Air University Review, May-June 1980

On War Today?

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ’S On War is often quoted, infrequently read, and rarely understood, and this fact alone constitutes sufficient justification for its serious study by professional soldiers. But On War should not be read as a source of information but rather as a medium for reflection. The content of On War is as dated as the man and his times, but his style of analysis provides the military professional with a practical frame of reference that is of inestimable value and timeless in application. Carl von Clausewitz proposed an ordered and logical methodology for defining and analyzing the phenomenon of war, but he couched his analysis in terms of an intellectual guest that breaks the barriers of time and technology. Indeed, he wrote "to educate the mind, to suggest a way to study war."¹

Clausewitz applied inquisitive analysis to the phenomenon of the French Revolution which spawned the democratization of war and the nation in arms. The measured precision, limited means, and specific objectives of eighteenth-century warfare were violently supplanted by intense chauvinism, mass armies, and total war. Napoleon was the key instrument in this remarkable transformation, and Clausewitz witnessed and experienced the essence and impact of the phenomenon. We are the beneficiaries of his examination and inquiry, for as he answered his questions, he also provided future military professionals with the means to answer their own questions. Reading Clausewitz in his effort to distill the essence of war causes us to reflect, analyze, and educate ourselves with regard to the phenomenon of war and all its implications and ramifications.

Peacetime priorities and constrained budgets can easily obscure the primary function of the professional soldier. Study, training, and preparation must be oriented toward effective and successful performance in combat regardless of the level of position or command. The impact of technology on warfare and the nature of the international arena today dictate thorough preparation for immediate response in times of crisis. The popular "come as you are" label for modern warfare applies to the entire spectrum of conflict; and personnel, training, and equipment priorities must be structured accordingly. Today's "readiness" is Clausewitz's "capability," and failure and defeat are the penalties for deficiency.

The United States has been distinctly fortunate in its national experience, for we have not suffered the trauma of a foreign invasion and defeat. Nor has our civilian population experienced the chaos, deprivation, and death resulting from combat operations within our own borders for more than a century. We have been profoundly conditioned by this past good fortune to the point of smug complacency. Neither soldier nor civilian can afford such complacency today.

A traditional trend in U. S. civil-military relations has accelerated to the point that there is a great disparity between those who form u late policy and develop strategy and those who serve as the executive agents. Military professionals have essentially abdicated the role of serious thinking and writing to the civilian strategists. Sensitivity and perception with regard to the implications of the use of force are sharpened considerably by experience in the arena of combat. Such sensitivity and perception preclude entering that arena lightly, for war is indeed much more than simply another policy option. It is one thing to philosophize and formulate in the abstract and quite another to fight in the brutal reality of war. By splitting the functions of serious thinking and writing apart from the tempering effect of combat experience, we are reminded of Sir William Butler's cryptic comments about "fighting done by fools and thinking done by cowards. "

The observation regarding courage appears self-evident. Unfortunately, it is often ignored until needed most. The age of management, technology, and intellectual endeavor often directs our energy and attention in very different directions. A basic reordering of priorities is in order, for although the level of sophistication of war has changed, the very substance of the phenomenon has not.

"Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility."² History is replete with examples of both types in the profession of arms. Alexander the Great, Lord Nelson, Daniel Morgan, Andrew Jackson, Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, and many others have demonstrated the crucial dimension of courage. More recently, Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe at Bastogne and General Douglas MacArthur in Korea vividly demonstrated the full spectrum bf courage of "two kinds." The past is prologue and the requirement constant. Courage of the highest order and strength of character are timeless requirements and unquestionable requisites for the profession of arms.

Projected on a more personal plane, sensitivity to physical exertion and suffering is reinforced by personal experience. The passage of time and advancement in rank can dim awareness and desensitize the commander. This was no doubt the case in the strategic and tactical debacle of the trench warfare stalemate during World War I. Such does not have to be the case, however, for we can recall General Mathew B. Ridgway's famous comment that ". . . for a battle commander ever to condone the unnecessary sacrifice of his men is inexcusable."³ The commander is responsible! A constant awareness and a permanent reminder must remain with the military professional as the time and distance from the arena of combat increase, and most assuredly as well with the political leader or civilian strategist who may never have been there.

The impact of technology on warfare is an interesting theme that deserves serious attention. Technological implications transcend the field of battle, but the invention of gunpowder, the development of the machine gun, and the advent of the airplane were sequentially exploited beyond all reasonable expectations of combat effectiveness.

Victory in battle rewards those who anticipate changes in warfare through the medium of technology. Defeat awaits those who do not. The ever increasing rate of technological advance and innovation, however, has created a technological obsession at the expense of other fundamental considerations. The advent of the military technologist is well documented and really needs no further elaboration here.⁴ Civilian technological expertise has likewise become an institutionalized imperative due to the complexity of modern warfare. But perspectives and priorities are essential if one is to prevail in combat.

We cannot lose sight of the importance of numbers and force ratios as we seek to maximize the benefits of technological innovations. Numbers are important! The Messerschmitt Me 262 represented one of the most impressive "force multipliers" in the history of warfare, but that fact provided little comfort to the Luftwaffe as its early jet aircraft was overcome by the sheer numbers of Allied opposition during World War II. Allied numbers superseded German technology, and the net result was defeat. The example is still relevant and the lesson timeless.

The relationship between war and policy probably constitutes the most significant justification for the study of Clausewitz today. This relationship is time tested and as relevant now as it was when Clausewitz first described it. The history of the United States does not reflect a clear understanding of this relationship, and the fierce pursuit of total military victory even at the expense of political considerations has practically become an ingrained trait of the American national character. In the words of one noted scholar: ". . . the United States usually possessed no national strategy for the employment of force or the threat of force to attain political ends, except as the nation used force in wartime openly and directly in pursuit of military victories as complete as was desired or possible."⁵ The advent of nuclear weapons as well as the frustrating experiences of Korea and Vietnam have aggravated this trait to the point of pain, and the political decision to tolerate "essential equivalence" or worse portends even greater pain and significant risk as well. Such a predicament can produce real confusion regarding the risk and utility of military action in soldiers and statesmen alike.

Soviet leaders no doubt acknowledge that the utility of force as an instrument of policy has decreased with the omnipresent threat of nuclear holocaust, but even fifteen years ago they clearly perceived that the political returns from exploiting the possession of significant military power were increasing dramatically.⁶ The shift in strategic balance that has occurred since the Cuban missile crisis should leave little doubt regarding their future inclinations. Our own national experience as well as the ideological motivations and significant military capability of  our potential opponents dictate that the American professional soldier carefully study and fully comprehend the intricate relationship between war and policy and all its international and domestic ramifications.

To anticipate twentieth-century answers in nineteenth-century writing is nonsensical. Soldiers, statesmen, and scholars are sometimes inclined either to ignore Clausewitz entirely or seek answers that are not there. Either extreme is as dangerous as it is foolish. Clausewitz set out to analyze and explain the phenomenon of war as he perceived it. The result is not so important as his logical method of analysis. Clausewitz does not provide answers but rather the means to answers. Questions and issues relating to war and politics are challenging and promise no easy solutions. The alternative to study, effort, application, and successful resolution, however, is as fearful as failing to accept this challenge is unprofessional.

The message is clear: "Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power!"⁷ Perhaps the cliché about doing your homework may yet come to mean something more than showing well at daily standup.

1. Lt. Col. A. S. Britt, "European Military Theory and Practice in the 18th and 19th Centuries," lecture presented at Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 27 September 1978.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 101.

3. General Mathew B. Ridway, "Leadership," Military Review, October 1966, p. 45.

4. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 21.

5. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. xix.

6. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 23.

7. Clausewitz, p. 219.

Lieutenant Colonel James L. Cole, Jr. (USAFE; M.A., Ohio State University; M.B.A., Auburn University) is Chief, Combat Operations, 63d MAG, Norton AFB, California. He is a senior pilot and a parachutist. He has published articles in Aerospace Historian, Aerospace Commentary, and Airlift Operations Review. Colonel Cole is a graduate of Armed Forces Staff College and Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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