Air University Review, May-June 1980
Dr. Joe P. Dunn
IN RECENT years, Asia has become center stage of American foreign policy. The aftermath of Vietnam unleashed new opportunities and directions. The Chinese rapprochement opened new parameters. Mistakes, misperceptions, and lost Opportunities have characterized past American actions in Asia. Hopefully, the future can be more promising; but American knowledge of this immense continent remains inchoate and for many the East is still "the inscrutable Orient." This is not a favorable condition. This eclectic group of books addresses contemporary Asia and seeks to unravel the mysteries of the recent past and offer prescriptions for the future. The first three are general works; the latter three deal with post-Mao China.
THE WIDENING GULF by Selig S. Harrison,* a journalist with extensive experience in Asia and former fellow at both Brookings Institution and the East-West Center in Honolulu, focuses on American failures in encounters with Asian nationalism. After explaining his methodology, Harrison undertakes a country-by-country analysis that emphasizes American misperceptions, particularly in misunderstanding the interrelationship between communism and nationalists. The author offers alternatives for future improvements.
*Selig S. Harrison, The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy (New York: Free Press, 1977, $15.95), 468 pages.
Harrison ranges wide over a number of topics, and the comprehensive, textbook nature of the book makes specific comments on its diverse content difficult. This review, then, will concentrate only on Harrison's discussion of post-Vietnam American military policy in Asia, a subject on which he is outspoken. He warns that the U.S. should not intervene in internecine national struggles. Even economic assistance to either adversary should be avoided. In confrontations between competing nationalists (even if one side is communist), a Western nation that becomes involved can easily become the ultimate enemy of both sides. Western nations' desired objectives, even when achieved, seldom are worth the cost.
Harrison advocates neither isolationism nor indifference. Rather, he counsels extreme caution and discrimination. Distinctions should be drawn between clear international aggression, such as Japan's invasion of China in the thirties, and the many instances of internal turmoil common in Asia: in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia (now Kampuchea), Laos, Thailand, Taiwan-Mainland China, and Indo-Pakistan. Harrison stresses that these internal struggles must be individually evaluated and not routinely interpreted as theaters for containing Soviet power around the globe. In theory this sounds good, but reality is more complex. Aggression is not as easily defined as the author implies, and internal contests do have international significance.
Harrison's argument for a retrenched American military posture in Asia exhibits similar naiveté. He minimizes the growth of the Soviet naval forward base system and considers American forward area military facilities unnecessary. In what he labels a "worst case" scenario, he is most sanguine about American ability to transport personnel and equipment to conflict areas. In actuality, his worst case scenario is posited on very favorable conditions. Harrison's data are dated, and his understanding of current logistic realities is deficient. His dismissal of a Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean and his admonition that the U.S. should wait until a genuine threat against oil traffic occurs before committing American power in the area are simplistic.
Harrison also espouses gradual extrication from mutual security treaties in areas where the chances of external aggression are relatively remote. Furthermore, he argues that the U.S. should curtail its role in arms transfers. His prescriptions include the following:
Concerning nuclear arms, Harrison intones that the U.S. cannot be sanctimonious about nuclear proliferation while continuing to stockpile her own arsenal. He argues that the U.S. should neither encourage nor discourage a nation's developing the nuclear option. Many nations consider a nuclear capacity essential to their national pride and national security. The U.S. has no right, Harrison contends, to impinge on such internal questions of national sovereignty.
In sum, Harrison's book is exhaustive, provocative, and in parts profound. He has a feel for Asian thought and pride. On the other hand, the author is incredibly simplistic in dealing with military issues. The work was researched in the late sixties and written at intervals during the seventies. Consequently, his treatment of power realities is dated. His assessment of the relative U.S. Soviet military balance is far out of date and totally inconsistent with current realities. Finally, it must be noted that the author's ponderous style seems inconsistent with his reputation as a noted journalist.
Most collections of essays are uneven in quality. Although this evaluation can be made of the volume edited by Yung-Hwan Jo,* here the good clearly outweighs the mediocre. Most of the twenty articles come from symposiums on U.S. relations with South Korea and Vietnam, which were held at Arizona State University (1976) and the University of Southern California (1977).
*Yung-Hwan Jo, editor, U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia: An Appraisal (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1978, $24.74), 488 pages.
In Part I, Soon S. Cho traces the tragedy of the Korean and Vietnam wars to the hastily conceived divisions of those countries at the end of World War II. With their attention on Europe, American policymakers proposed the divisions with little concern for the peoples involved or the potential dangers of division. Robert T. Oliver offers a favorable account of Syngman Rhee and the establishment of the Republic of Korea. Gareth Porter resurrects the errors of early American involvement in Vietnam in the 1950s. Douglas Pike presents his blueprint for future U.S.-Vietnamese relations. Former South Vietnamese diplomat Ph an Thien Chau and American academic Jayne Werner, from entirely different perspectives, advocate U.S. overtures to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in order to encourage her independence from P.R.G or U.S.S.R. hegemony. Scott G. McNall advances a tenuous thesis that political events in Vietnam were totally incidental to the fact that the country afforded the U.S. a "theatrical stage" for demonstrating the viability of limited warfare. Donald E. Weatherbee concludes with a sound assessment of the current Southeast Asian balance.
In Part II, Gregory Henderson affords an insightful and compassionate critique of U.S.-Korean relations in the wake of Vietnam. T. G Rhee and Anthony Kahng offer more critical, assertive, and less satisfying reports. North Korean apologist Fred Carrier echoes communist rhetoric in a damning indictment of American imperialism in South Korea. South Korean diplomat Pyong-choon Hahm renders a stirring defense of the present regime and a justification of American support.
Part III includes articles on Japan, Taipei, and the Philippines as well as on Chinese and Soviet perceptions of U.S. policy in Korea. Among the more interesting is East German scholar Bernd Kaufmann's account of contemporary Korea. He criticizes the U.S. and praises Soviet policy; but his archvillain is China, which he considers the primary cause of instability and friction on the Korean peninsula. Robert A. Scalapino's brief, scholarly overview of South Korea is one of the best essays in the volume.
These brief remarks do little more than give an idea of the diversity of the book. Excerpts from the discussions, debates, and critiques of the papers add another valuable dimension to the volume. This is a significant book, highly recommended for specialist and layman alike.
THE title of the Wang and Chin volume clearly describes its subject.* Asia's mineral deposits are increasingly important in world affairs. Japan has emerged as the world's third largest producer of mineral and metal goods, and she is a leader in promoting mineral discovery not only in Asia but around the world. China's and Southeast Asia's modernization efforts depend on their ability to pay for imported Western technology with their mineral wealth.
*K.P. Wang and E. Chin, Mineral Economics and Basic Industries in Asia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, $23.70), 358 pages.
After a general overview of Asia's role in the world's mineral economy and the continent's economic geography and industrial base, the authors survey 26 Asian countries following the same outline for each: (1) Brief introduction, (2) Significance of minerals, (3) Mineral supply position, (4) Nature of mineral enterprise, (5) Principal mineral industries, (6) Mine and industry workers, (7) Mineral transport, (8) Energy and power, (9) Summary. Each chapter is followed by a map of the country and by numerous pictures concentrating on economic affairs. Maps, charts, and tables throughout the book provide abundant specific data.
The book is an extremely useful reference work and is, surprisingly (at least to this reviewer), quite interesting reading. Not only scholars but the informed general audience will profit from this work. Indeed, the Westview Special Studies on Asia, of which this book is a part, is becoming a distinguished scholarly series dealing with political, economic, and social issues.
AUSTRALIAN Ross Terrill, associate professor of government at Harvard, is an acknowledged expert on China, author of 800,000,000: The Real China, and a master of prose.* He visited China four times during the sixties and seventies. This book, a sequel to 800,000,000, is a well-written, colorful, dramatic essay on events of 1976 and 1977, directed to the popular audience rather than to the scholar. Terrill untangles the complex and confusing events of these pivotal years, tracing the up-and-down career of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the emergence of Hua Kuo-feng, and the brief triumph and decline of the ultraradical Maoist Gang of Four.
*Ross Terrill, The Future of China: After Mao (New York: Delacorte Press, 1978, $9.95), 331 pages.
Throughout, the author editorializes freely. A strong proponent of rapprochement, Terrill advocates recognition of the People's Republic, severing of U.S. relations with Taiwan, and reintegration of the island with the mainland. At the time he wrote the book, Terrill feared an American tilt toward the Soviet Union and, thus, called for an evenhanded Soviet and Chinese policy. In recent interviews, he appears less concerned about a tilt toward the Chinese. Terrill sees little possibility of reconciliation between the two communist powers. He explains that only the most disastrous American policy could drive the Soviets and Chinese back into accommodation.
While interesting reading, the book has a major flaw. It offers nothing new, and the author's undocumented generalizations tend to be rather trite at this point. Unfortunately, the book was hopelessly dated by the time it appeared in print, and daily events continue to erode its usefulness.
ROBERT SUTTER's book is also dated,** but it has greater basic substance than Terrill's. In the last year or so, many books assessing the history of U.S.P. R C. relations have appeared. This is one of the better studies. Sutter, a former CIA research analyst and now an Asian expert at the Library of Congress, offers new information and perspective as he traces the long road to rapprochement. He provides both a concise history of Sino-American relations and perceptive analysis of the dynamics involved.
**Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, $10.95), 155 pages.
The early chapters describe the dilemmas of the China Hands as they strove to maintain a tenuous wartime Chinese Communist-Kuomintang coalition against the Japanese. Sutter cites recently released State Department documentation that indicates early attempts by the Chinese Communists to achieve more favorable relations with the United States. The Chinese were wary of total dependence on the Soviet Union and made overtures to the U.S., but these opportunities were rebuffed.
While the Nixon visit in 1972 signaled a long overdue new direction, Sutter argues that American policymakers did not pursue all possible avenues of accommodation. Chinese leadership was divided over substantive issues but united in a pragmatic desire to rectify China's deteriorating position in the world balance of power. Writing in early 1978, Sutter proved to be an acute analyst as he predicted that the pro-modernization and pro-Western forces would reach out for better relations. However, Sutter did not fully appreciate the economic dimensions of the present rapprochement. He believed that there were few economic or cultural grounds on which to build a relationship; accommodation would be founded on strategic considerations and the balance of power in East Asia. Just the opposite of Selig S. Harrison, Sutter counsels a continued strong V.S. military presence in Asia, for a diminished profile could lead to erosion of the gains of recent years. China will respect a powerful military potential and negotiate in good faith.
Sutter relies heavily on media analysis ("a systematic review of the controlled output of the Chinese media channels") to ascertain patterns, trends, and intentions in Chinese policy. In this approach, he uses recently declassified material from the files of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Important as is this analytic technique, the author recognizes the problems, weaknesses, and potential hazards of this approach. He proceeds with caution and does not exaggerate the merits of his methodology.
Superbly organized, tightly argued, and well written, this is a good contribution to available literature. Scholars will find it fresh and rewarding; the average reader will enjoy it as well. This is a first-rate study.
THE final book,* a collection of eight short stories originally published in Chinese between November 1974 and August 1976, differs from those reviewed above. Chen Jo-hsi, born in 1938 and educated in Taiwan, began to write early in her life. She demonstrated talent but because of her lack of life experience, her work had little substance, little depth of meaning. After postgraduate studies in the United States, she and her husband settled in the People's Republic and lived there for seven years during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In 1973 they were allowed to leave and they settled in Canada. During her stay in China, Chen did no writing; however, since leaving she has gained an international reputation for her work about this period.
*Chen Jo-hsi, The Execution of Mayor Yin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, $8.95), 220 pages.
Although Chen is not political, her stories by definition take on a political dimension. As Simon Leys repeats in the collection's introduction: "In the empire of lies, the humblest truth is revolutionary, mere reality is subversive." And so it is with Chen's stories, which deal with the "small happenings in the everyday life of ordinary people." They capture better than any text or memoir the nature of life in Maoist China, and they have a power and dynamism difficult to put in words. As with all good fiction, it must be read rather than explained. The stories depict the undramatic horrors of totalitarianism intermingled with the joys, beauty, and frustration of normal life "subtly painted in Chekhovian shades of grey." Chen juxtaposes the warm and cruel, the heroic and trivial, the glory and tragedy, of 900 million people caught up in the reality of one of history's most traumatic moments.
Most Chinese who have lived in the P.K.C despair of their inability to convey to the Western audience the nature of life in Maoist China without resorting to distortions or stereotypes. All agree that Chen alone seems able to bridge the communication gap. She has earned acclaim as a writer of world stature, and her life and writings will undoubtedly be the subject of many literary, political, and sociological doctoral dissertations. But above all, I must repeat, she must be read. There is more truth in these pages of nonfiction than in many collections of documents or monographs. Personally, I have not enjoyed, and felt, a book so moving in some time. Whither Asia? And what of U.S. policy in this area of the globe? The long Vietnam years cast off a few shackles and force open a
few of the doors of ignorance and indifference. The new Chinese interactions uncover a few of the mysteries of this enigmatic nation. But the West has much to learn and experience if the past is not to be prologue of the future. The opportunities are vast; the benefits for mankind unprecedented. But many warn, and not without justification, that the dangers should not be deprecated. The West might well take the admonition of Chairman Mao, who, though no longer oracle of the East, left an enduring message for us all: "What we need is an enthusiastic but calm state of mind and intense but orderly work."
Converse College
Spartanburg, South Carolina
Contributor
Joe P. Dunn
(Ph.D., University of Missouri) is Assistant Professor of History and Politics and head of the International Affairs major at Converse College. He has taught in Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain. Dr. Dunn has read papers at several historical conferences and published numerous book reviews in academic journals, including Parameters, Cross Currents, and the Review.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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