbital injection of the Albatros into any prescribed orbit; the U.S. space shuttle does not have this capability. Tied to launch from only two locations (either Vandenberg AFB, California, or Cape Kennedy, Florida), the U.S. shuttle is much more severely restricted as to available orbital planes than the Soviet space shuttle.

THE large orbiting Soviet space stations will be used for a great variety of scientific and technical activities. However, the Center for Strategic Studies has cautioned that "The Soviets are already committed to exploit space for military purposes."³⁷ The Albatros system is being developed by the military and probably can also be used as a space interceptor or bomber to perform a wide variety of military space activities. Possibilities range from covert satellite interrogations to more aggressive acts, such as function jamming, the overt collection of satellites from orbit, or their in-orbit destruction.

Space has been the scientific area to which the Soviets have been able to point with great national pride, having established an impressive list of firsts, highlighted by Sputnik 1 and the first manned space mission in the Vostok program. It is not inconceivable that they would release the details of the Albatros near the time that the U.S. is planning to launch its space shuttle. The undercurrents of Soviet-American space rivalry even suggest a possibility that the Soviets will launch their space shuttle shortly before the U.S. does, to reemphasize Soviet space leadership. Numerous examples of such technological upstagings permeate the history of man in space. The introduction of a reusable shuttle represents the next opportunity in space for a spectacular technological first for some time to come, Such a Soviet first would subtly humiliate the United States as a global power by degrading its preeminence in science and technology, while magnifying that of the Soviets, Thus, there is a very real possibility that the Soviets may attempt to launch a space vehicle that they call a space shuttle, if for no other reason than for the prestige of the accomplishment

The Albatros will be a relatively economical means for the Soviet Union to continue its space explorations and expand its military capabilities. But this expanded space capability also represents a formidable threat to those U.S. military operations that are dependent on satellite data, Thus, the U.S. must formulate strategic concepts for contending with the Soviet space shuttle, and its progress must be carefully followed and reviewed in order that countermeasures may be taken to neutralize any threat that may be posed to U.S. national security. General Jacob E. Smart, USAF (Ret), has cogently recommended a policy to guide our national and military attempts to overcome the threat posed by the Albatros:

Today and henceforth the United States must be prepared to defend itself against aggression in space and from space. We cannot surrender the "high ground" without contest. We must be in space to acquire knowledge of what others are doing there and to prepare to counter that which threatens us.³⁸

Air War College

Notes

1. Hal Piper, "The Long Soviet Reach Out into Space," Baltimore Sun, October 15, 1978, p. K2.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Craig Covault, "Soviets Developing Fly-Back Launcher," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 6, 1978, p. 20.

5. General Jacob E. Smart, USAF (Ret), "Strategic Implications of Space Activities," Strategic Review, Fall 1974, p. 20.

6. Dr. Hans Mark, "Space Shuttle," Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, October 1978, p. 16.

7. "Soviet Space Shuttle," Spaceflight, vol. 19, no. 6, p. 211; Rudolf Hofstaetter, "The Soviet Space Shuttle," Flag Revue Flugwelt International, no. 1, pp. 26, 31-32; Maartin Houtman, "Albatros: The Soviet Space Shuttle," Spaceview, May/June 1976, pp. 24-31; "The Kosmoljot Is the Soviet Version of the Space Shuttle," Soldat und Technik, vol. 19, no. 6, p. 299.

8. Houtman, p. 29.

9. Ibid.

10. "The Soviet Space Ferry Project/Counterpart to the American Space Shuttle," Soldat und Technik, June 1976, p. 299.

11. Ibid.

12. Houtman, p. 28.

13. "Soviets Confirm Shuttle Vehicle Effort," Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 16, 1978, p. 25.

14. Ibid.

15. Covault, "Soviets Developing Fly-Back Launcher," p. 19.

16. Craig Covault, "Soviets Build Reusable Shuttle," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 20, 1978, p. 14.

17. Covault, "Soviets Developing Fly-Back Launcher," p. 20.

18. Charles S. Sheldon II, "The Soviet Interceptor Program," TRW Space Log 1977 (Redondo Beach, California: TRW, Inc., 1978), pp. 2-5.

19. Houtman, p. 31.

20. Ibid., p. 30

21. Ibid., p. 31.

22. "Soviet Space Shuttle," Spaceflight, p. 211.

23. "Soviets Confirm Shuttle Vehicle Effort," p. 25.

24. Hofstaetter, p. 31.

25. "Soviet Space Shuttle," Spaceflight, p. 211.

26. Covault, "Soviets Developing Fly-Back Launcher," p. 20.

27. "The Kosmoljot Is the Soviet Version of the Space Shuttle," p. 299.

28. Houtman, p. 31.

29. Piper, p. K2.

30. Ibid.

31. "Spacecraft Details," TRW Space Log 1977 (Redondo Beach, California, TRW, Inc., 1978), p. 30.

32. AF Pamphlet 200-21, Soviet Aerospace Handbook, May 1978, p. 80.

33. Soviet Space Program, 1971-1975, Staff Report for the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences (Washington, D.C., 1976), vol. I, pp. 491-92.

34. Ibid., p. 492.

35. Sheldon, pp. 2-5. Also, see Charles E. Sheldon II, "The Soviet Space Program," Air Force Magazine, March 1975, p. 56.

36. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets Test Beam Technologies in Space," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 13, 1978, p. 16.

37. The Soviet Military Technological Challenge (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1967), p. 86.

38. Smart, p. 24.

Lieutenant Colonel Carl A. Forbrich, Jr. (Ph.D., Stanford University) is Chief, Bombs and Warheads Branch, Air Force Armament Laboratories (AFSC), Eglin AFB, Florida. He has worked with high energy lasers and has served as Chief, Chemical Laser Branch, Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. While an Associate Professor of Aeronautics, USAFA, he did spectroscopic research at the Frank J. Seiler Laboratory there. Colonel Forbrich is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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